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SUMMARY 
 
Insurance against Damage caused by Pollution 
 
 
Universally complications exist concerning insurance cover for the risks posed 
by pollution damage. Environmental insurance cover can be procured under 
first-party or third-party insurance. For the latter, the polluter’s statutory or civil 
liability is required. The determination of liability for compensation, especially 
delictual liability, remains problematic. 
 
The right to the environment in section 24 of the Constitution creates a 
general duty of care. The introduction of a strict liability regime can be 
recommended to alleviate the burden of proving fault and contributory 
negligence. Where there is multiple or cumulative causation or the exact 
identity of the polluter is unknown, potential solutions regarding the allocation 
of liability include a pollution-share, joint and several, market-share or, as a 
last resort, a proportional allocation. Actionable damages should include 
property damage, pure economic loss, clean-up costs and natural resource 
damages, including compensation for reduced aesthetic value. 
  
Due to the uncertainty and potential magnitude of pollution-related claims, 
insurers have attempted to avoid or limit these risks by including specific 
pollution exclusion and limitation clauses in policies. Statutory regulation of 
policy content and prescribed wording for clauses could address problems 
relating to the interpretation of policy provisions. 
 
Various other issues such as the coverage of gradual pollution, the effect of 
the various triggers of coverage and the potential long-tail liability of insurer, 
the lack of information and the unpredictability of the risk cause further 
complications for both the insured and the insurer. Policies should preferably 
be issued on a ‘claims-made’ basis linked to retroactive dates. Mandatory 
third-party insurance to the benefit of a third party should be required within 
specific high-risk industries, specifically for the benefit of the prejudiced 
person or an environmental remediation fund. The right of a prejudiced party 
to claim directly from the polluter’s liability insurer should be introduced. 
  
Currently, the focus appears to be more on protection and environmental 
remediation than on civil compensation. There is an urgent need for the 
development of statutory and civil liability compensation mechanisms and for 
an increased regulation of insurance policies and practices to ensure effective 
insurance cover to provide compensation for environmental damage. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
‘Environmentalism is a spiritual responsibility’ 
                 Patriarch Bartholomew I 
                     Eastern Orthodox leader 
 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
 
The one theme that dominates our age is that of the environment. The 
acknowledgement of ecological values has since the 1970s, except for 
unemployment, been on most political agendas.1 Due to various 
environmental catastrophes and the manifestation of environmental damage 
over the past decades, international awareness on the issue and the search 
for solutions has increased profoundly.2 Global warming, as a long-term effect 
of pollution, has become the greatest challenge that the world’s population will 
have to face and overcome in order to survive. The international community 
expects members to adhere to set international environmental standards and 
to accept responsibility for their contribution to pollution damage. 
 
                                            
1 Oil casualties and pesticides were initial concerns in the 1960s, followed by emissions and 
chemical discharges in the 1970s. The depletion of the ozone layer and resulting climate 
change are current issues; for a historical perspective on the increasing environmental 
awareness see Larsson M The Law of Environmental Damage: Liability and Reparation 
(1999) 121 et seq. 
2 For example, the Exxon Valdez, Erika and Prestige oil spills; the Love Canal disaster in 
1980 in the United States of America, where thousands of drums containing a chemical waste 
called dioxins were buried in a landfill site, creating a major health hazard for residents in the 
area; pollution of the Houston Ship Channel by the operations of a refining and chemical plant 
complex by Shell Oil Co; the Bhopal gas leak in India; the increasing awareness of the extent 
of asbestos poisoning causing asbestosis worldwide, especially in South Africa, where the 
latest casualties now even include deaths caused by secondary asbestos pollution in 
Kuruman in the Northern Cape in February 2008; the frequent occurrence of oil fires and gas 
flares in the Niger Delta that causes water and air pollution that in turn affects plant-life, 
causes acid rain and the death of marine life, causes the contamination of fish and produce 
that are then unfit for human consumption in a society that subsists mainly on farming and 
fishing for which the water from the Niger is crucial, and also pushes the affected organisms 
to the brink of extinction. 
 
 
2
The development of the South African economy necessitates an increase in 
hazardous activities that inevitably increases pollution causing environmental 
damage. The interests of the economy and its growth are as a universal 
general rule directly opposed to the interests of the community and the 
interests of the individual.3 Society faces three great challenges, namely 
environmental sustainability, a stable world population and the end of extreme 
poverty. Conflict exists between development at the cost of the environment, 
and protection of the environment at the expense of development. An 
example of this conflict of interests can be found where a property developer 
lawfully exercises his rights to develop urban settlements within a protected 
natural environment, but which have the potential of causing irreversible 
environmental harm.4 Countries attempting to industrialise are confronted with 
the fact that measures to protect the environment are expensive and 
resources are limited.5 The universal goal, however, should for the sake of 
mankind, remain one of sustainable development.6 
 
Where loss, harm or damage to persons and the environment is caused by 
economic activity, public policy dictates that someone should be held liable 
and should be at risk to make good such loss, harm or damage.7 Someone 
has to pay for the damage suffered and for clean-up and restoration costs. 
Polluters and victims usually turn to their insurers for financial reimbursement 
to cover their losses and their liabilities. As will be seen from this study, 
insurers who are confronted with huge pollution damage claims constantly 
attempt to avoid or limit claims brought under their policies. 
 
                                            
3 United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development Our Common Future 
(also known as the ‘Brundlandt Report’) (1987). 
4 This was at issue in the case of Myburgh Park Langebaan (Pty) Ltd v Langebaan 
Municipality and others 2001 4 SA 1144 (C).   
5 Shaw MN International Law (2003) 758. 
6 The Brundtland Report 43 defined the concept; see Larsson 49 n 41 for alternatives to this 
term such as ‘sustainable growth’, as used in most EU documents. 
7 See Winter G “Perspectives for environmental law – entering the fourth phase” 1989 Journal 
for Environmental Law 38 for international recommendations on the importance of finding a 
balance between development and the protection of the environment; for an even earlier 
wake-up call see Rabie MA “The need for adequate environmental law” 1971 (September) De 
Rebus 361. 
 
 
3
To illustrate the potential magnitude of damage, the following serve as recent 
examples of pollution claims. In the United States of America the Massey 
Energy Company, the world’s fourth largest coal producer, was fined $20 
million in January 2008 in the largest ever civil penalty levied for a pollution 
violation, and also has to invest an additional $10 million in pollution control 
improvements.8 In France the oil company Total, in its capacity as a cargo 
owner, was held partly liable together with the ship’s owners for an oil spill on 
the coast of Brittany in 1999. Total was ordered to pay $298 million in 
damages, and fined $550 000 for causing marine pollution.9 The specialty 
chemical company W.R. Grace recently settled asbestos claims for $1.8 
billion.10 Closer to home, claims due to asbestosis and manganism have 
recently escalated.11  
 
 
1.2 EXPOSITION AND PURPOSE OF STUDY 
 
When it comes to social change, the law sometimes leads, sometimes follows 
and in this case mostly trots alongside.12 The law, especially in South Africa, 
has in the past contributed little to the effective protection of the environment, 
and has been lax in setting strict guidelines to hold polluters liable and to 
regulate the payment and funding of clean-up and restoration costs. These 
issues are currently being rapidly addressed.13 Studies and case law in most 
countries expose the limitations of traditional concepts in liability and 
insurance law when it comes to environmental pollution damage claims. 
 
                                            
8 Urbina I “U.S. Fines Mine Owner $20 Million for Pollution” The New York Times 18 January 
2008. 
9 Carvajal D “French Court finds Oil Company Partly Liable for Spill” The New York Times 17 
January 2008. 
10 Huslin A “W.R. Grace to Settle Asbestos Claims for $1.8 Billion, Start New Chapter” The 
Washington Post 16 April 2008. 
11 Lubbe & Four Others v Cape Plc and related appeals 27-7-2000 (House of Lords; Khanyile 
S “Assmang back in hot seat for safety violations” Business Report 21 April 2008 
http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?farticleId=4361612 (last accessed on 21 April 2008). 
12 Waldmeir P “The Freedom to Exclude” The Financial Times 12 April 2003. 
13 See, for example, the establishment of a liability regime for air pollution by the enactment of 
the new National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act 39 of 2004 as examined in 
chap 3 par 3.4.4.10 below. 
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This study aims to identify and investigate complications relating to the 
insurability of pollution-related risks and liabilities. It attempts to propose 
solutions to circumvent these problems and provides recommendations to 
facilitate effective compensation and remediation via the South African 
insurance market. 
 
Initially developing countries direct their focus more at development than at 
protection of the environment, followed by a stage where the focus is primarily 
on protection of the environment and prevention of harm rather than 
advancing development at all cost. This can be seen, for example, by the 
penalties levied in the United States and in France as mentioned in the text 
above. As South Africa is still classified as a developing country, it might not 
do any harm to learn from their experience and to implement protection and 
indemnification measures before it is too late, rather than to steamroller ahead 
with plans for development without first installing efficient liability regimes to 
provide for satisfactory clean-up and restoration of inevitable environmental 
damage, and providing for instruments in the insurance and financial markets 
to facilitate effective compensation. 
 
The modern challenge for the insurance industry in providing cover for claims 
that relate to damage caused by pollution, is that environmental harm is 
currently caused not only by the traditional polluting causes, such as water 
pollution by the release of effluents from factories, seepage from rusted waste 
containers, excessive release of smoke and gases from factories and by the 
illegal ‘midnight dumping’ of waste products, but also by the increased use of 
new technologies and exposure to new risks, that even include the threat of 
environmental terrorism.14 Hacking, for example, has the potential to cause 
enormous environmental damage. In 2001 a hacker broke into the computer 
network of a government-run sewage plant in Queensland, Australia, 
deliberately releasing thousands of litres of raw sewage into public 
                                            
14 For a collaborative study on some of these new risks in a civil liability context see Faure M 
& Neethling J (eds) Aansprakelijkheid, risico en onderneming: Europese en Zuid-Afrikaanse 
perspectieven (2003) (hereinafter ‘Faure & Neethling’).  
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waterways.15 Another major new waste stream is toxic e-waste caused by 
discarded electronic goods, currently comprising more than 5 percent of all 
municipal waste internationally.16 These new hazards place demands on the 
insurance industry that cannot always be met.17 
 
Our law acknowledges various sources of legal obligations between persons. 
Once an obligation exists, rights and duties or liabilities accrue to the parties. 
The insurability of property damaged by pollution, as well as the insurability of 
liability for pollution damage caused, lie at the heart of this study.18 
 
In case of first-party insurance cover, issues relate specifically to the extent of 
the cover provided, and whether the operation of exclusion and limitation 
clauses affects a claim for damages under a specific policy. 
 
As far as third-party or liability insurance is concerned, the issues are far more 
complex. Because an interdependency exists between liability and third-party 
or liability insurance, it is necessary to examine liability regimes before an 
examination of insurability can be launched.19  In this context environmental 
risks have two basic components, namely the policyholder’s obligations to 
clean-up contamination, and his liability to third parties for environmental 
damage caused. Each and every requirement set for delictual liability poses a 
variety of complications in the context of environmental liability. Examples 
include liability for omissions and the legal duty to prevent loss, wrongfulness, 
contributory negligence, multiple and cumulative causation and the nature and 
assessment of actionable damages as well as their apportionment. 
                                            
15 Schenker JL “Look out! Inside that PC! It’s the KILLER WORM!” Time 1 February 2008 61. 
16 See especially chap 3 par 3.4.8 on The Hazardous Substances Act 15 of 1973 that an 
‘electronic product’ is seen as a hazardous substance for which statutory liabilities in terms of 
the Act can be incurred; http://www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports/not-in-our-
backyard (last accessed on 21 February 2008). 
17 Faure M &  Skogh G The Economic Analysis of Environmental Law and Policy (2003) 282; 
for a comprehensive discussion on the new risk posed by toxic mould see Goodman GA 
“Insurance Triggers as Judicial Gatekeepers in Toxic Mold Litigation” 2004 (57) Vanderbilt 
Law Review  241. 
18 Larsson 525 proposes that the complications en problems relating to insurance against 
environmental damage deserves a thesis of its own. 
19 This view is confirmed by Faure M (ed) “Interdependancies Between Liability and 
Insurance” in Tort and Insurance Law Vol 5: Deterrence, Insurability and Compensation in 
Environmental Liability: Future Developments in the European Union (2003) 207. 
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Due to the unique nature of pollution claims, the last years have seen the 
emergence of a new international environmental or toxic tort law.20 In view of 
these trends, chapters 3 and 4 contain a detailed discussion on the South 
African law on constitutional, statutory, and common-law based liability in an 
environmental context. 
 
Insurance claims for environmental damage caused by pollution are different 
from other socially acceptable claims that are generally acknowledged under 
the general principles of insurance, due to the unpredictability of the risks and 
the difficulty in proving liability, as well as the potential of the apocalyptic 
extent of damage that can be caused to the environment and affect the 
quantum of the resulting insurance claims.21 Insurance cover has therefore 
over time often been excluded or limited contractually by various pollution 
exclusion clauses.22 
 
Due to social pressures the insurance industry had to make a serious about-
turn to incorporate and entertain claims for pollution damage. The availability 
of insurance in the market is directly influenced by the probability that a 
specific type of liability may be incurred. As liability for environmental damage 
is rapidly increasing, the demand for effective insurance products has of 
necessity increased as well.23   
 
In a nutshell, the risks of damage and liability, their insurability and the 
availability of effective insurance mechanisms in an environmental context 
form the main thrust of this thesis. 
 
                                            
20 See also Larsson 382 with regard to the global emergence of environmental tort law; also 
on 383 n 840 where she holds the opinion that a parallel between environmental tort law and 
product liability tort law is not far-fetched, and that development in the latter can assist in 
developing the former. This possibility is also considered in this study. 
21 See Spier J “Apocalyptische Scenarios, De prijs van de onzekerheid na de aanslagen in 
the Verenigde Staten op 11 September 2001 en de daarop volgende economische ellende” in 
Faure & Neethling 3, 13; see also Kuschke B “Insurance against damage caused by pollution” 
2000 (3) TSAR 494. 
22 See chap 6 par 6.5 for a detailed discussion on the current issues surrounding the nature 
and effect of pollution exclusion clauses. 
23 As stated by Havenga P “Liability for Environmental Damage” 1995 (7) SA Merc LJ 188.  
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1.3 METHODOLOGY 
 
This study is based on an analysis of local South African legislative and 
common-law legal principles. The problem at hand must be approached and 
examined in the following sequence. 
 
Where environmental pollution damage occurs, one must first determine 
whether the claim falls within the descriptions in law of both the ‘environment’ 
and ‘pollution’ before it becomes possible to determine who is to be held liable 
for the damage or loss. The relevant definitions and descriptions of these 
terms are summarised in Chapter 2. 
 
The following step in the process is to determine the identity of the person 
who is to be held liable for the damage or loss. The first layer of liability for 
damage is statutory liability that is examined in Chapter 3. 
 
The second layer of liability is civil or delictual liability that is examined 
extensively in Chapter 4. 
 
Once the liability of the polluter has been determined, the insurability of the 
damage or loss under first-party insurance cover, and the insurability of the 
liability of the polluter under third-party insurance cover, must be evaluated. 
This is dealt with in Chapter 5.  
 
Chapter 6 contains a study of the universal core issues and autogenous 
complications relating to pollution damage liability and the insurability against 
pollution damage. 
 
A comparative study to determine whether answers can be found in other 
jurisdictions in an attempt to address the shortcomings in our national system 
follows in Chapter 7. The jurisdictions decided upon were the United 
Kingdom, The Netherlands, Belgium and finally the United States of America, 
with specific focus on its federal law. 
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The United Kingdom was chosen because of the long liaison South Africa has 
had with its counterpart in the development of insurance law.24 The 
development in the United Kingdom of a specialised toxic tort law may prove 
to be informative for the extension of our own law of delict in the context of 
pollution damage liability. 
 
The Netherlands and Belgium were chosen because of the Roman-Dutch 
roots that their law shares with South African law, and because these two 
countries have been at the forefront of intensive study and legal innovation in 
an attempt to accommodate pollution liability claims and to develop effective 
compensation mechanisms. 
 
The United States of America offers a contribution to the study due to the 
implementation of its statutory fund solution that provides for the recovery of 
environmental clean-up and restoration costs. As the position in many of the 
states have merit and the problems are universal, no single state could be 
singled out for purposes of the study. 
 
As some of the issues are multi-dimensional, they cannot be addressed 
comprehensively in the scope of a single chapter and are therefore addressed 
in various chapters. Liability for causing prospective loss, and the assessment 
as well as the insurability of prospective loss that are discussed in various 
chapters, serve as an example.  
 
The final conclusion and recommendations for South African law follow in 
chapter 8. 
 
1.4 DELIMITATION OF SCOPE 
 
The following aspects are limited or excluded from the scope of this thesis: 
 
                                            
24 Reinecke MFB, Van der Merwe S, Van Niekerk JP & Havenga P General Principles of 
Insurance Law (2002) par 26. 
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1.4.1 environmental pollution that causes damage or loss remains the main 
focus of the study, and it is not extended to also include product liability 
for damage unless the principles of the latter inform the former; 
1.4.2 the study does not cover damage caused by natural catastrophes; 
1.4.3 the study focuses primarily on liability for private and public property 
damage and not on personal injuries; 
1.4.4 the heavily regulated international liability regimes that apply to marine 
pollution, oil pollution, waste disposal and the nuclear industry regimes 
are not examined extensively and are discussed as briefly as possible 
in order to serve the purpose of this study; 
1.4.5 a lengthy discussion on the liability of states is not within the scope of 
the thesis unless it is of relevance to a specific insurable liability; 
1.4.6 criminal liability for pollution damage falls beyond the scope of the 
study; 
1.4.7 the study includes only a limited discussion of contractual liability as 
most of the issues relate to extra-contractual liability; 
1.4.8 transboundary pollution and transboundary liability regimes are, due to 
their specialised and extensive nature, not considered in great detail; 
1.4.9 alternatives to insurance, for example specialised financial instruments 
such as contractual warranties or guarantees and non-compliance 
fines, governmental compensation funds or other risk-sharing 
alternatives are also beyond the scope of the study. 
 
Very little South African case law exists specifically on matters relating to 
environmental insurance litigation, whereas the body of case law in respect of 
delictual liability and insurance in general is extensive. As far as possible, only 
Supreme Court of Appeal and Constitutional Court case law and legislation 
dealing with liability issues and insurance matters relevant to environmental or 
pollution issues were used as reference. 
 
I have attempted to state the law as at 1 September 2008. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
DEFINING THE ENVIRONMENT AND POLLUTION 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
It remains uncertain what the exact definitions or descriptions of the terms 
‘environment’, ‘pollution’ and related ‘damage’ actually are, as the possibilities 
are non-exhaustive.1 One must at least attempt to complete a process of 
‘terminological disentanglement’2 in order to effectively address the liability for 
and the insurability of the inevitable changes to the environment brought 
about by polluting activities. 
 
Whereas the environment was in the past simply divided by its three classical 
components namely land, water and air,3 the modern approach is to view the 
environment holistically from a multi-media perspective.4 In international law 
                                            
1 As can be seen from the various possibilities discussed in this chapter, and in the words of 
Fuggle RF & Rabie MA Environmental Management in South Africa (1999) 83 ‘Many writers 
who discuss environmental issues do not even attempt to define the term “environment”.’ This 
does appear to be the safest approach rather than getting caught up in the quagmire of 
attempting to formulate the perfect description; Glazewski J Environmental Law in South 
Africa (2005) 9 holds the same opinion. For an international perspective on the problems 
regarding the formulation of a general definition of ‘environmental damage’ see Carette A 
Herstel en vergoeding voor aantasting aan niet-toegeeigende milieubestanddelen (1997) 70; 
Faure M (ed) Tort and Insurance Law Vol 5: Deterrence, Insurability and Compensation in 
Environmental Liability: Future Developments in the European Union (2003) (hereinafter 
‘Faure (ed)’) 133. 
2 In the words of Winter G, Jans JH, Macrory R & Kramer L “Weighing up the EC 
Environmental Liability Directive” 2008 (June) Journal of Environmental Law 163 166 who 
confirm and advocate the necessity of defining important terms in a context of pollution 
liability. 
3 The lithosphere (the sphere of soils and rocks), the hydrosphere (the sphere of water) and 
the atmosphere (the sphere of the air) as described in http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Ecological (accessed on 28 August 2006). 
4 See in general Henderson Environmental Laws of South Africa Vol 1 (1999) xvii; see also 
the discussion in Fuggle & Rabie 83 et seq; see some statutory definitions provided in 
international legislation, for example s 1 of the Environmental Protection Act of 1990 of the 
United Kingdom that defines environment as consisting of ‘all, or any of the following media, 
namely the air, water and land’; the Australian Environment Protection Act 1973 for Tasmania 
defines the environment in s 2(1) as ‘the land, water and atmosphere of the earth’; see the 
criticism by Kidd M Environmental Law, A South African guide (2008) 2 that these definitions 
exclude any organisms and only refer to the physical environment. This approach does offer 
Footnote continues on the next page. 
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parallel regimes address various topics in international law, which requires the 
environment to be sectorally divided concerning the protection of different 
environmental components such as wildlife, water and the marine 
environment, air and climate and natural resources, and also transectorally as 
regards the factors that impact on the environmental components. These 
include, for example, waste, hazardous substances, genetically manipulated 
material, biotechnology and energy. The latter includes nuclear energy and 
nuclear technology.5 
 
Before 1970 the term ‘environment’ was virtually unknown as a specific legal 
term.6 The need to find an agreeable standard description and meaning of the 
term was brought forward by the need for a general comprehensive 
environmental policy, for the integration of environmental management and 
for compulsory environmental impact studies as required in our law.7 As will 
be seen from the discussion in this chapter, finding a single acceptable 
definition for the ‘environment’ proves to be a challenge.8 
 
Fuggle and Rabie state that one should not focus on the individual 
components of the environment, but rather ‘centre one’s attention on the 
concept of the environment as a whole’.9 They identify the environment as 
                                            
the benefit that it includes the natural environment as well as any human modifications made 
to the natural environment. 
5 See in general Larsson M The Law of Environmental Damage: Liability and Reparation 
(1999) 61, 122; and also the recent extensive work of De Ketelaere D (ed) Handboek Milieu- 
en Energierecht (2006) on environmental law in general as well as on the emerging field of 
energy law.  
6 According to Fuggle & Rabie 83. 
7 This led to the Green Paper for Public Discussion: An Environmental Policy for South Africa 
dated, October 1996 that provided a basis for developing an environmental policy; The White 
Paper on Environmental Management Policy for South Africa dated May 1998 that set out the 
government’s national policy, culminating in the National Environmental Management Act 107 
of 1998. 
8 Glazewski 9 confirms that there cannot be one single obvious definition of the environment; 
Fuggle and Rabie 92 concur by saying that ‘what is to be regarded as the environment 
seems, in the final analysis, to be a policy question upon which opinions may differ’; Larsson 
154 considers all the apparently futile attempts to find a universally acceptable definition. 
9 Fuggle & Rabie 83; see also Kidd 3 who is of the opinion that the definition provided in the 
Local Government (Planning and Environment) Act of 1990 for Queensland, Australia is 
probably closer to the meaning one seeks. This definition for the environment in s 2(1) 
includes ‘(a) ecosystems and their constituent parts including people and communities; (b) all 
natural and physical resources; (c) those qualities and characteristics of locations, places and 
areas, however large or small, which contribute to their biological diversity and integrity, 
Footnote continues on the next page. 
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‘the earth’s natural resources, both renewable and non-renewable’.10 Einstein 
is reported to have said that ‘the environment is everything that is not me’,11 
which is the simplest yet apparently a most effective description. 
 
As stated in the White Paper on Environmental Management in South Africa, 
the environment means different things to different people.12 The environment 
also means different things in the context within which the term is used.13 As 
various statutes cover different scopes and different mediums within the 
general environment, it remains practical to provide a definition within each 
specialised statute that focuses only on those elements of the environment 
covered by that particular piece of legislation, rather than to attempt to 
formulate a single definition that applies to them all. The existing statutory 
definitions of the ‘environment’ and its related concepts and of ‘pollution’ and 
its related concepts vary enormously, as will be seen from the discussion on 
the various statutes below. The exact scope of the entire field of 
environmental law in general also remains uncertain, as it appears to cover 
any aspect that relates to or interacts with the environment.14  In the words of 
Bray, ‘[t]he term ‘environment’ is not static but evolving: it may differ from 
country to country and over time, depending to a large extent on policy 
decisions and people’s perceptions’.15 
 
There is of course still merit for the point of view that one should attempt to 
enact a standard definition within the sphere of general environmental law, to 
                                            
intrinsic or attributed scientific value or interest, amenity, harmony and a sense of community; 
and (d) the social, economic, aesthetic and cultural conditions which affect the matters 
referred to in pars (a), (b) and (c) or which are affected by those matters’. 
10 Fuggle & Rabie 90; see also par 2.2.5.2 for a further reference to the views of these 
authors. 
11 As quoted by Ball S & Bell S Environmental Law:The Law and Policy relating to the 
Protection of the Environment (1994) 4. 
12 White Paper on the Environmental Management Policy for South Africa published in the 
Government Gazette No 18894 on15 May 1998 9. 
13 Glazewski 9 divides general environmental law into three inter-related areas of general 
concern, namely land-use planning and development, resource conservation and utilisation, 
and waste management and pollution control. 
14 This view is reiterated by Fuggle & Rabie 83 et seq; see also Glazewski 9, 11 and Kidd 1, 4 
for similar views. 
15 Bray E “Public participation in environmental law” 2003 (10) SA Public Law Journal 121 
(hereinafter ‘Bray (2003)’). 
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serve as a default definition where no suitable alternative is available. The 
definitions found in NEMA and in the ECA as discussed below attempt to 
serve this purpose.  
 
Other definitions are found in various statutes, bills, white and green papers, 
academic publications and textbooks, both national and international.16 For 
the purposes of this thesis, the national descriptions and definitions of both 
the ‘environment’ and ‘pollution’ are dealt with extensively. As the Constitution 
calls upon courts to regard public international law, including international 
environmental law and applicable international conventions signed, agreed or 
acceded to, to form part of our law,17 brief references to a few generalised 
descriptions from foreign jurisdictions are included in this chapter where 
applicable.18 
 
The same applies when attempting to define the terms ‘pollution’ and 
‘damage’.19 Various attempts have been made to provide general definitions 
or descriptions of what ‘pollution’ and ‘pollution damage’ in an environmental 
context actually are.20 Most works on environmental law do not necessarily 
cover all aspects of pollution, defilement, environmental harm or damage, the 
production and dumping of waste into the environment, or aspects relating to 
the ensuing liability and the duty to clean-up. The descriptions of the term 
‘pollution’ and of its related concepts are therefore sought in more general 
works unless a specific source, such as a statute, provides a specialised 
description.21 
 
                                            
16 Sands 15 et seq provides a variety of versions found in international sources. 
17 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (hereinafter ‘the Constitution’) s 25. 
18 See par 2.2.5.3, par 2.3.5.2 below. 
19 The extent of the term ‘damage’ is considered extensively  in the text on liability issues as 
examined in chap 4 par 4.2.6 and specifically with regards to interpretation in chap 6 par 6.5 
and par 6.6.2 below; see also specifically on issues of insurability in chap 5 par 5.3.2.3.4 
below. 
20 See the discussions on the extent of the term ‘pollution damage’ in par 2.3 below; and in 
chap 5 par 5.3.2 and chap 6 par 6.5.6 in the text below on its application in the context of 
insurance; see in this regard Glazewski 9, and also 10 where he provides a brief explanation 
of the distinction between ‘brown’ issues that deal with the negative side of resource 
development, such as pollution and waste control, and ‘green’ issues relating to resource 
utilisation. 
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2.2 DEFINING ‘THE ENVIRONMENT’ 
 
2.2.1 General 
 
For a simple definition of the term, in a narrow sense, the starting point would 
logically be to refer to the basic meanings allocated to the term ‘environment’ 
in various dictionaries. ‘Although dictionaries are helpful insofar as they set 
forth the ordinary, usual meanings of words, they are imperfect yardsticks of 
ambiguity. By their very nature, dictionaries define words in the abstract, and 
must always be viewed in context.’22 The definitions found in statutes then 
follow, which are more specialised and aim to focus on the subject matter of 
the specific legislation. Related concepts are briefly discussed,23  followed by 
the view, criticisms and proposals made by writers on the subject. 
 
2.2.2 Dictionaries 
 
2.2.2.1 The Concise Oxford Dictionary24 
 
The ‘environment’ is defined in this general dictionary as ‘the surroundings or 
conditions in which a person, animal or plant lives and operates. The natural 
world, especially as affected by human activity’.25 
 
The first part of this definition sees the environment as that surrounding a 
person, animal or plant, and not as including these things.26 Harm or damage 
done directly to an animal or plant, and not merely to its environment, will 
therefore not be seen as damage to the environment. This is a very limited 
                                            
21 See the discussion in par 2.3.3 below. 
22 These meanings found in dictionaries must be viewed in context as was stated in the case 
of New Castle County v Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company 933 F.2d 1192 (3d 
Cir.1991) 1193.  
23 Such as the brief discussion on the meaning of the term ‘ecology’ in par 2.2.4.1 in the text 
below, that is often used as a synonym for the ‘environment’. 
24 Pearsall (ed) The Concise Oxford Dictionary (1999). 
25 The Concise Oxford Dictionary 477. 
26 See also in this regard Urdang (ed) The Oxford Thesaurus (1991) 125 where synonyms for 
the environment are listed as ‘surroundings, environs, atmosphere, ecosystem, conditions, 
habitat, circumstances, medium, milieu, territory, locale, setting, mise en scene, situation’. 
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viewpoint and does not offer a satisfactory definition to cover what modern 
man sees as environmental pollution or damage. 
 
The second part of this definition refers to the natural world, which is the 
description of the ‘environment’ in terms of the limited approach as discussed 
by Fuggle and Rabie.27 The criticism that can be levelled against the limited 
approach is briefly that it does not include the built environment or the 
environment as changed or modified by humans, and thus narrows the scope 
only to what we understand the classical concept of ‘nature’ to be.28  
 
2.2.2.2 Black’s Law Dictionary29 
 
The ‘environment’ is defined as ‘the totality of physical, economic, cultural, 
aesthetic and social circumstances and factors which surround and affect the 
desirability and value of property and which also affect the quality of people’s 
lives’.30 
 
This definition follows the extensive approach and is therefore far broader 
than the previous one, yet refers only to property in general and to the quality 
of people’s lives. Defilement of nature that does not directly detract from or 
affect the quality of people’s lives will not be covered by this definition even if 
the specific aspects of nature are seen as property that is reduced in 
desirability or value.  
 
                                            
27 See Fuggle & Rabie 86 et seq. 
28 ‘Nature’ is defined in The Concise Oxford Dictionary 950 as ‘the phenomena of the physical 
world collectively, including plants, animals, and the landscape, as opposed to humans and 
human creations; the physical force regarded as causing and regulating these phenomena’; 
Fuggle & Rabie 84 describe the natural environment as ‘in a strict sense the natural world in 
its pure state, but more generally regarded as referring to renewable and non-renewable 
natural resources such as air, water, soil, plants, animals etc’. One can also note here that 
genetically modified organisms would, under this definition, not fall under the description of 
the ‘environment’ as they have been changed from their pure state through human 
modification to something deemed to be ‘unnatural’. 
29 Garner (ed) Black’s Law Dictionary (1990). 
30 Black’s Law Dictionary 534. 
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The term ‘property’ is defined as ‘that which is peculiar or proper to any  
person, that which belongs exclusively to one. In the strict legal sense, it is the 
aggregate of rights which are guaranteed and protected by the government. 
The term is said to ‘extend to every species of valuable right and interest’.31 
As everyone has the right to a clean and healthy environment in terms of the 
Constitution,32 this right is also included in the specific description of the 
concept of ‘property’ found above. 
 
Fuggle and Rabie on the other hand criticize the use of the term ‘environment’ 
as a synonym for words such as ‘circumstances’, ‘milieu’ or ‘situation’, as they 
hold the view that the intention should be not to refer to an interrelationship 
but merely to a context or circumambience.33 This is in accordance with the 
view of Garner who refers in the definition provided to the environment merely 
as the circumstances and factors that surround property and people, yet also 
prefers not to include the interrelationship between them.34 
 
2.2.2.3 Webster’s Dictionary35 
 
The ‘environment’ is described as ‘the entire surroundings of an organism, 
and for man also the totality of his natural and culturally altered living space’.36 
 
Once again an extensive approach is followed, as only that which surrounds 
an organism, and not the organism itself, falls within the scope of the 
‘environment’ in terms of the first part of the definition. Under the second part, 
all things surrounding man, that would by implication include all living 
organisms as well, are covered. Man himself does not, in terms of this 
definition, form part of the environment. Although this is an older definition as 
                                            
31 Black’s Law Dictionary 1216. 
32 The Constitution s 24. 
33 Fuggle & Rabie 4; see also the discussion of the viewpoints of various authors in par 
2.2.5.2 of the text below. 
34 As the editor of Black’s Law Dictionary.  
35 Gove PB (ed) Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 
(1961). 
36 As quoted by Fuggle & Rabie 84 from Gove above. 
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it is a pre-1970s attempt to define the term ‘environment’, it is still quoted with 
approval in view of the scope of this study.37 
 
2.2.2.4 http://www.wikipedia.com 
 
The general definition in this popular layman’s electronic dictionary describes 
‘the environment’ as ‘a complex of surrounding circumstances, conditions or 
influences in which a thing is situated or developed, or in which a person or 
organism lives, modifying its life or character’.38 ‘The ‘environment of an 
organism’ is described as ‘including both physical properties, which can be 
described as the sum of local abiotic factors39 such as solar insulation, climate 
and geology, as well as other organisms that share its habitat’. Lastly it also 
states that ‘in biology, ecology40 and environmental science, an environment 
is the complex of physical, chemical, and biotic factors that surround and act 
upon an organism or ecosystem’.41 
 
2.2.3 National Statutory Definitions 
 
2.2.3.1 General introduction 
 
As is shown below, a multitude of statutes apply and refer to situations 
relating to the management of the environment and ecological issues, as well 
as to environmental pollution and degradation. 
 
                                            
37 See especially the conclusion below that for purpose of this study, man cannot be included 
as part of the environment, as this would have the effect that where one person’s conduct 
directly injures another, it would also constitute an environmental injury. The scope of this 
work requires a person’s conduct to directly damage the environment, which then indirectly 
causes harm or loss to another person. 
38 http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki.Environment (last accessed on 6 September 2006). 
39 ‘Abiotic factors are the non-living factors of the earth which affect the ability of living 
organisms to survive in an environment, and includes both physical and chemical factors’, for 
example soil, weather, the availability of consumable water, the amount of sunlight and 
natural disasters’ http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki.Abiotic (last accessed on 11 September 
2006). 
40 Par 2.2.4.1. 
41 N 36 above. 
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Although the National Environmental Management Act42 functions as the 
general statute on environmental matters, and its definitions are referred to as 
authoritative in various other statutes, the focus of some of the statutes 
discussed below is of such a specialised nature that a specialised definition 
for the purpose of these Acts is required, and consequently provided. Key 
environmental legislation, namely the Constitution, the National Environmental 
Management Act and the Environmental Conservation Act43 are discussed 
first, followed by the other relevant statutes in alphabetical order. 
 
2.2.3.2 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
 
2.2.3.2.1 Section 24: the right to the environment 
 
The right to the environment is dealt with specifically in section 24 of the 
Constitution,44 which reads as follows: ‘Everyone has the right to an 
environment that is not harmful to their health and well-being; have the 
environment protected for the benefit of present and future generations 
through reasonable legislative and other measures that: prevent pollution and 
ecological degradation; promote conservation; secure ecologically sustainable 
development and use of natural resources, while promoting justifiable 
economic and social development.’ 
 
This section refers to the terms ‘environment’, to ‘ecology’ as well as to 
‘natural resources’. As far as the latter term is concerned, one could deduce 
from only the words used, and the context within which they are used,45 that it 
refers to the ‘natural environment’ as part of the greater ‘environment’ as a 
                                            
42 As discussed in par 2.2.3.3 in the text below. 
43 The Environment Conservation Act as discussed in par 2.2.3.4 below. 
44 See chap 3 par 3.2 for a comprehensive discussion of the scope and effect of this section 
of the Constitution on statutory liability. 
45 As it is in a subparagraph that falls within the description of ‘environment’ in the main body 
of s 24, and is in the subparagraph specifically linked to the rest of the provision that refers to 
the ‘ecologically sustainable development and use’ of said natural resources. 
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whole.46 No definitions for these terms are specifically provided elsewhere in 
the Constitution.47 
 
2.2.3.2.2 Scope of terminology used in section 24 
 
The Constitution has made it difficult to achieve full integration of 
environmental laws, as it provides for functional areas of concurrent national 
and provincial legislative competence, functional areas of exclusive provincial 
legislative competence, and some competence allocated to local authorities.48  
 
Schedule 4 Part A of the Constitution lists the functional areas of concurrent 
national and provincial legislative competence, under which are found the 
Environment and Pollution Control, as well as Nature and Soil Conservation 
and Health Services. 
 
Under Part B the matters provided for on local government level include air 
pollution, water, sanitation services, wastewater and sewage disposal 
systems, and aspects relating to pontoons, ferries, jetties, piers and 
harbours.49 Schedule 5 of Part B refers to local matters that include cleansing, 
control of public nuisances, noise pollution, refuse removal, refuse dumps and 
solid waste disposal. 
 
The application of section 24 is therefore extensive and its terminology must 
be interpreted as broadly as possible to accommodate all the issues that it 
addresses. National as well as provincial legislation cover these aspects and 
various statutes contain specific definitions for, or refer to, the ‘environment’. 
For the purposes of this thesis only the definitions provided in national 
statutes are examined. 
 
                                            
46 See the examination of the scope of ‘natural resources’ in n 26 above, and in chap 6 par 
6.6.2.5 on the description of ‘natural resource damage’.  
47 See the examination of the scope of ‘natural resources’ in n 26 above, and in chap 6 par 
6.6.2.5 on the description of ‘natural resource damage’.  
48 See in general the discussion by Henderson 1-4. 
49 S 155(6)(a), s 155(7). 
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2.2.3.2.3 Interpretation 
 
In accordance with s 39(2) of the Constitution any legislation or legislative 
provisions must be interpreted in line with the spirit, purports and objects of 
the Bill of Rights. This would require any interpretation of statutory or other 
relevant wording that gives effect to the environmental right as contained in 
the Constitution, to be in accordance with the purpose that the right to the 
environment serves.50 
 
2.2.3.3 National Environmental Management Act51 
 
2.2.3.3.1 Terminology in the Process preceding NEMA 
 
The Act is a legislative measure as contemplated by section 24(b) of the 
Constitution,52 and was preceded by extensive discussions over many years. 
Prior to the enactment of NEMA, various reports by the Planning Committees 
of the President’s Council on nature conservation in South Africa were issued, 
each containing a different definition of what the term ‘nature’ entails.53 The 
Green Paper and the White Paper followed.54  
                                            
50 MEC: Department of Agriculture, Conservation and the Environment Dr ST Cornelius v HTF 
Developers (Pty) Ltd Case nr CCT 32/07 [2007] ZACC 25 par 10. 
51 Act 107 of 1998 (hereinafter referred to as ‘NEMA’). 
52 Par 2.2.3.2.1 above. 
53 In the Report of the Planning Committee of the President’s Council on priorities between 
conservation and development PC 5/1984 par 3.1 it was described as ‘all living and therefore 
renewable natural resources’; in the Report of the Planning Committee on nature 
conservation in South Africa PC 2/1984 par 2.1 it was provided that in a broader sense it 
would also have to include ‘non-renewable natural resources, such as landscapes, natural 
phenomena such as habitats, as well as biological organisms and communities’; in the Report 
of the Planning Committee on nature conservation in South Africa par 4.1.1.1 it was stated 
that in the broadest sense it would include ‘the works of man that are of lasting cultural value 
and that serve to enhance the quality of the environment’. The last attempt at a description in 
these reports provides that the environment is ‘the aggregate of physical, biological and 
cultural conditions affecting the life of an individual human being or the community’ as found 
in the Report of the three committees of the President’s Council on a national environmental 
management system PC 1/1991 par 1.3.2. 
54 Green Paper 4 on the process preceding the Paper; in the Green Paper: http://www. 
gov.za/ greenpaper/1996/environmental.htm the ‘environment’ was described as including 
‘many things, the land, water and air, all plants, animals and microscopic forms of life on 
Earth, the built environment and our social, economic, political and cultural activities that form 
part of everyday life. The ‘environment’ is further described as ‘embracing the conditions 
and/or influences under which any individual or thing exists, lives or develops. These include 
the following categories of conditions or influences: the natural environment including 
Footnote continues on the next page. 
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2.2.3.3.2 Definition in NEMA 
 
‘Environment’ was subsequently defined in NEMA as  
‘the surroundings within which humans exist and that are made up of – the 
land, water and atmosphere of the earth; micro-organisms, plant and animal 
life; any part or combination of (i) and (ii) and the interrelationship among and 
between them; and the physical, chemical, aesthetic and cultural properties 
and conditions of the foregoing that influence human health and well-being’.55 
The health of organisms other than humans is not mentioned. Although other 
organisms are seen as part of the surroundings within which humans exist, 
the health of these organisms is not included per se. It appears that the 
relevance of their health will only fall within the ambit of the ‘environment’ if it 
directly influences human health and well-being. 
 
2.2.3.3.3 Legislation enacted in terms of NEMA 
 
Legislation that will be enacted in accordance with the provisions of NEMA will 
usually in the definitions clause merely provide that ‘environment’ has the 
meaning assigned to it in section 1 of the National Environmental 
Management Act.56 It is therefore clear that NEMA will, as a general rule and  
                                            
renewable and non-renewable natural resources such as air, water, land and all forms of life; 
the social, political, cultural, economic and working conditions that affect the nature of an 
individual or community; and natural and man-made spatial surroundings, including urban and 
rural landscapes and ecosystems and those qualities that contribute to their value’. In the 
White Paper 9, the word ‘environment’ refers to ‘the biosphere in which people and other 
organisms live. It consists of renewable and non-renewable natural resources such as air, 
water (fresh and marine), land and all forms of life; natural ecosystems and habitats; and 
ecosystems, habitats and spatial surroundings modified or constructed by people, including 
urbanised areas, agricultural and rural landscapes, places of cultural significance and the 
qualities that contribute to their value’. It is also stated that ‘people are part of the environment 
and are at the centre of concerns for its sustainability’. It appears as if people were not 
included under the first description provided in Green Paper, yet were included as ‘all forms of 
life’, whereas people were specifically included in the White Paper. See the conclusion in par 
2.4 where criticism is levelled against the inclusion of people in terms of a broad definition, as 
the injury of a person would then be included as harm or damage to the environment. 
55 NEMA s 1 item 11; see also Verulam Fuel Distributors CC v Truck and General Insurance 
Co Ltd and another 2005 1 SA 70 (W) 71, 73 where reference is made to ‘pollution and 
ecological damage’. 
56 See, for example, the recent National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act as 
examined in par 2.2.3.10, and The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Act as examined in par 
2.2.3.9 below. 
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unless an express alternative description is required and provided, provide the 
default or overall umbrella definition for all subsequent legislation proposed or 
enacted in terms of NEMA. 
 
2.2.3.4 Environment Conservation Act57 
 
2.2.3.4.1 Definition in the ECA 
 
This Act preceded NEMA and was the first in South Africa that attempted to 
define the term ‘environment’. It is defined as meaning ‘the aggregate of 
surrounding objects, conditions and influences that influence the life and 
habits of man or any other organism or collection of organisms’.58 It is 
important to note that this definition was not replaced or substituted by the 
subsequent definition in NEMA. 
 
2.2.3.4.2 Extended scope of the ECA 
 
The purpose of the ECA is ‘to promote the preservation of ecological 
processes, natural systems, natural beauty or species of indigenous wildlife or 
the preservation of biotic diversity in general’.59 This serves as an extension of 
the definition provided for in the term ‘environment’, and extends the basic 
concept to include an organism (therefore including man) as well. 
 
Under the preamble to the General Policy enacted in terms of the ECA,60 
every inhabitant of the Republic of South Africa has the right to live, work and 
relax in a safe, productive, healthy and aesthetically and culturally acceptable 
environment and therefore also has a personal responsibility to respect the 
same right of his fellow man.61 
 
                                            
57 Act 73 of 1989 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the ECA’). 
58 The ECA s 1 item 13. 
59 The ECA Part III s 16(1)(a). 
60 Enacted in accordance with s 2(1) of the ECA in GN 51 of the Government Gazette 15428 
of 21 January 1994. 
61 Bullet 1 of the Preamble. 
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The preamble further provides that every generation also has the duty to act 
as a trustee of its natural environment and cultural heritage in the interest of 
succeeding generations.62 In addition, the preamble provides that the State, 
every person and every legal entity has a responsibility to consider all 
activities that may have an influence on the environment duly and to take all 
reasonable steps to promote the protection, maintenance and improvement of 
both the natural and the human living environment.63 
 
Irrespective of the formal definitions found in the ECA, various other terms 
were used in the preamble, such as ‘natural environment’, ‘cultural heritage’ 
and ‘human living environment’. The broad description of the latter would 
include the spatial or built environment and all other environments included if 
the extensive approach is followed. In the Policy itself reference is also made 
to the urban environment.64 If all provisions of the ECA together with its 
Regulations and the General Policy are read together, it becomes clear that a 
very broad and extensive approach is followed with respect to what the 
‘environment’ for purposes of this Act entails. 
 
In terms of the ECA a certain area may also be declared as a ‘protected 
natural environment’.65 The fact that the environment can specifically be 
classified as a protected natural environment in section 16(1) leads one to the 
conclusion that the environment in general then, in terms of the ECA, also 
includes man-made buildings and other structures above and beyond nature66 
as we know it.67  
 
                                            
62 Bullet 2 of the Preamble. 
63 Bullet 4 of the Preamble. 
64 Under the heading ‘The Urban Environment’. 
65 The ECA s 16(1); in s 1 item 24 the term ‘protected natural environment’ is not defined but 
reference is merely made of s 16(1) regarding the declaration of an area as such; see also s 
44(2) of the ECA as well as reg 2.2 of the regulations issued in terms of the ECA. 
66 See the reference to the definitions and descriptions of ‘nature’ and the ‘natural 
environment’ referred to in n 26, n 50 and n 51 above. 
67 See also the Declaration 1 of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
Stockholm June 1972 (A/CONF 48/14) that ‘[b]oth aspects of man’s environment, the natural 
and the man-made, are essential to his well-being and to the enjoyment of basic human rights 
– even the right to life itself’. 
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As stated, the earlier version of the definition contained in the ECA has not 
been repealed and replaced by the later definition provided in the NEMA.68 
Two distinct definitions therefore pertain to a single term as far as the scope 
and focus of the two statutes are concerned.69 Whereas the definition in 
NEMA is more often used as the default definition,70 some statutes such as 
the Development Facilitation Act below refer to the ECA definition as the 
default definition.71 
 
2.2.3.5 Development Facilitation Act72 
 
‘Environment’ is merely defined ‘as described in section 1 of the ECA’.73 
 
2.2.3.6 Genetically Modified Organisms Act74 
 
‘Environment’ in this Act is very broadly defined as ‘the aggregate of 
surrounding objects, conditions and influences that influence the life and 
habits of man or any other organism or organisms’.75 Upon inspection it is 
clearly an abbreviated form of the definition as found in the ECA above. 
 
One can argue that due to the unknown new risks posed by the effects of 
genetic engineering, the scope of the environment that is potentially at risk 
has to be as extensive as possible, rather than restricted by statute, and that 
this definition serves this purpose. Because of the great uncertainties that 
exist  worldwide regarding the extent and effect of genetic manipulation, this 
has become one of the most rapidly developing areas in law, and statutory 
control will have to be maintained and implemented to keep track with 
developments.   
                                            
68 Par 2.2.3.3 in the text above. 
69 See in this regard Glazewski 9. 
70 For example, in The National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act as examined in 
par 2.2.3.10 below. 
71 See par 2.2.3.5 below. 
72 Act 67 of 1995. 
73 S 1 item 8. 
74 Act 15 of 1997. 
75 S 1(x). 
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2.2.3.7 Marine Pollution (Control and Civil Liability) Act76 
 
It is interesting to note that ‘environment’, ‘marine environment’ and ‘pollution’ 
are not defined in this Act, even though the words are used in the paragraph 
on the objects of the Act. The objects of the Act are to provide for the 
protection of the marine environment from pollution by oil and other harmful 
substances, and to provide for the prevention of and to combat such 
pollution.77 
 
2.2.3.8 Maritime Zones Act78 
 
For purposes of this thesis it is important to discuss the extent of the South 
African environment as well. Obviously the land within our physical borders 
fall within the South African environment and is therefore subject to the 
national legislation discussed in this chapter. Difficulties arise with the 
determination of the extent of the South African environment as far as the sea 
and other inland waters are concerned. It is therefore necessary to conduct a 
brief examination of statutes that determine the extent of our territorial waters. 
 
In this Act only the concept of ‘internal waters’ is defined as ‘all waters 
landward of the baseline, and all harbours’.79 The baseline is defined as ‘the 
low-water line, as modified by straight lines adjoining certain grouped co-
ordinates described in the Schedule to the Act’.80 The low-water line is then 
defined as ‘the intersection of the low-water tidal plain with the land and 
includes the low-water line on a low-tide elevation’.81 Low-tide elevation is 
defined as ‘a naturally formed area which is surrounded by water and which is 
above water at low-tide, but submerged at high tide and situated within a 
                                            
76 Act 6 of 1981. 
77 The Preamble to the Act. 
78 Act 15 of 1994. 
79 S 3(1). 
80 S 2. 
81 S 1 item 5. 
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distance of not more than 12 nautical miles from the low-water line of the 
mainland or of an island’.82 
 
The territorial waters of the Republic of South Africa are described in section 4 
as ‘the sea within a distance of 12 nautical miles from the baselines’. In terms 
of the Act the common and any other law in force applies to both inland and 
territorial waters.83 
 
The powers of government have been extended in terms of this statute to 
areas beyond the territorial waters to an area known as the contiguous 
zone.84 The contiguous zone covers the area at sea 24 nautical miles from the 
baselines.85 Even though it is strictly speaking beyond the borders of the 
Republic, the Republic has the right to enforce any sanitary law86and to 
punish any contravention thereof.87 
 
2.2.3.9 Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act88 
 
The ‘environment’ is described merely ‘as defined in section 1 of the NEMA’.89 
 
2.2.3.10 National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act90 
 
In this Act the term ‘environment’ enjoys the meaning assigned to it in the 
definition found in the NEMA.91 
 
 
 
                                            
82 S 1 item 3. 
83 S 3(2), s 4(2). 
84 S 4. 
85 S 5(1). 
86 As well as any customs, emigration and immigration laws. 
87 S 5(2). 
88 Act 28 of 2002. 
89 S 1 item 13. 
90 Act 39 of 2004. 
91 S 1, see also par 2.2.3.3. 
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2.2.3.11 National Forests Act92 
 
The term ‘ecosystem’ is mentioned in a variety of other statutes. This term is 
specifically defined in the National Forests Act as ‘a system made up of a 
group of living organisms, the relationship between them and their physical 
environment’.93 The environment is not specifically defined in this Act. 
 
2.2.3.12 National Heritage Resources Act94 
 
It should be mentioned that the definitions of the ‘environment’ found in other 
statutes95 are broad enough also, upon interpretation, to include our cultural 
resources as part of the comprehensive definition of the ‘environment’ that 
they provide.96 For this reason, and also because it is classified as an 
environmental statute, a brief examination of this Act is required. 
 
This Act only contains a definition of ‘heritage resource’97 that briefly 
describes such a resource as any place or object of cultural significance. This 
is then defined as ‘aesthetic, architectural, historical, scientific, social, 
spiritual, linguistic or technological value or significance’.98 
 
‘Living heritage’ is also defined in the Act as ‘the intangible aspects of 
inherited culture, and may include cultural tradition, oral history, performance, 
ritual, popular memory, skills and techniques, indigenous knowledge systems 
and the holistic approach to nature, society and social relationships’.99 
‘Nature’ is therefore included specifically in the description. 
 
                                            
92 Act 84 of 1998. 
93 S 2 item 9 of chap 1 titled ‘Introductory Provisions’. 
94 Act 25 of 1999. 
95 Found in both NEMA par 2.2.3.3, and the ECA in par 2.2.3.4 above. 
96 See Henderson 2-371 on this point. Although these resources include aspects of the 
natural environment they fall under the administration of the Department of Arts and Culture 
and not under the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism as the other statutes do. 
97 S 1 item 16. 
98 S 1 item 6. 
99 S 1 item 21. 
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‘Object’ also refers to environmental aspects and is defined as ‘any movable 
property of cultural significance which may be protected in terms of the 
provisions of this Act, including any archaeological artefact, palaeontological 
and rare geological specimens, meteorites and other objects mentioned in 
section 3’.100 Once again aspects of nature and the environment are included 
in this description. 
 
2.2.3.13 Wreck and Salvage Act101 
 
Part I of the Schedule to the Act contains the International Convention on 
Salvage 1989 to which South Africa is a party by agreement. In Article I 
‘damage to the environment’ is defined as meaning ‘substantial physical 
damage to human health or to marine life or resources in coastal or inland 
waters or areas adjacent thereto, caused by pollution, contamination, fire, 
explosion or similar major incidents’.102 
 
2.2.4 Related Concepts 
 
2.2.4.1 ‘Ecology’ 
 
The term ‘ecology’ is often used as a synonym for the ‘natural 
environment’,103 and can be defined as ‘that branch of biology which deals 
with the relations of living organisms to their surroundings, their habits and 
modes of life’;104 ‘the distribution and abundance of living organisms and how 
                                            
100 S 1 item 29; s 3 contains a long list of aspects that form part of the national estate, 
including but not limited to for example places, building, structures, equipment, graves, burial 
grounds, as well as movable objects such as books, films, etc. 
101 Act 94 of 1996. 
102 Art 1 par (d). 
103 Par (a) of the Preamble of the National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act 
discussed in par 2.2.3.10 below, applies the term ‘ecological degradation’ as an alternative for 
‘pollution’; see also Verulam Fuel Distributors CC v Truck and General Insurance Co Ltd and 
another 2005 1 SA 70 (W), where reference is made to ‘pollution and ecological damage’ 71, 
73. In order to cover all possibilities, s 38 of the Minerals and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act as discussed in par 3.4.4.8 of the text below includes the broadest possible 
reference namely ‘environmental damage, pollution or ecological degradation’; see also the 
use of this term by Bowman M in Bowman M & Boyle A Environmental Damage in 
International and Comparative Law (2005) chap 4. 
104 The Concise Oxford English Dictionary (1991) 494. 
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the distribution and their abundance are affected by the interactions between 
the organisms and their environment’.105 This definition therefore includes all 
living organisms. It was coined in 1866 by biologist Ernst Haeckel when he 
defined ecology as ‘the comprehensive science of the relationship of the 
organism to the environment’.106 ‘Ecology’ is also described as the science of 
survival.107 The term ‘ecology’ must be mentioned as it also appears in the 
Constitution, although no specific definition is provided.108 This term is not 
specifically defined in any of the national environmental statutes. 
 
2.2.4.2 ‘Natural resources’  
 
The term ‘natural resources’ is often used to refer to the environment in 
general, or at least to the ‘natural environment’ as one of its components.109 In 
the Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act,110 the term ‘natural 
agricultural resources’ includes ‘the soil, the water sources and the 
vegetation, excluding weeds and invader plants’. The examination as to 
whether ‘natural resource damage’ (also known as ‘NRD’) resorts under 
‘property damage’ for purpose of insurance claims is extensively dealt with in 
chapter 6 below.111 
 
2.2.5 Other Descriptions 
 
2.2.5.1 General introduction 
 
Above and beyond the extensive dictionary and statutory definitions 
discussed above, many authors have tried to define both the environment and 
what pollution with regards to the environment entails. In addition to the 
                                            
105 http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecological (last accessed 11 February 2008). 
106 http://www.mblwhoilibrary.org/heackel/bio.html (last accessed on 12 February 2008). 
107 As put by Rabie MA “The need for adequate environmental law” September 1971 De 
Rebus Procuratoriis 361. 
108 See also the discussion in par 2.2.3.2 above. 
109 See the CERCLA definition in par 2.2.5.3 and its reference in n 122 below. 
110 Act 43 of 1983. 
111 See chap 6 par 6.6.2.3 and 6.6.2.5 below. 
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discussion in the introduction to this chapter,112 the more extensive views of 
some authoritative South African authors are considered below. 
 
2.2.5.2 Views of South African authors 
 
According to the statement made by Henderson in his introductory note to the 
section dealing with cultural resources, because of the definitions of the 
environment provided by NEMA and the ECA, even cultural resources fall 
within the ambit of environmental law.113 Under the general international 
principle of sustainable development a nation’s natural environment as well as 
its’ cultural heritage have to be protected.114  
 
Kidd concedes that it seems as if the definitions provided nationally and 
internationally do not bring us closer to a meaning that elucidates the exact 
scope of environmental law, as some are open-ended, whereas others that 
are more specific, are still wide.115 
 
Bray states that ‘[a]n all-embracing concept of the environment is 
unacceptable as a workable basis for determining the scope and content of 
environmental law because it would tend to make all law environmental law’.  
She warns that making it too narrow would be restrictive as it could exclude 
some aspects of the environment that one would prefer to be included. She 
proposes that it suffices to say that ‘environmental law deals primarily with 
human beings and the environment and the legal relationship (balance or 
harmony) that exists, or should exist, between them’.116 
 
                                            
112 Par 2.1 above. 
113 Henderson 2-371. 
114 See the discussion on The National Heritage Resources Act in par 2.2.3.12 above; see 
also Bray (2003) 123 who states that South Africa has been among the leading countries to 
enshrine a right to the environment in its bill of rights and to incorporate the concept of 
sustainable development in its Constitution as well. 
115 Kidd 2. 
116 Bray (2003) 121. 
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Glazewski holds the opinion that there cannot be one single obvious definition 
of the environment.117 He therefore does not offer his own attempt at defining 
the term, and only refers to the statutory definitions found in the NEMA and 
the ECA.118 
 
In the words of Fuggle and Rabie ‘the term environment means various things 
to various people’.119 According to these authors the term ‘environment’ can 
be interpreted in so many ways that it needs to be qualified so as to focus 
attention on its particular relevance in a specific sphere. Internationally a 
limited approach and an extensive approach exists. 
 
In terms of an extensive approach the term ‘environment’ can therefore be 
divided into the following categories, namely (a) the natural environment, that 
encompasses the natural world in its pure state, thus all natural resources 
including all the inhabitants and contents of nature such as plant and animal 
life, mountains, rivers, soil, natural rock formations, etc;120 (b) the spatial 
environment, that refers to natural areas such as regions, provinces, or 
countries, specific landscapes such as mountains, wetlands and forests, and 
the built or man-made environment, that encompasses the spatial structures 
erected by man; (c) the social, sociological or cultural environment within  
which human beings find themselves, including the political, cultural-historic 
and work environment; and (d) the economic environment.121 
 
‘Environmental problems’ should then, according to Fuggle and Rabie, refer to 
impaired interrelationships between human beings and their physical 
surroundings.122 All animals, plants and other physical aspects such as man-
                                            
117 Glazewski 9. 
118 Par 2.2.3.3 and 2.2.3.4 above. 
119 Fuggle & Rabie 4. 
120 Also in par 2.2.4.2 on the term ‘nature’ and ‘natural resources’; and n 26, n 50 and n 51 
above. 
121 See Fuggle & Rabie 84 et seq for this division; Larsson 123 acknowledges three distinct 
groupings, namely, the natural, the man-made and the human environment which includes 
the economic environment. The latter is not included in this study. 
122 This view is held by Fuggle & Rabie 84. 
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made structures, land, water, air and so forth are covered under ‘physical 
surroundings’. This approach is preferred. 
 
One should note that irrespective of all these detailed descriptions, for the 
purpose of this study on the liability for causing environmental or ecological 
damage, contamination or destruction, and the insurability thereof, the 
environment has to be recognized as a relational concept regarding the 
interrelationship of human beings with their surroundings, and not as a 
concept that excludes human beings entirely from the environment.123 In 
terms of this extensive approach almost everything that in some or other way 
influences the life of human beings, is covered and forms part of the 
‘environment’ as defined. This also complicates matters regarding the scope 
of environmental law, as all fields of law technically to some extent then fall 
under environmental law. 
 
Three different approaches can be identified. In terms of a holistic approach, 
emphasis is placed on the concept of the environment as a whole, and not on 
its individual components. In terms of a limited approach on the other hand, 
the ‘environment’ consists only of nature, thus the natural environment. This 
excludes the anthropogenic124 environment consisting of the social, 
sociological or cultural, economic and spatial environment as discussed 
above.125 In terms of an extensive approach, the ‘environment’ appears to be 
the ‘human environment’, and therefore includes all relevant factors that 
determine human existence, such as the natural, spatial, sociological, 
economic, cultural-historic, built, political and work environments.  
 
 
                                            
123 As endorsed by Fuggle & Rabie 86; see also s 4(1) of The (Australian) Commonwealth 
Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act of 1974 that stipulates that ‘the 
environment includes all aspects of the surroundings of man, whether affecting him or in his 
social groupings’. 
124 The Concise Oxford Dictionary 56 defines the term ‘anthropogenic’ as an adjective 
meaning: ‘(chiefly in pollution) originating in human activity’. 
125 See also Fuggle & Rabie 86; for a discussion of what the ‘natural environment’ entails, see 
par 2.2.4.2 of the text above; also n 26 above for a description of ‘nature’. 
 33
2.2.5.3 Examples of descriptions from foreign jurisdictions 
 
In addition to the English and Australian definitions quoted above,126 a few 
other examples may be examined. The definition of ‘natural resources’ found 
in the United States in CERCLA127 simply reads as follows: ‘land, fish, wildlife, 
biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and other such 
resources ’that belong to, are managed by or under the control of a 
governmental authority’.128 
 
The description for ‘environmental damage’ proposed for the regulations to be 
issued in accordance with the EU Environmental Liability Directive129 includes 
(a) damage to protected species, natural habitat or sites of scientific interest 
caused by a ‘designated activity’; (b) damage to surface water and 
groundwater; and (c) contamination of land by substances, preparations, 
organisms or micro organisms.130  These must result in a significant risk of 
adverse effect on human health.131 The description is very broad and the 
purpose is not to provide a specific statutory definition. 
 
A compact and effective definition can be found in the New Zealand 
Environment Act of 1986, that the ‘environment’ includes ‘(a) ecosystems and 
their constituent parts; (b) all natural and physical resources; and (c) the 
social, economic, aesthetic and cultural conditions which affect the 
environment of which are affected by changes to the environment’.132 The 
                                            
126 Par 2.1 n 4 that refers to some Australian and English statutory definitions. 
127 United States Comprehensive  Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
of 1980 (hereinafter referred to as ‘CERCLA’). 
128 § 9601(16); see the comprehensive discussion of this statute in chap 7 par 7.6.2.2 below; 
see also in general Fogleman V Environmental Liabilities and Insurance in England and the 
United States Part A (2005) 303 for an examination of the CERCLA definition and its 
application in the extensive body of case law in the US. 
129 Directive 2004/35 CE [2004] O.J. L143/56. 
130 Bell S & McGillivray D Environmental Law 6th ed (2006) 393 are of the opinion that the 
narrow scope of the description of ‘environmental damage’ under the Directive is problematic, 
but that it  does offer the benefit of providing improved protection for the ‘unowned 
environment’. 
131 Art.2(1) describes ‘environmental damage’ as including (a) damage to protected 
species;(b) water damage;(c) land damage; ‘damage’ is in general is defined as ‘a 
measurable adverse change in the natural resource or measurable impairment of a natural 
resource service which may occur directly or indirectly’. 
132 See Larsson 122 n 5 where this definition is considered. 
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environment can also be said to cover ‘all those elements which in their 
complex inter-relationships form the framework, setting and living conditions 
for mankind, by their very existence and by virtue of their impact’.133 
 
Sands prefers to follow a scientific approach by dividing environmental issues 
into the following ‘compartments’, namely (a) atmosphere and atmospheric 
depositions; (b) soils and sediments; (c) water quality; (d) biology; and (e) 
humans, as it does not have a generally accepted usage as a term of art in 
international law. Recent international agreements have consistently preferred 
to identify the various media included in the term, rather than to provide a 
single general description.134 
 
 
2.3 DEFINING ‘POLLUTION’ AND RELATED CONCEPTS 
 
2.3.1 General  
 
Most causes of damage or loss caused to the environment are well known 
and are in a broad sense labelled as pollution, for example, where air, water 
and soil are contaminated by chemicals and so forth. These causes are 
currently receiving their fair share of attention worldwide in legislation and 
case law, especially relating to their interpretation in insurance policies.135 It is 
important also to emphasise the ‘new’ risks to the environment that are posed 
by, for example, the detrimental effects of electro-magnetic fields,136 toxic 
                                            
133 EEC OJ C 115, dated May 1976 2. 
134 According to Sands Ph Principles of International Environmental Law (2003) 16. 
135 Rodler DN “Carbon Monoxide ruled to be a pollutant” 2003 (27 January) The Legal 
Intelligencer 1 refers to the case of Matcon Diamond Inc v Penn National Insurance Co Co No 
186 WDA (2002) PA Super (January 2003), where carbon monoxide was found to be a 
pollutant and to fall within the ambit of the pollution exclusion clause in an insurance policy. 
This was found to be the case as the court held that a ‘contaminant’ should be defined as 
being something that ‘renders another thing impure and unsuitable for breathing’, which 
definition was provided in the well-known case of Mount Lebanon v Reliance Insurance 
(2001) PA Super 177. 
136 Also referred to as ‘electro smog’. 
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mold growth and the potential risks posed by the genetic modification of 
organisms, where the damage caused cannot simply be classified as affecting 
the classic mediums of air, water and land.137 A general discussion of the 
generic term ‘pollution’, as well as its synonyms or related concepts such as 
‘waste’ and ‘litter’ follows. Specific forms of pollution such as oil pollution, 
marine pollution and the potential damage caused by nuclear risks fall outside 
the scope of this study and are therefore not extensively addressed in this 
thesis. 
 
2.3.2 Dictionaries 
 
2.3.2.1 The Concise Oxford Dictionary138 
 
‘Pollution’ is not specifically defined, yet ‘pollute’ is defined as ‘to contaminate 
(water, the air etc.) with harmful or poisonous substances, to corrupt’.139 
 
This definition only includes contamination through harmful or poisonous 
substances, and does not provide for general littering or the discharge of 
organic waste for example, that is merely unsightly yet does not cause direct 
harm and is not generally poisonous. The definition also does not link 
pollution to the environment, yet refers in general only to mediums that make 
up the environment as examples of things that can be polluted. 
Reference can be made to the term ‘anthropogenic’ in this dictionary, as the 
term ‘environment’ is defined as an adjective meaning ‘(chiefly in pollution) 
originating in human activity’.140 For purposes of this thesis ‘pollution’ and 
subsequent liability incurred for polluting the environment therefore requires 
the pollution to be caused by human activity in some or other form, and not by 
natural disasters or catastrophes. 
 
                                            
137 See par 2.1 n 3 above. 
138 Par 2.2.2.1 n 22 above. 
139 The Concise Oxford Dictionary 1108. 
140 Above 56. 
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2.3.2.2 Black’s Law Dictionary141 
 
‘Pollution’ is not defined, but the word ‘pollute’ is said to be ‘to corrupt or 
defile; especially to contaminate soil, air or water with noxious substances’.142 
This definition is very similar to the one provided by The Concise Oxford 
Dictionary.143 The effect of noxious substances as a pollutant has been 
included.  The term ‘noxious’ is defined as ‘harmful, poisonous or very 
unpleasant’.144 
 
2.3.2.3 Dictionary of Legal Words and Phrases145 
 
The term ‘environment’ does not appear in this dictionary, yet the term 
‘pollution’ is referenced but the definition or description provided refers only to 
case law146 and a reference to a journal article by Van Niekerk.147 His view is 
that ‘environmental pollution must be seen for what in effect it has become, 
that of a basically unlawful act’. This offers no true definition of pollution itself. 
He refers to various synonyms such as ‘insults to the environment’ and 
‘environmental blight’ in his publication, and describes ‘environmental harm’ 
merely as ‘including harm of an acoustic and aesthetic kind’.148 
 
In the case of S v Verlander149 referred to above, a criminal charge was 
brought against a farmer who stored grass in an unused dam. During an 
unexpected and rare flood, the grass was swept down-river and caused a 
nuisance to other landowners. In his decision on whether the accused 
contravened the old Water Act,150 Beadle CJ examined the definition of 
                                            
141 N 27 above.  
142 Black’s Law Dictionary 1180. 
143 Par 2.3.2.1 above. 
144 The Concise Oxford Dictionary 975 explains that the word is derived from the Latin term 
noxa that means ‘harm’. 
145 Claassen Dictionary of Legal  Words and Phrases Service (J-P).  
146 Dictionary of Legal Words and Phrases P-64; S v Verlander 1975 2 SA 376 (RA). 
147 See Van Niekerk “The Ecological Norm in Law or the Jurisprudence of the Fight against 
Pollution” 1975 (92) SALJ 78. 
148 Van Niekerk 82–85. 
149 S v Verlander 378. 
150 The Water Act 54 of 1956, chap 268R, s 135A read with s 135DA. 
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‘pollution’ as provided for in the old Water Act151 and came to the conclusion 
that not all instances of nuisance are to be seen as pollution for purposes of 
criminal liability, yet he did not address its effect on civil liability.152 
 
2.3.2.4 http://www.wikipedia.com 
 
It is again interesting to note the definition provided in this layman’s electronic 
dictionary. It describes ‘pollution’ as ‘the contamination of the environment by 
harmful substances, and the release of chemical, physical, biological or 
radioactive contaminants to the environment’.153 Principal forms of pollution 
include air pollution,154 radioactive contamination,155 noise pollution,156 light 
pollution,157 and even visual pollution or the pollution of aesthetics.158 
 
2.3.3 National Statutory Definitions  
 
2.3.3.1 General introduction 
 
Not many statutes use the general term ’pollution’, and many prefer to use 
other alternatives in the context of damage or loss caused to the environment 
by pollution. The term ‘waste’ is also often used in the context of pollution and 
is used in various statutes as discussed below.159 Some statutes therefore 
define the term ‘pollution’, others define only ‘waste’ and some refer to other 
                                            
151 S 2 of the Act defines pollution as ‘pollution, in relation to water, including private water, 
means (a) such contamination or other alteration of the physical, chemical or biological 
properties of the water, including change of temperature, taste, colour, turbidity or odour; or 
(b) such discharge of any liquid, gaseous, solid or other substance into the water; as will or is 
likely to create a nuisance or to render such water harmful, detrimental or injurious’. 
152 S v Verlander 378. 
153 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pollution (last accessed on 21 January 2006). 
154 Above; and includes ‘the release of chemicals and particulates into the atmosphere’. 
155 N 137 radioactive contamination was only added later, in the wake of the 20th century 
discoveries in astrophysics, and refers specifically to alpha emitters and actinides in the 
environment. 
156 N 145 ‘which encompasses roadway noise, aircraft noise, industrial noise as well as high-
intensity sonar’. 
157 N 145 ‘includes light trespass, over-illumination and astronomical interference’. 
158 N 145 ‘which can refer to the presence of overhead power lines, motorway billboards, 
scarred landforms (as from strip mining), open storage of junk or municipal solid waste. 
159 According to Kidd 127 the concept ‘pollution’ incorporates the concept ‘waste’, yet that it 
should be noted that the two terms are not synonymous. 
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related terms such as ‘litter’ and ‘leaching’.160 These definitions are for 
practical reasons of unity discussed together in each of the statutes below, 
and not under the heading of ‘related concepts’,161 which will refer only to 
damaging polluting events. 
 
2.3.3.2 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 
 
The term ‘pollution’ also appears in the Constitution in section 24,162 which 
reads as follows: ‘Everyone has the right to have the environment protected 
for the benefit of present and future generations through reasonable 
legislative and other measures that prevent pollution and ecological 
degradation.’163 
 
The Constitution lists the functional areas on Environment and Pollution 
Control, as well as Nature and Soil Conservation and Health Services as    
concurrent national and provincial legislative competencies.164 Matters 
relating to pollution that are provided for on a local government level include 
air pollution, water, sanitation services, wastewater and sewage disposal 
systems, and pontoons, ferries, jetties, piers and harbours.165 Local matters 
include cleansing, control of public nuisances, noise pollution, refuse removal, 
refuse dumps and solid waste disposal.166 
 
 
 
 
                                            
160 Par 2.3.3 below. 
161 See par 2.3.4 below. 
162 See also pars 2.2.3.2 above and chap 3 par 3.2.2 on constitutional aspects. 
163 Own emphasis. 
164 Sched 4 Part A. 
165 Sched 4 Part B s 155(6)(a), s 155(7). 
166 Sched 5 Part B; see also paragraph 2.2.3.2.2 above on the difficulty on achieving full 
integration of environmental laws under the Constitution, which results in an extensive variety 
of terminology referring to pollution and to environmental damage. These cannot all be 
examined in greater detail, yet is addressed under the more general terminology as discussed 
below where applicable. 
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2.3.3.3 National Environmental Management Act167 
 
‘Pollution’ is defined as ‘any change in the environment caused by (i) 
substances; (ii) radio-active or other waves; or (iii) noise, odours, dust or heat  
emitted from any activity, including the storage or treatment of waste or 
substances, construction and the provision of services, whether engaged in or 
by any person or an organ of state, whether that change has an adverse 
effect on human health or well-being or on the composition, resilience and 
productivity of natural or managed ecosystems, or on materials useful to 
people, or will have such an effect in the future’.168 
 
2.3.3.4 National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act169 
 
In this Act both the terms ‘environment’ and ‘pollution’ enjoy the meanings 
assigned to them in the definitions found in the NEMA.170  
 
In the Act  ‘air pollution’ is specifically defined as ‘any change in the 
composition of the air caused by smoke, soot, dust (including fly ash), cinders, 
solid particles of any kind, gases, fumes, aerosols and odorous 
substances’.171 This description is especially relevant for purposes of the 
discussion of pollution exclusion clauses in chapter 6 below.172 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
167 Act 107 of 1998. 
168
 S 1 item 24. 
169 Act 39 of 2004. 
170 NEMA s 1; see also par 2.3.3.3 above; see also for relevant case law Verulam Fuel 
Distributors CC v Truck and General Insurance Co Ltd and another 2005 1 SA 70 (W) 71, 73 
where reference is made to ‘pollution and ecological damage’ that was caused by the 
appellant. 
171 S 1 item 1. 
172 See chap 6 par 6.5.3 on the scope and wording of the absolute pollution exclusion 
clauses. 
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2.3.3.5 Environment Conservation Act173 
 
2.3.3.5.1 General Environmental Policy 
 
The term ‘pollution’ is not specifically defined in the ECA, yet in section 2, the 
ECA provides that a general environmental policy needs to be drawn up, in 
order to protect the environment against ‘disturbance, deterioration, 
defacement, poisoning, pollution or destruction as a result of man-made 
structures, installations, processes or products of human activities’.174 The 
General Policy that was enacted in terms of the ECA refers expressly to 
‘pollution control’,175 yet the term pollution is not defined anywhere in the ECA, 
its regulations or in the General Policy itself. 
 
In Part IV in section 19 regarding the prohibition of littering, ‘littering’ is 
described as ‘discard, dump or leave any litter on any land or water surface, 
street, road or site in or on any place to which the public have access’.176 
‘Litter’ is defined as ‘any object or matter discarded or left behind by the 
person in whose possession or control it was’.177 
 
2.3.3.5.2 Descriptions in the ECA 
 
Part V of the ECA covers activities that have, or may have, a ‘detrimental 
effect’ on the environment, in other words pollute the environment. Some 
regulations under the ECA178 also cover activities which may have substantial 
detrimental effect on the environment. The ‘detrimental effect’ could be seen 
                                            
173 Act 73 of 1989. 
174 S 2. 
175 As enacted in GN 51 Government Gazette 15428 of 21 January 1994 in terms of s 2(1) of 
the ECA. 
176 S 19(1). 
177 S 1 item 17. 
178 RGN 1183/18261/5 of 5 September 1997, published In terms of s 2(1) of the ECA. 
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as a synonym for pollution as it means that the environment is in some way 
defiled or damaged, in other words polluted.179   
 
The term ‘waste’ is more broadly described, and is seen as ‘any material,180 
solid, liquid or gaseous that is discharged or emitted, irrespective of control, 
treatment, reduction or compositional change or lack thereof, that is no longer 
used for its original purpose and that is likely to be stored or accumulated for 
three months or longer irrespective of the intentions on the person who stores 
such waste, that is sent off-site to be recycled, reused, regenerated, 
alienated, treated or disposed of, or from which such processes will be 
extracted'.181 
 
2.3.3.5.3 Description in the Regulations to the ECA 
 
Regulations enacted under section 21 of the ECA identify a long list of 
activities that have the potential of causing a substantial detrimental effect on 
the environment.182 
 
These actions can briefly be summarised as work done for construction, 
upgrading or erection,183 change of land use,184 concentration of living 
organisms in confined spaces for the purpose of commercial production,185 
intensive husbandry or importation of organisms,186 release of any organism 
from its natural area or distribution,187 genetic modification of an organism,188 
                                            
179 This viewpoint is reiterated by Van Niekerk 85; MEC: Department of Agriculture, 
Conservation and the Environment Dr ST Cornelius v HTF Developers (Pty) Ltd CCT 32/07 
[2007] ZACC 25 par 4. 
180 Where previous definitions have referred to ‘matter’, this definition, according to the 
Concise Oxford Dictionary 731 refers to ‘material’. The latter means ‘the matter from which a 
thing is made; the elements or constituent parts of a substance’. 
181 S 4(12). 
182 As enacted in GN R1182 Government Gazette 18261 of 5 September 1997. 
183 Sched 1 reg1. 
184 Sched 1 reg 2. 
185 Sched 1 reg 3. 
186 Sched 1 reg 4. 
187 Sched 1 reg 5. 
188 Sched 1 reg 6. 
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reclaiming land,189 disposal and handling of waste,190 certain scheduled 
processes,191 and the cultivation or use of virgin ground.192 
 
In general all of these activities have the potential of causing pollution or 
detriment to the environment, and are therefore actions that have to be 
prevented, limited or prohibited. Regulations have also been enacted 
regarding the control of the activities as listed.193  
 
This leads one to the conclusion that pollution is not classified according to 
the status of the environment or the conditions of the environment, but rather 
classified in the ECA in terms of actions that could cause the environment to 
be detrimentally affected and therefore polluted. 
 
There are also regulations in terms of section 25 of the ECA regarding noise, 
vibration and shock.194 One could ask whether the latter also have the 
potential to ‘pollute’ the environment. Where noise and vibrations cause the 
loss of amenities of one’s property or discomfort during the use of property, 
one may argue that this constitutes harm or loss even though it is not of a 
physical nature.195 As the ECA covers conservation of the environment and as 
noise control is discussed in the ECA, one can conclude that noise pollution, 
or vibration or shock pollution, is also seen as pollution of the environment.196 
 
Regulations enacted in terms of the ECA197 provide a very broad description 
of ‘waste matter’. The regulations identify waste as ‘an undesirable or 
superfluous by-product, emission, residue or remainder of any process or 
                                            
189 Sched 1 reg 7. 
190 Sched 1 reg 8. 
191 Sched 1 reg 9. 
192 Sched 1 reg 10; in Sched 1 reg 11 item 4 ‘virgin ground’ is defined as ‘land that has at no 
time during the preceding 10 years been cultivated’. It remains unclear why the use or 
cultivation of virgin ground should necessarily have the potential to cause substantial 
detriment to the environment. 
193 Regulations regarding activities identified in s 21(1) of the ECA as enacted in GN R 1183 
Government Gazette 18261 of 5 September 1997. 
194 As enacted in GN R154 Government Gazette 13717 of 10 January 1992. 
195 See chap 6 par 6.6.2.3.2 below. 
196 See also the definition provided in par 2.3.3.5 in the text above 
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activity, any matter,198 either gaseous, liquid or solid or any combination 
thereof, originating from any residential, commercial or industrial area, which 
is discarded by a person; accumulated or stored to be discarded irrespective 
of prior treatment of such waste or not; building rubble used for landfill or 
levelling of land; or is stored for purpose of recycling, re-using or extracting a 
usable product from such matter’. 
 
The regulations exclude certain categories of matter from this description, 
provided they are produced in terms of specified legislation. These exclusions 
include discarded radio-active substances,199 any minerals, tailings, waste 
rock or slimes produced by or due to mining activities,200 and ash produced or 
resulting from the generation of electricity.201  
 
Waste is further divided under the directions issued in terms of the ECA 
regarding the control and management of general communal and general 
small waste disposal sites202 as general waste, landfill and leachate.203 
 
‘General waste’ is described as ‘waste that does not pose an immediate threat 
to human life or the environment’.204 This includes household waste, builder’s 
rubble, garden waste, dry industrial and commercial waste. This type of waste 
has the potential of producing a polluting leachate, or could create various 
nuisances such as odour, fly or other nuisances. 
 
‘Land fill’ means the land body created by the disposal of waste either to fill 
excavations or by creating a landform above ground.205 The recently coined 
term ‘brownfield’ deserves a brief explanation and description as it concerns a 
                                            
197 As enacted in accordance with s 20 in GN 1986 Government Gazette 12703 of 24 August 
1990, as amended by GN 292 Government Gazette 24938 of 28 February 2003. 
198 ‘Matter’ is defined in the Oxford Concise Dictionary 732 as ‘physical substance in general, 
as distinct from mind and spirit; that which has mass and occupies space’. 
199 In terms of the Nuclear Energy Act 92 of 1982. 
200 In terms of the Mines and Works Act 27 of 1956. 
201 In terms of the Electricity Act 41 of 1987. 
202 In terms of s 20(5)(b), as enacted in GN 91 Government Gazette 23053 of 1 February 
2002. 
203 See the description as per n 201, and the reference in n 204 below. 
204 Item 7 in the definitions clause found in the relevant Schedule. 
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very current issue of regulating the process of reclaiming landfills. Landfills 
are contaminated repositories of wastes, yet they are also referred to as 
‘brownfields’ where they have the potential to be redeveloped for renewable 
energy development.206 
 
‘Leachate’ refers to ‘an aqueous solution, containing final and intermediate 
products of decomposition, various solutes and waste residues that has a 
high pollution potential resulting from the percolation of water though 
decomposing waste’.207 
 
The latter is of specific importance for this thesis as gradual pollution, 
discussed in chapter 6208 is usually caused by the leaching209 of waste into 
the environment. This type of pollution creates a situation called ‘long-tail 
liability’ that is difficult to insure against and causes enormous problems 
regarding the institution of claims against polluters. 
 
2.3.3.5.4 ECA Draft Policy on Hazardous Waste Management 
 
Issues on hazardous waste are dealt with in terms of the Draft Policy on 
Hazardous Waste Management to be enacted in terms of the ECA.210 In the 
introduction to the Schedule the main aim of hazardous waste management is 
stated as the protection of human health and safety as well as the 
environment.211  
 
                                            
205 Above item 8.  
206 Ferrey S “Converting brownfield environmental negatives into energy positives” 2007 (34) 
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 417 418. It is important to note that when 
acquiring a brownfield property there is an unavoidable transfer of existing environmental 
liabilities, that obviously play a role in the future insurability of the site. 
207 Above item 10. 
208 See chap 6 par 6.3 of this thesis on specific issues relating to the insurability of gradual 
pollution damage. 
209 According to The Oxford Concise Dictionary 671, ‘leaching’ means ‘to make (a liquid) 
percolate through some material; subject (bark, ore, ash or soil) to the action of percolating 
fluid’. 
210 As enacted in GN 1064 Government Gazette 15987 of 30 September 1994. 
211 Above in par 2.3.3.5; see also Henderson 1-105. 
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The term ‘hazardous waste’ is not specifically identified and used as the 
criterion per se, but rather the risk factor that is caused by the disposal of the 
waste.  Hazardous waste can be seen as waste that either ‘directly or 
indirectly threatens human health or the environment due to certain risks, 
such as explosions, fire, infections, pathogens, parasites or their vectors, 
chemical instability, reactions or corrosions, acute or chronic toxicity, cancer, 
mutations, tumours or birth defects, toxicity (once again), or damage to the 
ecosystems or natural resources, accumulation of biological food chains, 
persistence in the environment or multiple effects’. This type of waste requires 
special attention and cannot be stored or released into the environment by 
adding it to sewage or allowing the creation of leachate. A specific SABS 
classification system for The Identification and Classification of Dangerous 
Substances and Goods also applies in the waste industry.212  
 
The difference between ‘hazardous’ and ‘dangerous’ in the draft policy and in 
the SABS classification is not clear. How the Policy and the SABS 
classification are to be read together remains uncertain. 213 The classification 
of substances as ‘dangerous’214 is in fact so broad that it covers most other 
alternatives that are not identified elsewhere as hazardous. From this 
definition it becomes clear that, in the attempt to be as comprehensive as 
possible, literally any result of any type of risk is covered in the Draft Policy. 
 
2.3.3.6 Dumping at Sea Control Act215 
 
This Act covers the pollution of the sea by the dumping or depositing of 
substances as well as the disposal of man-made structures and crafts at 
sea.216 In a broad sense this is also pollution, yet the Act does not define 
‘pollution’ in general. 
 
                                            
212 Code 0228/MDG. 
213 The Draft Policy on Hazardous Waste Management in terms of the ECA above, and the 
SABS classification as discussed. 
214 Class 9 of the relevant SABS classification. 
215 Act 73 of 1980. 
216 Above s 1 item 3. 
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2.3.3.7 Genetically Modified Organisms Act 217 
 
The term ‘waste’ is specifically defined as ‘any matter, whether gaseous, 
liquid or solid or any combination thereof, which is, in the opinion of the 
person in whose possession or under whose control it is, an undesirable or 
superfluous by-product, emission, residue or remainder of any process or 
activity in connection with genetically modified organisms’.218 
 
As far as damage to the environment is concerned, two other terms in the Act 
should be mentioned. The first is the description of ‘hazard’, which means ‘an 
intrinsic biological, chemical or physical characteristic of a genetically modified 
organism which could lead to an adverse impact on the environment’.219 The 
other term relates to the ‘risk’ or environmental damage, which means ‘the 
probability of causing or incurring a loss or damage or an adverse impact or 
misfortune’.220 
 
2.3.3.8 Marine Pollution (Control and Civil Liability) Act221 
 
Even though the title and the preamble to this Act refer to pollution, the term 
‘pollution’ is not specifically defined in this Act. The definitions section222 does, 
however, contain a description of ‘hazardous substance’, which can be the 
cause of pollution.  A ‘hazardous substance’ is defined as ‘any substance 
which, if introduced into the sea, is likely to create a hazard to human health, 
harm living resources and marine life, damage amenities or interfere with 
other legitimate uses of the sea, including oil and any other substance subject 
to control by MARPOL 1973/78,223 and mixtures of such substances and 
water or any other substances’.224 
                                            
217 Act 15 of 1997. 
218 S 1(xxix). 
219 S 1(xiv). 
220 S 1(xxv). 
221 Act 6 of 1981. 
222 Above s 1. 
223 Meaning the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973, as 
amended by the Protocol of 1978, adopted by IMCO, the Inter-Governmental Maritime 
Footnote continues on the next page. 
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2.3.3.9 Marine Pollution (Intervention) Act225 
 
Various other conventions that cover marine pollution, by oil or by other 
substances,226 are given effect to by this Act,227 yet the Act itself contains no 
specific definition of the term ‘pollution’. The meanings allocated in these 
international conventions and protocols would then apply in terms of this Act. 
 
2.3.3.10 Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act228 
 
The regulations229 issued in terms of this Act require that any holder of a right 
or permit must ‘avoid the generation and production of pollution, waste and 
mine residue at source’.230 Where this cannot be altogether avoided, it must 
be minimized, re-used or recycled, or disposed of.231 ‘Pollution’, ‘waste’ and 
‘mine residue’ are not specifically defined and must be interpreted in general 
terms. The regulations also provide for the management of air quality,232 noise 
management and control,233 soil pollution and erosion control,234 and lastly the 
disposal of waste material.235 Under the latter the sources of ‘waste material’ 
are described as ‘the waste from reduction works, beneficiation plants, coal 
preparation plants, screening and washing installations and generating 
stations at mines’.236 Dumping or impounding of ‘rubble, litter, garbage, 
rubbish or discards of any description, whether solid or liquid’, all which 
                                            
Consultative Organisation, in London on 17 February 1978, as set out in the Schedule to the 
Marine Pollution (Prevention of Pollution from Ships) Act 2 of 1986. 
224 N 207 s 1 item 9. 
225 Act 64 of 1987. 
226 International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil 
Pollution Casualties, done at Brussels on 29 November 1969, as set out in Sched 1 of the  
Act, and the Protocol relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Marine Pollution by 
Substances Other than Oil, done at London on 2 November 1973, as set out in Sched 2 of the 
Act. 
227 S 2. 
228 Act 28 of 2002. 
229 As in RGN 527/26275/3, 23 April 2004 Government Gazette 26942 of 29 October 2004. 
230 Above reg 63(a). 
231 Reg 63(b) and (c). 
232 Reg 66. 
233 Reg 64. 
234 Reg 70. 
235 Reg 69. 
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describe other wastes, is prohibited unless it is done at specified sites and in 
the specified manner.237 
 
In regulations relating to the control of soil pollution and erosion,238 many 
descriptions of ways in which the environment can be polluted, and relevant 
regulations that address the problem of pollution, can be found. Examples 
include ‘spillage of hazardous chemicals onto soils or its escape or migration 
into surrounding soils’;239 ‘oils, grease and hydraulic fuels’;240 and ‘the 
acidification, salinisation and mineralization of soils through seepage of 
polluted water’.241 
 
2.3.3.11 National Nuclear Regulator Act242 
 
Once again ‘pollution’ is not specifically defined, yet the term ‘nuclear 
damage’ is described as ‘(a) any injury to or death or any sickness or disease 
of a person; or (b) other damage, including any damage to or any loss of use 
of property or damage to the environment’.243 The ‘environment’ is also not 
specifically defined in this statute. 
 
2.3.3.12 National Water Act244 
 
In Chapter 1 of the Act, ‘pollution’ is defined as ‘the direct or indirect alteration 
of the physical, chemical or biological properties of a water resource so as to 
make it less fit for any beneficial purpose for which it may reasonably be 
expected to be used; harmful or potentially harmful to the welfare, health or 
                                            
236 Reg 69(3). 
237 Reg 69(4). 
238 Reg 70. 
239 Reg 70(3). 
240 Reg 70(4). 
241 Reg 70(6). 
242 Act 47 of 1999. 
243 S 1 item 15. 
244 Act 36 of 1998. 
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safety to human beings; to any aquatic or non-aquatic organisms; to resource 
quality or to property’.245 
 
‘Resource quality’ refers to ‘the quality of all the aspects of a water 
resource’.246 ‘Waste’ is described as ‘any material that causes or is 
reasonably likely to cause the water resources to be polluted’.247 
 
2.3.3.13 Nuclear Energy Act248 
 
The Act does not contain a specific definition of ‘pollution’, yet contains only a 
definition on ‘radioactive waste’ that has the potential of causing pollution.249 
 
2.3.3.14 Waste Management Bill250 
 
Brief reference must be made to the terminology used in this Bill that is 
expected to be enacted in the near future. 
 
The term ‘pollution’ enjoys the same meaning as that assigned to it in terms of 
section 1 of NEMA.251 The term ‘contaminated’ is described as ‘the presence 
in or under any land, site, buildings or structures of a substance or organism 
above the concentration which is normally present in or under that land, which 
substance directly or indirectly affects or may affect the quality of the soil or 
the environment adversely’.252 
 
The definition for ‘waste’ has been improved and is much shorter than the 
definitions provided in the ECA or in the Draft Policy. It provides that ‘waste 
                                            
245 S 1 item 15; Verulam Fuel Distributors CC v Truck and General Insurance Co Ltd and  
another  71 and 73 where reference is made to ‘pollution and ecological damage’. 
246 S 1 item 19; ‘water resource’ is described as ‘includes a watercourse, surface water, 
estuary or aquifer’ in s 1 item 27.  
247 S 1 item 23. 
248 Act 46 of 1999. 
249 Above s 1 item 28 refers to such waste as ‘any radioactive material destined to be 
disposed of as waste material’. 
250 No 1832 of 2007. 
251 S 1(ee). 
252 S 1(f). 
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includes any substance, whether solid, liquid or gaseous which is (i) 
discharged, emitted or deposited in the environment in such volume, 
consistency or manner as to cause an alternation to the environment’.253 
 
‘Hazardous waste’ is described as ‘waste that may be, by circumstances of 
use, quantity, concentration or inherent physical, chemical or toxicological 
characteristics, have a significant adverse effect on health and the 
environment’.254 
 
2.3.4 Related Concepts 
 
2.3.4.1 General alternatives 
 
Nationally as well as internationally a multitude of terms such as 
‘environmental damage, harm, contamination or impairment’,255 
‘environmentally degrading activity’256 or an activity that has a ‘substantial 
detrimental or deleterious effect on the environment’,257 ‘unacceptable 
negative impact on the environment’,258 ‘insults to the environment and 
environmental blight’,259 and ‘ecological damage or ecological degradation’,260 
are often used as synonyms for ‘environmental pollution’. 
                                            
253 S 1(rr). 
254 S 1(o); see in contrast par 2.3.3.5.4 for the more extensive statutory description referred 
to. 
255 See in this regard the terminology used by Shaw 767, Larsson 123, 125; Havenga (1995) 
187 n 3; s 38(1)(e) of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002; 
Saylor RN & Cole AM “The Mother of all Battles: the Dispute over Insurance Coverage for 
Environmental Contamination in the United States” 1993 Environmental Liability 29. 
256 Anderson 399 “Transnational Corporations and Environmental Damage: Is Tort Law the 
Answer?” 2002 (Spring) Washburn Law Journal 2. 
257 In the regulations enacted in terms of s 2(1) of the ECA RGN11183/18261/5 (5 September 
1997); see also Shaw 765. 
258 S 38(2) of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002. 
259 See Van Niekerk 82–85 for the use of this term; The Water Act 54 of 1956 s 2(a). 
260 The Constitution s 24 refers to ‘pollution and ecological degradation’; and as found in par 
(a) of the preamble to the National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act, where 
‘ecological degradation’ is applied as an alternative for ‘pollution’; also Verulam Fuel 
Distributors CC v Truck and General Insurance Co Ltd and another 71, 73 where reference is 
made to ‘pollution and ecological damage’; s 38(1)(e) of the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act 28 of 2002; Larsson 146 prefers to refer to ‘ecological damage’ 
as specifically damage caused to public natural resources. 
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Some authors even use the terminology ‘environmental problems’ that offers 
the widest possible description.261 In the case of Truck and General Insurance 
Co Ltd v Verulam Fuel Distributors CC and another,262 where a diesel spill 
caused ‘pollution, contamination and ecological damage’,263 these terms were 
not specifically defined. The court found it unnecessary to embark upon a 
major enquiry of whether ‘ecological damage’ equates to ‘property damage’, 
which was the issue at hand.264 
 
2.3.4.2 Statutory alternatives 
 
In terms of the Constitution in section 24 ‘everyone has the right to have the 
environment protected for the benefit of present and future generations 
through reasonable legislative and other measures that: prevents pollution 
and ecological degradation’. 265 It refers to both ‘pollution’ and ‘ecological 
damage’. Some statutes cover as many alternatives as possible, such as the 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act266 that requires persons 
not to cause ‘unacceptable pollution, ecological degradation or damage to the 
environment when prospecting’.267 
 
2.3.5 Other Descriptions 
 
2.3.5.1 Views of South African authors 
 
Henderson268 distinguishes various forms of pollution according to the 
mediums that pollute or mediums through which they pollute. He distinguishes 
pollution of the atmosphere,269 pollution through mismanagement of 
                                            
261 See the view of Fuggle & Rabie as referred to in par 2.3.5.1 in the text below. 
262 N 51 above. 
263 Par 5. 
264 Par 23; for a detailed discussion on the different types of damage caused by pollution and 
whether cover is included or excluded, see chap 6 par 6.5 and 6.6 below. 
265 See also par 2.2.3.2.1 of the text above. 
266 Act 28 of 2002; also the discussion in par 2.2.3.9 and 2.3.3.10 in the text above. 
267 S 17(1)(c). 
268 Henderson 5-4 to 5-5. 
269 The National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act 39 of 2004. 
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hazardous substances,270 pollution of water resources271 and noise 
pollution.272 
 
Fuggle and Rabie do not define or explain the term ‘pollution’ per se, yet they 
discuss the broader concept of ‘environmental problems’ that are mostly 
caused by what we understand to be pollution or defilement of the 
environment through the actions of human beings.273 
 
These authors distinguish four separate classes of environmental problems, 
namely, degradable wastes, persistent wastes, reversible biological and 
geophysical impacts and irreversible biological and geophysical impacts.274 
 
Each class has its own legal implications and legal sanctions, according to the 
different strategies that have to be followed to solve the relevant 
environmental problems. Where there is an emission of degradable wastes, 
penalties may be levied to allow for cosmetic action. Sanctions in the form of 
criminal prosecution, civil claims for damages, seizure and forfeiture of assets 
or effluent taxes may be applied. Liability in terms of these sanctions is clearly 
an insurable interest that is insurable where insurance cover is available. 
These penalties could also be applied to persistent wastes, yet as the latter is 
long-term and cumulative, the penalties should be so onerous as to act as a 
deterrent that prohibits or prevents persons from causing these environmental 
problems. 
 
                                            
270 In terms of The Hazardous Substances Act 15 of 1973; Fertilizers, Feeds, Agricultural 
Remedies and Stock Remedies Act 36 of 1947, yet excluding mining and radioactive wastes 
through GN 1986 of 24 August 1990, and in terms of inter alia The Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act 28 of 2002, Electricity Act 41 of 1987, The Nuclear Energy Act 
46 of 1999 and The National Nuclear Regulator Act 47 of 1999. 
271 In terms of The National Water Act 36 of 1998. 
272 In terms of various statutes and laws of which the regulations issued in accordance with 
the Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989 and the Road Traffic Act 29 of 1989 are but two 
examples. 
273 Fuggle & Rabie 4, 5. 
274 See Fuggle & Rabie 5 – 6 for a comprehensive discussion of these classes. 
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In both these cases the test for successful legal sanctions would be whether it 
effectively prevents problems from occurring, rather than to remedy the 
situation once the problems have actually occurred. 
 
Regarding the other two classes, the authors are of the opinion that, as each 
case will be unique, a blanket provision cannot be laid down to cover all 
situations. The answer is to control case by case by requiring the completion 
of proper environmental impact studies in each specific situation.275 Where 
developments cause irreversible harm, it is clear that they should be 
prohibited entirely.276 
 
Holdgate277 defines pollution as ‘the introduction by man into the environment 
of substances or energy liable to cause hazards to human health, harm to 
living resources and ecological systems, damage to structures or amenity, or 
interference with legitimate uses of the environment’.278 
 
Glazewski discusses pollution control aspects by following a pure media 
approach, namely by dividing the issues under air, land and water,279 yet he 
does not define the term ‘pollution’ as such. 
 
Kidd defines pollution as ‘the introduction by man into the environment of 
substances or energy liable to cause hazards to human health, harm to living 
resources and ecological systems, damage to structures or amenity, or 
interference with legitimate uses of the environment’.280 
 
 
                                            
275 See the statutory provisions that regulate environmental impact studies assessments in 
general in NEMA chap 3. 
276 This is also in accordance with the views of Fuggle & Rabie 6. 
277 Holdgate MW A Perspective of Environmental Pollution (1997). 
278 Holdgate 7. 
279 Glazewski 629. 
280 Kidd 127, see also 127–129 where he explains that he bases his discussion on the 
definition of waste as found in Gourlay World of Waste: Dilemmas of Industrial Development 
(1992) 21, as well as on the definition found in the Concise Oxford Dictionary, on which some 
criticism is provided by Kidd 127 n 5. 
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2.3.5.2 Examples of descriptions from foreign jurisdictions  
 
The definition of the pollution of the marine environment as found in the 
Convention of the Law of the Sea,281 namely ‘the introduction by man, directly 
or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine environment which 
results or is likely to result in deleterious effects’,282 is a simple yet very 
efficient definition and can also be applied to pollution of the environment in 
general. 
 
Shaw includes loss of property as well as harm caused to living resources or 
ecosystems, interference with amenities and other legitimate uses of the 
environment under the description which he endorses.283 
 
Larsson prefers to use the synonym ‘environmental damage’,284 but approves 
of the description that ‘it also indicates any alteration in a given environment, 
and is an indication of a legally significant threshold level of damage or 
interference, and also includes an interference with the use of the 
environment’.285 The pollution must be man-made where human conduct (or 
omissions) creates a danger or adds substances to the environment.286 
 
In the United Kingdom, The Department of Environment’s Working Group on 
Financial Guarantees against Environmental Damage in the Waste 
Management Industry provides a broad description of ‘environmental damage 
and nuisance’ as ‘odour, vermin, noise, dust, litter, fire, traffic and local visual 
amenity’.287 
 
                                            
281 1982; see also chap 3 par 3.3.3 and Annexure A to this study. 
282 Article 1(4) of the Convention. 
283 Shaw 766. 
284 Larsson 123, 124 concedes that the two terms are often used interchangeably. 
285 Larsson 124 referring to Springer AL “Towards a meaningful concept of pollution in 
international law” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1977 (26) 531.  
286 See also Larsson 126 with regard to the position in terms of the OECD Recommendation 
for the Implementation of a Regime of Equal Right of Access and Non-discrimination in 
Relation to Transfrontier Pollution C(77)28(Final) of 17 May 1977.  
287 Financial Guarantees Report (1991); See also Fogleman 1066 for a discussion of this 
specific definition. 
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The EU Environmental Liability Directive288 describes ‘environmental damage’ 
in the context of pollution as including (a) damage to protected species;(b) 
water damage;(c) land damage’; where ‘damage’ is in general is defined as ‘a 
measurable adverse change in the natural resource or measurable 
impairment of a natural resource service which may occur directly or 
indirectly’, which must result in a significant risk of having an adverse effect on 
human health.289 
 
 
2.4 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
It is clear from the examination of the possibilities in this chapter that the 
relevant descriptions and definitions vary extensively. As the ‘environment’ 
means different things to different people, the scope of the descriptions clearly 
depend on the need for which a description is sought, as well as the angle 
from which one views the issue.290 In some cases the verbosity of the 
descriptions is astounding. It is submitted that the varied statutory definitions 
and descriptions considered have the potential to create legal uncertainty, yet 
that these distinctions can in most cases be justified as the focus for which 
each definition is proposed, differs. As a sectoral as well as a transectoral 
division of environmental law is unavoidable,291 it impacts on the descriptions 
required for effective administration and governance. As discussed, the 
various statutes provide definitions that focus exclusively on the scope of the 
relevant Acts. Where the facts and circumstances of a specific situation 
require these concepts to be interpreted in accordance with one of the 
specialised statutes, the descriptions in that statute will of course enjoy 
precedence. 
 
Where a problem with interpretation exists, for example, where a civil claim is 
brought in a specific situation that does not fall directly within the scope of a 
                                            
288 See n 125 above. 
289 Art 2(1). 
290 See par 2.1 for the reference in the White Paper on Environmental Management in South 
Africa n 12 above. 
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specialised statute, guidance should be given by the general descriptions 
provided by NEMA and the ECA, and also by statutes that address similar 
issues that pertain to the facts of the case. Where statutes offer no solution 
the views of authoritative writers could offer guidance. In the final instance, 
cognisance can also be taken of corresponding international descriptions. The 
exact description that offers a solution will clearly depend on the individual 
facts and circumstances of each instance. 
 
The parameters of the concept ‘environment’ are continuously evolving, and it 
is therefore not prudent and appears to be impossible to propose a final 
solution to the problems relating to the varied descriptions of the ‘environment’ 
and ‘pollution’. As many specialists in environmental law have not yet 
succeeded in formulating comprehensive definitions, it seems futile to even 
attempt to propose a final definition. The international trend of avoiding the 
term ‘environment’ by using other general terms such as ‘life support 
systems’, ‘foundations for life’ or ‘biosphere’ merely avoids the issue and does 
not provide clarity that is satisfactory for purposes of this thesis. 
 
For purposes of this study, it is proposed that the ‘environment’ can be 
described simply as ‘everything surrounding a human being, yet not including 
any human beings’. If one includes humans as part of the environment, then 
damage by one human caused directly to another, through assault for 
example, can be seen as environmental damage. Environmental damage 
should rather be damage caused to the environment by or due to the conduct 
of a human being that indirectly has a negative impact on the rights and 
interests, such as the health and well-being, of another human being. 
Although it can be said that nature has to be protected merely for nature’s 
sake, one should concede that it must be protected more for the sake of 
mankind. This is in accordance with section 24 of the Constitution that 
provides that ‘[e]veryone has the right to have the environment protected for 
the benefit of present and future generations’.292 This description specifically   
                                            
291 See par 2.1 above. 
292 Own emphasis. 
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acknowledges the environment in terms of its link to humans, and does not 
refer to the protection of the environment only for the sake of the environment 
itself. 
 
Although this is a very broad definition, the scope of its application has to be 
linked to and thus limited by the definition of ‘pollution’ provided below, as 
both terms go hand-in-hand for purposes of the topic and focus of this thesis.   
 
As the focus of the study is on damage and liability issues and related first-
party and third-party insurance cover, ‘pollution’ for purposes of this study 
needs to be defined in its narrow sense, in that it should also accommodate 
any detrimental or negative result caused by human conduct that causes or 
has the potential to cause the wrongdoer’s liability towards another, and does 
not include situations where pollution results from sources other than human 
conduct, for example, by forces of nature or natural soil erosion.  
 
‘Pollution’ can, therefore, for purposes of this thesis be defined simply as ‘any 
change of, or in, the state of the environment that is caused by a person’s 
conduct or lack thereof, that causes ensuing damage, harm, loss or prejudice 
to another’. This definition is broad enough to cover even situations where the 
environmental damage causes pure economic loss, loss of environmental 
amenities or a reduced enjoyment of life because of an unsightly or non-
aesthetical environment, for example, where plastic bags get stuck in bushes, 
trees are lost due to acid rain, or where polluted soil and water cause wild 
animals to contract diseases, resulting in them not being the splendid 
specimens one expects to see. 
 
This description has the advantage that it also covers an exacerbation or 
increase of pollution in areas that have already been polluted. Should one 
refer only to a change in the environment from its original state, it could 
appear to include only actions that initially polluted the environment from its 
proper natural state, and not further acts of increased pollution to an already 
polluted environment. 
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Once it has been determined that a specific factual situation falls within the 
scope of an environmental pollution damage scenario, the liability issues of 
ensuing claims have to be dealt with. An examination of the legal rules 
relating to liability in South African law, both statutory and common-law rules, 
follows in the next two chapters.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
STATUTORY LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY POLLUTION 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Liability for environmental damage is established under both national and 
international law.1 As a starting point, the relevant sections and principles of 
the Constitution as the supreme law of South Africa are discussed as 
environmental damage usually entails some form of violation of human 
rights.2 On an international level, Declaration 1 of the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment provides that ‘[b]oth aspects of man’s 
environment, the natural and the man-made, are essential to his well-being 
and to the enjoyment of basic human rights – even the right to life itself’.3 The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights4 also provides that ‘[e]very 
                                            
1 Anderson M “Transnational Corporations and Environmental Damage: Is Tort Law the 
Answer?” 2002 (Spring) Washburn Law Journal 399 concedes that ‘[i]t is now commonplace 
to observe that the causes and consequences of global environmental change cannot be 
addressed through the exercise of national jurisdiction alone’; examples of conventions 
include The Basel Convention of the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous 
Wastes and their Disposal ratified in May 1994; the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) signed on 15 June 1993 and 27 August 1997 and ratified on 29 
August 1997, and the other conventions discussed in par 3.3.3 and listed in Annex A. 
2 In most well-known cases of environmental damage as mentioned in chap 1 par 1.1 n 3 the 
introduction to this study, the claims relate to damage to the environment, other patrimonial 
damages and also to death, personal injuries and include claims based on human rights 
violations as well; for an African perspective see Ebeku KSA “The right to a satisfactory 
environment and the African Commission” 2003 (3) African Human Rights Journal 149; for a 
European perspective see Article 1 of The Charter on Environmental Rights and Obligations 
of Groups and Organizations as reprinted in the Report on the Regional Conference at 
Ministerial Level on the Follow-Up Report of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development in the European Commission for Europe Region: Action for a Common Future 
(Bergen 16–18 May 1990) where it is reiterated that the right to a satisfactory environment 
means that all human beings have a fundamental right to an environment that is adequate for 
their health and well-being, and that it includes a responsibility to protect the environment for 
the benefit of present and future generations; see also the Constitution s 24 that provides the 
following: ‘Everyone has the right to an environment that is not harmful to their health and 
well-being’. In a recent class action in environmental context, the Inuit group is taking the 
Federal government of the USA to the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights to force 
the government to reduce global warming by greenhouse gas emissions as they claim that 
government’s actions or omissions infringe upon their fundamental human rights: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/ 5365728 (last accessed on 27 September 2006). 
3 Stockholm June 1972 (A/CONF 48/14). 
4 Adopted on 27 June 1981 OAU DOC CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev 5. 
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individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and 
mental health’,5 and that ‘[a]ll peoples shall have the right to a general 
satisfactory environment favourable to their development’.6 As section 39 of 
our Constitution provides that international law has to be considered, the 
effect of international agreements and instruments as listed in Annexure A is 
briefly considered.7 An identification and summary of the relevant sections of 
South African statutes are given below. 
 
As the Constitution applies to all law, the values enshrined in the Bill of Rights 
apply to statutory law and to the entire body of private law, which includes the 
law of obligations, specifically the law of delict and insurance law, which form 
the main thrust of this study.8 
 
 
3.2 THE CONSTITUTION 
 
3.2.1  Brief History 
 
The right to a satisfactory, healthy or clean environment is enshrined in over 
60 constitutions from all over the world.9 The first time in legal history that the 
right was constitutionally acknowledged in South Africa was in terms of 
section 29 of the Interim Constitution of South Africa10 that read as follows:  
                                            
5 S 16(1) of the African Charter; see also Van der Linde M & Louw L “Considering the 
interpretation and implementation of article 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights in light of the SERAC communication” 2003 (3) African Human Rights Law Journal 
167; see also Ebeku 161 in general for a comparative study of the right to a clean 
environment in various international constitutions, with specific emphasis on the position in 
African countries. 
6 S 24 of the African Charter. 
7 As enforced by s 39(1)(b); see s 108(2), s 231, s 232 and s 233. 
8 Reinecke MFB, Van der Merwe S, Van Niekerk JP & Havenga P General Principles of 
Insurance Law (2002) (hereinafter ‘Reinecke et al’) par 29. 
9 Ebeku 149 et seq for specific wordings of this fundamental right as they appear in the 
constitutions of various countries. 
10 Act 200 of 1993. 
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‘Every person shall have the right to an environment that is not detrimental to 
his or her health and well-being.’11 A reworded version was included in the 
final Constitution in section 24 which is discussed below.12 
 
3.2.2  Constitutional Rights relevant to the Environment 
 
3.2.2.1 Fundamental right to the environment 
 
3.2.2.1.1 The right to the environment in section 24 
 
The fundamental right to the environment is found in section 24 of the 
Constitution: ‘Everyone has the right to: 
(a) an environment that is not harmful to their health and well-being; 
(b) have the environment protected for the benefit of present and future 
generations through reasonable legislative and other measures that: 
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; 
(ii) promote conservation; 
(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural 
resources, while promoting justifiable economic and social 
development.’ 
 
3.2.2.1.2 Classification of the right to the environment 
 
The right to the environment is classified as a green or third generation right. 
These third generation rights have also been referred to as ‘people’s rights’ as 
they are rights for the public at large rather than rights of individuals.13 The 
right to the environment is in fact a composite right that includes social, 
economic and cultural considerations, with the ultimate goal of ensuring a 
                                            
11 See De Klerk and another v Du Plessis and others 1994 6 BCLR 124 (T) for a discussion of 
the wording and effect of this clause given prior to the enactment of the final Constitution. 
12 Par 3.2.2.1.1. 
13 See Kidd M Environmental Law, A South African Guide (2008) (hereinafter ‘Kidd’)  19 for a 
brief exposition of the classification; see also Glazewski J “The environment, human rights 
and a new South African Constitution” 1991 (7) SAJHR 167; as well as the discussion by 
Loots C “Making Environmental Law Effective” 1994 (1) SAJELP 17. 
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balanced environment. Although development must be socially, 
environmentally and economically sustainable, it also places an imperative on 
the State to secure environmental rights.14 The right does not supersede or 
eclipse other rights. 
 
3.2.2.2 Conflicting constitutional rights 
 
The process of environmental management by its very nature induces tension 
with other rights contained in the Bill of Rights, most notably property rights15 
and the right to freedom of trade and occupation.16 
 
Other constitutional rights that must be read in context with the right to the 
environment include the right to life,17 human dignity,18 equality,19 freedom 
and security,20 privacy21 and the socio-economic right of children,22 especially 
their rights to basic nutrition and shelter.23 These are all non-derogable 
rights.24 
 
Two other socio-economic rights that could impact on the right to the 
environment are the right to access to food and water and the right to 
adequate housing.25 The right of the freedom of trade, occupation and 
profession can often be in conflict with the right to the environment, where 
industrial development and other related activities impact negatively on the 
                                            
14 NEMA s 2; MEC: Department of Agriculture, Conservation and the Environment Dr ST 
Cornelius v HTF Developers (Pty) Ltd Case nr CCT 32/07 [2007] ZACC par 12, par 28; Fuel 
Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director-General: Environmental Management, 
Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Mpumalanga Province and Others 
2007 6 SA 4 (CC) pars 13, 44, 59. 
15 S 25. 
16 S 22. 
17 S 11. 
18 S 7(1), 10. 
19 S 9; see also the position stated by Christie RH The Law of Contract in South Africa 5th ed 
(2006) 13 and the discussion of exclusion clauses in chap 6 par 6.5 below. 
20 S 12. 
21 S 14. 
22 S 28. 
23 S 28(1)(c) and s 28(1)(d). 
24 Table of Non-Derogable Rights in the Constitution chap 2. 
25 S 26. 
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environment.26 Other rights that apply in the process of enforcing the 
constitutional right to the environment include the rights of access to 
information,27  of just administrative action,28 the extended provisions on locus 
standi,29 and the requirement to consider international law.30 These are, 
together with the right to the environment in section 24, classified as 
derogable rights. 
 
Irrespective of the right envisaged in section 24, the remainder of the 
Constitution contains various other provisions that deal with matters pertaining 
to environmental law that have made it difficult to achieve full integration of 
environmental laws. This is caused by the different functional areas of 
concurrent national and provincial legislative competence, functional areas of 
exclusive provincial legislative competence, and some competence allocated 
to local authorities as provided for in the Constitution.31  
 
The focus of this study will remain on national legislation, as provincial and 
local government legislation is too extensive in scope, and has limited 
application to the purposes of this study. 
  
As mentioned above, the Constitution is divided into various functional areas 
for purposes of pollution control and waste management, and the following 
brief exposition of these functional areas can be made. Henderson identifies 
the prime areas as the environment, pollution control and road traffic 
regulation, the latter specifically relating to air and noise pollution. These are 
all concurrent national and provincial legislative competencies.32  
 
                                            
26 S 22. 
27 S 32, also the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 that gives effect to the 
constitutional right to information. 
28 S 33; also the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
29 S 38; also the full discussion of this section in the text below.  
30 S 39(1)(b); see also the reference to s 39 in n 39 and its application in par 3.3.1 in the text 
below; see also Bray E “Legal perspectives on Global Environmental Governance” 2005 (68) 
THRHR 357 361 on the management of the environment as a ‘shared’ functional area within 
the national and the provincial spheres of government’. 
31 Henderson PGW Environmental Laws of South Africa Vol 1 (1999) 1-4. 
32 Schedule 4 Part A. 
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Secondary areas include air pollution, municipal health, and certain water and 
sanitation services that are identified as functional areas that enjoy concurrent 
national and provincial legislative competencies, yet are subject to the 
executive authority and administrative control of local authorities.33 
 
Lastly, provincial authorities have exclusive legislative authority over 
cleansing and control of public nuisances, over which local authorities then 
have the executive authority as well as the administrative control.34 
 
3.2.3 Liability and Remedies for Infringement 
 
3.2.3.1 Application of the Constitution 
 
Both the State and other persons, such as individuals and juristic persons, 
have to ensure that the environment is protected. The constitutional right to 
the environment needs to be assessed in this context. 
 
3.2.3.1.1 Vertical application 
 
The Constitution primarily has a vertical application between the State and its 
citizens.35 The right to just administrative action in section 33 applies to the 
State’s functions and is especially relevant to any development and any 
processes that affect the environment.36 The basic values and principles that 
govern public administration are set out in section 195(1). 
 
                                            
33 Schedule 4 Part B. 
34 Schedule 5 Part B. 
35 In terms of s 7(2) that provides that the State must respect, protect, promote and fulfill the 
rights in the Bill of Rights; as well as s 8(1) that provides that it binds the legislature, the 
executive, the judiciary and all organs of State. 
36 S 33 reads as follows: ‘(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair. (2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by 
administrative action has the right to be given written reasons. (3) National legislation must be 
enacted to give effect to these rights, and must – (a) provide for the review of administrative 
action by a court, or where appropriate, and independent and impartial tribunal; (b) impose a 
duty on the State to give effect to the rights in subsections (1) and (2); and (c) promote an 
efficient administration.’ See also in this regard The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 
of 2000 that regulates the enforcement of this constitutional right. 
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3.2.3.1.2 Horizontal application 
 
Section 8 provides that the Bill of Rights also applies to non-state bodies and 
to individuals where applicable.37 This means that one could also enforce 
constitutional rights against all  persons, thus against the State, a non-state or 
private body or against any individual for causing pollution or ecological 
degradation, not promoting conservation or for failing to comply with the 
duties as required by section 24. 
 
Due to the provisions of section 39, the Bill of Rights also enjoys an indirect 
horizontal application in that the interpretation or development of any law 
needs to comply with the provisions in the Constitution.38 This includes the 
development or interpretation of principles of the law of delict and the law of 
contract.39 The values that underlie our constitutional democracy, among 
them the values of human dignity, the achievement of equality,40 the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms, and the rule of law form the 
                                            
37 S 8 provides as follows: ‘(1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, 
the executive, the judiciary and all organs of State. (2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a 
natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the 
nature of the right, and the nature of any duty imposed by the right. (3) When applying a 
provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of subsection (2), a court – 
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the 
common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right; and (b) may 
develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation is in accordance 
with section 36(1).’ 
38 S 39 provides that ‘(1) [w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum - (a) 
must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom; (b) must consider international law; and (c) may consider 
foreign law. (2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or 
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of 
the Bill of Rights. (3) The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or 
freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common law, customary law or legislation, to 
the extent that they are consistent with the Bill’. De Klerk and another v Du Plessis and others 
1994 6 BCLR 124 (T); see in general the discussion by Loots C “The Impact of the 
Constitution on Environmental Law” 1997 (4) SAJELP 57; see also Bell S & McGillivray D 
Environmental Law 6th ed (2006) (hereinafter ‘Bell & McGillivray’) 388 who declare that 
‘[h]uman rights law may force through some welcome developments, for example to bring 
nuisance actions.’ See also the discussion of claims based on nuisance or the abuse of rights 
in chap 4 par 4.2.3.4.1 below. 
39 As was confirmed by both the majority and the minority judgments in Barkhuizen v Napier 
2007 5 SA 323 (CC). 
40 Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000, for example, 
gives effect to the Constitution in its goal to prevent or limit discrimination. 
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principles on which the determination of public policy must be based.41 Any 
statute or contractual provision that is contrary to public policy, tested against 
constitutional values, is unenforceable.42 This is especially relevant when one 
has to determine the constitutionality of clauses in insurance policies that limit 
or infringe upon the policyholder’s constitutional rights. 
 
3.2.3.2 Remedies in terms of section 24 
 
The inclusion of section 24 in the Constitution clearly creates a statutory duty 
to protect the environment and to prevent pollution that could cause damage 
to the environment. The question remains whether this section is wide enough 
to create specific constitutional remedies which the injured party who suffers 
damage could enforce against the polluter who causes it.  
 
It is important to note that section 24 is divided into two distinct subsections. 
Section 24(a) provides that ‘[e]veryone has the right to an environment that is 
not harmful to their health and well-being’.43 This section places a duty upon 
all citizens and on the government not to act in a way that could cause 
pollution or ecological degradation to harm or cause detriment to the 
environment. No specific remedies are mentioned in section 24(a). 
 
                                            
41 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (AD) 7  for a discussion of public policy ex ante the 
Constitution; ex post the Constitution again Barkhuizen v Napier par 29 et seq; Afrox 
Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA); Naude T & Lubbe FG “Exemption clause – a 
rethink occasioned by Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom” 2005 (121) SALJ 441 et seq; South 
African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 3 SA 323 (SCA); Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 
SA 1 (SCA); Johannesburg Country Club v Stott 2004 5 SA 511 (SCA); see also Havenga 
(1995) 187; also the general discussion of the legality of contractual clauses by Christie 213 
et seq.  
42 Barkhuizen v Napier par 29; see in this regard the extensive discussion in chap 6 par 
6.5.2.3 below. 
43 It is not clear what the words ‘health and well-being’ precisely mean, and this remains open 
for eventual interpretation in subsequent case law, and based on the facts and circumstances 
of each specific situation. The term ‘well-being’, being broader than the term ‘health’, could, 
for example, include even aspects beyond bodily integrity and include aspects of human 
dignity and even privacy. Our general well-being also includes our right to enjoy quality of life. 
See as an example in this regard the case of Lopez Ostra v Spain 1995 20 EHRR 277 that 
was brought before The European Court of Human Rights, where the court ruled that a bad 
smell emitting from a tannery that did not cause environmental harm per se, was a violation of 
the right to privacy of the neighbouring residents. 
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Section 24(b), however, provides that ‘[e]veryone has the right to have the 
environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, 
through reasonable legislative and other measures’.44 
 
In contrast to section 24(a) above, section 24(b) does create a positive duty to 
take the required actions in order to reach the constitutional goals set out in 
the Bill of Rights. Section 24(b) also places an imperative on the State to 
secure environmental rights by legislation. Once again, no specific remedies 
are mentioned in this section. General constitutional remedies will therefore 
apply as discussed below.45 
 
3.2.3.3 Limitation in terms of section 36 
 
Section 36 allows for the infringement upon or limitation of a person’s 
constitutional right to a satisfactory environment by a law of general 
application in certain specified circumstances. A fair balance has to be struck 
between the competing interests of the community as a whole, and that of the 
specific individual whose fundamental rights are infringed upon. The relevant 
section reads as follows: ‘(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited 
only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including 
– (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance and purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and the extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the 
limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the 
purpose. (2) Except as provided under subsection (1) or in any other provision 
of the Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights’. 
 
This section will apply in a situation where a constitutional right is infringed 
upon for the greater good of society, for example where an industrial 
                                            
44 Own emphasis; see the full wording of s 24(b) in par 3.2.2.1.1 above. 
45 See par 3.2.3.5 below. 
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development that can benefit a developing society46 causes environmental 
damage to the property of an individual.47 
 
The effect of competing constitutional rights is relevant to the issues 
addressed in the following chapters, for example on the liability for omissions, 
regarding issues of wrongfulness and for the assessment of actionable 
damages as discussed in chapter 4 below.48 The application of constitutional 
principles will determine whether there was an acceptable and therefore legal 
infringement of a constitutional right.49 The constitutionality of contractual 
exclusion, exemption and limitation clauses that intend to exclude liability for 
environmental harm or damage in insurance contracts, deserves special 
attention and is discussed in detail in chapter 6 below.50 
 
3.2.3.4 Right of access to information 
 
Another right that is important for the enforcement of the right to the 
environment in section 24 is the right of access to information.51 It is important 
to be able to ascertain whether conduct or lack thereof by the State or by 
another person has the potential of causing damage to the environment, to a 
                                            
46 As allowed in the Constitution s 22, the freedom of trade, occupation and profession; s 25, 
the right to property; s 26 the right to housing; and s 27 the right to inter alia food and water. 
47 S 24 the right to environment.  
48 Petroprops (Pty) Ltd v Barlow and another 2006 5 SA 160 (W) 189 where the right to 
property competed directly with the right to a clean and healthy environment, as the plaintiff 
intended to build and operate a fuel service station in an ecologically sensitive area. 
49 See Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes  7 for an comprehensive examination of the criterion of 
public policy prior to the Constitution; for case law ex post the Constitution see Barkhuizen v 
Napier par 23 et seq; Reddy v Siemens Telecommunications 2007 2 SA 486 (SCA) 493, 496, 
500; Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom  21 et seq; see also the discussion by Naude & Lubbe 
441; South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd  par 27; Brisley v Drotsky; 
Johannesburg Country Club v Stott; Havenga (1995) 187; also in general Van der Merwe S, 
Van Huyssteen LF, Reinecke MFB & Lubbe GF Contract General Principles 3rd ed (2007) 97, 
199, 192, 513; Christie 18, 248, 347. 
50 See the full discussion of the constitutionality of exclusion,exemption and limitation clauses 
in chap 6 par 6.5 below. 
51 S 32 that reads as follows: ‘(1) Everyone has the right of access to – (a) any information 
held by the State; and (b) any information that is held by anther person and that is required for 
the exercise or protection of any rights. (2) National legislation must be enacted to give effect 
to this right, and may provide reasonable measures to alleviate the administrative and 
financial burden on the State.’ For an extensive general discussion of the constitutional right 
of access to information see Klaaren J & Penfold G on “The Right of Access to Information” in 
Woolman S (ed) Constitutional Law of South Africa Chap 62 2nd ed (2006) (hereinafter 
‘Klaaren & Penfold’) chap 62. 
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person or to the community at large via the environment, in order to act 
proactively to prohibit or limit this conduct. Where loss or damage has already 
been caused, sufficient information is crucial for an actionable claim.52 
Information found in environmental impact assessments for example can be 
of great value.53 This is discussed in chapter 6 below regarding the adverse 
effect that a lack of information has on the predictability of the risk.54 
 
To succeed with an environmental claim, one usually requires access to 
information contained in various reports, such as environmental impact 
assessment reports, and records held by other persons, for example, by the 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism.55 The right of access to 
information is a universal human right. The international position on 
infringements of this right and subsequent liability may potentially be applied 
as a precedent when dealing with future issues in this regard in South Africa 
where the South African law is lacking in precedent.56 
 
                                            
52 See Bray E “Public participation in environmental law” 2003 (68) THRHR 121 (hereinafter 
‘Bray (2003)’) 126 who also states that  access to information concerning the environment is 
crucial to effective public participation in environmental decision-making. Affected parties and 
communities ‘must be furnished with relevant information to enable them to prepare an 
appropriate defence in environmental actions’. 
53 The requirement to complete and provide EIA’s in terms of Chap 5 of the NEMA, that came 
into effect on 1 July 2006. 
54 See chap 6 par 6.2 below. 
55 The results of an environmental impact assessment report, as well as the Environmental 
Authorisation are required in terms the Regulations issued in accordance with chap 5 of the 
NEMA, or by s 38 and s 39, and reg 50 of the Minerals and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act referred to in par 3.4.11 of the text below.  
56 See McGinley and Egan v United Kingdom 1998 27 EHRR 1 where the explosions of 
nuclear testing on Christmas Island had the potential to cause radiation damage to the 
plaintiffs who lived in close proximity of the testing facility. The State refused information that 
would enable the plaintiffs in the first instance to determine whether the specific testing had 
the potential to cause damage, how serious one could expect the damage to be, and also 
what the quantum of damages would be when the injuries manifested. The court found at 44 
that ‘[t]he issue of access to information which could either have allayed the applicants’ fears 
in this respect, or enabled them to assess the danger to which they were exposed, was 
sufficiently closely linked to their private and family lives, as to raise an issue under (the 
relevant) provision’ and subsequently held the State liable for its failure to disclose the 
relevant information; also Lopez Ostra v Spain 277 where the State was held liable for 
allowing a factory to be erected for the purpose of processing waste from various unlicenced 
tanneries, which caused air pollution and bad smells. The court held at 295 that ‘[n]aturally, 
severe environmental pollution may affect individuals well-being and prevent them from 
enjoying their home environment in such a way as to affect their private and family lives 
adversely without however, seriously endangering their health’. 
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The comprehensive Promotion of Access to Information Act57 gives effect to 
the fundamental right to information, in terms of which access is given to 
information and records held by public bodies58 as well as by private bodies.59 
The Act provides for specific grounds for refusal of access to records held by 
these bodies.60 These exceptions that have been gleaned from the cumulative 
experiences of other jurisdictions reflect the need to balance the conflicting 
interests of the parties involved.61 Except for a refusal based on the grounds 
of the protection of the privacy or security of a person or on the protection of 
his property, these grounds do not include any specific ground to refuse 
access to information relating to  environmental records or the environmental 
status of property. What has been emphasised repeatedly is that a party is 
entitled to disclosure of ‘relevant evidential material’.62 
 
Where access is sought to the information held by a private body, the access 
will only be allowed where procedural requirements have been met, where no 
statutory grounds for refusal exist, and where access is required to protect or 
exercise any right, whether it is a constitutional, statutory or common law 
rights.63 This ‘need to know’ is an additional yet not onerous requirement that 
                                            
57 Act 2 of 2000. 
58 Part 2 s 11–s 49 of the Act; Klaaren & Penfold 62–11 et seq for a discussion of the 
distinction between these bodies; also 62–12 on the fact that a public body includes a State 
department and would therefore include the Department of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism. 
59 Part 3 s 50 to s 73 of the Act; Unitas Hospital v Van Wyk and another 2006 4 SA 436 (SCA) 
445 where it was confirmed that the requester of the information has to show an ‘element of 
need’ or ‘substantial advantage’ by gaining access to the information. 
60 Part 2 chap 4 contains the grounds for refusal of access to the records of public bodies, 
whereas part 3 chap 4 contains the grounds for refusal of access to the records of private 
bodies.  
61 Klaaren & Penfold 62–18 et seq; also Govender K “The Assessment of Limitation on 
Access to Information in the Promotion of the Access to Information Act and the Danger that 
Disclosure will become the Exception rather than the Norm”  Seminar Report  2001 (5) 
presented at the Conference on the Constitutional Right of Access to Information 
(Johannesburg 2000) 525. 
62 See especially Earthlife Africa (Cape Town) v Director-General: Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2005 3 SA 156 (C) par 51 that it is not equivalent to a right 
of complete disclosure; also par 65 that access must be allowed to serve the requirement of 
procedural fairness. 
63 S 50 of the Act; Unitas Hospital v Van Wyk and another 445; see also O’Regan J regarding 
the fact that the broader notion of the term ‘right’ than in a general private law context may be 
appropriate in Premier Province of Mpumalanga and Another v Executive Committee of the 
Association of Governing Bodies of State-Aided Schools: Eastern Transvaal 1999 2 BCLR 
151 (CC) 163 n 10; also Klaaren & Penfold 62–14 that it can be interpreted so broadly that 
the term ‘rights’ moves closer to the meaning of a legitimate expectation. 
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a requester must prove before he is allowed access to the information 
required.64 
 
The requirements were set in The Cape Metropolitan Council v Metro 
Inspection Services65 that (a) the requester has to state what the right is that 
he wishes to protect or exercise; (b) the exact information that is required and 
(c) how the information would assist him in protecting or exercising his right.66 
One may ask whether the requester has to prove a prima facie case of the 
rights that he wishes to protect or exercise, or whether access to information 
may be granted to enable him to establish whether he has such a right.67 It is 
submitted that the latter should be supported as it clearly facilitates the 
primary rationale of the right of access to information. 
 
Where disclosure is sought from a public body, the ‘need to know’ - the 
requester’s motives for seeking access, and the public body’s information 
officer’s beliefs in this regard - are irrelevant as access must be provided as 
stipulated in the Act unless statutory grounds for refusal of access exist. As 
far as access to environmental impact assessments is concerned, a public 
body may refuse access where the record contains an opinion, advice, report 
or recommendation or an account of consultation, discussion or deliberation 
for the purpose of formulating a policy or taking a decision in the exercise of 
power or performance of a duty imposed by law.68 As this section is so 
broadly worded and would frustrate most claims brought on the grounds of 
improper administrative action, it should be interpreted restrictively. It should 
only apply to pre-decision documents, and only to documents containing 
opinions and the like and not to documents that set out facts.69 Where the 
document contains evaluative material and disclosure would be in breach of a 
duty of confidentiality, access may also be refused.70  
                                            
64 Govender 18 also holds the same view that this is not an onerous requirement.  
65 2001 3 SA 1013 (SCA).  
66 The Cape Metropolitan Council v Metro Inspection Services par 28. 
67 Klaaren & Penfold 62-16 – 62-18. 
68 Promotion of Access to Information Act s 44(1)(a). 
69 Klaaren & Penfold 62–23. 
70 Promotion of Access to Information Act s 44(2). 
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In the final instance, where it is in the public interest that information be 
disclosed, overriding the other non-disclosure provisions may be justified. This 
is extremely important in an environmental context, as the Act states that a 
request for access must be granted, notwithstanding the other provisions of 
the act if ‘(a) the disclosure of the record will reveal evidence of – (i) a 
substantial contravention of, or failure to comply with the law; or (ii) an 
imminent and serious public safety or environmental risk;71 and  (b) the public 
interest in the disclosure of the record clearly outweights the harm 
contemplated in the provision in question’.72  
 
This will be of immense value and will clearly assist any person who wishes to 
bring a claim for environmental damages that depends on the disclosure of 
information in records held by a public body. 
 
3.2.3.5 General constitutional remedies and the right of access to the 
courts  
 
3.2.3.5.1 General remedies 
 
Section 38 deals with the way in which, and by whom, constitutional rights can 
be enforced, and provides that ‘[a]nyone listed in this section has the right to 
approach a competent court alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been 
infringed or threatened, and the court may grant appropriate relief, including a 
declaration of rights.73 The persons who may approach a court are: (a) 
anyone acting in their own interest; (b) anyone acting on behalf of another 
person who cannot act in their own name; (c) anyone acting as a member of, 
                                            
71 Own emphasis. 
72 Klaaren & Penfold 62–24 criticise this provision in that the emphatic language used could 
have the effect that this override will seldom apply;  they are also of the opinion that a 
mandatory disclosure of this type of information, and not a mere override of refusal to 
disclose, would have been in the public interest; see also the decision in Earthlife Africa 
(Cape Town) v Director-General: Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism) par 50 et 
seq. 
73 Own emphasis: this section forms a pivotal principle when the extent of constitutional 
remedies, especially a constitutional damages claim, is examined; see pars 3.2.3.5.4, 
3.5.3.6.1 below.  
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or in the interest of, a group or class of persons; (d) anyone acting in the 
public interest; and (e) an association acting in the interest of its members’. 
 
What ‘appropriate relief’ is, will depend on the facts and circumstances of 
each case and the context in which the court is approached for assistance.  It 
is a strict requirement that the remedy must be effective. Upon finding that 
there is an inconsistency, the court may declare any law or conduct invalid.74 
 
A court can grant a declaration of rights to clarify the extent of a protectable 
right.75 This, however, creates no direct legal consequences, yet focusses on 
the clarification of constitutional or other legal obligations. 
 
A prejudiced party could also obtain injunctive relief where his rights are 
threatened or infringed upon. Clearly the interdict, whether mandatory or 
prohibitive, is also one of the most powerful remedies to protect or enforce a 
constitutional right. This was already acknowledged in the case of Minister of 
Health and Welfare v Woodcarb (Pty) Ltd and another76 where an interdict 
was granted to prevent the defendant from continuing its activities that caused 
pollution of the atmosphere.77 Our courts can also come to the assistance of 
the State to enforce environmental obligations by issuing an order of contempt 
of court in an attempt to enforce compliance. A supervisory or structural 
interdict that keeps the progress of the defendant under the court’s 
supervision can be of great value and assistance where an interdict to prevent 
damage to the environment, or an interdict to repair environmental damage, is 
concerned.78 
 
                                            
74 Constitution s 172(1)(a). 
75 S 38; see in this regard also Rail Commuters Action Group and Others v Transnet Ltd and 
Others 2006 6 SA 68 (C) par 108. 
76 1996 3 SA 155 (N). 
77 It is submitted that the doctrine of ripeness cannot apply where an interdict is sought to 
prevent an infringement of a constitutional right, as the purpose of the interdict is to prevent a 
person from being affected and it cannot be a requirement that he must already be affected 
before the relief is provided; see also National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality & 
Others v Minister of Home Affairs & Others 2000 2 SA 1 (CC) par 21 for the application of the 
doctrine of ripeness in a constitutional context. 
78 Sibiya & Others v DPP: Johannesburg High Court & Others 2005 5 SA 315 (CC) par 22. 
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An applicant can furthermore choose to appeal any administrative decision 
that affects his rights to the environment or pursue a review of such a  
decision.79  
 
These are, however, of lesser importance for the purposes of this study as the 
focus should remain of an insurable liability, in this case the liability to pay 
damages. This is discussed in greater detail below. 
 
3.2.3.5.2 The fundamental right of access to courts 
 
Insurance policies usually contain standard exclusion clauses that bar or limit 
the policyholder’s rights to judicial redress against the insurer. It was already 
held in Schierhout v Minister of Justice80 in 1925 that an agreement that 
deprives someone of seeking redress in court for a future injury or wrong, 
would, at common law, be an illegal undertaking.  
 
Section 34 of the Constitution deals with the right of access to courts and to 
other dispute resolution procedures, by providing that ‘[e]veryone has the right 
to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a 
fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent 
and impartial tribunal or forum’. 
 
The right of safeguarding equality in the form of equal protection by the law is 
ensured by the general right of access to the courts as set out above.81 
  
It would be possible to obtain an interdict to prevent conduct that leads to 
environmental damage and the resulting loss or damage from occurring or 
                                            
79 Earthlife Africa (Cape Town) v Director-General: Department of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism par 37 et seq; see also Director: Mineral Development Gauteng Region and Sasol 
Mining (Pty) Ltd v Save the Vaal Environment 1999 2 SA 709 (SCA) par 15 et seq on the 
application of the audi alteram partem-rule in an environmental context. 
80 1925 AD 417 424. 
81 In Barkhuizen v Napier par 33 it was found that this right reflects the foundational values 
that underlie our constitutional order and also constitutes public policy; see also in general 
Liebenberg S in Davis DM, Cheadle MH & Haysom NRL Fundamental Rights in the 
Constitution: Commentary and Cases  (1997) 256 et seq. 
 75
continuing.82 The courts could also order the polluter to clean-up the 
environment, and under specific circumstances an award for constitutional 
damages could even be made.83 In terms of section 172(1)(a) of the 
Constitution that deals with the powers of the courts in constitutional matters, 
any conduct by a person or other entity or institution can be found to be 
unconstitutional and appropriate relief ordered. The section provides that 
‘when deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court – (a) must 
declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is 
invalid to the extent of its inconsistency’. 
 
Our courts can also, due to their inherent jurisdiction, come to the assistance 
of the State by enforcing environmental obligations through the issue of an 
order of contempt of court. 
 
3.2.3.5.3 Class actions 
 
Class actions and actions that can be instituted on behalf of a group of 
persons who all have the same cause of action, for example by environmental 
                                            
82 Minister of Health and Welfare v Woodcarb (Pty) Ltd and another; Petroprops (Pty) Ltd v 
Barlow and another  where the court a quo found that the application brought before it by a 
group in the public interest was not harassment, but was brought to protect the environment 
in general. In the words of the court: ’Their interest and motivation is selfless, being to 
contribute to environmental protection in the common good. None of them stands to gain 
material personal profit.’ 
83 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and 
others amici curiae) 2005 5 SA 3 (CC) acknowledged that constitutional damages may be 
claimed for damage caused by an infringement of constitutional rights, is quoted with 
approval; MEC Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Kate 2006 4 SA 478 (SCA) 491 
confirmed that a claim for constitutional damages should succeed where it is the most 
appropriate remedy based on the facts and circumstances of a specific case; cf the earlier 
decision in Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) that can be interpreted 
as a strong discouragement to attempt such a claim. Constitutional damages are also allowed 
in various countries around the world, such as in the USA. See in this regard, for example, 
United States v Georgia No 04-1203, S.Ct, 2006 WL 43973 that allowed a claim for damages 
for constitutional violations against a particular State; also Philip Morris USA v Williams 2006 
U.S.LEXIS 4161, where an order was made that punitive damages must be paid by a person 
(not the State) to another for a constitutional rights violation, but that the claim remains 
subject to constitutional limits; see also the more detailed discussion of interdicts and on 
claims for constitutional damages discussed below in pars 3.2.3.6 and 3.5.3.6. It is important 
already at this stage to confirm that an order for payment of constitutional damages would 
trigger the cover provided under liability insurance, as discussed in chap 5 par 5.2.2.4 and 
chap 6 par 6.3 below. 
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protection groups on behalf of the community at large,84 are specifically 
acknowledged by the Constitution in section 38.85 In terms of the common-law 
doctrine of continentia causae or cohesion of cause of action, an action may 
even be brought by members of the class or group outside the jurisdiction of 
the Court where the action is brought, based on common interest,86 
convenience, justice and good sense.87  
 
The constitutional right to a clean environment in terms of section 24 forms 
the background against which a class action brought in an environmental 
pollution damages case has to be interpreted, and would justify a class action 
where a ‘public standing for the environment’ exists.88 In Minister of Health 
and Welfare v Woodcarb (Pty) Ltd and another, for example, the court granted 
an interdict in the Minister’s favour to prevent the defendant from continuing to 
pollute the atmosphere as it impaired the rights of the general public.89 
 
The locus standi of a person acting in the public interest will be determined by 
the following factors: (a) whether there is another reasonable and effective 
manner in which the challenge may be brought; (b) the nature of the relief 
sought; (c) the extent to which it is of general or prospective application; and 
(d) the range of persons or groups who may be affected directly or indirectly 
                                            
84 Such as Earthwatch, Earthlife Africa, the South African Foundation for the Conservation of 
Coastal Birds or the Wildlife Society of Southern Africa. 
85 The Constitution s 38(c) allows anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group 
or class of person; Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare Eastern Cape and another v 
Ngxuza and others 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA); Wildlife Society of Southern Africa and others v 
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism of RSA and others 1996 (3) SA 1095 (T); see 
also other statutes that provide expressly for class actions, for example the NEMA, in s 32(1) 
that also creates the right to bring a class action to protect the rights of various persons, in the 
public interest and even in the interest of protecting the environment; Rail Commuters Action 
Group and Others v Transnet Ltd and others) 87; see also Bray (2003) 133 that over the 
years many good environmental cases were lost because of the shortcoming that groups 
could not bring an action, and that ‘countless environmental offenders were never brought to 
book’. S 38 of the Constitution and s 32 of NEMA had the effect of liberalising the previously 
restrictive locus standi requirements. 
86 Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare Eastern Cape and another v Ngxuza and 
others 1193; for the origin of this rule, see the United States of America Federal Rule of Court 
8(8) that serves as an early introduction of this type of action. 
87 Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare Eastern Cape and another v Ngxuza and 
others 1193; 1201; Rail Commuters Action Group and Others v Transnet Ltd and others 89. 
88 Larsson 506 et seq discusses this concept of ‘pubic standing’ in view the European position 
on class actions. 
89
 Minister of Health and Welfare v Woodcarb (Pty) Ltd 159. 
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by any order of court, and the opportunity they are afforded to present 
evidence and argument to the court personally.90 
 
A class action clearly benefits parties who have smaller individual claims, for 
example, where a number of claimants all suffered losses due to a single 
polluting event, but where their right of individual redress is unsuitable for 
enforcement in isolation or where it would be disproportionately expensive to 
do so.91 A class action in specifically an environmental context will prove to be 
an effective vehicle to protect and enforce rights to the general environment, 
and a public interest action has since the inception of the Constitution and 
NEMA become a reality in South African law. See also Raubenheimer NO v 
Trustees, Johannes Bredenkamp Trust and Others92 that any person who 
presents a case based on statutory provisions that are concerned with the 
protection of the environment has locus standi in accordance with NEMA 
section 32 of NEMA. 
 
3.2.3.5.4 Constitutional damages 
 
As stated in Fose v Minister of Safety and Security the court held that ‘[t]here 
is no reason in principle why “appropriate relief” should not include an award 
of damages, where such an award is necessary to protect and enforce’ 
fundamental rights.93 In view of later case law supporting the possibility of 
claims for constitutional damages, it is submitted that it is possible to claim 
constitutional damages from a person who infringes upon the constitutional 
right to the environment as ‘appropriate relief’ under sections 24 and section 
                                            
90 Ferreira v Levin NO & Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC); Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and 
Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) par 234; see also Raubenheimer NO v Trustees, Johannes 
Bredenkamp Trust and Others 2006 1 SA 124 (C) that any person who presents a case 
based on statutory provisions that are concerned with the protection of the environment is 
provided with locus standi in accordance with NEMA s 32. 
91 Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare Eastern Cape and another v Ngxuza and 
others 1195 to 1996; Lubbe & Four Others v Cape Plc and related appeals 27-7-2000 (House 
of Lords) on the hearing of an asbestos claim in England where the parent company was 
situated, rather than in South Africa where the damage was caused by a subsidiary of the 
parent company; also Petroprops (Pty) Ltd v Barlow and Another 185 that one has to keep in 
mind the disadvantage that cost orders remain a great concern in class actions where 
individuals are drawn into litigation in respect of public interest issues. 
92 2006 1 SA 124 (C). 
93 Par 60. 
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38.94 In President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) 
Ltd (Agri SA and others amici curiae) the court acknowledged that 
constitutional damages may be claimed for damage caused by an 
infringement of a constitutional right. In MEC Department of Welfare, Eastern 
Cape v Kate the court confirmed that a claim for constitutional damages 
should succeed where it is the most appropriate remedy based on the facts 
and circumstances of a specific case. The remedy must also clearly fit the 
injury.95 Although awards have been made by extending delictual liability in 
view of the Constitution, it is important to note that proving delictual liability is 
not a prerequisite for all claims for constitutional damages.96  
 
Constitutional damages for loss in the absence of a common-law remedy will 
therefore only be possible where a damages claim is the most appropriate 
remedy in the specific circumstances.97 Where the State fails to act in 
accordance with its duties, the Constitutional Court has acknowledged that it 
is also possible to sue for damages based on delict where the State fails to 
act in accordance with its statutory, common-law or constitutional duties.98 
 
Damages for the infringement of the right to the environment can consist of 
clean-up or remedial costs, either on an emergency or a long-term basis, or 
costs incurred to eliminate threats to the environment.99 As to the question 
whether the determination of the quantum of damages is also a constitutional 
issue, it is submitted that there should be no reason why this should not be 
                                            
94 See this wording in italics in s 38 in par 3.2.3.5.1 above; cf the earlier decision in Fose v 
Minister of Safety and Security par 60 that discouraged such a claim. 
95 Steenkamp NO v The Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 3 SA 121 (CC) par 29 
(as both the judgments of the 2006-case heard by the SCA, and the 2007-case heard by the 
CC are applied in this thesis, the cases are distinguished by reference to the respective 
courts); see also MEC Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Kate 491. 
96 See the cases of Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA); 
Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 1 SA 389 (SCA) for state liability based on 
the state’s negligent failure to act, as discussed in chap 4 par 4.2.3.3 regarding delictual 
liability. 
97 MEC Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Kate 490 to 491. 
98 Steenkamp NO v The Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape (CC) 29–55. 
99 See in general the discussion by Van der Linde M & Basson E on “The Right to the 
Environment” in Woolman S (ed) Constitutional Law of South Africa Chap 50 2nd ed (2006) 
50–49. 
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the case as it clearly falls under the broad description of ‘appropriate relief’.100 
By not acknowledging it as such, the absurd consequences would be that 
where the Constitutional Court decides on the existence or merits of a 
potential claim for damages, it cannot make an order for payment of damages 
unless the matter is referred back to a lower court. 
 
The South African courts have made awards for environmental damages in 
the following three cases. In HL & H Timber Products (Pty) Ltd v Sappi 
Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd101 an award was made based on a breach of a 
statutory duty in terms of the Forests Act,102 for damage caused by a veld or 
forest fire that was started negligently.103 In Viljoen v Smith104 an employer 
was held vicariously liable for delictual damages where a veld fire started by 
one of his employees caused damage to the plaintiff’s farm.105 In 
Johannesburg City Council v Television & Electrical Distributors (Pty) Ltd106 a 
stormwater canal system that was improperly constructed caused flooding 
and resulted in an award for damage caused to goods on an adjacent flooded 
property.107 
 
3.3.1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
3.3.1 General 
 
Due to the nature of pollution and its global effects and especially because of 
the cross-border nature of environmental issues, it is clear that the causes 
and consequences of global environmental change cannot be addressed 
                                            
100 See also the judgments of Mokgoro J and Moseneke DCJ in Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 6 SA 
235 (CC) pars 53–54, and 90–92 that support this conclusion. 
101 2001 4 SA 814 (SCA). 
102 Act 122 of 1984 s 84. 
103 It is important to note that s 84 of this Act also creates a presumption of negligence, which 
places the onus on the defendant to disprove his negligence.  
104 1997 1 SA 309 (A). 
105 Viljoen v Smith 318. 
106 1997 1 SA 157 (A). 
107 In Johannesburg City Council v Television & Electrical Distributors (Pty) Ltd 171 damages 
were awarded as they were found to be foreseeable and the wrongdoer was clearly negligent.  
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through the exercise of national jurisdiction alone.108 The effect of 
international agreements, conventions, directives and protocols must also be 
examined. 
 
In terms of both the Stockholm109 and the Rio Declaration,110 States have 
sovereignty over their natural resources and the responsibility not to cause 
environmental damage. The Rio Declaration acknowledged ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities’ for developed countries and for the developing 
countries,111 and developed general principles of international law for 
sustainable development.112 The Rio Declaration also addressed the 
development of international law regarding liability and compensation for 
persons prejudiced by pollution and other environmental damage.113  
 
It is therefore necessary briefly to focus on some international environmental 
principles and general liability principles in terms of international law, and to 
include some international agreements relevant to the scope of this study.114 It 
is trite law that the universal principle of pacta sunt servanda applies and that 
                                            
108 Anderson 1; for example the European Commission Directive on civil liability for damage 
caused by waste; see in general on this point Sands 926. On the transboundary nature of 
pollution damage, see specifically Van Dunne JM (ed) Transboundary Pollution and Liability: 
The Case of the River Rhine (Conference proceedings of the International Conference held at 
Rotterdam 19 October 1990) Instituut voor Milieuschade, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam 
(1991) (hereinafter ‘Van Dunne’) on the pollution of the River Rhine that flows through various 
countries. 
109 Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration called for the rehabilitation and right to claim 
redress for environmental damage or degradation in the Report on the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment Declaration 1 (A/CONF 48/14) Stockholm June 1972. 
110 Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration in the Report on the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (A/CONF.151/6/Rev.1June 13, 1992) Brazil June 1992. 
111 Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration; for a detailed examination of the position in various 
countries, see also in general Rajamani L Differential Treatment in International 
Environmental Law (2006). 
112 See the relevant principles in par 3.3.2.1, specifically item (e) below. 
113 See Sands Ph Principles of International Environmental Law 2nd ed (2003) (hereinafter 
‘Sands’) 58 specifically for the distinction between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries; the 
action plan as developed in Agenda 21 of the UNCED Report A/CONF. 151/26Rev.1(1993); 
Shaw MN International Law 5th ed (2003) (hereinafter ‘Shaw’) 754 identifies the initial 
conceptual problem posed for international law as the State-oriented nature of the discipline, 
leading to a differentiation in the applications and content of legal principles. The international 
community has slowly been moving away from this regime towards one of international co-
operation. 
114 Annex I; a lengthy discussion of the liability of States is not within the scope of the thesis 
unless it falls within the scope of insurable liabilities which is not usually the case. 
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it requires countries to abide by binding treaties based on the principles of 
good faith and equity.115 
 
3.3.2 Distinctive Principles of International Environmental Law 
 
3.3.2.1 Identification of the principles 
 
The following guiding principles are internationally acknowledged as principles 
that apply in the protection of the environment:116 (a) the polluter-pays 
principle;117 (b) the precautionary principle;118 (c) the principle of preventative 
action;119 (d) the principle of co-operation;120 (e) the principle of sustainable 
development;121 (f) the principle of common but differentiated responsibility;122 
                                            
115 As confirmed by Sands 150. 
116 See in this regard Sands 231; these principles are also implemented nationally, for 
example, by the ECA as discussed in par 3.4.3 below; see also the application of these 
principles in the context of marine pollution by Huybrechts MA & Van Damme KN in Faure 
MG & Hu J (eds) Prevention and Compensation for Marine Pollution Damage (2006) 123. 
117 See par 3.3.2.2 below; Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration; see detailed references to this 
principle in Faure (ed) 32; Kramer L EC Environmental Law (2007) (hereinafter ‘Kramer’) 27; 
Sands 279; Shaw 759; and also Larsson 90. 
118 See par 3.3.2.3 below; Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration; Principle 21 of the Stockholm 
Declaration; Sands 266; see for a general discussion Fisher E, Jones J, Von Schomberg R 
Implementing the Precautionary Principle: Perspectives and Prospects (2006); Kramer 23; 
Shaw 759, 776; see also Larsson 111 that the benefit of this principle lies therein that action 
is required before the polluting incident ocurs. 
119 Larsson 111 elaborates that the principle of substitution resorts under the principle of 
preventative action. The former includes, for example, the duty to use less harmful 
components where possible; for more detailed discussions of the principle of preventative 
action see also Kramer 25 and Sands 246. This principle again offers the benefit that it 
requires action to be taken prior to the polluting incident, as is the case in terms of the 
precautionary principle discussed in n 116 above. 
120 See Sands 249. 
121 The concept was defined in the Brundtland Report 43; Shaw 778; Sands 252 et seq 
explains that the principle includes integration of the environment and development. This is 
currently one of Africa’s biggest challenges. For a comprehensive work on this principle see 
the study by Tladi D Sustainable Development in International Law: An analysis of key enviro-
economic instruments (2007). 
122 See Sands 285. 
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(g) the principle not to cause transboundary environmental damage;123 (h) the 
principle of strict liability;124 (i) the principle of restitutio in integrum.125 
 
Some of these principles relate specifically to aspects of liability for 
environmental damage caused, and deserve further explanation. 
 
3.3.2.2 Polluter-pays principle 
 
The best known principle that is incorporated widely into international as well 
as national environmental law is the polluter-pays principle. It is, however, not 
an absolute principle.126 As this is the case, communities and governments 
must attempt to ensure that this principle is met by laying down efficient 
standards and environmental charges to force persons who are responsible 
for pollution, such as operators of hazardous installations, to eventually carry 
the costs, rather than relying on the public purse. 
 
It remains an unavoidable economic reality that the polluter will pass these 
costs on to the consumer, leading to a reallocation or internalisation of costs. 
The justification for the implementation of a strict liability regime is also often 
based on this principle.127 Its application is clearly not suitable for huge natural 
catastrophes due to the extensive liabilities that it could cause for the 
                                            
123 See in this regard Shaw 768; for statutory measures on transboundary pollution see 
specifically the National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act 39 of 2004 as discussed 
in par 3.4.13 below, specifically s 50 that authorises the Minister to take action to prevent and 
remedy the source of air pollution that is generated within South Africa, and that has a 
substantial detrimental effect on the environment or the health of people and animals in other 
countries. 
124 In specific situations the principle of strict liability is established but not applied absolutely, 
yet must be taken into consideration. It is proposed in the conclusion to this study that a strict 
liability regime for environmental damage liability can be advantageous; current examples 
include statutory strict liability for marine oil pollution. 
125 Larsson 117 confirms the view that this reflects the ideal situation which is, of course, the 
full restitution of harm. 
126 As stated by Sands 213, 279; Faure M & Skogh G The Economic Analysis of 
Environmental Law and Policy (2003) (hereinafter ‘Faure & Skogh’) 26 confirm that this 
popular principle ‘has intuitive appeal in that the person responsible for the damage should 
pay’. 
127 See in this regard the discussion in chap 4 par 4.2.4.5 below on the justification to 
introduce a strict liability regime in South Africa for environmental damage. 
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polluter.128 The value of the polluter-pays principle is that it provides an 
incentive for polluters to adhere to set standards in order to prevent liability.129 
 
3.3.2.3 Precautionary principle 
 
This principle has been widely accepted but has also been heavily 
criticised.130 It is, for example, expressed by the duty to complete compulsory 
environmental impact assessments,131 as well as by the more general duties 
to comply with set industry standards of best available technology.132 In MEC: 
Department of Agriculture, Conservation and the Environment v HTF 
Developers (Pty) Ltd133 the court held that the Environmental Conservation 
Act134 gave officials the right to apply the precautionary principle.135 In order to 
achieve effective sustainable development, environmental policies of 
necessity have to be based on the precautionary principle.136 
 
3.3.3 International Agreements 
 
3.3.3.1 Status of agreements 
 
Binding international agreements or instruments impose obligations on the 
countries to act either individually or collectively to achieve the goals set by 
the agreements, and States can be held liable for their omissions or 
transgressions.137 South Africa is bound to these instruments by being a 
                                            
128 This is in accordance with the position in as in the OECD Report on The Application of the 
Polluter-Pays Principle to Accidental Pollution RecC(89)99(Final) 1989. 
129 For a South African perspective, see Havenga P “A Few Steps Closer Towards 
Establishing the ‘Polluter-Pays’ Principle” 1997 (9) SA Merc LJ 89; for a more international 
perspective Faure (ed) 32, also with reference to the opinion of Jans JH European 
Environmental Law 2nd ed (2000) specifically 37 et seq. 
130 See Sands 266 for criticism on this principle.  
131 In accordance with Chap 5 NEMA which came into operation 1 July 2006. 
132 Larsson 111 describes this principle as one that ‘requires one to omit from causing harm, 
and to prevent harmful activities’. 
133 Case CCT 32/07 [2007] ZACC 25. 
134 S 39A of Act 73 of 1989. 
135 Par 15. 
136 As reiterated by Sands 269. 
137 See Robb CAR (ed) International Environmental Law Reports Vol 3 (2001) for case law 
that serves as authority on this point; Shaw 768 confirms that States remain responsible for 
Footnote continues on the next page. 
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party, a party with reservation or a signatory, or has acceded to some of the 
conventions and treaties.138 A comprehensive list of these agreements and 
their status in South African law can be found in Annexure A to this study. 
 
Although they do not apply to all countries, cognisance can also be taken of 
various EC Directives such as the EC Directive on Environmental Liability with 
Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage of the 
European Parliament and Counsel, which aims to prevent and remedy 
environmental damage that presents a threat to human health, as these 
instruments can serve as examples of possible measures that countries in 
Africa could adopt in future. The EU Directive on Environmental Liability is 
examined in greater detail in chapter 7 below.139 
 
3.3.3.2 Compliance 
 
A duty rests upon participating countries to enforce the terms of the 
conventions on national level and to ensure due compliance by its citizens. 
The Constitution provides for the recognition, status and effect of customary  
international law, agreements and treaties, and confirms that they are binding 
once the prescribed approval or ratification process has taken place.140 
 
International arbitration procedures are available as dispute resolution and 
enforcement mechanisms, and various international courts141 have jurisdiction 
to hear matters in terms of international law.142  
 
 
unlawful acts by their officials, and must ensure that their international obligations are 
respected within their territory. 
138 See Annexure A to this thesis on the treaties, conventions and protocols that form part of 
South African law. 
139 See chap 7 par 7.2 below. 
140 S 39, also enforced by s 108(2), s 231, s 232 and s 233. 
141 For example, The International Court of Justice, the Dispute Settlement Body of the World 
Trade Organization, The European Court of Justice and the various Human Rights Courts. 
142 See Sands 212–226 for an examination of the various mechanisms available. 
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3.3.4 Liability and Insurance 
 
3.3.4.1 Identification of participants 
 
Contemporary international law recognises a wide range of participants, 
including States, international organisations, regional organisations, non-
government organisations, public companies, private companies and 
individuals.143 Not all these entities enjoy international personality under all 
the branches of international law. As personality is a relative phenomenon, it 
varies depending on the circumstances of a specific issue. A brief exposition 
of the position of the State and the position of individuals and non-state 
bodies follows. 
 
3.3.4.2 Liability of States 
 
The liability of an entity will depend largely on its nature, the extent and focus 
of an international legal rule, and the specific facts and circumstances of the 
situation that require the investigation into international liability.144  
 
The ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts adopted in 2001 reflect the liability imposed upon actors for their illegal 
acts or for adverse consequences due to their lawful acts.145 Article 37 
provides that ‘(1) The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is 
under an obligation to compensate for damage caused thereby, insofar as 
damage is not made good by restitution. (2) The compensation shall cover 
                                            
143 See Henderson A “A step forward or a slap in the face? Lubbe & Four Others v Cape Plc 
and related appeals 27-7-2000 (House of Lords)” 2000 (October) De Rebus 47 on the 
position of the liability of holding companies and their subsidiary companies that operate in 
different countries.  
144 Shaw 178, 409–459 considers the recognition of an entity as a ‘State’. 
145 Report of the ILC, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001); see Sands 872; see also Boyle A in Bowman 
M & Boyle A Environmental Damage in International and Comparative Law (2005) 
(hereinafter ‘Boyle’) 23–25 for a discussion of State liability in an environmental context. Draft 
proposals of the ILC have rejected the implementation of a radical strict liability regime and 
prefer loss allocation amongst the various State actors based on existing civil liability treaties. 
See in this regard the principles of a strict liability regime in chap 4 par 4.2.4.5 below; Larsson 
153 et seq considers the international legal principles that apply specifically to State liability 
specifically for transboundary pollution damage. 
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any financially assessable damage including loss of profits insofar as it is 
established.’ 
 
As far as the State is concerned, it is clear that our government could incur 
liability for failing to comply with its duties. The liability of the State has, in 
view of the various constitutional rights of the State’s subjects, been extended 
from the pre-constitutional position. The State can also incur liability where it 
fails to give effect to a constitutional right. A brief reference can be made to 
section 33(1) of our Constitution that confers on everyone the right to 
administrative action that must be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. It 
is submitted that where the State has to comply with an international 
agreement and fails to do so, the international community and the citizens of 
the State may bring the latter to justice and require specific performance. 
 
3.3.4.3 Liability of persons 
 
Liability could be based on commissions or omissions, based either on a fault 
liability or on a strict liability regime. The latter implements a prima facie 
liability for which only specific defences, exemptions or qualifications exist.146  
 
Claims for reparation include all costs required to wipe out the consequences 
of the illegal act and to re-establish the original position.147 This could be 
restitution in kind or payment of a monetary sum for damages or losses 
sustained.148 Such an award could be referred to the UN Compensation 
Commission that has established formal criteria for the quantification of claims 
regarding environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources.149 
                                            
146 See also chap 4 par 4.2.4.5 for an extensive discussion of a strict liability regime for 
pollution damage liability; also Sands 881 n 57, n 59 for a general examination of strict and 
absolute liability regimes and n 124 for the defences available. 
147 Boyle 17 holds the opinion that reparation requires full compensation, which must be given 
content on particular detailed rules, and that it has no single, logically determined, fixed 
meaning; that the basic principle of reparation cannot be a practical guide to the assessment 
of damages, as methods of assessment and the results vary considerably in various legal 
systems. 
148 Report of the ILC n 113 above: (Part I chap II) art 34. 
149 UN Security Council Doc. S/AC.26/1991/W.P.20, 20 November 1991; and par 35 of 
Decision 7 of the Commission’s Governing Council. 
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3.3.4.4 Mandatory insurance cover 
 
3.3.4.4.1 General 
 
Compulsory or mandatory liability insurance cover by both States and 
individuals has not been widely implemented in all areas under convention, 
except for potential liabilities in the nuclear industry and in the marine 
environment.150  
 
3.3.4.4.2 Marine pollution insurance cover 
 
The marine environment is currently the environmental medium in which 
pollution issues have been addressed most extensively.151 As far as marine 
pollution is concerned, extensive and specialised international and national 
statutory measures exist that ensure the effective synchronisation of the 
prevention of transboundary pollution and the regulation of transboundary 
pollution damage liability.152 The greatest regulatory framework can be found 
within the oil and petroleum industry as the transport of these substances by 
sea poses the greatest risks for marine pollution.153 
 
                                            
150 The Lugano, Paris and Vienna Conventions as examined by Sands 934. 
151 For a comprehensive work on marine pollution see Hui W in Faure MG, Hu J (eds) 
specifically 2–23; see in general also Larsson 127 for a discussion of liability for marine 
pollution by oil; for the South African position under the general principles of insurance law 
see Reinecke et al chap 19. 
152 Such as the International Convention on Liability and Compensation for the Carriage of 
Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea 1996; the 1992 Protocol to the International 
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage 1971, the Rio Convention on Biodiversity 1992; The Convention on the Law of the 
Sea 1982, and others; see also Annex A to this thesis for international instruments relevant to 
the scope of this study; see in this regard Winstanley T “Trans-boundary corporate liability” 
2000 (November) De Rebus 56; as well as Henderson (2000); see also chap 6 par 6.1 and 
par 6.6.2.2 on transboundary pollution. 
153 See Part 4 Division 1 of the Merchant Shipping (International Oil Pollution Compensation 
Fund) Bill 2005, which has yet to be enacted in South Africa, on contributions that will become 
due to the fund in terms of the 1992 Protocol to the International Convention on the 
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971, and 
which will allow the Republic to participate in the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions that to 
date have been approved by Parliament in terms of the Constitution s 231(2); see also 
Annexure A. 
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Ship owners can incur strict liability154 for incidents involving hazardous and 
noxious substances.155 Detachment of liability is possible only in limited 
circumstances.156 The 1996 Convention furthermore provides for the 
channeling of liabilities in that only the ship owner or the statutory fund are 
liable to make compensation available to persons affected by polluting 
incidents.157 Liability is furthermore limited to specific amounts.158 
 
It is important to note that for marine pollution, ship owners must maintain the 
required liability insurance cover or provide security by presenting other 
financial instruments.159 The Convention specifically provides for direct claims 
by the prejudiced party against the insurer and not against the insured.160 
 
3.3.4.4.3 Liability cover for nuclear incidents 
 
Another example of international co-operation lies within the nuclear industry, 
where the International Atomic Energy Agency or IAEA acts as a single 
central intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical co-operation in the 
nuclear field. It is the world’s nuclear inspectorate on safety and liability 
issues, and promotes the safe use of nuclear technology and facilitates co-
operation in nuclear development.161 
 
                                            
154 See the discussion in chap 4 par 4.2.4.5 for the general principles of strict liability; also the 
various statutes that provide for strict liability regimes in par 3.4 below. 
155 Article 7(1) of the 1996 Convention. 
156 In terms of chap II of the 1996 Convention the circumstances include (a) an act of war or 
natural disaster; (b) damage caused wholly by the intentional conduct of a third party; (c) 
wholly due to negligent or wrongful acts of a government or other authority. 
157 Article 7(5) of the 1996 Convention; chap III creates the Hazardous and Noxious 
Substances Fund that under Article 14 provides compensation for (a) incidents caused by 
unidentified ships; (b) where the ship owner cannot be held liable; (c) where the ship owner 
cannot meet the claim; (d) or where the damage caused exceeds the limits of the ship 
owner’s liability. 
158 The Article 9 limitations are justified by public policy considerations in that an attempt must 
be made to soften the onerous strict liability imposed.  
159 Article 12 of the 1996 Convention; compulsory insurance certificates must be issued and 
presented where required; see Shaw 808 on details and procedures for claims against ship 
owners. 
160 Article 12(8); see especially this type of first-party insurance to the benefit of a third party 
as examined in greater detail in chap 5 par 5.3.3 below. 
161 http://www.iaea.org (last accessed on 21 February 2008); see also Shaw 771, 801 for a 
discussion of the structure and role of the IAEA. 
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Liability in this industry is dealt with by various international instruments as 
adopted under the scope of the IAEA, and also by various international 
conventions such as the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage, as well as the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for 
Nuclear Damage.162 The Vienna Convention bases liability on the civil law 
concept and requires countries to adopt the following principles: (a) that 
liability is channeled exclusively to the operators of nuclear installations; (b) 
that the liability is absolute; (c) liability is limited in amount;163 and (d) liability 
is limited in time.164 
 
Operators of nuclear facilities must also maintain mandatory insurance or 
other financial securities to cover their potential liabilities.165 Jurisdiction lies 
within the courts of the country in whose territories the nuclear incident 
occurred. The Convention has not yet met with general international 
approval.166 Liability in this specific industry in a South African context is 
discussed in more detail below.167 
 
As the scope of this thesis is on pollution liability in general, and as the marine 
and nuclear liability regimes have been identified as delimitations for purpose 
of this study, this basic discussion should suffice and the issues are not 
examined in greater detail. 
                                            
162 See Annex A attached hereto. 
163 In terms of Articles II and III of the Convention liability must be limited to a specific 
minimum amount, but a maximum is not fixed and remains within the discretion of each 
country. Additional funding, consisting of contributions by the parties, and contributions by the 
Installation State and other contracting parties are available to cover damage, as well as the 
cover provided by additional insurance coverage.  
164 Rights to compensation are extinguished if an action is not brought within 30 (thirty) years 
from the date on which the damage is induced by a nuclear incident. National law may 
establish shorter prescription time limits, but not less that three years from the date on which 
the claimant knew or ought to have known of the damage and the operator’s liability. 
165 See Shaw 803 for a discussion of the various limitations of the claims and on the 
responsibility of the specific State to ensure that these limits are met. 
166 States such as Russia, China and Pakistan who pose a major nuclear threat have not yet 
signed or adopted the Convention. South Africa is currently a non-party to the nuclear 
conventions http://www.ola.iaea.org/factSheets/CountryDetails.asp?country=ZA (last 
accessed on 27 February 2008); see the general considerations of the impact this has on the 
industry by Brown OF “A Continuing Impediment to Nuclear Commerce: The Uranium 
Institute Twenty Fourth annual Symposium 1999” http://www.world-
nuclear.org/sym/1999/brown. 
167 See pars 3.4.4.12 and 3.4.4.15 below. 
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3.4 SOUTH AFRICAN STATUTORY LIABILITY 
 
3.4.1 General 
 
Statutes may create pure statutory duties and ensuing criminal liability or 
payment of fines for non-compliance, but may also establish the remedy of a 
statutory private law claim for damages.168 It is trite law that the intention of 
the legislature to create a civil remedy must appear clearly from the express 
provisions of the statute. The provision must address both the basis of the 
claim and the identification of the capacity of the parties involved. It is 
conceivable that the cause of pollution is not limited to the introduction of 
substances into the environment, but that it can include the introduction of 
genetically modified organisms that did not exist previously or did not occur 
naturally in a specific environment. This requires the inclusion of some 
references to genetically modified organisms and their adverse impact on the 
environment and ensuing liability for damage caused to the environment in 
the discussion in this chapter.169 
 
3.4.2 National Environmental Management Act170  
 
3.4.2.1 General 
 
Although many statutes dealing with the environment have been enacted, two 
key environmental statutes apply in general to environmental protection. The 
first is the National Environmental Management Act (hereinafter ‘NEMA’), and 
the other is the Environment Conservation Act as discussed below.171 
                                            
168 See the explanation by Neethling J, Potgieter JM & Visser PJ Law of Delict 5th ed (2006) 
(hereinafter ‘Neethling et al‘) 69, specifically the content of n 235, on the intention of the 
legislature to create specific extraordinary statutory remedies in this regard. 
169 See also chap 2 pars 2.2.3.3 and par 2.3.3.3 for definitions and descriptions used in the 
Act. 
170 Act 107 of 1998. 
171 See par 3.4.3 below. 
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3.4.2.2 Rights in the Preamble to NEMA 
 
In terms of the preamble to NEMA: ‘Everyone has the right to an environment 
that is not harmful to his or her well-being. Everyone has the right to have the 
environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, 
through reasonable legislative and other measures that prevent pollution and 
ecological degradation, promote conservation and secure ecologically 
sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting 
justifiable economic and social development.’172 It further provides that it is 
desirable that the law should be enforced by the State and that the law should 
facilitate the enforcement of the environmental laws by civil society. This 
imposes a statutory duty upon the State to comply with these provisions, and 
also, most importantly so, imposes a duty upon all its citizens to act in 
accordance with these statutory provisions. 
 
3.4.2.3 Liability in terms of NEMA 
 
NEMA deals specifically with the duty of care to prevent damage and the duty 
to remedy environmental damage.173 Section 28174 requires every person to 
take reasonable measures to prevent the occurrence, continuation or 
recurrence of pollution or degradation to the environment.175 It also requires a 
person to minimize and rectify pollution or degradation where the harm 
caused to the environment cannot be prevented or stopped, even where it is 
authorised by law. Although it was arguably not the intention of the legislator, 
                                            
172 See the judgment in Hichange Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Produce Co (Pty) Ltd t/a Pelts 
Products and others 2004 2 SA 393 (EC) 409 that ‘appropriate relief’ provided for in s 32(1) of 
NEMA even includes the right of the government to close a factory that caused extensive air 
pollution, where the management of the factory failed to remedy the situation after repeatedly 
being ordered to do so. 
173 NEMA Chap 7 Part 1 on ‘Compliance and Enforcement’. 
174 S 28(1). 
175 See the discussion of the definition of the ‘environment’ in terms of NEMA in chap 2 par 
2.2.3.3. 
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it was decided in the case of Bareki v Gencor Limited176 that NEMA does not 
work retrospectively, which is a cause of great concern. 
 
This duty applies to owners, occupiers and even to mere users of land on 
which environmental damage can occur.177 The measures as required by 
section 28(1) are very broad, and include the investigation, assessment and 
evaluation of the impact that the pollution has on the environment,178 the duty 
to inform and educate employees as to their manner of work and the impact 
that their conduct can have on the environment,179 to cease, prevent or modify 
activity that pollutes or harms the environment,180 to contain or prevent the 
movement of pollutants or cause of degradation,181 to eliminate the source of 
pollution182 as well as to remedy the effects of pollution or degradation.183 This 
creates extensive statutory duties for any person who is involved in an activity 
that has the potential to cause pollution damage or degrade the environment. 
 
An interesting statutory exemption is made for a person to avoid civil liability 
for acting in contravention to, or failing to act in accordance with, a civil 
obligation, for example, in accordance with his contractual duties. NEMA 
provides that no person will incur any liability, either civil or criminal, where 
such a person refuses to participate in any activity that could cause pollution 
or degradation to the environment.184 
 
NEMA makes no mention of any liability or other insurance, whether 
mandatory or elective. 
 
                                            
176 2006 1 SA 432 (T). 
177 S 28(1); reg 2, enacted in terms of s 44 of NEMA, requires any person using a vehicle 
within a coastal zone to take all reasonable measures to avoid, minimize or rectify any harm 
caused. 
178 S 28(3)(a). 
179 S 28(3)(b). 
180 S 28(3)(c). 
181 S 28(3)(d). 
182 S 28(3)(e). 
183 S 28(3)(f). 
184 S 29(1). Furthermore, these persons have a statutory duty to report their failure or refusal 
to work within specified time limits, and may not be threatened or bribed to resume work; see 
s 29(2)–s 29(5). 
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3.3.3.2 Persons responsible for clean-up 
 
3.4.2.4.1 Identification of persons 
 
The following persons are responsible for the costs incurred to remedy or 
rehabilitate: (a) persons either directly or indirectly responsible for the 
pollution or degradation, or even for any potential pollution or degradation;185 
(b) owners of the relevant land or their successors-in-title;186 (c) persons in 
control of land, or who used the land at the time of the pollution or degradation 
‘when the activity or process is or was performed or undertaken, or the 
situation came about’;187 (d) any persons who acted negligently in failing to 
prevent such pollution or degradation as required in terms of NEMA;188 and 
(e) even a person who benefited from the preventative or remedial measures 
taken in terms of section 28(7).189 
 
3.4.2.4.2 Extent of liability for clean-up costs  
 
The costs that can be claimed include labour, administrative and overhead 
costs, but must be reasonable.190 From the wording used, these persons 
appear to be jointly and severally liable, with a subsequent right of recourse 
against each other.191  The liability of the State is limited to any failure to act 
that is unlawful, negligent or in bad faith. Costs incurred due to criminal 
liability are excluded as well.192 
 
                                            
185 S 28(8)(a). 
186 S 28(8)(b). 
187 S 28(8)(c); see also chap 6 par 6.3 on the effects of insurance cover triggers and the 
possibility of a long-tail liability. 
188 S 28(1), s 28(8)(d). 
189 This will be the situation where the Director-General or Head of Department took the 
relevant measures upon themselves. 
190 S 28(10). 
191 S 28(8) provides that ‘[t]he Director-General or Provincial Head of Department may 
recover all costs incurred as a result of s 28(7) from any or all of the following persons’; and s 
28(11) provides that ‘[w]here more than one person is liable under subsection (8), the liability 
must be apportioned according to the degree to which each was responsible for the harm to 
the environment’. 
192 S 49. 
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3.4.2.4.3 Duty to notify 
 
Where an ‘emergency incident’ occurs,193 the responsible person194 is obliged 
to give proper notice of the incident,195 and then as soon as is reasonably 
practicable after knowledge of the incident, take measures to contain and 
minimise the effect,196 undertake clean-up measures,197 remedy the effects of 
the incident,198 and assess the effects on the environment and on public 
health.199 The relevant authority may instruct the responsible person to take 
the necessary steps, or can take such steps on behalf of such a person.200 
The authority may then claim a reimbursement for all reasonable costs 
incurred, jointly and severally from all responsible persons involved in the 
incident.201 
 
3.4.2.5 Enforcement 
 
3.4.2.5.1 Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
  
As far as enforcement is concerned, the Director-General202 can enforce 
these duties by giving a directive or compliance order to the relevant 
persons.203 Failure to react allows the Director-General to take the required 
measures.204 Any person may, after a notice period of 30 days, apply for a 
                                            
193 S 30(1)(a) defines ‘an incident’ as ‘an unexpected sudden occurrence, including a major 
emission, fire or explosion leading to a serious danger to the public or potentially serious 
pollution of or detriment to the environment whether immediate or delayed’. 
194 As defined in s 30(1)(b), as the person who is responsible for the incident, owns or is in 
control of the hazardous substance. 
195 S 30(3). 
196 S 30(4)(a). 
197 S 30(4)(b). 
198 S 30(4)(c). 
199 S 30(4)(d). 
200 S 30(6), (7) and (8). 
201 S 30(9); Truck and General Insurance Co Ltd and another v Verulam Fuel Distributors CC 
and another 2007 2 SA 26 (SCA) par 12. 
202 This will be the Director-General of Environmental Affairs and Tourism in terms of s 1 item 
9 of the NEMA. 
203 S 28(4). 
204 S 28(7). 
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court order to enforce the Director-General to give such a directive where 
required.205 
 
Even more drastic powers are given to the Director-General to expropriate 
rights in respect of polluted land to the benefit of a person who is to remedy or 
rehabilitate such land.206 To add insult to injury, the costs of the expropriation 
are also for the account of the person who was required to remedy or to 
rehabilitate. 
 
3.4.2.5.2 Class actions 
 
Class actions in a constitutional context have been examined above.207 In 
general, as far as the legal standing of persons other than the State to bring 
an application in order to enforce environmental laws is concerned,208 both 
the Constitution and NEMA create the right to bring a class action to protect 
the rights of various persons where the action is in the public interest. It is 
submitted that an action may even be in the interest of protecting the 
environment for its own sake as it can be seen to serve the interests not only 
of the current generation, but also of future generations.209 The latter 
inclusion210 therefore does not require the pollution or degradation to cause 
harm to any person, but only allows a claim where harm to the environment 
itself is caused. The action envisaged in section 32 refers to a civil action, 
whereas section 33 as discussed below refers to a private criminal 
prosecution. 
 
3.4.2.5.3 Criminal sanction 
 
In a proposed amendment of section 31, a person convicted of an offence in 
terms of section 31N for failing to comply with a compliance notice will be held 
                                            
205 S 28(12). 
206 S 28(6). 
207 See par 3.2.3.4.2 above. 
208 NEMA Chap 7 Part 2. 
209 S 32(1); s 31N. 
210 S 32(1)(e). 
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liable to pay a fine not exceeding R5 million or to imprisonment for a period 
not exceeding 10 years or both.211 
 
3.4.3 The Environment Conservation Act212 
 
3.4.3.1 The ECA General Policy 
 
In the General Policy issued in terms of section 2(1) of the ECA, 213 ‘[e]very 
inhabitant of the Republic of South Africa has the right to live, work and relax 
in a safe, productive, healthy and aesthetically and culturally acceptable 
environment and therefore also has a personal responsibility to respect the 
same right of his fellowman. Every generation has an obligation to act as a 
trustee of its natural environment and cultural heritage in the interest of 
succeeding generations’. 
 
The General Policy of ECA under its heading ‘Pollution Control’ broadly 
provides that pollution should be prevented by the formulation of a 
comprehensive effective policy, by the enactment of legislation, by 
establishing and maintaining certain specified norms and standards, by 
applying the best practicable environmental options based on the most recent 
and suitable technology, by fostering positive attitudes among people and by 
co-operating internationally. 
 
3.4.3.2 Liability in terms of the ECA 
 
In terms of section 29 of ECA, contravention of the ECA’s provisions incurs 
criminal liability.214 The various subsections stipulate the maximum prison 
terms, penalties and fines to be paid, and as a drastic remedy, also allow for 
                                            
211 National Environmental Management Amendment Act 46 of 2003 s 4. 
212 Act 73 of 1989. 
213 General Policy in accordance with ECTA as enacted by GN 51 in Government Gazette No 
15428 (21 January 1994). 
214 In Part VII of ECA titled ‘Offences, Penalties and Forfeiture’. 
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the attachment of goods.215 Any vehicle or anything used in committing the 
offence may be forfeited to the State.216 
 
3.4.3.3 Policy on Hazardous Waste Management 
 
The Policy in terms of ECA on Hazardous Waste Management217 includes the 
international guiding principles for the management of waste in order to 
prevent pollution of the environment.218 The Waste Management Bill that is in 
the process of being finalised,219 imposes tough penalties that include a fine 
of R 1 million or a 10-year jail term, or both.220 
 
3.4.3.4 Enforcement 
 
Section 31A of ECA deals with the powers of various authorities where the 
environment is, or has been, seriously damaged, endangered or detrimentally 
affected by any activity. These include the powers to direct a person to cease 
any activity and take such steps as the authority deems fit to eliminate, reduce 
or prevent the damage, danger or detrimental effect.221 The person may also 
be directed to rehabilitate the environment at his own expense.222 Where a 
person fails to comply, the authority may take or instruct any other person to 
take these steps and all expenditure may then be claimed from the former.223 
This may include more than just the minimum environmental clean-up costs 
                                            
215 See also for example the Schedule on Plastic Carrier Bags and Plastic Flat Bags as 
enacted in GN R625 Government Gazette No 24839 (9 May 2003) s 3; the Regulations 
issued in terms of s 25 of ECA regarding Noise Control as enacted in GN R154 Government 
Gazette No 13717 (10 January 1992) reg 9. 
216 S 30 of the ECA. 
217 As enacted by GN 1064 in Government Gazette No 15987 (30 September 1994). 
218 See the more detailed discussion in par 3.3.2 above on the status of these international 
environmental principles.  
219 The final hearing was held on 11 March 2008, yet the Act has to date not been enacted. 
220 Waste Management Bill published in terms of General notice 1832 / 2007 in Government 
Gazette 29487 of 12 January 2007 3. 
221 S 31A(1). 
222 S 31A(2). 
223 S 31A(4); see also MEC: Department of Agriculture, Conservation and the Environment, 
Dr ST Cornelius v HTF Developers (Pty) Ltd par 2. 
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incurred, as remediation and restitution to the previous position in addition to 
the basic clean-up costs can be extensive and expensive.224 
 
3.4.4 Other Environmental Statutes 
 
3.4.4.1 Animals Protection Act225 
 
In terms of the Act any contravention of the provisions of the Act is a criminal 
offence. 226 
 
It is important to note that a court has the power to award an amount of 
damages to any person upon a court application, to cover any loss or 
expenses incurred by any person due to the contravention of the Act merely 
on the criminal charges presented to the court where the accused was found 
guilty of committing the offence.227 This award has the same effect as a 
judgement given in a normal civil action.228 
 
3.4.4.2 Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act229 
 
Where any employee meets with an accident in the workplace, out of or in the 
course of his employment, resulting in his disablement or death, the employee 
or his dependants may claim the benefits payable in terms of the Act.230 This 
will also apply where an employee suffers due to pollution-related accidents or 
                                            
224 A similar view is reiterated by Havenga (1995)197. 
225 Act 71 of 1982. 
226 S 2(1). 
227 S 2(4)(1), s 2(5)(4). 
228 S 2(4)(2). 
229 Act 130 of 1993. 
230 S 22(1), 22(4). In a landmark case for occupational health law in South Africa a 49-year 
old ex-miner is suing the mining company AngloGold Ashanti for damages of R 2.7 million for 
silicosis and silico tuberculosis caused by his exposure to dangerous quantities of dust and 
gas in the mine where he worked for 16 years. AngloGold is challenging the plaintiff’s right to 
sue the company based on s 35 of the Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act, that he is 
limited to the once-off claim amount that he received from the compensation commissioner in 
terms of the Act, and that it precludes any other claims for compensation. The constitutionality 
of the limitation in s 35 is being challenged in this case. Judgment is only expected by middle 
2009 http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fArticleId=4245288 (last accessed on 2 August 
2008). 
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incidents. An award can then made by the Director-General in accordance 
with the provisions of the Act. The Director-General may order that the 
employer is individually liable and require the employer to deposit financial 
securities that are, in the Director-General’s discretion, sufficient to cover the 
liability towards the employee or his dependants in terms of the Act.231  
 
The Act specifically limits claims for compensation to the statutory benefits 
allowed under the Act. No other action against an employer, such as one in 
delict, is available to the employee or his dependants for any occupational 
injury or disease that falls within the scope of this Act.232 This restriction does 
not, however, preclude an employee from claiming compensation in terms of 
the Act, and to recover amounts not covered by his statutory claim from a 
third party who was also responsible for the injuries or caused the disease.233 
Where the employer or Director-General was held liable for payment in terms 
of the Act, they may recoup any compensation paid to the employee from the 
third party who was responsible for the loss.234 
 
A current issue that is extremely relevant are the claims of employees against 
their employers based on ‘sick building syndrome’. Where a factor or 
combination of factors creates poor indoor air quality, causing health 
complaints, liability can be incurred.235 
 
3.4.4.3 Game Theft Act236 
 
Where a court convicts any person for the theft, or specifically with regard to 
environmental damage for damage caused to game, it may award 
compensation to the person suffering the loss.237 
                                            
231 S 31. 
232 S 35. 
233 S 36(1)(a). 
234 S 36(1)(b). 
235 See in this regard Mitchell WJ “CGL Pollution Exclusion Provisions and the Sick Building 
Syndrome” Defense Counsel Journal 1999 (January) 124, as well as the discussion of this 
issue and its effects on pollution exclusion clauses in chap 6 par 6.5.6.7 below. 
236 Act 105 of 1991. 
237 S 7. 
 100
 
3.4.4.4 Genetically Modified Organisms Act238 
 
In terms of section 17 the ‘user’239 of a genetically modified organism 
(hereinafter ‘GMO’) shall ensure that appropriate measures are taken at his 
own costs to avoid an adverse impact on the environment and human and 
animal health arising from the use of these organisms.240 Users must notify 
the relevant authority immediately of any ‘accident’241 and its circumstances, 
and must provide all information necessary to assess the impact of the 
environment and to enable the implementation of emergency measures.242  
 
The liability for damage caused by the use or release of a GMO organism 
shall be borne by the user concerned.243 Liability is excluded where the GMO 
was in the possession of an inspector and the user could not foresee or have 
foreseen such damage but failed to take reasonable action to prevent it.244 It 
appears from the wording in this section that the intention is to impose strict 
liability on the user while he is in possession and control of the GMO, 
irrespective of the conduct of third parties such as an inspector, as his liability 
is based only on his lack of foreseeability while the GMO was in the 
possession of the third party. 
 
The relevant authorities245 may take all reasonable measures to remedy the 
situation where a user fails to do so,246 and may recover all costs 
proportionally from any person who benefits from these measures.247 These 
                                            
238 Act 15 of 1997; the Act is in accordance with the UN Convention on Biological Diversity as 
listed in Annexure A. 
239 S 1(m) defines a ‘user’ as ‘a person who conducts an activity with a genetically modified 
organism’. 
240 S 17(1A); s 17 has been comprehensively amended by s 11 of the Genetically Modified 
Organisms Amendment Act 23 of 2006. 
241 S 1(a) defines ‘accident’ as ‘any incident involving the unintended general release of a 
genetically modified organism that is likely to have an immediate or a delayed averse impact 
on the environment or human or animal health’. 
242 S 17(1A) of Act 15 of 1997; s 5(h) of Act 23 of 2006. 
243 S 17(2). 
244 S 17(2) of Act 15 of 1997. 
245 In this case The Executive Council for Genetically Modified Organisms.  
246 S 17(3). 
247 S 17A(1). 
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costs must be reasonable and may include, but are not limited to, 
administration, labour and overhead costs incurred by the Council.248 
 
Where more than one person is held jointly and severally liable, the Council is 
entitled, upon request, to apportion liability. It is important to note that this 
apportionment does not relieve the persons from their joint and several liability 
for the costs.249 Any order given by the relevant authority shall have the effect 
of a civil judgment.250 
 
3.4.4.5 Hazardous Substances Act251 
 
The Act provides that any person who sells, imports, manufactures or packs 
classified hazardous substances is presumed to have done so and incurs 
liability for his actions under the provisions of the Act.252 
 
Employers, mandators and principals incur vicarious liability for the conduct of 
their employees, mandatees and agents unless they can prove that they did 
not permit or connive in the conduct, that they took all reasonable measures 
to prevent the conduct and that it did not fall within the course of employment, 
mandate or authority of the above persons.253 An action merely to forbid such 
conduct does not serve as proof of reasonable measures to prevent it.254 
 
3.4.4.6 Marine Pollution (Control and Civil Liability) Act255 
 
It is interesting to note that ‘environment’, ‘marine environment’ and ‘pollution’ 
are not specifically defined in this Act, even though the purpose thereof is to 
provide for the protection of the marine environment against pollution by oil 
and other harmful substances, and to prevent and combat such pollution. The 
                                            
248 S 17A(3). 
249 S 17A(4). 
250 S 17A(5). 
251 Act 15 of 1973. 
252 S 13(1). 
253 S 16(1). 
254 S 16(2). 
255 Act 6 of 1981. 
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Act places extensive duties upon owners, operators of ships and off-shore 
installations,256 and also covers issues regarding the liability of persons for 
contravention of the provisions of the Act.257 
 
The person who is the owner of any ship, tanker or offshore installation at the 
time of an incident leading to the discharge of oil, whether through a single 
occurrence or a series of occurrences, is liable for any loss or damage caused 
elsewhere than on such a ship, tanker or installation.258 The owner is also 
liable for the costs of any measures taken by the Authority259 to prevent or 
reduce loss or damage after any such incident.260  Such an owner must 
deposit an amount or furnish the guarantees as requested and determined by 
the Authority in its discretion, to cover the loss or damage.261 
 
The loss or damage includes costs and expenses for the measures taken to 
remove pollution,262 as well as an amount deemed by the Director-General to 
be sufficient to compensate any organisation for expenses incurred in any 
rescue, treatment, feeding and rehabilitating of any coastal birds polluted by 
the discharged oil.263 The Act does not refer to the rescue or treatment of any 
sea animals, but only to the ocean itself. This Act must be read in conjunction 
with the Sea Birds and Seals Protection Act264 discussed below.265 
 
The owner is held strictly liable unless he can prove that the incident was 
caused by an act of war or other form of force majeure.266  Certain limits of 
                                            
256 See in this regard for example the duty of an operator of an offshore installation to apply 
for a pollution safety certificate issued by the Authority in terms of s 24. 
257 See the Preamble to the Act. 
258 S 9(1)(a). 
259 The South African Maritime Safety Authority as defined in s 1 of the Act. 
260 S 9(1)(b). 
261 S 16. 
262 S 9(2)(a). 
263 S 9(2)(b). 
264 Act 46 of 1973. 
265 Par 3.4.4.17 of the text below. 
266 S 9(3) provides that the owner is liable unless he proves that the discharge was caused by 
(a) an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible 
natural phenomenon; or by (b) an act or omission by any person who is not the owner, the 
latter’s servant or agent, and who acted intentionally to do damage, or (c) was wholly caused 
by the negligence or other wrongful act of any government or other authority responsible for 
the maintenance of lights or navigational aids. 
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liability are also prescribed by the Act in these circumstances.267 Co-owners 
are held jointly and severally liable where their respective liabilities cannot be 
distinctly separated.268 It is important to note that the legislature intended the 
act to create a comprehensive  liability regime, as it provides expressly that no 
other liability except for the liabilities dealt with in the Act, can be incurred 
towards any other person.269 
 
The Act lastly provides for the seizure and detention of ships pending 
payment of costs due, and the subsequent realisation of the asset to use the 
proceeds for the satisfaction of any claims for loss, damage or costs.270 These 
rights enjoy preference over any lien or mortgage over the ship or goods.271 
 
Vessels such as warships or tankers used in the service of the State are 
exempted from this Act.272 
 
3.4.4.7 Mine Health and Safety Act273  
 
Various statutory duties are placed on employers, operators and owners of 
mines, manufacturers and suppliers of any article or substance that is used 
for or by a mine, regarding the health and safety of persons involved in some 
way or another in a mine and its operations, for example by the employees in 
the mine.274 The Act also places a duty of care on the employees at a mine to 
protect their own health and safety as well as the health and safety of other 
persons involved and creates a statutory duty to mitigate their own losses, as 
well as to create a statutory duty of care to mitigate the losses of others. 
 
                                            
267 S 9(5), s 10. 
268 S 9(4). 
269 S 10. 
270 S 19. 
271 S 19(3). 
272 S 11. 
273 Act 29 of 1996. 
274 See, for example, s 5 that requires the employer to maintain a healthy and safe mining 
environment; s 11 that requires the employer to assess and respond to risks; and s 21 that 
places a duty on any manufacturer or supplier of articles or substances to be used in mining 
activities to ensure the health and safety of persons. See also the landmark case referred to 
in n 196 above. 
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Any contravention of the Act constitutes an offence and the Act prescribes 
specific fines and terms of imprisonment for the different contraventions.275  
No reference is made to a claim for damages. The Act specifically provides 
that the State or its organs cannot incur civil liability for the conduct of one of 
its officers where he acted without negligence and in good faith.276 
 
3.4.4.8 Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act277 
 
The holder of a reconnaissance permission, prospecting right, mining right or 
permit or retention permit is responsible for any environmental damage, 
pollution or ecological degradation as a result of his or her reconnaissance,  
prospecting or mining operations that occurs in the area for which the right or 
permits were issued.278 Various sections in Chapter IV of the Act deal mainly 
with the rehabilitation of the surface of land. 
 
In the first place the Act provides that the holder mentioned above,279 must as 
far as is reasonably practicable, rehabilitate the environment affected by his 
operations to its natural or predetermined state or to a land use that conforms 
to the generally acceptable principle of sustainable development.280 Financial 
provision must also be made for the remediation of environmental damage.281   
 
The Minister has the power to effect such a remediation in certain situations 
where a person fails to rehabilitate in accordance with the provisions of the 
Act.282 The Minister may then recover these costs where the Department had 
to take emergency remedial measures before contacting the person who had 
to remedy the position.283 
 
                                            
275 S 92. 
276 Mine, Health and Safety Act 29 of 1996 Sched 2, s 104; Sched 7, s 22(2). 
277 Act 28 of 2002. 
278 S 38(1)(e). 
279 The holder of rights, permits or permissions in terms of s 38(1). 
280 S 38(1)(d). 
281 S 38–41. 
282 S 46. 
283 S 45. 
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The Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act furthermore 
contains a specific section that drastically extends liability, in that it provides 
that ‘irrespective of the Companies Act284 or the Close Corporations Act,285 
the directors of a company or members of a close corporation are jointly and 
severally liable for ‘any unacceptable negative impact on the environment, 
including damage, degradation or pollution advertently or inadvertently 
caused by the company or close corporation which they represent or 
represented’.286 This is a rare example of a statutory limitless long-tail liability, 
which type of liability is examined and discussed in detail in chapter 6 
below.287 
 
In the regulations to the Act various actions are prohibited, including dumping, 
disposal of waste material, oil pollution and more. As mentioned above, 
section 41 contains a pecuniary provision in terms of which the applicant of 
any right or permit issued in terms of the Act has to demonstrate in his 
environmental management programme that he has made sufficient financial 
provision, or has the necessary financial means, to rehabilitate or manage 
negative environmental impacts caused by his activities, and that he can 
comply with his management programme in accordance with his statutory 
duties. 
 
The Act also requires that surfaces be sanitised and that ‘acceptable hygienic 
and aesthetic practices must be adhered to’.288 This means that the 
environment must be clean, unpolluted, aesthetically pleasing and appear to 
be fully rehabilitated to the extent that it is acceptable to the community. 
 
                                            
284 Act 61 of 1973. 
285 Act 69 of 1984. 
286 S 38(2); see also Winstanley T 56 for an evaluation of the judgment given this case. 
287 See chap 6 par 6.3 below. 
288 Reg 71(2) in terms of RGN 527/26275/3 of 23 April 2004 Government Gazette No 26942 
(29 October 2004). 
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3.4.4.9 National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act289 
 
In terms of chapter 7 persons are guilty of offences where they act in 
contravention of the Act, and may be imprisoned or fines may be levied.290  
 
The Act does not provide for a claim for any other damages or compensation.  
 
It should be noted that section 50 covers transboundary air pollution that 
originates in the Republic but has a significant detrimental impact on the 
environment or health in another country. The Minister may take measures to 
prevent, control or correct the releases within the Republic that migrate to 
other countries.291 
 
3.4.4.10 National Forests Act292 
 
In Chapter 7 of this Act various imprisonment terms, community service terms 
and fines are prescribed for the various categories of offences as stipulated in 
the Act.293 
 
It is further interesting to note that the Act also provides for an order made in 
criminal proceedings for the payment of compensatory damages to a person 
who suffered a loss due to the offence.294 The Act also provides for the 
seizure of assets and forest produce by any forest officer.295 
 
3.4.4.11 National Heritage Resources Act296 
 
Certain sections of the environment, both natural and built, have been 
declared national heritage sites and must be conserved in terms of the Act. A 
                                            
289 Act 39 of 2004. 
290 S 52(1). 
291 S 50(2). 
292 Act 84 of 1998. 
293 S 58; also s 61–s 64. 
294 S 59(1)(b). 
295 S 68. 
296 Act 25 of 1999. 
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compulsory repair order may be given to any person by the heritage 
resources authority, and failing compliance the authority may effect the 
repairs and recover the costs from such a person.297 As the Act is a statute 
concerned with the protection of the environment, any plaintiff or applicant 
who based his claim on the provisions of the Act had locus standi to bring his 
claim or present his case.298  
 
Various fines, imprisonment terms, orders for the repair of damages, 
community service and forfeiture of assets are prescribed for other 
contraventions of the Act.299 
 
This Act specifically excludes strict liability for any contravention of the Act for 
conduct committed in good faith and without negligence.300 
 
3.4.4.12 National Nuclear Regulator Act301 
 
In order to give effect to this statute, the Act provides for co-operative 
governance as contemplated in section 3 of the Constitution.302 All organs of 
the State are required to co-operate effectively to ensure compliance with the 
provisions of the Act in the monitoring and control of nuclear hazards.303 An 
organ of State can therefore incur statutory liability where it does not fulfil its 
statutory duties. 
 
This Act also provides for a strict liability regime for nuclear damage caused 
by the holder of a nuclear installation licence.304 This places an onerous duty 
of care upon the holder of such a licence. 
 
                                            
297 S 45, s 51(7). 
298 See in this regard the judgment in Raubenheimer NO v Trustees, Johannes Bredenkamp 
Trust and Others 2006 1 SA 124 (C) in this regard. 
299 S 51. 
300 S 55. 
301 Act 47 of 1999. 
302 See par 3.2.1 in the text above. 
303 S 6(1). 
304 S 30. 
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In order to provide for financial security, the Act requires the Minister of 
Minerals and Energy, in consultation with the Minister of Finance, to 
determine the levels of,305 and manner306 in which financial security has to be 
provided for each specific category307 of installation. In addition, the Act 
further requires the holder of such a licence to provide proof annually to the 
Minister that sufficient financial security is in place so that any claim for 
compensation308 can be met. 
 
There is also a statutory limitation of liability in that the amount claimable is 
limited to the amount determined by the Minister of Minerals and Energy in 
terms of section 29(2). This is strange in that the limitation of liability depends 
merely on the projection of the Minister of possible losses for which the level 
and nature of the instrument that provides financial security, are determined. 
This means that any claim against the installation for compensation can never 
exceed the amount covered by the financial security, even though the actual 
damages suffered exceed this limit. Where the amount claimed exceeds or 
has the potential to exceed the amount for which financial security has been 
given under section 29 of the Act, the person against whom the claim is or 
could be instituted has to notify the Minister immediately, who could obtain 
additional funding from Parliament to cover the claim.309 This is clearly 
contrary to the polluter-pays principle. 
 
It is debatable whether it would be possible to institute a claim against the 
Ministers where their projection and determination of the amount of the 
financial security was too low, therefore not providing for adequate financial 
compensation where nuclear damage is suffered, and where Parliament 
decides not to appropriate funds to cover any deficit. 
 
The holder of the licence retains any contractual right of recourse or 
contribution against any other person causing the loss for which the holder is 
                                            
305 S 29(2)(a). 
306 S 29(2)(b). 
307 S 29(1). 
308 This refers to any claim made in terms of s 30 of the Act. 
309 S 33(1), s 33(2) and s 33(3)(a). 
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held liable.310 Persons acting without a licence are also held strictly liable for 
any nuclear damage caused,311 as well as persons who are present on the 
property of a nuclear installation without the permission of the holder of the 
licence312 or who intentionally cause or contribute to any nuclear damage.313 
The chief executive officer of the Regulator, as appointed under the Act,314 
may determine alternative conditions for liability for nuclear damage caused 
by vessels.315 The holder of a certificate of registration issued under the Act316 
is not held liable under the Act itself, but may be held liable in terms of the 
common law or any other relevant statute.317 
 
A person could take recourse in terms of this Act or in accordance with the 
provisions of other relevant statutes, or he could base his claim on other 
causes of action such as a civil liability claim.318 The Act provides clearly that 
a person may not benefit from both the Act and from any other act.319 
 
Claims under the Act prescribe after 30 years from date of occurrence or from 
the date of the last event where there is a succession of occurrences,320 
unless the claimant became aware or could reasonably have been expected 
to become aware of the identity of the defendant and the facts that lead to the 
claim. In this case the claim prescribes 2 years from the date on which the 
person became, or should have become, aware of said information.321 
Prescription is suspended from the date on which written negotiations 
                                            
310 S 30(6). 
311 S 30(8). 
312 S 30(6)(a). 
313 S 30(6)(b). 
314 S 15. 
315 S 31; ‘vessel’ is not defined in s 1 of the Act, yet described in s 21(2) as ‘a vessel which is 
propelled by nuclear power or which has on board any radioactive material capable of 
causing nuclear damage’. 
316 S 22(1). Such a certificate is issued upon application of a person who wishes to engage in 
any action that could cause nuclear damage, as stated in s 2(1)(c). 
317 S 32. 
318 For example, in terms of The Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 
130 of 1993, or in bringing a common-law delictual claim in accordance with the principles 
discussed in chap 4 below. 
319 S 30(5). 
320 S 34(1). 
321 S 34(2). 
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regarding a settlement commence until notice of termination of negotiations is 
received from either party.322 
 
Where a site does not comply with the provisions of the Act,323 an inspector 
appointed in terms of the Act324 may order the rehabilitation of a site. This 
would also be a liability that could be insurable as the costs for rehabilitation 
could be very high and are not covered by the financial security provided to 
cover nuclear damage claims.325 
 
Section 52 provides for offences and penalties for non-compliance with the 
provisions of the Act. 
 
3.4.4.13 National Parks Act326 
 
Section 24 contains many subsections prescribing different penalties for 
various offences committed in terms of the Act. 
 
3.4.4.14 National Water Act327 
  
In terms of section 20 a ‘responsible person’328 has to report an ‘incident’329 in 
accordance with the provisions of the Act,330 take all reasonable measures to 
contain and minimise the effect, clean-up and remedy the effects of the 
incident and take all measures as instructed by the authority. Where the 
person fails to do so, it may be done on his behalf by the authority and the 
reasonable costs incurred may be recovered from him.331 Where more than 
                                            
322 S 34(3). 
323 In terms of s 5, s 20, s 32, and s 36. 
324 S 41(1). 
325 S 29. 
326 Act 57 of 1976. 
327 Act 36 of 1998. 
328 S 20(2) provides that ‘any person who is responsible for the incident, owns or was in 
control of the substance involved in the incident at the time of the incident’. 
329 S 20(1) provides that ‘any incident or accident in which a substance pollutes or has a 
detrimental effect on, or the potential to pollute or have a detrimental effect on a water 
resource’. 
330 S 20(3). 
331 S 20; costs also include labour, administration and overhead costs. 
 111
one person can be held responsible, they are held jointly and severally 
liable.332 
 
3.4.4.15 Nuclear Energy Act333 
 
The Act prohibits the disposal of radioactive waste and the storage of 
irradiated nuclear fuel unless a specific statute334 expressly authorises a 
person to do so.335 The Act prescribes fines and imprisonment terms upon 
conviction for contravening the Act.336 
 
3.4.4.16 Sea Birds and Seals Protection Act337 
 
Any person contravening this Act may be imprisoned or ordered to pay a fine 
in terms of section 12 of the Act. 
 
 
3.5 REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF STATUTORY DUTY 
 
3.5.1 General 
 
Various statutes provide for compliance measures and for remedies in the 
event of a breach of peremptory statutory provisions. 
 
3.5.2 The Constitution 
 
Compliance measures are found in the more general environmental statutes 
as well as in the Constitution itself.338 In terms of section 24 of the 
                                            
332 S 20(9). 
333 Act 46 of 1999. 
334 The Hazardous Substances Act 15 of 1973 provides for either written permission of the 
Minister of Minerals and Energy, or for a ministerial authority where such written permission is 
absent. 
335 S 46. 
336 S 56. 
337 Act 46 of 1973. 
338 See par 3.2 above. 
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Constitution339 ‘[e]veryone has the right to have the environment protected for 
the benefit of present and future generations through reasonable legislative 
and other measures’.340  
 
The exercise and control of public power and public administration is always a 
constitutional matter and subject to constitutional control.341 It therefore 
requires the application of the principles and values found in the Constitution. 
The Constitution itself entrenches the basic principle of legality.342 It must be 
kept in mind that a failure to comply with any statutory duty is not per se 
wrongful.343 Policy considerations of fairness and reasonableness have to be 
taken into account in each situation to determine whether breach of a 
statutory duty is wrongful in view of the facts and circumstances of a particular 
situation.344 
 
3.5.3 Statutory Legal Liability 
 
3.5.3.1 Civil and/or criminal consequences 
 
Most statutes contain provisions regarding the consequences of a breach of 
statutory duties.345  The consequences may be criminal, civil or both, 
depending on the intention of the legislator. 
 
Some statutes create a specific remedy that allows for a statutory civil 
damages claim by a specific person or class of persons who suffer a specific 
loss resulting from the failure to comply with the provisions of the statute that 
                                            
339 See the comprehensive discussion in par 3.2.2.1 of the text above. 
340 Own emphasis. 
341 The Constitution chap 10 s 195; see in this regard the court’s view in both Steenkamp NO 
v Provincial Tender Board 2006 3 SA 151 (SCA) 155, and Steenkamp NO v The Provincial 
Tender Board, Eastern Cape (CC) par 20, also n 11 in the latter case. 
342 Affordable Medicines Trust and others v Minister of Health 2006 3 SA 247 (CC) 265. 
343 See the comprehensive discussion of the wrongfulness of failing to comply with a statutory 
provision for purposes of a common-law delictual claim in chap 4 par 4.2.3.3.3 and par 
4.2.3.3.4 below. 
344 Steenkamp NO v The Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape (CC) pars 37–42. 
345 See all the relevant environmental statutes discussed in par 3.4 of the text above. 
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results in damage to the environment.346 A statute could also allow the State 
or other authority to prosecute the offender for his criminal actions, or it could 
issue an abatement notice, withdraw previously allocated permits, refuse to 
renew permits347  and attach goods.348 
 
3.5.3.2 Strict liability 
 
Some statutes create a strict liability regime in terms of which fault is not a 
requirement for liability.349 Certain categories of persons (for example, the 
licencee of a nuclear power plant) can be held liable merely because of the 
official position that they occupy.350  
 
3.5.3.3 Compliance order or directive  
 
Other statutes expressly require rehabilitation, sanitation or remediation of the 
environment.351 Various authorities have the right to require or enforce 
compliance with statutory measures. 352 A compliance directive may be given 
                                            
346 See, for example, s 38(1)(e) and s 38(2) of The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Act as 
discussed in par 3.4.4.8; s 7 of The Game Theft Act in par 3.4.4.3; s 17(2) of the Genetically 
Modified Organisms Act in par 3.4.4.4 above; s 9(1)(a) of The Marine Pollution (Control and 
Civil Liability) Act in par 3.4.4.6; s 59(1)(b) of The National Forests Act in par 3.4.4.11 that 
allows for an order of compensatory damages to be made in criminal proceedings; s 30 of 
The National Nuclear Regulator Act in par 3.4.4.13 above.  
347 Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 s 18. 
348 National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act 39 of 2004 as discussed in par 
3.4.4.9 above. 
349 See s 38(2) of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act in par 3.4.4.8 in 
terms of which the directors of a company or the members of a close corporation are jointly 
and severally liable for environmental damage caused advertently or inadvertently by the 
company or close corporation they represent or represented; also s 38(1)(e) that provides that 
‘[t]he holder of a reconnaissance permission, prospecting right, mining right or permit or 
retention permit is responsible for any environmental damage, pollution or ecological 
degradation as a result of his or her reconnaissance prospecting or mining operations that 
occurs in the area for which the right or permits were issued’. As no mention is made of any 
form of the requirement or the lack of, fault, it can be reasonable assumed in view of the 
provisions of s 38(2) that the Act enforces a strict liability in this section; s 28 of NEMA also 
imposes strict liability.  
350 See, for example, the Nuclear Energy Act (1999) s 61(3); The Environment Conservation 
Act 73 of 1989 s 31A(1), s 31A(2). 
351 Reg 71 of the regulations enacted in terms of ECA; see also the discussion of the relevant 
statutes in par 3.4 above. 
352 See, for example, s 38–41, and s 45–46 of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Act 28 of 
2002 in par 3.4.4.8 above, that requires compulsory rehabilitation of the surface of land and in 
terms of which the Minister of the relevant governmental department may order compliance. 
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by the Director-General of a specific government department, and the costs 
and expenses they incur may be reclaimed from the polluter.353  
 
3.5.3.4 Statutory liability to qualify as ‘legal liability’ for liability insurance 
cover 
 
Statutory liability such as the liability to pay clean-up costs, qualifies as a 
‘legal liability’ for which cover is provided in most liability insurance policies.354 
It should in this context also be noted that it is not possible to contract out of 
any peremptory statutory duty by including an exclusion, exemption or 
limitation clause in a contract in order to escape liability.355 The issue of the 
insurability of liabilities is discussed extensively in chapters 5 and 6 below. 
 
3.5.3.5 Interdict 
 
One would obviously be able to obtain a prohibitive interdict to prevent 
conduct that causes environmental damage from occurring or continuing, or to 
obtain a mandatory interdict to enforce compliance with the duty to clean-up 
or pay the costs of the remediation of the environment.356 As far as pollution 
damage to the environment is concerned, an application for an interdict 
succeeded in the case of Minister of Health and Welfare v Woodcarb (Pty) Ltd 
and another357 to prevent the defendant from continuing the activities that 
caused pollution of the atmosphere.358 
 
                                            
353 NEMA s 28(4). 
354 Truck and General Insurance Co Ltd v Verulam Fuel Distributors CC and another par 14. 
355 Drifters Adventure Tours CC v Hircock 2007 2 SA 83 (SCA). For a detailed discussion of 
the extent and enforceability of these clauses, see chap 6 par 6.5. 
356 See also par 3.2.3.5.1 above where the interdict as a remedy is discussed in greater detail 
in a constitutional context. 
357 1996 3 SA 155 (N). 
358 It is submitted that the doctrine of ripeness cannot apply where an interdict is sought to 
prevent an infringement of a constitutional right, as the purpose of the interdict is to prevent a 
person from being affected and it cannot be a requirement that he must already be affected 
before the relief is provided; see also National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality & 
Others v Minister of Home Affairs & Others par 21 for the application of the doctrine of 
ripeness in a constitutional context. 
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Our courts can also come to the assistance of the State by issuing an order of 
contempt of court in an attempt to enforce compliance with the statutory 
provisions. A supervisory or structural interdict that keeps the progress of the 
defendant under the court’s supervision can be of great value and assistance 
where an interdict to prevent damage to the environment, or where an 
interdict to repair environmental damage is concerned.359 
 
3.5.3.6 Damages 
 
3.5.3.6.1 Constitutional damages 
 
It is submitted that one would, in view of case law supporting the possibility of 
claims for constitutional damages and in terms of the discussion above be 
able to claim damages as ‘appropriate relief’ in terms of section 24. Courts will 
not be reluctant to make an order specifically for constitutional damages 
where it is the most appropriate remedy in the circumstances, provided the 
remedy clearly fits the injury.360  
 
3.5.3.6.2 Statutory civil damage claims 
 
It is also possible to claim statutory civil damages where a specific statute 
makes an express allowance for such a claim. Examples include the damages 
that can be claimed in terms of The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Act,361 
The Game Theft Act,362 The Genetically Modified Organisms Act,363 The 
Marine Pollution (Control and Civil Liability) Act,364 and The National Forests 
                                            
359 Sibiya & Others v DPP: Johannesburg High Court & Others par 22. 
360 Constitution s 38; Steenkamp NO v The Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape (CC) par 
22, 29; MEC Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Kate 491; President of the Republic of 
South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and others amici curiae); see also s 
59(1)(b) of the National Forests Act in par 3.4.3.10 of the text above, as well as the more 
detailed discussion of constitutional damages in par 3.2.3.5.4 above. 
361 Par 3.4.4.8 in the text above. 
362 Par 3.4.4.3 above. 
363 Par 3.4.4.3 above. 
364 Par 3.4.4.6 above. 
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Act that allows for an order of compensatory damages to be made in criminal 
proceedings;365 and The National Nuclear Regulator Act.366 
 
It must be emphasised that these remedies are available for claims against 
individuals as well as for claims against the State where it acts in a 
blameworthy manner or fails to act as required. Public remedies suited to 
vindicate breaches of administrative justice are to be found in section 8 of 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act,367 conferring upon a court the powers 
to make orders that it considers to be ‘just and equitable’, which includes an 
order to pay compensation in ‘exceptional matters’.368  
 
Our Constitutional Court has acknowledged the possibility of successfully 
suing the State based on a private law matter in a delictual claim, yet only 
where the plaintiff succeeds in proving that the State had a duty of care 
towards the plaintiff.369 As the State also must procure insurance cover in 
some situations, this issue is relevant to the insurability of liabilities, statutory 
or otherwise for environmental damage caused. It is submitted that the 
conduct required by international treaties, agreements and protocols, and that 
which is required under the Constitution in section 24(b), create a duty of care 
that requires the State to act accordingly. It is, however, not always clear 
where the boundary between a statutory duty or a common law duty and 
ensuing liability lies, and it is also not clear which remedy will prove to be the 
most suitable.370 The position will clearly depend on the facts and 
circumstances of each situation, and will be clarified by the development of 
the legal position over time by case law or by statute. 
 
 
                                            
365 Par 3.4.4.10 above. 
366 par 3.4.4.12 above. 
367 Act 3 of 2000. 
368 S 8(1)(c)(ii)(bb); see in this regard Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board (SCA) 161; 
see also Earthlife Africa (Cape Town) v Director-General: Department of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism 2005 3 SA 156 (C) par 21 et seq. 
369 See also the discussion in par 3.5.3 above; see also the minority judgement in Steenkamp 
NO v The Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape (CC) par 37; pars 82 to 99.   
370 Steenkamp NO v The Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape (CC) par 76. 
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3.5.3.7 Class actions 
 
The Constitution provides legal standing for a class action or application 
brought by persons other than the State to enforce compliance with 
environmental laws.371 The general position of class actions has already been 
discussed above.372  
 
In an environmental context, NEMA also creates the right to bring a class 
action specifically to protect the rights of persons where it is in the public 
interest and even in the interest of protecting the environment for its own 
sake.373 The latter inclusion374 therefore does not expressly require the 
pollution or degradation to cause harm to any person, but merely where harm 
to the environment itself is caused.375 A class action for environmental 
interests should be developed to the extent that is regularly allowed for other 
situations, such as the class action for consumers that is readily allowed in 
most countries, can be supported.376 
 
 
3.6 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The fundamental right to the environment provided for in the Constitution has 
established solid foundations for the development of an effective 
environmental damage liability regime in South African law. 
 
                                            
371 See the discussion of class actions in par 3.2.3.4.2 on the Constitution s 38(c) and (d) 
above. 
372 See par 3.2.3.5.3. 
373 NEMA Chap 7 Part 2 s 32(1). 
374 S 32(1)(e). 
375 This includes a class action by any environmental interest protection group such as the 
South African National Foundation for the Conservation of Coastal Birds or Earthwatch; see 
also the conclusion in par 2.4 in chap 2 of this work on this issue that damage to the 
environment merely for the environment’s sake, and not for the benefit in some way for 
human beings, is not considered in this thesis. 
376 See the similar viewpoint by Winter G “Perspectives for environmental law – entering the 
fourth phase” 1989 Journal of Environmental Law 46; see also chap 4 par 4.2.4.5.2 below for 
a brief discussion of the effect that the legislation as proposed by the Consumer Protection 
Bill [B 19B–2008] will have on South African law once it comes into operation. 
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As the Constitution primarily has a vertical application, section 24 has enabled 
citizens to enforce their rights against the State where the latter acts in a 
manner that infringes upon their rights and causes damage to the 
environment, or has the potential to do so. In its indirect horizontal application, 
the right to the environment has enabled individuals to enforce their right to 
the environment against each other, especially as it is in the public interest to 
do so because of man’s common interest in the environment. The right in 
section 24 informs this criterion of public policy. Although the Constitution 
contains many rights that have the potential to conflict with the right to the 
environment, it is quite clear that these rights may not simply be exercised at 
the expense of the environment. Any infringement of the right to the 
environment must meet the criteria for the limitation of constitutional rights as 
set out in section 36. 
 
Information is crucial for a successful claim for environmental damage, 
whether the claim is by the prejudiced party against the polluter, by the 
prejudiced party against his insurer in terms of first-party insurance cover, or 
by the polluter against his insurer in terms of his liability or third-party 
insurance cover. The right of access to information in section 32 of the 
Constitution, and the subsequent enactment of the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act 2 of 2000 has facilitated the process of obtaining information 
that in the past would have been difficult to obtain. Where disclosure of 
information is in the public interest, overriding the non-disclosure provisions of 
the Act is justified. The Act specifically refers to the fact that the danger of 
imminent and serious environmental risk is one of the factors that justify 
disclosure of related information as it is clearly in the public interest. 
 
The Constitution also provides for a variety of remedies for the party who is 
prejudiced by the infringement of his constitutional rights due to environmental 
damage. The court may grant ‘appropriate relief’ in terms of section 38, which, 
due to its broad wording, entails an unlimited number of possibilities.  In the 
first instance, it enables a court to declare any law or conduct invalid. This can 
be a very effective remedy against the State where its conduct infringes upon 
a person’s constitutional right to the environment. 
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A prejudiced party may also obtain injunctive relief. This relief may be 
mandatory, with the purpose of enforcing compliance with a duty or process. 
An order to force a polluter to clean-up serves as an example. The interdict 
may also be prohibitive, in that it prevents imminent conduct or the 
continuation of infringing conduct.  
 
The relief could also include a declaration of rights. This would be of great 
value where the interpretation of the scope and effect of an environmental 
statute is in issue.  
 
It is possible to claim compensation in the form of constitutional damages, 
where it is the most appropriate remedy in the specific circumstances and 
provided that it fits the injury caused by the infringement of the constitutional 
right. It is submitted that an award for constitutional damages for damage 
caused to the environment would have to be limited to clean-up or 
remediation costs, because the focus of the constitutional right should remain 
on restoration of the environment to its original state. There is no reason why 
the quantum of damages should not, in view of the right of the Constitutional 
Court to award such a claim, also be determined by the Constitutional Court. 
 
Section 38 of the Constitution and section 32 of NEMA have also created the 
possibility of instituting a class action for a claim relating to environmental 
issues. As the protection of the environment is of common interest and usually 
to the benefit of the community at large, a class action by or on behalf of a 
class of persons can be effective. The class action proposed by the 
Consumer Protection Bill377 where the interests of consumers are affected, 
should be introduced for actions brought by prejudiced parties where their 
environmental interests are infringed upon. 
 
As will be seen from the next chapter on civil liability, the constitutional right to 
the environment has, in the final instance, also facilitated meeting the burden 
                                            
377 The Bill was signed on 24 April 2009 and is required to come into operation within 10 
months from date of signature  which is expected only early in 2010. 
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of proving that conduct that causes environmental damage is wrongful. It also 
creates a duty to act in order to prevent environmental damage, which eases 
the burden of proving the wrongfulness of an omission to do so.  
 
South African environmental legislation and environmental processes should 
be guided by the distinctive principles of international environmental law. This 
has been the case in most of the recently enacted statutes, for example, in 
the enactment of NEMA and the ECA. Where a statute, however, requires the 
State to carry the costs of remediation of the environment without a proper 
right of recourse against the polluter, the statute does not advance the 
implementation of the polluter-pays principle. Section 33 of The National 
Nuclear Regulator Act serves as an example of this point.  
 
As far as the future application and implementation of these principles is 
concerned, the following recommendations may be made. The polluter-pays 
principle should form the basis for the introduction of a statutory liability for the 
payment of common-law damages for environmental damage. It should also 
be the principle on which a common-law liability to pay compensation for 
pollution damage is based. The precautionary principle and the principle of 
preventative action should furthermore inform the criteria of wrongfulness for 
omissions when determining common-law liability. In the last instance, the 
principle of strict liability should form the basis for the introduction of a strict 
liability regime for environmental damage. The increased introduction of 
statutory strict liability regimes, similar to the proposed strict product liability 
regime, is discussed further in chapter 4 below.378 
 
Internationally, states are already co-operating in the oil, marine and nuclear 
industries. Due to the increase in incidents that cause transboundary 
pollution, for example, transboundary air and soil pollution, global co-
operation, monitoring and enforcement of measures in other high-risk 
industries should increase.   
 
                                            
378 See chap 4 par 4.2.4.5 below. 
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Although there are many statutes that are concerned with environmental 
matters, very few focus on creating civil liability towards parties prejudiced by 
the polluter’s statutory non-compliance that leads to environmental damage. 
Most statutes prescribe authorised acts and procedures, and provide for 
criminal sanctions as compliance measures, whether a fine or imprisonment 
or both. The payment of a R5 million fine as punishment for a conviction in 
terms of section 31N of NEMA, and the penalties and fines levied in terms of 
section 29 of the ECA, serve as examples. Fines are not allocated to 
restoration funds that primarily aim to finance the restitution or remediation of 
the polluted environment to undo the effects of pollution damage. It is 
submitted that the introduction of these   restitution schemes that are primarily 
financed by the criminal fines levied, will have the desired effect in terms of 
the polluter-pays principle. Additional financing can be obtained from 
mandatory financial guarantees from participants in the specific industries for 
which the fund exists. 
 
Since the 1990s, statutes that require polluters to clean-up the damage they 
caused at their own cost have increased. Section 28 of NEMA serves as the 
predominant statutory measure to enforce environmental remediation at the 
cost and expense of the polluter. Where the latter fails to do so, the State 
Department may do so on his behalf and recoup the costs from him. In the 
absence of available funds, section 28(6) of NEMA goes so far as to authorise 
the State to expropriate the polluter’s land. A similar provision that enables the 
State to claim all costs and expenditures from the polluter can be found in 
section 31A of the ECA. 
 
The problem is therefore that very few statutes create a statutory duty to pay 
civil-law damages to a third party who is prejudiced by the pollution. The 
possibility of succeeding with a statutory civil damages claim still remains slim 
unless statutes are enacted that expressly provide for such a remedy. To date 
this remedy has been created for the benefit of third parties, only under very 
specific and limited circumstances in The Game Theft Act, The Genetically 
Modified Organisms Act, The Marine Pollution (Control and Civil Liability) Act, 
The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Act, The National Forests Act and the 
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National Nuclear Regulator Act. Because the standard primary statutory 
remedies are mainly compliance orders or directives with statutory provisions 
that require prevention prior to pollution or remediation after the fact, the rights 
of prejudiced third parties to claim damages require urgent attention. 
It is important to note that, due to the wide definition of the ‘environment’ in 
NEMA, any person who presents his case based on any statutory provision 
concerned with the protection of the environment has locus standi in terms of 
section 32(1) of NEMA and will have to present his case accordingly. 
 
As far as statutory exemptions from liability are concerned, section 29(1) of 
NEMA contains a provision with one of the most far-reaching consequences 
in this regard. It provides that a person is exempted from any liability, whether 
statutory or civil, where he refuses or fails to participate in any activity 
required from him that could cause pollution or degradation of the 
environment. 
 
Few statutes therefore contain statutory remedies that trigger cover under 
liability insurance policies. This can be seen from the relatively small number 
of statutes that are relevant to the scope of this study and were examined 
above. 
 
No statutory mandatory insurance to provide cover for environmental damage 
is required in South Africa, except for those in the marine and nuclear 
industries that are regulated in accordance with international law. It is 
proposed that the possibility of introducing mandatory insurance cover, or 
where the market cannot accommodate such an insurance scheme, the 
submission of mandatory financial guarantees, which can add to the funding 
of restitution schemes, must be investigated for specific high-risk industries. 
 
Where a prejudiced third party is unable to claim the damages that he suffers 
from the polluter based on statutory liability, or where he fails to recoup all his 
losses by the statutory measures available, the third party has to rely on a 
civil-law damages claim against the polluter. Civil liability claims by a 
prejudiced party against the polluter are addressed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
CIVIL LIABILITY 
 
‘We must not overlook the fact that the greatest, most effective and, most 
important, presently available factor for immediate action is the common law. 
The common law is ready to move forward, this time in the field of 
environmental law.’1 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
As the statutory and regulatory responses to the growing threat of 
environmental damage have been largely ineffective and slow and appear not 
to be able to offer comprehensive solutions in the near future, the national law 
of civil or private law liability for ‘environmental delicts’, also known as ‘toxic 
torts’, will at the moment continue to play the largest role, even on a 
multinational or global level.2 A civil liability system is, however, far from 
adequate. As can be seen from the discussion in this chapter, a civil claim, 
because of its inherent limitations, cannot always guarantee effective and 
comprehensive compensation solutions.3  
 
In the economic analysis of law, tort or liability law is seen as an instrument to 
effectively indemnify against losses suffered, and also as an effective 
                                            
1 In the words of Van Niekerk B “The Ecological norm in law” 1975 (92) SALJ 80 n 7, which 
still holds true today. 
2 Larsson M The Law of Environmental Damage: Liability and Reparation (1999) 118 states 
that of the various options, the instrument generally referred to in international instruments 
and preferred by states is civil liability, although it does not provide a complete strategy for the 
restitution of environmental damage; see also Andersen M “Transnational Corporations and 
Environmental Damage: Is Tort Law the Answer?”  2002 (Spring) Washburn Law Journal 2 
(hereinafter ‘Andersen’) 3. 
3 See Neethling J “Aanspreeklikheid vir ‘nuwe’ risiko’s: Moontlikhede en beperkinge van die 
Suid-Afrikaanse deliktereg” in Faure M & Neethling J (eds) Aansprakelijkheid, risico en 
onderneming: Europese en Zuid-Afrikaanse perspectiven (2003) (hereinafter ‘Faure & 
Neethling’) 17; see also the contribution by Havenga P “Nuwe risiko’s in Suid-Afrika: 
Versekering en alternatiewe vergoedingsmeganismes as antwoord daarop” in Faure & 
Neethling 135. 
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instrument to deter accidents.4 Environmental damage is costly to remedy and 
because of its magnitude, could even lead to insolvency. This has the 
potential to act as a strong deterrent, as the expectation to be held liable 
should induce parties to take care to prevent accidents completely or to 
change their activities to reduce accident risk, and to minimise accident costs 
as well as the costs of accident avoidance.5 The potential of causing 
irreparable and permanent pollution damage to the environment has become 
one of the crucial reasons why stricter and more effective environmental 
damage liability regimes have to be established in law.6 The most logical 
starting point for claiming environmental damages would be to do so with a 
civil liability claim.7 
 
Social policy requires that ‘harm rests where it falls’, meaning that a person 
has to bear the loss that he suffers.8 Only in legally recognised instances can 
the wrongdoer become legally liable to compensate the plaintiff.9 Aquilian 
                                            
4 Winter RA “Liability Insurance, joint tortfeasors and limited wealth”  
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6V7M-4KF6BPH (last 
accessed on 18 July 2006) 4 who put it thus: ‘[g]iven the cost of using tort liability and liability 
insurance for allocating risk-bearing, the more important role of the tort system is however the 
creation of incentives to avoid accidents.’ 
5 See in this regard Faure M & Hartlief T “Aanprakelijkheid en verzekering voor nieuwe 
risico’s” in Faure & Neethling 41 (hereinafter ‘Faure & Hartlief’); see also 53 for recognition 
that the threat of insolvency has a deterrent effect on the conduct of polluters; see Faure M & 
Skogh G The Economic Analysis of Environmental Law and Policy (2003) (hereinafter ‘Faure 
& Skogh’) 263–267 for an explanation of the role that insurance plays as a risk aversion 
technique. 
6 Bell S & McGillivray D Environmental Law 6th ed (2006) (hereinafter ‘Bell & McGillivray’) 382 
et seq highlight the difficulties with private law claims. They caution that private law remedies 
are not always the most suitable to claim environmental damage. The private law acts only as 
the protector of private interests, and not necessarily for the protection of the public interest. 
Private law rights are also based on imprecise and unduly absolute standards, and problems 
exist in the proving of claims. See also Larsson 119 who is of the opinion that in view of 
ineffective statutory or fault-based civil liability regimes, a non-contractual strict liability system 
as a first-generation liability regime would appear to be most effective. 
7 In the words of De Ketelaere D (ed) Handboek Milieu- en Energierecht (2006) 1351 on the 
Belgian Voorontwerp Decreet Milieubeleid, ‘Het mees logische aanknopingspunt voor het 
herstel van milieuschade is via het aansprakelijkheidsrecht’. 
8 Res perit domino is a fundamental premise in law; Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Motor Vehicle 
Tracking v Advertising Standards Authority 2006 1 SA 461 (SCA) 462; see Van der Walt JC & 
Midgley JR Principles of Delict 3rd ed (2005) (hereinafter ‘Van der Walt & Midgley’) 31; 
Larsson 383 calls this the ‘victim pays principle’. 
9 As explained by Neethling J, Potgieter JM & Visser PJ Law of Delict 5th ed (2006) 
(hereinafter ‘Neethling et al’) 3. 
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liability is, for example, such an exception to the rule of res perit domino.10 
According to current public policy the prejudiced party should not carry the 
loss he suffers because of pollution damage caused by others. This is seen to 
be unreasonable and would cause an internalisation of costs. It would also be 
against the polluter-pays principle, which has been acknowledged as one of 
the distinctive principles of environmental law.11 On the other hand, it would 
also be unreasonable to expect the state to carry or cover all losses caused 
by pollution, especially in developing countries where, because of other 
pressing needs, insufficient funds are available for this purpose. 
 
As development and protection of the environment are direct opposites, the 
one working against the other, it is necessary to find a balance between the 
two needs. The right to develop needs to remain subject to a reciprocal duty 
to act to the benefit and wellbeing of other individuals and of the community at 
large. This can only happen where the environment for these communities 
and individuals is protected to their benefit.12 
 
In South Africa the history surrounding and leading to the inclusion of the right 
to environment in the Constitution13 and the classification of this right, as well 
as the right to development contained in the Constitution, are clear indications 
of the approach of the government to stimulate the economy, yet to control 
                                            
10 See n 8 above; Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Motor Vehicle Tracking v Advertising Standards 
Authority 468. 
11 Par 3.3.2 in the text above; see Havenga PH “A Few Steps Closer to the Polluter-pays 
principle” 1997 (9) SAMercLJ 89; see Cowen DV “Toward Distinctive Principles of South 
African Environmental Law: Some Jurisprudential Perspectives and a Role for Legislation” 
1989 (52) THRHR 3, 7; see also Kidd M Environmental Law, A South African Guide (2008) 
(hereinafter ‘Kidd’) 53. 
12 See in this regard ‘The Declaration of the Right to Development: UN General Assembly 
Resolution’ 41/128 of 4 December 1986, that provides in Article 1.1 that ‘[t]he right to 
development is an unalienable human right’. Article 1.2 states that ‘[i]t includes the exercise of 
this right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources’. Article 2.1 states that 
‘[t]he human person is the central subject of development and should be the active participant 
and beneficiary of the right to development’. In Article 2.2 it is stated that ‘[t]he need for full 
respect of their human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as their duties to the 
community’ has to be taken into account. In accordance with Article 2.3 all states are obliged 
to formulate development policies that aim at the constant improvement of the well-being of 
the entire population and all individuals; see also in general the World Commission 
Environment and Development Report Our Common Future known as the Brundtland Report 
(1987). 
13 Constitution s 24. 
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development by considering environmental issues.14 Except for criminal 
sanction against a polluter or specified statutory liability, the only other 
alternative to claim losses from a polluter is by applying the rules of civil 
liability.15 
 
The plaintiff should be able to hold the polluter liable based on the fact that an 
acknowledged legal obligation entitles him to do so. As stated, the down-side 
of holding the polluter liable16 is that it will also give rise to the internalisation 
of costs, which then in real terms replaces the loss right back on the 
shoulders of the citizens and the consumers in society.17 It is therefore crucial 
to grasp that mere civil liability cannot provide the only answer regarding the 
question as to who has to shoulder the loss caused by environmental pollution 
damage. It is also necessary to develop a general effective compensation 
system, with realistic aims to cover losses, restore the environment and 
attempt to hold polluters liable, in order to create the maximum benefit for 
society as a whole. 
 
Because the intrinsic nature of the law of delict is to provide effective 
remedies for wrongful acts, and also because of the development of extensive 
delictual principles and experience gleaned from their vast application in a 
wide range of claims dealt with in the past, delictual liability is most attractive 
as an alternative to statutory liability.18 The benefits are clearly that the 
                                            
14 See the full discussion of the right to environment in chap 3 par 3.2.2.1; the right is 
classified as a green or third generation right. These rights are referred to as so-called 
‘people’s rights’ as they are rights for the public a large rather than rights of individuals; on the 
other hand the Constitution s 195(1)(c) provides that ‘public administration must be 
development-orientated’; see in this regard Kidd 19; see also Glazewski J “The Environment, 
Human Rights and a New South African Constitution” 1991 (7) SAJHR 167. 
15 See the early discussion by Loots C “Making Environmental Law Effective” 1994 (1) 
SAJELP 17. 
16 See par 3.3.2.2 of the text above. 
17 See the brief discussion in chap 5 par 5.1.3.2 on the disadvantage of insurance in that it 
causes an unavoidable internalisation of costs. As an illustration on this point, the State of 
California is suing six car manufacturers for monetary compensation for the damage caused 
to the health of the people, the economy and the environment by the greenhouse gas 
emissions of their cars. Should the claim succeed, it is highly probable that the manufacturers 
will merely increase the prices of new cars to recoup their losses; see 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/5365728.stm (last accessed on 27 September 2006). 
18 Neethling in Faure & Neethling 73 argues that this is due to its generalised nature: ‘Die 
rede hiervoor is dat die algemene beginsels juis weens hulle buigsaamheid en vloeibaarheid 
Footnote continues on the next page. 
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wrongdoer is held liable for his wrongful actions,19 and must pay a quantifiable 
monetary compensation to the plaintiff. This has the potential to enable the 
party prejudiced by the delict to recoup the losses he has suffered and 
provides funding for effective environmental remediation and recuperation. 
 
Another positive side-effect is brought about by the fact that the potential 
liability of the wrongdoer will act as a deterrent and discourage polluting or 
environmentally degrading activities.20 A liability system also proves to be 
cheaper to manage than a regulatory system that involves governmental 
participation.21 It can therefore be expected that most claims will be brought 
under a delictual liability regime. As issues relating to pollution insurance 
appear to be universal issues, liability issues are not, which requires the 
South African position to be discussed in detail. However, to date there is very 
little jurisprudence in a South African context on environmental damage 
liability and even less on its insurability. Alternative causes of action include 
breach of contract and unauthorised agency and are only dealt with briefly at 
the end of this chapter as their application will be limited. Reinecke agrees 
that liability insurance most often covers the delictual liability of the insured 
towards a third party.22 
 
 
4.2 DELICTUAL LIABILITY 
 
4.2.1 Introduction 
 
In terms of the South African law of delict, a delict is a culpable, wrongful act 
by a person (the wrongdoer) that causes patrimonial loss to another or which 
                                            
meestal net ‘n aanpassing of nuwe toepassing deur die howe verg.’; Van der Walt & Midgley 
31 also support this view that the law of delict offers ‘elastic and adaptable principles’ that can 
be applied to novel situations and new risks. 
19 See chap 3 par 3.3.2.2 above on the international environmental principle that the polluter 
must pay. 
20 As identified by Andersen 5. 
21 In the opinion of Faure & Hartlief 43. 
22 See Reinecke MFB, Van der Merwe S, Van Niekerk JP & Havenga P General Principles of 
Insurance Law (2002) (hereinafter ‘Reinecke et al’) par 10. 
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causes loss to, or impairs the latter’s personality.23 English tort law follows a 
more casuistic approach as specific wrongful acts or torts must meet specific 
requirements to lead to tort liability.24 Our law, which is founded on general 
principles of liability, has not been free from some beneficial influence by tort 
law, leading to the hybrid character of our current law of delict.25 The global 
experiences in environmental tort cases provide fertile ground for the adoption 
of successful practices and legal rules of other countries by our law, as can be 
seen, for example, in cases of nuisance.26 
 
In terms of South African law, five requirements must be met for delictual 
liability, namely an act or conduct; wrongfulness; fault; causation and damage 
must therefore be present before delictual damages can be claimed from the 
polluter.27 
 
Each of these poses unique challenges in an environmental context. Some of 
these requirements, especially the criteria of wrongfulness, causation and the 
apportionment of damages are very difficult to prove in the case of an 
environmental delict, and create serious obstacles which have to be cleared 
for a claimant to succeed with his claim.28 Examples include problems caused 
by the impossibility of identifying a single occurrence, the wrongdoer or the 
place of origin of the pollution causing the damage,29 or where the 
manifestation of the damage becomes apparent long after the damage-
causing occurrence, where it manifests in many different places and in many 
                                            
23 As described by Visser PJ “A note on some aspects of prospective loss and factual 
causation” 2004 (13) Speculum Iuris 137 138; see also Neethling et al 3 for a similar 
description. 
24 See in this regard Neethling et al 4; see also Van der Walt & Midgley 18 where they 
compare tort law to the South African law of delict. 
25 See Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk v Eksteen 1964 3 SA 402 (A) 410; as stated by Neethling et 
al 4 n 12. 
26 See par 4.2.3.4.1 for the South African position, and par 7.3.3.3 for the position in the UK. 
27 See in general Neethling et al 3, 4, 23. 
28 For an exposition of the challenges, see Neethling J “Aanspreeklikheid vir ‘nuwe’ risiko’s: 
Moontlikhede en beperkinge van die Suid-Afrikaanse deliktereg” 2002 (65) THRHR 574 576. 
29 The Bhopal gas leak occurred due to a decision taken by the parent company in the USA, 
that was subsequently communicated to its subsidiary company in India, where the 
compliance with the instruction caused the massive gas leak and subsequent pollution. 
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different guises,30 and even in different countries beyond the jurisdiction of 
national law.31 
 
Although mainly common-law principles apply to environmental delicts, some 
statutory rules and principles could govern or impact on these delictual claims. 
The principles of the fundamental rights contained in the Constitution have to 
be applied to determine and interpret those requirements where open-ended 
standards apply, for example, in the determination of wrongfulness, 
negligence and legal causation.32 In some instances a statutory exclusions 
could exclude fault as a requirement for the liability of the wrongdoer, and 
thus create a strict liability regime for specific situations or industries.33 Claims 
against employers for occupational injuries and diseases are, for example, 
limited to the statutory benefits provided and expressly exclude the possibility 
of a civil claim against the employer.34 
 
As there are relatively few statutory provisions on liability as can be seen from 
the discussion in chapter 3 above, and as the few that do exist do not offer 
satisfactory solutions in most situations, common-law claims appear to be the 
answer. As stated, the occurrence and recurrence of claims have led to the 
international development of a ‘toxic or environmental tort law’.35 
Internationally the concept of a claim based on the principles of nuisance 
                                            
30 See chap 4 par 4.2.5.2 on causation and par 4.2.6 on forms of damage that could be 
caused; see also chap 6 par 6.6 on the extent of damages claimable. 
31 The Sandoz chemical leak that occurred in Basel Switzerland, caused pollution of the 
waters of the Rhine river, that in turn caused extensive damage in both Germany and France. 
The Chernobyl nuclear disaster not only caused massive local damage in the USSR, but 
radioactive material was blown as far as Germany and the Netherlands, causing abnormal 
crop growth. Transboundary pollution damage and liability raises issues of its own, and 
cannot be dealt with in great detail within the scope of this study; see, however, some brief 
references in chap 3 par 3.3.2.1(g) and chap 3 n 121 above. 
32 S 8, s 38 and s 39 as discussed in par 3.2.2, par 3.2.3. and par 3.5.2 of the text above are 
relevant; see also Van Aswegen A “The Implications of the Bill of Rights for the Law of 
Contract and Delict” 1995 (11) SAJHR 50 51–60; see also Van der Vyfer JD “The Private 
Sphere in Constitutional Litigation” 1994 (57) THRHR 378–379. 
33  S 30 of the National Nuclear Regulator Act as discussed in par 3.4.4.12 of the text; liability 
in terms of s 17 of The Genetically Modified Organisms Act 15 of 1997 in par 3.4.4.4 above;  
see also the discussion in par 3.5.3.2 on statutory strict liability; and par 4.2.4.5 in the text 
below. 
34 See par 3.4.4.2 below on the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act s 
22. 
35 See Larsson 30 for one of the first references to the term ‘toxic tort’. 
 130 
appears to have become the classic environmental tort that can 
accommodate a variety of claims.36 An example of a nuisance claim would be 
where air, water or soil pollution is caused by an owner or occupier to 
adjacent properties or to other properties in close proximity of the source of 
the pollution. In terms of general principles an owner or occupier of land is 
entitled to enjoy his rights to the property without unreasonable interference 
from others. The South African position on nuisance and its position in other 
countries are discussed more extensively below.37 
 
4.2.2 Conduct 
 
4.2.2.1 General 
 
An act can be described as a person’s conduct as determined by his will, in 
other words a voluntary human act or omission.38 The wrongdoer, therefore, 
who makes a conscious and voluntary decision to act or not to act in a certain 
way, can be held liable for the consequences where his actions cause some 
form of environmental damage.  
 
4.2.2.2 Positive conduct and omissions 
 
Conduct may take the form of positive conduct (commissio) or negative 
conduct (omissio), although in some cases it is difficult to distinguish which 
                                            
36 Nuisance in the South African context of the abuse of rights is discussed in pars 4.2.3.3, 
4.3.3.9 below; see in this regard also Neethling et al 107–108; 336; see also the judgment in 
Laskey and Another v Showzone CC and Others 2007 2 SA 48 (C) par 16–18 where the court 
held that a claim based on excessive noise was a situation for correct application of the 
common-law remedy of private nuisance. The plaintiffs were entitled to interdictory relief only 
where they succeeded in indicating ‘occasioned harm’. Madden MS & Boston GW Law of 
Environmental and Toxic Torts: Cases, material and problems 3rd ed (2005) (hereinafter 
‘Madden & Boston’) 55 also reiterate a similar viewpoint that nuisance remains at the core of 
environmental torts; Faure & Skogh 216 examine the potential extent of nuisance by 
considering the acceptable norms when exercising one’s property rights. 
37 See chap 4 par 4.2.4.5 for the South African position; chap 7 par 7.3.3.4.2 for the position 
in the UK; chap 7 par 7.6.3.3 for the position in the USA; and pars 7.4.3.3.2 for the position in 
Belgium and par 7.5.3.2 for the position in the Netherlands. 
38 See the descriptions in Neethling et al 23; see also Van der Walt & Midgley 51. 
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one it is.39 Liability for an omission or failure to act is more restricted than 
liability for a commission. A person can be held delictually liable for an 
omission to act only if it constitutes an exception recognised in the South 
African positive law as forming the basis of such liability. This will be where a 
legal duty or duty of care rests upon a person to act in a certain way and he 
fails to do so.40 Failure to take positive steps to prevent environmental 
damage could be an example of such an omission, yet one should keep in 
mind that not all omissions are actionable.41 Examples of actionable 
omissions, especially omissions by the State, are discussed in the 
examination of the requirement of wrongfulness below.42 
 
4.2.2.3 Multiple wrongdoers 
 
The conduct of various persons could be the cause of a single loss occurring. 
Where there is potentially more than one wrongdoer (for example, in the event 
of general air pollution by motor vehicles, or in the event of soil or water 
pollution where various industries involved in similar activities, are grouped 
together on a piece of land), it is often difficult to determine whose actions 
were the main cause or even a contributory cause for pollution damage. This 
issue is discussed in the section on multiple and cumulative causation 
below.43 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
39 Van der Walt & Midgley 66 state that that ‘the mere fact that linguistic alternatives enable 
us to describe a positive action in a negative way is legally irrelevant to the determination of 
the nature of the conduct.’ 
40 See Bareki NO and another v Gencor Ltd and others 2006 1 SA 432 (T) 439–441; and 
Minister of Safety and Security v Carmichele 2004 3 SA 305 (SCA) 321, 324 for the court’s 
views on the extent of a legal duty to act; see also Neethling et al 28; 29; especially n 59. 
41 For authoritative case law, see the Constitutional Court judgment in Carmichele v Minister 
of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) 962, 968; and the judgment in Premier Western 
Cape v Faircape Property Developers (Pty) Ltd 2003 6 SA 13 (SCA) 31. 
42 See par 4.2.3.3.3 nd 4.2.3.3.4 below. 
43 See par 4.2.5.2 and chap 6 par 6.4.3 below. 
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4.2.3 Wrongfulness 
 
4.2.3.1 General 
 
The act of infringing on a person’s subjective rights44 or conduct that violates 
a legal duty is deemed to be wrongful if it has detrimental consequences.45 
Legal subjects have a general legal duty not to infringe upon another person’s 
subjective rights.46 Where an individual interest has been prejudiced, a dual 
investigation is required. One must first determine whether the holder of the 
right was disturbed in the use and enjoyment of his right, and then whether 
the infringement took place in a legally reprehensible way. Legal norms must 
be used to determine whether the actual infringement occurred in such a 
legally reprehensible or unreasonable manner.47  
 
4.2.3.2 Criteria to determine wrongfulness 
 
The legal convictions of the community, the boni mores, are the criteria to 
determine whether specific conduct is wrongful or not.48 This test is an after-
the-fact objective assessment based on reasonableness, taking into account 
all the facts and circumstances of a specific situation.49 
                                            
44 For a discussion of the doctrine of subjective rights, see Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie 
Meyer Films 1977 4 SA 376 (T) 386 et seq; see also Neethling et al 45–49. 
45 See in this regard Mukheiber v Raath 1999 3 SA 1065 (SCA) 1075; Visser PJ “Die 
verhouding tussen onregmatigheid en skade” 1991 (54) THRHR 782 784; Coetzee LC 
“Onregmatigheid in die afwesigheid van belange-aantasting” 2004 (67) THRHR  661, 662, 
669. 
46 Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising Standards Authority484; 
Malahe v Minister of Safety and Security 1999 1 SA 528 (SCA) 540; see also the discussion 
in Neethling et al 41. The courts often use the term ‘duty of care’, although it remains an 
English law concept and should not be adopted in our law. See in this regard the recent case 
of Van der Eecken v Salvation Army Prop Co and another 2008 4 SA 28 (T) where a 
wrongdoer lost control of a fire on his property that then spread to neighbouring properties; 
par 36–39 that he ‘breached his duty of care’ by failing to take adequate precautions in terms 
of s 12 of the National Veld Fire Act 101 of 1998. 
47 See in this regard Neethling et al  31, 48; Herschel v Mrupe 1954 3 SA 464 (A) 490. 
48 Steenkamp NO v The Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 3 SA 121 (CC) pars 21, 
41; Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 3 SA 590 (A) 597.  
49 Steenkamp NO v The Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape (CC) par 41; Faure & Skogh 
310 make the point that setting stricter regulatory standards can assist in setting the levels of 
care required to the standard of the bonus paterfamilias. This can be especially relevant as 
increased regulation of activities that affect or use the environment could provide this type of 
assistance. 
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Where the subjective rights of various legal subjects are in competition, for 
example, where someone protects his own rights, such as his right to trade 
freely or to ply his trade or profession50 which in his view enjoys priority, by 
infringing upon another’s rights right to a clean environment, the infringement 
is prima facie wrongful.51 The objective criterion of reasonableness must be 
applied to balance the rights or interests, by taking into account, for example, 
the nature and extent of the harm or loss; the value of the loss to the 
prejudiced party and to society; possible preventative measures as well as the 
probable degree of success of such measures, the nature of the relationship 
between the parties, the motive and knowledge of the wrongdoer, and so 
forth.52 
 
Because of the application of the boni mores-test, the fundamental rights 
entrenched in the Constitution also play an important role to determine 
whether a specific action is wrongful. As reasonableness is an open-ended 
criterion, the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights,53 requires that the 
boni mores must incorporate and protect constitutional values and norms.54 
The Constitution does not replace the boni mores. Wrongfulness must be 
interpreted more widely now than in the past, in order to give better protection 
to the values underpinning the Bill of Rights.55 The criterion allows for 
                                            
50 S 22 of the Constitution. 
51 See the view held by Havenga (1997) 92; see in this regard also the judgment in Malahe v 
Minister of Safety and Security  540 where it was held that the mere fact that an injury is 
caused gives right to an inference of wrongfulness; see also the corresponding views of 
Neethling et al 41. 
52 As identified by Neethling et al 35; Administrateur, Transvaal v Van der Merwe 1994 4 SA 
347 (A) 361–362; s 36 of the Constitution; see specifically the discussion in par 3.2.1.2 of the 
text above. 
53 Specifically s 8, s 38, s 39. 
54 See the discussion of the constitutional right to the environment in chap 3 par 3.2.2 and the 
conclusion in par 3.6 above; see especially Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (CC) 
962, pars 42–43; s 35(3), s 39(2) and s 195(1) on the basic values and principles governing 
public administration; Steenkamp NO v The Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape (CC) 
pars 20 – 23; see also in general Neethling J and Potgieter JM “Toepassing van die Grondwet 
op die Deliktereg” 2002 (65) THRHR 265. 
55 Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 1 SA 389 (SCA) 396; see also Fagan A 
“Rethinking Wrongfulness in the Law of Delict” 2005 (122) SALJ 90; see in general the 
discussion by Neethling et al 36. 
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changes in the law to reflect the changing values and needs of the 
community.56 
 
4.2.3.3 Wrongfulness of omissions and the legal duty to act 
 
In the event of a claim based on an omission, or where the claim is one for 
pure economic loss,57 one must ask whether a legal duty to act has been 
breached.58 As environmental damage could more likely be caused by 
omissions than by positive conduct, the discussion of the wrongfulness of 
omissions is extremely relevant. Where a wrongdoer was supposed to take 
precautionary or preventative measures, a standard of due care has been 
set.59 ‘When determining whether the law should recognize the existence of a 
legal duty in any particular circumstances, what is called for is not an intuitive 
reaction to a collection of arbitrary factors, but rather a balancing against one 
another of identifiable norms’.60 
 
The following omissions have been generally acknowledged as actionable 
omissions that are relevant in an environmental context as far as liability 
claims in our law for environmental damage are concerned. As public policy 
considerations change, these categories are not a numerus clausus and may 
                                            
56 See the discussion by Scott TJ “Die Regsplig by ‘n Late en die Veroorsaking van Suiwer 
Ekonomiese Verlies” 1995 (28) De Jure (hereinafter ‘Scott (1995)’), especially 158–164 for an 
examination of the variety of interpretations of the ‘principle of public policy’, see also the 
judgement given in Minister of Law and Order v Kadir 1995 1 SA 303 (A). 
57 See the comprehensive discussion of claims for pure economic loss in par 4.2.6.2.5 and 
chap 6 par 6.6.2.6 below; see also Scott (1995) 158–164 in this regard. 
58 Minister of Finance and others v Gore NO 2007 1 SA 111 (SCA) 138; Bareki NO and 
another v Gencor Ltd and others 439–441; Minister of Safety and Security v Carmichele 
(SCA); Neethling et al 137 recognise that the term ‘duty of care’ has occasionally been used 
by our courts and was adopted from the ‘duty of care’ doctrine in English law, but that as it is 
foreign to our law, it should be rejected and replaced by the norm of a breach of a legal duty. 
59 Faure & Skogh 246 identify that this is in accordance with the international environmental 
precautionary principle, and in accordance with the principle of preventative measures as 
discussed in chap 3 par 3.3.2.1(b), (c), and par 3.3.2.3 above. 
60 Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA) par 21; see also  
Lubbe & Four Others v Cape Plc and related appeals 27-7-2000 (HL) on the duty of care that 
an asbestos mining company has towards its employees. 
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also change accordingly.61 There may also be an interaction between the 
various categories discussed below, especially in an environmental context.62 
 
4.2.3.3.1 Omissio per commissionem 
 
Where a person who creates a potentially dangerous situation and then fails 
to remove the danger, known as an omissio per commissionem or prior 
conduct, it serves as a strong indication of the existence of the wrongdoer’s 
legal duty to prevent the potential danger from becoming a real danger.63 Any 
resulting loss or damage caused to another person by such an omission may 
be claimed from the wrongdoer. This type of omission is especially relevant as 
far as liability for pollution damage is concerned.64 An example would be 
where, because of lack of capacity, there is a toxic waste overflow from the 
waste storage facility of a factory, and the problem is not addressed but 
ignored, resulting in pollution damage. Three requirements exist, namely there 
must be (a) the creation of a new source of danger; (b) a failure to remove this 
danger; and (c) another person must suffer the resulting loss, impairment or 
injury. 65  
 
4.2.3.3.2 Control of a dangerous object or substances 
 
Where a person is in control of a dangerous object, such as a polluting 
substance or facility, and fails to exercise proper control over it with the result 
                                            
61 Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising Standards Authority 484. 
62 See, for example, the case of Minister van Polisie v Ewels where a policeman failed to 
prevent an assault. The following were all applied to determine whether there was a legal duty 
to act: a statutory duty(see par (c) in the text below), a special relationship (see par (e) in the 
text below), and a public office held by the policeman (see par (d) in the text below); see also 
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (CC) 938. 
63 See in general Neethling et al 52; Van der Walt & Midgley 86 explain that in this situation 
liability is founded on a combination of the preceding or previous conduct and the subsequent 
omission, based on the facts and circumstances of each case; see also Knobel JC 
“Aanspreeklikheid weens ‘n Late in die Geval van ‘n Munisipaliteit” 1987 (50) THRHR 480 for 
the application of these principles in an analogous situation; see also Minister van Polisie v 
Ewels 596; Regal v African Superslate 1963 1 SA 102 (A) 109, 116. 
64 See in this regard Lubbe & Four Others v Cape Plc and related appeals on claims for 
asbestos poisoning; see also par 3.3.4 above on the liability of the State for its wrongful 
omissions. 
65 See this issue as addressed in the various judgments in the case of Regal v African 
Superslate  respectively at 109, 111, 116, 121. 
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that loss or damage is caused to someone else, the wrongdoer can be   held 
liable for the loss or damage caused by his omission.66 Should a manufacturer 
who utilises dangerous chemicals during his manufacturing processes, fail to 
maintain proper control of the chemicals, causing environmental damage 
through pollution, he could be held liable to compensate persons for the loss 
or damage caused by his omission. One must first ask whether there was 
actual control, and secondly whether a legal duty existed to prevent damage 
caused by an omission to exercise proper control.67 A situation that has 
appeared regularly before the courts, and one which has the potential to 
cause immense environmental damage, is the failure to control a fire, which 
then rages out of control.68 The occupier of property on which dangerous 
conditions exist, has a legal duty to prevent injury to persons who access the 
property or enter the premises.69 
 
4.2.3.3.3 Requirement to act in accordance with a rule of law 
 
Where either common law or statute requires a person to act in a specific 
way, any failure to act in accordance with such a rule of law is prima facie 
wrongful.70 Firstly, the infringement must be justified, and then the 
infringement must not exceed the boundaries set by the statute.71 An example 
would be where a statutory duty rests upon a polluter to rectify the harm 
                                            
66 Cape Town Municipality v Bakkerud 2000 3 SA 1049 (SCA); Daniël Mostert v Cape Town 
City Council 2001 1 SA 105 (SCA) 120; see also Administrateur Transvaal v Van der Merwe 
361; Van der Walt & Midgley 86 explain that mere control and supervision of property does 
not create a legal duty per se; see also in this regard Neethling et al 56. 
67 See, for example, Van der Eecken v Salvation Army Prop Co and another on the failure to 
control a fire when creating a firebreak, which then allowed the fire to spread to neighbouring 
properties; see also Steenberg v De Kaap Timber (Pty) Ltd 1992 2 SA 169 (A);  
Administrateur, Transvaal v Van der Merwe 359; as well as the case note by Scott TJ “Die 
Onregmatigheidstoets in die Deliktereg in die geval van ‘n Late: Administrateur, Transvaal v 
Van der Merwe 1994 4 SA 347 (A)” 1995 (28) De Jure 234. 
68 See in this regard Steenberg v De Kaap Timber (Pty) Ltd); Minister of Forestry v 
Quathlamba (Pty) Ltd 1973 3 SA 69 (A).  
69 See Oosthuizen v Homegas (Pty) Ltd 1992 3 SA 463 (O), where liquid petroleum gas 
stored and decanted in an inadequately ventilated room caused harm to persons on the 
premises; Neethling et al 57, especially n 144–145. 
70 See also Van der Eecken v Salvation Army Prop Co and another on the statutory duty as 
created in s12 of the National Veld Fire Act, and whether a failure to comply with the statutory 
duty to control fires when creating firebreaks was wrongful in a civil law context. 
71 Neethling J and Potgieter JM “Statutêre bevoegdheid: Die rol van redelike 
voorsienbaarheid by onregmatigheid en nalatigheid” 2004 (25) Obiter (hereinafter ‘Neethling 
& Potgieter (2004)’) 477.  
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caused to the environment at the cessation of industrial activities,72 or where a 
polluter is held liable for clean-up costs in the event of a polluting act.73 Failing 
to comply could be found to be wrongful and would enable the plaintiff to 
claim delictual damages for the damage suffered.74 Where there is a 
possibility of unfairness, a statute that imposes a duty will not enjoy 
retroactive operation.75 
 
In order to prove wrongfulness, the plaintiff must also prove that the statutory 
measure provides him with a civil remedy. This will depend on the nature and 
objectives of the measure.76 A criminal sanction does not rule out the 
existence of an additional common-law remedy that can be used in 
conjunction with the former.77 The plaintiff must also be a member of the 
group for whose benefit and protection the statutory duty was imposed,78 the 
statute must have contemplated the nature and occurrence of the harm,79 the 
defendant must have transgressed the statutory provision and a causal link 
must exist between the transgression and the harm.80 An example of a 
common-law duty would be where a contractual undertaking is given to 
ensure the safety of another. As contractual liability and its insurability fall 
outside of the scope of this study, they are not considered extensively.81 
 
 
 
                                            
72 See Chap 7 of NEMA s 28, and , for example, s 28(1) reg 2 where a person using a vehicle 
in a coastal zone has to rectify harm that he causes; see also Bareki NO and another v 
Gencor Ltd and others 439–441.  
73 See, for example, s 25(12), s 28(8)(c) of NEMA; s 45 of the National Heritage Resources 
Act  and other relevant statutes as discussed in par 3.4.4 above. 
74 Relevant case law in this regard includes Minister van Polisie v Ewels; Olitzky Property 
Holdings v State Tender Board 2001 3 SA 1247 (SCA); Knop v Johannesburg City Council 
1995 2 SA 1 (A) 35; Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (CC); Minister of Safety and 
Serurity v Carmichele (SCA); see also in general Neethling et al 59–62. 
75 Bareki NO and another v Gencor Ltd and others 439 on the position in terms of NEMA s 
28(1), s 28(2). 
76 Premier Western Cape v Faircape Property Developers (Pty) Ltd  29. 
77 As was already held in Patz v Greene and Co 1907 TS 427. 
78 Where a statutory duty is imposed for the benefit of society in general, an interdict would be 
a more suitable remedy, and not a claim for damages instituted by a particular individual. 
79 Neethling et al 70, specifically n 237. 
80 See in this regard Da Silva v Coutinho 1971 3 SA 123 (A) 141–148. 
81 See in this regard par 4.3 below. 
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4.2.3.3.4 A particular office  
 
A person who occupies a public office (such as the Minister or the Director-
General of Environmental Affairs and Tourism) can possibly incur liability for 
his failure to act in a certain way.82 Should his failure to act cause loss or 
damage to another, the holder of the office or position could possibly incur 
liability for the loss or damage so caused. 
 
Public accountability as far as organs of state are concerned, has not evolved 
into a general liability for damages caused by improper administrative 
actions.83 The recent case of Steenkamp NO v The Provincial Tender Board, 
Eastern Cape before our Constitutional Court dealt extensively with the 
question whether a breach of a statutory duty was in fact wrongful for purpose 
of proving delictual liability.84 This case dealt with the negligent yet bona fide 
award of a tender. It was held that in the absence of a clear legal duty in 
statute or in common law, or on constitutional principles, a failure to act in an 
administrative just manner is not wrongful per se.85 In view of this decision, 
and the duty in terms of section 24 of the Constitution as well as the various 
other statutory duties of the State provided for in environmental legislation as 
discussed above, it is submitted that it would appear to be easier to prove 
wrongfulness for omissions leading to environmental losses, than was the 
case in the exercise of a ordinary run-of-the-mill administrative act in a tender 
process in respect of which no express statutory duty exists.86 
 
                                            
82 For example, the duties of the Director-General in terms of NEMA s 28 as discussed in par 
3.4.2.3 above. 
83 Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising Standards Authority 487; 
Olitzki Property Holdings v State Tender Board and another par 31. 
84 See also the discussion of grounds of justification, specifically the breach of statutory duty 
and official capacity, in par 4.2.3.4.4 below in this regard. 
85 See the Constitution s 172(1)(a) on the exercise of public power; see specifically pars 37, 
39 of the case. 
86 See the discussion by Neethling J “Delictual Protection of the Right to Bodily Integrity and 
Security of the Person against Omissions by the State” 2005 (122) SALJ 572; also Neethling 
J “Die Carmichele-Sage kom tot ‘n Gelukkige Einde” 2005 (2) TSAR 402 in reaction to the 
Carmichele judgments. 
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4.2.3.3.5 Special relationship between the parties 
 
Where there is a special relationship between parties, such as that between 
the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station as an employer, and its employees, one 
can expect the employer to act in a specific manner. Should he fail to do so, 
and in the process cause loss or injury to his employees, he could be held 
delictually liable because of his omission. Where a person is contractually 
obliged to protect another from harm and fails to do so, his omission is 
wrongful. A contractual undertaking creates a legal duty to act in accordance 
with the undertaking freely given by agreement.87 
 
4.2.3.3.6 Creating the impression that interests will be protected 
 
Where one person is placed under a reasonable reliance by another that the 
latter will protect the interests of the former, a legal duty rests upon the person 
creating the (false) impression to act in accordance with the reliance that he 
created. Where the creation of such an impression or reliance is wrongful (in 
terms of the boni mores as tested according to reasonableness), and also 
blameworthy, delictual liability can follow. Where a person innocently creates 
a false impression, he cannot be held delictually liable, as fault is absent. This 
will be the case where a local authority who allows industrial development in 
close proximity of a residential area, creates the impression to the residents 
that environmental impact assessments have been done and approved and 
that the development will not harm the environment, but in reality where the 
proper procedure was not followed. 
  
4.2.3.4 Grounds of justification 
 
Circumstances, which occur regularly in practice, allowed for the development 
of supplementary criteria to determine whether conduct is seen as wrongful 
for purposes of delictual liability. In some cases the law recognises grounds 
that justify a person’s conduct, which then has the effect that even where such 
                                            
87 As stated by Neethling et al 58 n 146. 
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conduct has infringed upon another person’s rights, causing loss, damage, 
harm or injury, it will not be deemed wrongful because of special 
circumstances. These are called grounds of justification.88 The following are 
factual circumstances, and is not a numerus clausus, that could provide 
adequate justification for the polluter’s conduct and eliminate the 
wrongfulness thereof in an environmental context. 
 
4.2.3.4.1 Doctrine of the abuse of rights and nuisance 
 
Nuisance has been accepted internationally as one of the most prolific 
environmental torts. Examples of nuisance can be found where smoke or 
gases that escape from one property drift over another,89 or where water or 
chemicals such as oil from underground storage tanks seep into the soil of 
another’s property.90 The doctrine of nuisance has not been expressly 
accepted as part of our law, yet similar principles that underlie the doctrine of 
the abuse of rights have been implemented and accepted by our courts.91 
This applies especially in the so-called ‘neighbour law’,92 also in general 
referred to as ‘nuisance’.93 The basic question remains whether a person 
                                            
88 Malahe v Minister of Safety and Security 534; see in general the discussion by Neethling et 
al 70 et seq. 
89 See the reference in chap 3 par 3.2.3.2 n 43 above on the case of Lopez Ostra v Spain 
(1995) 20 EHRR 277, where the State was held liable for allowing a factory to be erected for 
the purpose of processing waste from various unlicenced tanneries, which caused air 
pollution and bad smells to the surrounding residential areas. 
90 See par 4.2.4.3.5 n 169 and chap 6 par 6.3.2.1 below, on the aviation fuel leak and 
seepage at the OR Tambo International Airport; see also Lascon Properties (Pty) Ltd v 
Wadeville Investment Co (Pty) Ltd 1997 4 SA 578 (W), where polluted water from mining 
activities escaped without having been rendered innocuous, causing damage to adjacent 
land, and that caused the mine to incur liability for the loss.  
91 Various cases serve as authority on this point, namely Regal v African Superslate (Pty) Ltd 
106; Gien v Gien 1979 2 SA 1113 (T) 1121; and Union Government (Minister of Railways and 
Harbours) v Marais 1920 AD 240 247; see the opinion of Van der Walt & Midgley 123 who 
submit that the abuse of rights are in essence an integral part of the fundamental principle 
that conduct contrary to boni mores is wrongful, and that it should not be seen as a separate 
and distinct doctrine in our law; see, however, Neethling et al 102 n 510 for criticism on this 
point. 
92 Own translation of ‘die burereg’. 
93 The tort of nuisance has been developed extensively in UK law as discussed in chap 7 par 
7.3.3.3 below, and in the USA as discussed in chap 7 par 7.6.3.4. Although it is not part of our 
law, the principles correspond with those of the doctrine of abuse of rights in Suth African law. 
See in this regard Flax v Murphy 1991 4 SA 58 (W) 61; East London Western Districts 
Farmer’s Association v Minister of Education and Development Aid 1989 2 SA 63 (A) 88; see 
the comprehensive discussion by Neels JL “Tussen Regmatigheid en Onregmatigheid: Die 
Leerstuk van Oorskryding van Regte en Bevoegdhede” (Part I) 1999 (1) TSAR 63; (Part II) 
Footnote continues on the next page. 
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abused any of his rights to his benefit, causing his neighbour some form of 
prejudice. The benefit and the prejudice must be weighed up against each 
other, based on the relative concepts of reasonableness and fairness.94 The 
constitutional right to the environment will also inform the concept of 
reasonable behaviour relating to the environment.95 
 
Nuisance can be divided into public nuisance, where the rights of the general 
public are infringed upon,96 private nuisance where one individual infringes 
upon the rights of another97 and lastly statutory nuisance, where a legislative 
authority declares specific conduct to be a nuisance for which liability can then 
be incurred.98 The general delictual requirements still apply to determine 
liability, although a nuisance is actionable irrespective of any proof of 
negligence or intent. A full discussion of whether fault is a requirement follows 
below.99  
 
The general principles that apply in our law are the following: (a) An owner of 
property may use his property as he sees fit yet within legal boundaries;100 (b) 
                                            
2000 (2) TSAR 317; (Part III) 2000 (3) TSAR 469; and (Part IV) 2000 (4) TSAR 643; also 
Neels JL “Die Onderskeid tussen Oorlas en die Oorskryding van Eiendomsreg op 
Onroerende Goedere” 2000 (33) De Jure 19. 
94 As stated in Dorland v Smits 2002 5 SA 374 (C) 384; see also Neethling et al 103. 
95 See the statement by Bell S & McGillivray D Environmental Law 6th ed (2006) (hereinafter 
‘Bell & McGillivray’) 388 that ‘[h]uman rights law may force through some welcome 
developments, for example, to bring nuisance actions.’  
96 The Restatement (Second) of Torts 1976 § 821B deals with common-law public nuisance; 
Madden & Boston 56 describe a public nuisance as ‘an unreasonable interference with a right 
common to the general public’. 
97 See PGB Boerdery Beleggings (Edms) Bpk and another v Somerville 62 (Edms) Bpk and 
another 2008 2 SA 428 (SCA) where a private nuisance was caused by the transfer of 
diseased game from one property to another; see also Van Rensburg and another NNO v 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and others 2008 2 SA 8 (SECLD) where the 
erection and extension of buildings contrary to title conditions caused a private nuisance to 
neighbouring properties; see Allaclas Investments (Pty) Ltd and another v Milnerton Golf Club 
and others 2008 3 SA 134 (SCA) where golf balls striking an appellant’s property which was 
situated adjacent to a golf course, did not constitute unusual use and therefore was not an 
actionable private nuisance. 
98 See par 4.2.3.4.1 below for a detailed discussion of the application of the doctrine of the 
abuse of rights and nuisance in South African law. 
99 See par 4.2.4 below. 
100 See the judgment in Trustees Two Oceans Aquarium Trust v Kantey & Templer (Pty) Ltd 
2006 3 SA 138 (SCA) par 11 for the reference by JRL Milton that ‘[a]n interference with the 
property rights of another is not actionable as a nuisance unless it is unreasonable. An 
interference will be unreasonable when it ceases to be a ‘to-be-expected-in-the-
Footnote continues on the next page. 
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the owner’s interests and the benefit of exercising his rights of ownership 
must be weighed up against his neighbour’s interests and the prejudice he 
suffers;101 (c) the owner’s reasonable or unreasonable conduct relates to 
whether he is acting wrongfully.102 Improper motive does not make the 
conduct wrongful per se;103 and (d) the presence or threat of danger is also 
not a nuisance per se, unless is it objectively unreasonable.104 
 
Our courts have in the past been unwilling to allow claims based purely on 
aesthetic considerations, visually or otherwise, as they are notoriously 
subjective and personal.105 In a recent case where a respondent erected and 
extended buildings contrary to restrictive title conditions on his property that 
proved to be a nuisance to neighbouring property, his unlawful conduct 
allowed the court not only to issue a demolition order, but the court was also 
afforded the discretion to allow a claim for damages. In this case, however, 
the court held that damages would not be a suitable remedy, as it would not 
put an end to the nuisance.106  
 
                                            
circumstances’ interference and is of the type which does not have to be tolerated under the 
principle of ‘give-and-take, live and let live.’ See also Gien v Gien 1120. 
101 See Regal v African Superslate (Pty) Ltd 106 for a reference to the relevant principles in 
Roman Dutch law; see also Gien v Gien 1121; Union Government (Minister of Railways and 
Harbours) v Marais 270; Neethling et al 105. 
102 See also Trustees Two Oceans Aquarium Trust v Kantey & Templer (Pty) Ltd par 11 for 
the reference by JRL Milton that ‘[t]he criterion used is not that of the reasonable man but 
rather involves an objective evaluation of the circumstances and milieu in which the alleged 
nuisance has occurred’. 
103 Gien v Gien 1113; Regal v African Superslate 107, 108; Neethling et al 107. 
104 Dorland and another v Smits 384; Regal v African Superslate 110. 
105 In Paola v Jeeva NO & Others 2003 4 All SA 433 (SCA) 439, 440 the court held that the 
view of a property affects its market value, and that it should be taken into consideration when 
approving building plans that could detrimentally affect the views of surrounding properties; 
see in this regard Kidd M “The view I behold on a sunshiny day” 2004 (121) SALJ (hereinafter 
‘Kidd (2004)’) 556 on the ‘right to a view’ and whether an infringement of this right should be 
seen as an actionable nuisance; see also the statement in Director: Mineral Development 
Gauteng Region and Sasol Mining (Pty) Ltd v Save the Vaal Environment 1999 2 SA 709 
(SCA) par 6(c) that pollution from a strip mine would destroy the ‘sense of place’ of the 
wetland in question, destroying the spiritual, aesthetic and therapeutic qualities associated 
with the area. See also Dorland and another v Smits 383 where the court held that one is not 
to use one’s property unreasonably to the undue detriment of one’s neighbour, and that it is 
not necessarily limited to one’s next-door neighbour. 
106 Van Rensburg and another NNO v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and others 
11, 12. 
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Kidd correctly supports the view that an interference with aesthetics should be 
actionable where it is proven to be unreasonable.107 The right to the natural 
environment should entitle one to enjoy the aesthetic appeal of nature. This 
issue is also of relevance where the scope of ‘damages’ claimable is 
examined, and where environmental pollution causes an appreciable 
diminution in the value of property because of its loss of aesthetic appeal and 
its subsequent reduced use and enjoyment. 
 
4.2.3.4.2 Impossibility to act 
 
The impossibility to act does not amount to necessity, but in specific 
circumstances it could exclude wrongfulness.108 In the well-known case of 
Regal v African Superslate (Pty) Ltd an owner of land allowed loose slate from 
his land to wash downstream, causing damage to another’s property. It was 
held that because the measures that would have to be taken by the former to 
prevent the slate from washing down were so extensive, compared to the 
interests of the latter, the failure to prevent the loss was not wrongful as 
prevention was impossible in the circumstances.109 
 
4.2.3.4.3 Consent to injury and voluntary assumption of the risk 
 
A person may waive his rights and consent to damage or harm being done to 
him, or to the risk of such harm or injury.110 This would be relevant for 
                                            
107 See Kidd (2004) 559, specifically referring to Knobel JC “Inbreukmaking op die estetiese 
oorlas” 2003 (66) THRHR 500; in Raubenheimer NO v Trustees, Johannes Bredenkamp 
Trust and Others 2006 1 SA 124 (C) the court held that a ‘sentimental and emotional 
attachment’ to a building that was to be demolished was not harmful to his ‘well-being.’ ;see 
also the views of Du Bois F & Glazewski J “The environment and the Bill of Rights” in The Bill 
of Rights Compendium (1996) 2B-38 that the use of the term ‘well-being’ in s 24 of the 
Constitution undermines the traditional view that aesthetic nuisance is not actionable. See 
also the discussion in chap 6 par 6.6.2.3 below on claims for potential extensive ‘damages’ 
that can affect a person’s enjoyment of life’s amenities; see also Kidd 21–22. 
108 See Van Oosten FFW “Die Aard en Rol van die Stelreël lex non cogit ad impossibilia in die 
Strafreg” 1986 (49) THRHR 375 for an analogy to this position in a civil law context.  
109
 Regal v African Superslate (Pty) Ltd 111–122.  
110 See in this regard Santam Insurance Co Ltd v Vorster 1973 4 SA 764 (A); Lampert v 
Heever 1955 2 SA 507(A); Neethling et al 89 et seq; Van der Walt & Midgley 140; this is in 
accordance with the Roman and Roman-Dutch law maxim volenti non fit iniuria as discussed 
by De Groot 3.35.8; Voet 47.10.4, meaning consent to actual injury or merely to the risk of an 
injury. 
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purposes of this study where the proper authorisation for a certain action is 
given after a proper environmental impact assessment has been completed 
and approved, and where the authorised conduct then subsequently causes 
pollution damage as was envisaged when the permit was issued. The 
question remains on whether the polluter can be held liable for the damage 
caused in terms of the ‘regulatory compliance defence’. Not all countries allow 
this as a defence against blameworthiness.111 
 
The question arises whether the state can be held liable for improperly 
providing authorisation on behalf of its citizens. All the requirements listed 
below must be met. The justification of official capacity would be another 
possible ground of justification. 112 In context, consent might also be given by 
a landowner to allow another to conduct mining explorations on his land, 
which then causes environmental damage. 
The following requirements have to be met: (a) Consent is a unilateral act that 
does not require an agreement between the parties involved and must be 
voluntary, apparent and evident and given as a conscious expression of the 
injured party’s will, with the serious intention actually to consent to the 
injury;113 (b) consent can be given expressly or tacitly before the injuring 
conduct commences,114 and can be revoked at any time before the injurious 
conduct takes place; (c) consent must be lawful, and not against the public 
interest or good morals;115 (d) the consenting party must be fully aware of a 
risk in that he carries full knowledge of the rights he is waiving and of the 
harm that he could incur or of the risk that he is taking;116 and (e) the 
                                            
111 See also Faure M Tort and Insurance Law Vol 5: Deterrence, Insurability and 
Compensation in Environmental Liability: Future Developments in the European Union (2003) 
(hereinafter ‘Faure (ed)’) 55 on the justification that such a licence or permit provides. 
112 See par 4.2.3.4.4 below. 
113 As stated in Lampert v Heever 509; see also Neethling et al 90. 
114
 Union Government (Minister of Railways and Harbours) v Matthee 1917 AD 688 703; 
Neethling et al 91. 
115 See the discussion by Knobel JC “HIV-toetse, Toestemming en 
Onregmatigheidsbewussyn” 1997 (60) THRHR 533 on the policy of a governmental 
department as a factor to establish boni mores, in the light of C v Minister of Correctional 
Services 1996 4 SA 292 (T); Neethling et al 94. 
116
 Santam Insurance Co Ltd v Vorster 781; see also Van der Walt 143 that the 
materialisation of the risk must be subjectively foreseen, appreciated and assumed. 
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wrongdoer must act within the scope of the consent given by the injured 
party.117 
 
Although consent to injury can be confused with voluntary assumption of risk, 
the injured party in the latter instance merely expresses his willingness to 
subject himself to the risk of subsequent injury. Mere knowledge of the 
potential risk is not sufficient. The injured party must have consented to 
actually run the risk, as per the requirements set above. The ‘first use’ 
defence can also be addressed here. This will apply to a situation where a 
factory was located in an uninhabited area, and a person who, knowing of the 
existing risk of pollution by the factory, assumes the risk by settling on 
property adjacent to the factory. The ‘newcomer’ is then precluded from acting 
once the risk realises and the polluting event occurs.118 
 
If a person acts in order to protect the interest of another, but without the 
latter’s consent, it is recognised as a situation of unauthorised agency. The 
conduct of the former (the negotiorum gestor) is lawful, although the latter 
suffered a loss or damages in the process. The test applied by the courts is 
whether the other person, had he been present, would have acted in the 
same way as the negotiorum gestor, and whether the negotiorum gestor was 
reasonably of the opinion at the time of his conduct that it would be to the 
benefit of the other person.119 
 
4.2.3.4.4 Statutory authority and official capacity 
 
Where a statutory provision authorises a person to act in a certain way, his 
actions performed in terms of the statute will not be wrongful even if someone 
else is harmed thereby. A statute must clearly authorise the type of 
infringement upon private interests if it was the clear intention of the legislator 
                                            
117
 Santam Insurance Co Ltd v Vorster 783. 
118 See Faure (ed) 63 for a consideration of the merits of this defence. It is proposed that the 
possibility that the factory could reduce or prevent the pollution should be investigated and 
should be taken into account in determining whether the polluting conduct is in fact wrongful.  
119 See in this regard Neethling et al 82 n 340; see also the brief examination of negotiorum 
gestio in par 4.4 below. 
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to authorise and sanction such an infringement and the consequent conduct 
falls within the limits of the authorisation.120 Where the statute is merely 
directory, an infringement of interests is clearly authorised. Where it is 
permissive, there is a presumption that infringement of another’s interests is 
not expressly authorised. The presumption falls away if the authority is 
entrusted to a public body acting in the public interest. Whether the authorised 
act is circumscribed or described in the specific situation will also play a role 
in the interpretation of the extent of the authorised act.121  
 
Factors that have to be taken into account to determine whether statutory 
infringement is authorised, include: (a) whether it would have been possible to 
exercise the powers without infringing upon another’s interests; (b) whether 
the conduct causing the infringement is reasonable, and (c) whether other 
measures or methods exist which are similar in cost and efficiency that could 
have provided the same results without causing the infringement.122 Two 
requirements have to be satisfied for statutory immunity, namely, that 
reasonable practicable measures were taken to prevent harm, and that there 
was no negligence.123 Once again reference must be made to Steenkamp NO 
v The Provincial Tender Board Eastern Cape on whether a breach of statutory 
duty was in fact wrongful for purpose of delictual liability, as there is a 
statutory duty to protect the environment in terms of the Constitution. The 
court held that in the absence of a clear legal duty in statute or in common 
law, or on constitutional principles, a failure to act in an administrative 
capacity is not wrongful per se.124 
 
Where a person occupying an official position must perform certain acts, or 
has to execute an official lawful order given to him and another person is 
                                            
120 See Neethling & Potgieter (2004) 477; Premier Western Cape v Faircape Property 
Developers (Pty) Ltd 29; Govender v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 273 (SCA); 
Johannesburg Municipality v African Realty Trust 1927 AD 163 172; Neethling et al 96 et seq. 
121
 Johannesburg Municipality v African Realty Trust 163; see in general Neethling et al 96. 
122
 Minister of Community Development v Koch 1991 3 SA 751 (A) 761; Johannesburg 
Municipality v African Realty Trust 177; Breede River (Robertson) Irrigation Board v Brink 
1936 AD 359. 
123 Johannesburg City Council v Television & Electrical Distributors 1997 1 SA 157(A) 165. 
124 See pars156, 161 of the case; see also Neethling & Potgieter (2004) 481 in this regard. 
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harmed thereby, the official’s actions will not be wrongful.125 An example 
would be where an environmental impact assessor carries out his official 
duties, or properly instructs someone to act in a certain manner, but the 
assessment leads to environmental harm or damage. 
 
The infringing act must also not exceed the scope of infringement allowed by 
the statute or the official authority. 
 
4.2.3.4.5 Necessity 
 
Necessity is a ground of justification where a state of superior force or 
necessity, caused by human conduct or by forces of nature, forces a person 
to act towards protecting the interest of another, resulting in loss or harm 
caused to an innocent third party. This may be the case where a bush fire 
necessitates a person to make a counter-burn to protect the interests of 
another, causing environmental damage in the process. Another example 
would be where the managers of the Koeberg power plant have to release 
radioactive material into the atmosphere as an emergency measure to 
prevent a nuclear meltdown, which would cause far more damage than that 
caused by the controlled release of the radioactive material.126 In a state of 
necessity the interests of another innocent party may be infringed upon 
lawfully.127 The test to determine whether there was a reasonable response to 
a particular situation that presented itself is an objective one.128 
 
The requirements for a successful plea of necessity are the following: (a) The 
state of necessity must be imminent or should already have commenced.129 
                                            
125 Moeketsi v Minister van Justisie 1988 4 SA 707(T); see also in this regard the Promotion 
of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 that gives effect to and the Constitution s 33(1), s 
233(2), s 195 on public administration on the right that administrative action that must lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair. The Act does not include a claim for damages under the list 
of remedies available for failure of administrative justice, yet allows for an award of 
‘compensation’ in exceptional circumstances. 
126 See in general S v Goliath 1972 3 SA 1 (A) . 
127 See in general Neethling et al 80; also Van der Walt & Midgley 127; S v Adams, S v 
Werner 1981 1 SA 187 (A) 220. 
128 Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Rieck 2007 2 SA 118 (SCA) 122. 
129 See Neethling et al 82 for an examination of this requirement. 
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(b) A person could protect his own rights or the rights of another during the 
state of necessity. Life, physical integrity, property and other interests such as 
privacy and freedom may be protected. (c) Conduct during a state of 
necessity will only be justified if it is the only way in which the threatened 
interest can be protected. A person acting in a state of necessity may not 
cause more harm than that which is absolutely necessary and unavoidable in 
the specific circumstances. The interest which is infringed upon should not be 
greater than the interest which is protected.130 (d) To determine whether the 
conduct is reasonable, the gravity of the risk of harm must be weighed against 
the interest protected and the effectiveness of the conduct, which must not 
have been excessive.131 Two conflicting principles relevant to the scope of 
this study are the right to sustainable development132 and the right to the 
environment. The rights of a property developer should be weighed against 
the right of having the natural environment protected from damage, where the 
property developer applies for a rezoning for a proposed activity on land 
zoned as a ‘protected natural environment’.133 
 
4.2.3.4.6 Pure economic loss 
 
Conduct that causes pure financial or economic loss is not prima facie 
wrongful, and claims to compensate for these losses are only actionable 
where a legal duty to act was breached. As the issues are extensive, claims 
for pure economic losses because of pollution damage are examined in 
greater detail in this chapter,134 and in chapter 6 on the nature and 
assessment of damages below.135  
 
 
                                            
130 The principle of commensurability or proportionality of interests applies in this situation, as 
stated by Neethling et al 83. 
131 Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd t/a Rocklands Poultry v Rieck 123. 
132 See also the Constitution s 195(1)(c) that ‘public administration must be development-
orientated’. 
133 See the case of Myburgh Park Langebaan (Pty) Ltd v Langebaan Municipality and others 
2001 4 SA 1144 (C). 
134 See par 4.2.6.2.5 below. 
135 Chap 6 par 6.6.2.6 below. 
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4.2.3.4.7 Defence 
 
Where a person’s necessary defence136 against an attack, launched by 
human conduct that is objectively wrongful and that threatens or violates the 
defendant’s or another’s individual interest, the defence that in turn violates 
the attacker’s rights or interests is justified. The defence must be reasonably 
necessary to ward off the attack, and its effects must not be out of proportion 
to the effects of the attack.137 Although the interests must not be in actual 
proportion, there should at least be some form of balance. The test is one of 
reasonableness. The value and nature of the interests may differ, and the 
method used for the defence does not have to correspond to the methods 
used in the attack.138 It is submitted that although it appears to be unlikely that 
environmental damage caused during an act of defence during an enemy 
attack will be a regular occurrence, the possibility does exist. 
 
4.2.4 Fault 
 
4.2.4.1 General 
 
It is often problematic for a claimant to prove that the defendant’s conduct was 
intentional or negligent. Doing so requires policy judgements where once 
again the provisions of the Constitution become relevant.139 Before someone 
can be held liable in delict, one must determine whether the conduct was 
wrongful and whether it was blameworthy (culpable).140 These are two distinct 
requirements, and conceptually, the requirement of wrongfulness should 
                                            
136 See in general Neethling et al 70–80. 
137 Ex parte Die Minister van Justisie: In re S v Van Wyk 1967 1 SA 488 (A); Ntsomi v Minister 
of Law and Order 1990 1 SA 512 (C) 526–530; Kgaleng v Minister of Safety and Security 
2001 4 SA 854 (W) 865; Van der Walt & Midgley 128 state that courts are required to look a 
posteriori at all the circumstances and not from the point of view of any person, and that the 
perspective is more that of a reasonable person in the position of a mere bystander. 
138 As held in Ex parte Die Minister van Justisie: In re S v Van Wyk 492. 
139 See chap 3 par 3.2 above. 
140 As addressed in Minister of Safety and Security v Carmichele (SCA) 318–327; Cape Town 
Municipality v Bakkerud 1055; Administrateur Transvaal v Van der Merwe 364; Sea Harvest 
Corporation (Pty) Ltd and another v Duncan Dock Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd and another 2000 1 
SA 827 (A) 838. 
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precede the requirement of fault. It is, however, possible to follow a flexible 
approach by testing for the presence of fault first, and then for the presence of 
wrongfulness.141 What remains certain is that delictual liability remains firmly 
based on the principle of fault, unless there is a specific exception such as a 
statutory strict liability.142 
 
Fault is present where a person acted in a reprehensible state of mind or with 
insufficient care.143 Although intent is seen as the subjective element of delict 
as it deals with a person’s disposition or attitude during his wrongful conduct, 
negligence retains a more objective nature. The accountability of the polluter 
regarding his legal capacity to be held at fault, as well as his disposition at the 
time of his blameworthy conduct are prerequisites for the presence of fault.144 
Each case has to be judged on its own facts and merit, and each person’s 
own abilities judged in order to determine whether he could be legally blamed 
for his conduct. In terms of the fault theory, negligence or intent forms the 
basis of delictual liability.145 Any damage caused by a force majeure event 
should not be imputable to the wrongdoer, as it serves as a defence against 
liability.146 
 
4.2.4.2 Intent 
 
A wrongdoer’s conduct is intentional if he directed his will at achieving a 
particular result while being aware that his conduct is wrongful.147 It is the 
                                            
141 Knobel JC “Die volgorde waarin delikselemente onregmatigheid en skuld bepaal moet 
word” 2008 (71) THRHR 1 12 supports a flexible approach, where considerations of utility 
may favour the approach that the one is not a prerequisite for the other, and that one could 
test for negligence before testing for wrongfulness. Both must at the end of the day, however, 
be present before delictual liability can exist. See also n 244 below, where Knobel holds the 
opinion that one could also test for causation and the presence of damages first, before 
testing for the other requirements such as for wrongfulness and fault. 
142 For a discussion of strict liability see par 4.2.4.5. below. 
143 See in general Van der Walt & Midgley 155. 
144 Weber v Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy 1983 1 SA 381(A) 389 410; Neethling et al 
110. 
145 As stated by Neethling (2002) 585; see also the South African Law Review Commission 
Project 96 “The Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956” par 3.10. 
146 This is in accordance with the position in other countries as discussed in chap 7 par 
7.3.3.2.1 and n 207 below; see in this regard also Faure (ed) 53. 
147 Dantex Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Brenner 1989 1 SA 390 (A) 396; see also 
Neethling et al 112. 
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legally reprehensible state of mind or mental disposition when directing one’s 
will at producing a particular consequence while knowing that it is unlawful or 
wrongful.148  
 
Three forms of intent can be identified, namely direct intent (dolus directus) 
where the wrongdoer desires the consequence of his conduct, indirect intent 
(dolus indirectus) where the wrongdoer intends a specific consequence while 
knowing that another will be unavoidable or inevitable, and lastly dolus 
eventualis where the wrongdoer foresees the possibility of a specific 
consequence and reconciles himself with it.149 One would expect the last form 
to be especially relevant for actions that cause environmental damage, as one 
could only hope that persons do not pollute with either direct or even indirect 
intent.150 Dolus eventualis must be distinguished from reckless conduct, the 
latter being a form of negligence as discussed below.151 A mistake regarding 
a relevant fact or the law, as to whether the conduct is wrongful, generally 
excludes intent. The approach is a subjective one and is limited only by the 
requirement that the mistake must be bona fide.152 
 
Motive is only of evidentiary value in proving intent or consciousness of 
wrongfulness. A mistake concerning the causal chain of events only affects 
intent where there is a marked deviation from what the wrongdoer perceived 
the chain to be, and the actual causal chain of events.153 This could be the 
case where a person is mistaken as to how extensive the consequences of 
his polluting activities are. 
 
 
 
                                            
148 As described by Van der Walt & Midgley 157. 
149 S v Beukes 1988 1 SA 511(A); see also Neethling 113. 
150 See Neethling 114 who state that even though there is a distinction between the three 
forms of intent, it is generally irrelevant which one is present in a particular case. 
151 See par 4.2.4.3 below. 
152 Dantex Investment Holdings v Brenner 396; see also Neethling 114; Van der Walt & 
Midgley 163 hold the opinion that requiring the mistake to also be reasonable is not 
reconcilable with the subjective nature of the mistake. 
153 S v Goosen 1989 4 SA 1013 (A) 1026; see also Burchell JM “Mistake or Ignorance as to 
Causal Sequence – A New Aspect of Intention” 1990 (107) SALJ 168. 
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4.2.4.3 Negligence 
 
4.2.4.3.1 General criteria 
 
Where a person’s conduct does not conform to the standard of conduct, which 
could legally be expected of him in those specific circumstances, his conduct 
is negligent. Three elements combine to constitute a delict based on 
negligence, namely a legal duty in the circumstances to conform to the 
objective standard of the reasonable person, conduct that is careless, 
thoughtless or imprudent and which falls short of that standard, and resultant 
loss consequent upon that conduct.154 
 
4.2.4.3.2 The reasonable person 
 
The question is whether a diligens paterfamilias or reasonable person in the 
position of the wrongdoer concerned would have foreseen the reasonable 
possibility of loss,155 and would have taken any steps to prevent loss or harm 
from occurring at all, and then failing to do so.156  An objective test is used to 
determine what is reasonable or not and this depends on the facts and 
circumstances of each case.157 The conduct is therefore tested according to 
the objective criterion of the reasonable person, and conduct would be 
negligent where a person acts recklessly, carelessly or thoughtlessly.158  
 
                                            
154 First National Bank of South Africa Ltd v Duvenage 2006 5 SA 319 (SCA) 19, 320, 325; 
Van der Walt & Midgley 166 state that one must adapt one’s conduct to the ideals and 
standards of a particular community and not vice versa; see also Neethling et al 117 on this 
point. 
155 Kruger v Coetzee 1966 2 SA 428 (A) 430; see in general Neethling 126. 
156 Kantey & Templar and Another v Van Zyl NO  2007 1 SA 610 (C) 623; Kruger v Coetzee  
430. 
157 Crown Chickens (Pty) Ltd v Rieck pars 11–13; Jones v Santam Bpk 1965 2 SA 542 (A) 
542. 
158 For relevant case law on this point, see Kruger v Coetzee 430; Jones v Santam Bpk; 
Jurgens Steenkamp NO v The Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape (CC) par 39; Minister 
of Safety and Security v Carmichele (SCA) 325; Minister of Safety and Security and another v 
Rudman 2005 2 SA 16 (SCA) 39; Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 441;  
Premier, Western Cape v Faircape Property Developers (Pty) Ltd 36; see also Neethling & 
Potgieter (2004) 483. 
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In an environmental context, this would require that the reasonable person 
would have foreseen the probability of causing any harm, and would have 
guarded against the loss. The nature of the person’s interest that is infringed 
upon should be one that the law would prefer to protect against negligent 
conduct. The characteristics of a reasonable person have to adapt with and to 
changing circumstances.159 Although the Van Duivenboden case dealt with 
the possession and use of dangerous fire-arms, an analogy can easily be 
drawn as far as the sanctioned possession and use or abuse of hazardous 
pollutants are concerned. Greater environmental awareness and the 
availability of information and data indicating the risk and the severity of 
environmental damage and possible ways of avoiding this are all factors that 
influence the criterion of the reasonable person. As ‘mere negligence in the air 
will not do’,160 the two crucial elements of negligence that have to be proven 
are foreseeability and preventability.  
 
4.2.4.3.3 Foreseeability and preventability 
 
Foreseeability requires damage in general to be reasonably foreseeable in a 
specific situation.161 There can be no general hard and fast rules.162 As to 
preventability, reasonable steps must have been taken to prevent or mitigate 
damage. What is reasonable will depend on the degree, nature and extent of 
the risk, the gravity of the damage, the utility of the wrongdoer’s conduct, and 
lastly the burden of costs, expenses and difficulties in taking precautionary 
measures.163 
 
                                            
159
 Weber v Santam Versekeringmaatskappy Bpk 410; see Neethling et al 121–126, and 133–
138 for a comprehensive discussion of the various applications of this test. 
160 Premier, Western Cape v Faircape Property Developers (Pty) Ltd  31. 
161 Sea Harvest Corporation (Pty) Ltd and another v Duncan Dock Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd and 
another 840; Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corporation Ltd v Koch 1963 4 SA 147(A) 152; 
Neethling et al 127 are of the opinion that any approach, be it absolute (that only the general 
possibility of harm must be foreseen) or relative (that only the specific consequence must be 
foreseen) could prove to be sufficient. 
162 As held by the court in Minister of Safety and Security v Carmichele (SCA) 326;Van der 
Walt & Midgley 177 state that it cannot be founded on statistical and mathematical 
calculations, but only legal evaluation of the risk in a particular situation, in terms of broad and 
flexible guidelines; see also in this regard Neethling et al 129. 
163 See Kruger v Coetzee 428 where the court held that the burden of eliminating the risk 
must clearly not outweigh the magnitude of the risk. 
 154 
4.2.4.3.4 Gross negligence 
 
In specific cases a distinction must be drawn between ordinary negligence 
and gross negligence. This has no relevance for Aquilian liability, yet it may 
be possible for a statute to require gross negligence for liability and the 
distinction will then be critical.164 One should also not confuse dolus 
eventualis as a form of intent with gross negligence. The latter may be 
described as conduct that, although falling short of dolus eventualis, involves 
such an extensive departure from the standard of the reasonable person that 
it borders on intent, and clearly justifies liability.165 
 
4.2.4.3.5 Burden of proof and res ipsa loquitur 
 
The plaintiff must prove fault on a balance or preponderance of probabilities, 
unless the burden of proof has shifted to the defendant, for example, because 
of a statutory provision.166 Brief reference must also be made to the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur, as its application is suitable to prove negligence in order 
to succeed with a delictual claim in cases of environmental or pollution 
damage.167 Hoffmann and Zeffert explain it as follows: ‘If an accident happens 
in a manner which is unexplained but which does not ordinarily occur unless 
there has been negligence, the court is entitled to infer that it was caused by 
negligence.’168  
 
                                            
164 There are currently no environmental statutes that require gross negligence instead of 
ordinary negligence for purpose of statutory liability, yet the possibility of future legislation 
setting this requirement cannot be ruled out; see also in this regard the comments by 
Neethling et al 119. 
165As stated in MV Stella Tingas Transnet Ltd t/a Portnet v Owners of the MV Stella Tingas 
2003 2 SA 473 (SCA). 
166 This would be the case where a statutory presumption of fault exists, and the defendant 
can only avoid liability where he can use specific defences to disprove it. Neethling et al 138 
acknowledge that an example of such a shift is where the media can be held liable in 
defamation cases; see also Neethling 79 in Faure & Neethling where he advocates the 
extension of its application to product liability claims, and to claims within the specialised 
information technology industry. This can be endorsed. See also the judgment in Ciba-Geigy 
(Pty) Ltd v Lushof Farms (Pty) Ltd 2002 2 SA 447 (SCA) 470. 
167 This issue was addressed in Daniël Mostert v Cape Town City Council;  see also in 
general Neethling et al 139. 
168 Hoffmann LH & Zeffertt DT The South African Law of Evidence 4th ed (1988)  551. 
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This will be the case where there is an oil spillage at sea or oil seepage on 
land where oil is not naturally present, that would not have occurred had it not 
been, for example, due to negligence in failing to maintain and repair oil 
storage facilities from damage caused by normal wear and tear.169 
 
4.2.4.4 Contributory fault 
 
4.2.4.4.1 Application in an environmental context 
 
Where the damage caused by more than one person is divisible, clearly each 
person will be liable in full for that part of the divisible damage he caused. Yet 
where the damage is indivisible, an apportionment of damages must be 
made.170 Honoré, referring specifically to pollution, dealt with the divisibility of 
damage as follows: 
‘There are a large number of cases, moreover, apart from the destruction of 
objects which can be counted, weighed and measured, in which the harm can 
be regarded as divisible. For example, it may have extensive magnitude 
without being divided into separate items. The collapse of a wall is an 
instance. It may be that without the tortfeasor’s contribution only part of the 
wall would have collapsed. Other instances are the pollution of a river, and the 
emission of noise, smoke and stench. In these instances the separate items 
of harm, if they exist, certainly cannot be counted, yet the notion of more or 
less harm makes perfectly good sense. Even if the magnitude is intensive 
(pain, suffering, loss of amenities, discomfort and inconvenience), it is 
possible in certain cases to say that less pain etc. would have befallen the 
                                            
169 ACSA (The ‘Airport Company of South Africa’) was responsible for three separate aviation-
fuel leaks at the OR Tambo International Airport http://www.news24.com/News24/ 
South_Africa (last accessed on 8 November 2006). 
170 Wright v Mediclinic 2007 4 SA 327 (A) 327 at 360, 378; Minister of Safety and Security and 
another v Rudman and another; Van der Walt & Midgley 239 explains that the Roman law, as 
does the English law, applied the ‘all or nothing’ rule, yet that its harsh and inequitable results 
eventually lead to the development of the so-called ‘last opportunity’ rule. This rule proved just 
as difficult to apply, as it required the creation of artificial exceptions and qualifications to 
satisfy notions of fairness in its application. This, in turn, necessitated legislative intervention 
which lead to the enactment of the statute discussed below; see the comments in Neethling et 
al 144 based on the text by Voet 9 2 7. 
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injured party in the absence of the tortfeasor’s conduct. The only problem is 
that of quantifying the difference in monetary terms.’ 171 
 
Where the two parties, for example, a polluting industry as the defendant and 
a neighbouring polluting industry as the plaintiff are both at fault in respect of 
specific damage caused, there is contributory fault that requires the 
apportionment of liability incurred for environmental damage. This can be 
either in the form of contributory intent or contributory negligence.172 The 
plaintiff’s blameworthy conduct must have occurred prior to the commission of 
the delict if it is to be relevant to the issue of apportionment. Subsequent 
conduct by the plaintiff clearly falls within the scope of the issue of causation 
or under the duty that rests upon him to mitigate the loss he suffers.173  
 
4.2.4.4.2 Statutory apportionment 
 
Where both parties, the claimant and the defendant, acted negligently by 
causing the same damages, the damages must be apportioned in accordance 
with the provisions of the Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956.174 
Section 1 of the Apportionment of Damages Act provides for the reduction of 
the delictual damages claimed only where there is contributory negligence, 
and not for contributory intent. Where the defendant’s conduct was intentional 
and the plaintiff had contributory negligence, the common-law position 
prevails in that the defendant cannot claim a reduction of damages.175 
                                            
171 Honoré AM “Causation and Remoteness of Damage” in Tunc A (ed) International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law Part I vol 7 chap 7 114. 
172
 Kantey & Templar (Pty) Ltd and Another v Van Zyl NO 627. 
173 See the statements by Van der Walt & Midgley 240, 244 on this point. 
174 Act 34 of 1956 s 1(1)(a): ‘Where any person suffers damage which is caused partly by his 
fault and partly by the fault of any other person, a claim in respect of that damage shall not be 
defeated by reason of the fault of the claimant, but the damages recoverable in respect 
thereof shall be reduced by the court to such extent as the court may deem just and equitable 
having regard to the degree in which the claimant was at fault in relation to the damage.’ S 
1(1)(b): ’Damage shall for the purpose of paragraph (a) be regarded as having been caused 
by a person’s fault notwithstanding the fact that another person had the opportunity of 
avoiding the consequences thereof and negligently failed to do so.’ 
175 Van der Walt & Midgley 240 argue that the question remains whether the Act applies to 
intentional conduct as well, and that the defendant raising the plaintiff’s intentional conduct 
successfully as a defence is moot; see in this regard also the views of Neethling et al 146; 
Midgley in Van der Walt & Midgley 147, however, holds a different view from Van der Walt as 
the former believes that no reason in principle exists that prevents contributory intention to 
Footnote continues on the next page. 
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The court may, to the extent that it deems fair and equitable, reduce the 
amount of damages176 in proportion to each party’s contribution to the same 
damage.177 Where the wrongdoer caused some part of the damage, it might 
be impossible to identify precisely which portion of the damage he caused. A 
pragmatic approach must therefore be followed, based on a reasonable guess 
or estimate on the facts of the case, where the exact reduction cannot be 
formulated on the grounds of logic or reason.178 An example would be where 
two parties contribute to the pollution of ground water on which they both 
depend for agricultural purposes. 
 
The principles that have to be applied to determine causation and principles 
on the exact quantification of damages are addressed in greater detail in the 
discussion of causation and damages below.179 Where more than one person 
caused the damage, but the claimant was innocent, the claimant can, in terms 
of section 2 of the Act, sue them all in the same action.180 
 
 
 
                                            
serve as a ground of justification. This cannot be accepted, in view of the old adage that ‘two 
wrongs cannot make a right’, and because the application of other principles of the law of 
delict do offer solutions to this issue as discussed above. 
176 In accordance with Neethling et al 147, the claim must be reduced in accordance with the 
apportionment of blame, and not merely be divided between the parties. 
177 In terms of s 2(8)(a) ‘[t]he Court may (i) order that such joint wrongdoers pay the amount of 
damages awarded jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved.’ S 2 
(8)(a)(iii) states that ‘[w]here it gives judgement against the joint wrongdoers jointly and 
severally as aforesaid, at the request of any of the wrongdoers, apportion the damages 
payable by the joint wrongdoers inter se, amongst the joint wrongdoers, in such proportions 
as the Court may deem just and equitable having regard to the degree in which each joint 
wrongdoer was at fault in relation to the damage suffered by the third person’;see  Kantey & 
Templar (Pty) Ltd and Another v Van Zyl NO 627; see specifically Jones NO v Santam Bpk 
555 for a summary of the various methods adopted to determine the respective degrees of 
fault; see also Harrington NO and another v Transnet Ltd and others 2007 2 SA 228 (C) 250–
254. One should keep in mind that the entire process of comparison remains subject to 
considerations of justice and equity. 
178 See Wright v Mediclinic 368, 371; De Klerk v ABSA and others par 37; see also Van der 
Walt & Midgley 242, 243 for older case law that serves to illustrate this point. 
179 See pars 4.2.5, 4.2.6 below; see also chap 6 pars 6.3.5, 6.4.3, 6.6.2 on problems relating 
to multiple causation and the quantification of damages in the text below; see also the 
allocation of liability between insurers as discussed in chap 6 par 6.3.5 below. 
180 S 2(1): ‘Where it is alleged that two or more persons are jointly or severally liable in delict 
to a third person, for the same damage, such persons may be sued in the same action.’ 
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4.2.4.5 Strict liability 
 
4.2.4.5.1 Recognition of strict liability 
 
A person could be held liable for his conduct in some situations even where 
fault is absent.181 Strict liability182 can only be incurred in exceptional 
circumstances as an alternative to the fault principle where a specific legal 
rule, found in the common law183 or in modern legislation,184 creates or 
recognises liability where the wrongdoer’s innocent conduct is held to be 
blameworthy even though fault is absent.185 Strict liability develops primarily 
from legislation. When imposed by legislation, the claims are usually 
statutorily capped to a maximum amount to soften the effect of the strict 
liability,186 although this is not the case for damage caused by GMOs as 
discussed above.187  
 
                                            
181 See specifically Van der Walt JC “Strict Liability in the South African Law of Delict” 1968 
(1) CILSA 49 (hereinafter ‘Van der Walt (1968)’); Neethling (2002) 578; see in general Van 
der Walt & Midgley 35; also Neethling et al 329. The well-known English rule decision of 
Rylands v Fletcher 1868 LR 3 HL 330 discussed in chap 7 par 7.3.3.4 below, has not been 
received into our law, which remains based on Roman-Dutch principles. As stated in par 
4.2.3.4.1, the principles are, however, similar to the doctrine of the abuse of rights found in 
South African law. 
182 Also called ‘objective liability’ or ‘risk liability’. 
183 Other similar actions that apply in an environmental context include the actio aquae 
pluviae arcendae, that requires a wrongdoer who obstructs the natural flow of water to cease 
his infringing actions, see in this regard also Neethling et al 83 n 348 on the requirement of 
necessity;  the actio de pauperie, in terms of which the owner of domestic animals is liable for 
the damage caused by his animals acting contra suam naturam, for example, where the 
animals cause damage to neighbouring land or a water source; O’Callaghan v Chaplin 1927 
AD 310; SAR&H v Edwards 1930 AD 3; the actio de pastu for damage caused by grazing 
animals as applied in Van Zyl v Kotze 1961 4 SA 214 (T); and lastly the actio de effusiis vel 
deiectis for damage caused by objects (such as toxic substances or waste) thrown or poured 
from buildings as applied in Colman v Dunbar 1933 AD 141. These actions all have the 
potential to be applied to situations where environmental damage is caused. 
184 S 28(1), s 28(2) NEMA; s 30 of the National Nuclear Regulator Act as discussed in par 
3.4.4.12 of the text; see especially s 55 of the National Heritage Resources Act as discussed 
in par 3.4.4.11 above that expressly excludes strict liability. 
185 See Van der Walt (1968) 51 who explains that the rapid development in technology and 
the advance of industrialisation towards the end of the 19th century made the development of 
liability without fault, which is in contrast to the dominating doctrine of fault, highly desireable. 
The same still holds true today. See also South African Law Review Commission Project 96 
Report 2003 chap 3 par C; see also Havenga (1995) 202 who accepts this as an important 
point of departure when one considers the introduction of a strict liability regime specifically 
for environmental damage liability. 
186 See Van der Walt (1968) 63. 
187 See in this regard chap 3 par 3.4.4.4 on the examination of the Genetrically Modified 
Organisms Act. 
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4.2.4.5.2 Justification for strict liability 
 
A strict liability regime will usually exist where a specific industry causes 
extraordinary increases in the risk of harm to the community.188 Strict liability 
regimes are based on the application of this ‘risk or danger theory’, where 
liability is justified only by participation in a dangerous or risky activity or by 
the creation of such a risk.189 
 
This reasoning forms the basis of a producer’s strict product liability.190  It has, 
however, not been developed as extensively in South African law as has been 
the case in other countries such as in the USA,191 yet this will be the case 
once the Consumer Protection Bill is enacted.192 The wrongfulness of the 
conduct lies in the failure to prevent loss caused by a defective product. 
Delictual requirements therefore include only conduct, wrongfulness, 
causation and loss. The Bill aims to introduce a long-awaited strict statutory 
product liability in the form of a strict joint and several liability of producers, 
importers, distributors and retailers of goods.193 
                                            
188 This has been the case, for example, for product liability, and some forms of statutory 
environmental liability, for example, the strict liability of ship owners for incidents involving 
hazardous and noxious substances in accordance with the 1992 Protocol to the International 
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage; liability in terms of NEMA s 28; The Nuclear Energy Act (1999) s 61(3); the ECA s 
31A(1), s 31A(2); see also especially Neethling (2002) 578, 585, 591 on new risks; see 
Neethling et al 293 for a general discussion of the development of strict delictual liability. 
189 As stated by Van der Walt (1968) 63. 
190 See in this regard Neethling in Faure & Neethling 75; see also Merkin RM Colinvaux’s Law 
of Insurance 8th ed (2006) (hereinafter ‘Merkin’) 717 for an examination of strict liability as well 
as contractual liability that resort under product liability in an insurance context. 
191 Neethling in Faure & Neethling 76 puts it as follows: ‘Die Suid-Afrikaanse reg staan 
nietemin op hierdie gebied nog in sy kinderskoene’. It is clear that future developments can 
be expected.  
192 See the Consumer Protection Bill [B 19D–2008] which was signed on 24 April 2009, yet 
will only be implemented at the end of 2009 or early in 2010; see http://www.busrep.co.za/ 
index.php?Farticle ID=4734423&fSectionId=561 “Department of Trade and Industry to 
improve trade laws” (last accessed on 1 December 2008); see also chap 6 par 6.3.5.2.1 
below for a more detailed discussion of the scope of the proposed legislation. 
193 S 61(1)  provides that any consumer who is harmed by unsafe goods, has the right to hold 
anyone involved in getting the product into the market, irrespective of negligence, liable for 
any hazard arising from or associated from such risks. Joint and several liability is introduced 
by s 61(3), s 61(6). A court may determine the extent and monetary value of any damages. 
Specific defences are allowed in terms of s 61(4), namely where a person acts in accordance 
with compliance with a public regulation; or where it would be unreasonable to expect the 
producer or supplier to discover the hazard at the time of his involvement. ‘Harm’ in terms of s 
61(5) of the Bill includes death, injury, illness, loss of or physical damage to property, and any 
Footnote continues on the next page. 
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The interest or profit theory serves as a possible second basis of justification 
for strict liability. According to this theory, a person who causes harm or loss 
to another while he acts in his own interest or for a profit, should carry the 
burden of all the advantages as well as disadvantages of his economic 
activities. Where a producer or manufacturer therefore pollutes the 
environment during his production or manufacturing process, he should bear 
the responsibility for the resulting damage that is caused to the person or 
property of another. Although this form of justification has been criticised, it is 
submitted that where a person directly exploits the environment for the 
primary purpose of operating a profitable commercial venture, yet irrespective 
of whether he succeeds in enjoying an eventual profitable gain, he should 
accept the ensuing responsibility that the environment could be harmed based 
on this justification.194 This would, for example, justify strict liability where a 
manufacturer of goods uses water from a stream and pumps polluted water 
back into it, which causes loss to persons who are dependent on the water 
downstream, and for damage caused to the natural environment consisting of 
the stream itself and its environs.   
 
Force majeure and contributory intent or contributory negligence on the side 
of the plaintiff serve as defences in most strict liability cases.195  
 
Strict liability is thus a rare exception to the norm that fault is required and 
requires an express rule to that effect.196 It does appear from national and 
international legislative measures that there is a universal increase in the 
introduction of strict statutory liability regimes, especially for activities in high-
                                            
‘economic loss’. The latter is important for the discussion of claims for pure economic loss as 
discussed in chap 4 par 4.2.6.2.5, and in chap 6 par 6.6.2.6 below. The term used is, 
however, only ‘economic loss’ and the Bill does not refer to ‘pure economic loss’. 
194 See Neething et al 330 who find this position unacceptable, as nearly every form of human 
activity is for the person’s own interest or benefit, and that where an economic advantage is 
required, a lack of profitability could negate a successful claim by the plaintiff. 
195 As recognised by Van der Walt (1968) 63; see also Neethling et al 331. 
196 See the discussion by Neethling in Faure & Neethling 75 on the development of strict 
liability specifically in the emerging field of product liability; Faure & Skogh 242 note that there 
is an international tendency to move towards strict liability where there is a risk of 
environmental damage, and that it is justified as strict liability is in accordance with the 
polluter-pays principle. 
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risk industries.197 There should be no reason why any activity that harms the 
environment should not also be classified as such. 
 
4.2.4.5.3 Strict liability in South African law 
 
Strict liability at common law can be found in terms of the traditional actiones 
as discussed below,198 and can also apply to situations where claims are 
based on the abuse of rights or nuisance as discussed above.199 Strict liability 
can also be introduced by statute, in which case the extent of liability can be 
capped by the statute to a maximum amount per occurrence or in the 
aggregate.200  
 
Various statutes also create a strict liability regime within specific industries. 
The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act,201 in particular, 
contains a specific section that opens the door for general strict liability for 
pollution damage. It provides that ‘irrespective of the Companies Act202 or the 
Close Corporations Act,203 the directors of a company or members of a close 
corporation are jointly and severally liable for any unacceptable negative 
impact on the environment,204 including damage, degradation or pollution 
advertently or inadvertently caused by the company or close corporation 
which they represent or represented’.205 
 
                                            
197 See the South African Genetically Modified Organisms Act in chap 3 par 3.4.4.4 above.  
The court held in Loriza Brahman v Dippenaar 2002 2 SA 477 (SCA) 485 that ‘[d]ie 
verskynsel van risiko-aanspreeklikheid brei in die moderne tyd uit en vervul op gepaste 
terreine ‘n nuttige funksie’. 
198 See par 4.2.7.5 below. 
199 Van Schalkwyk v Van der Wath 1963 3 SA 636 (A); see also the discussion of ‘the 
doctrine of the abuse of rights and nuisance’ in ‘wrongfulness’ par 4.2.3.4.1 above. 
200 This is especially the case in the nuclear industry as can be seen from limits imposed by 
The Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage referred to in chap 3 pars 
3.3.4.4.3 and  3.4.4.13 above; see also Van der Walt (1968) 63 par (v) in this regard. 
201 Act 28 of 2002; see also par 3.4.4.8 above. 
202 Act 61 of 1973. 
203 Act 69 of 1984. 
204 Own emphasis. 
205 S 38(2). 
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In addition to the Consumer Protection Bill considered in the discussion of the 
justification of strict liability above,206 other examples of statutory strict liability 
in an environmental context can be found in the Hazardous Substances 
Act,207 the Marine Pollution (Control and Civil Liability) Act,208 the National 
Nuclear Regulator Act,209 and the Genetically Modified Organisms Act.210 The 
latter is one of the most recent implementations of this type of liability in the 
‘new risk’ area created by the engineering of genetically modified organisms. 
The Genetically Modified Organisms Act provides that where a user’s failure 
to ensure that appropriate measures are taken when using the GMO causes 
an adverse impact on the environment and human and animal health, he 
remains liable for the damage.211 Liability is only excluded where the GMO 
was in the possession of an inspector and the user could not foresee or have 
foreseen such damage but failed to take reasonable action to prevent it.212 It 
appears from the wording in this section that strict liability is imposed upon the 
user while he is in possession and control of the GMO, as his liability is only 
limited by his lack of foreseeability while the GMO was not in his possession. 
The uncertain risks posed by the processes of genetic engineering are clearly 
seen as participation in a dangerous and risky activity, and risk also lies in the 
possession or control of a dangerous living substance, both which impose 
strict liability on the user while he is in possession and control of the GMO.213 
 
An example of where the common law introduces a strict liability regime that 
applies specifically in an environmental context is in terms of the old Roman 
law interdictum quod vi aut clam. This action was subsequently modified by 
Roman-Dutch law and accepted as such in South African law, and is applied 
where a person causes damage to another by his interference with the natural 
                                            
206 See par 4.2.4.5.2 above. 
207 Act 15 of 1973; s 16 creates a regime for vicarious liability for contravention of the 
provisions of this Act; see chap 3 par 3.4.4.5; see also in general par 3.5.3.2 on statutory 
strict liability. 
208 S 9(3) of Act 6 of 1981 as discussed in chap 3 par 3.4.4.6. 
209 S 30 of Act 47 of 1999 as discussed in chap 3 par 3.4.4.12. 
210 Act 15 of 1997 as discussed in chap 3 par 3.4.4.4 above; this Act is in accordance with the 
UN Convention on Biological Diversity as listed in Annexure A. 
211 S 17(2). 
212 S 17(2) of Act 15 of 1997. 
213 S 17(2) as discussed in chap 3 par 3.4.4.4. 
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flow of surface water, for example, by dumping waste or pollutants into a river, 
that results in harm or loss to another.214 
 
In the case of Daniël Mostert v Cape Town City Council215 the court confirmed 
that, as far as liability in common law and liability insurance cover is 
concerned, a person cannot take out insurance where an insurable interest is 
absent. No such interest can exist under third-party insurance unless that 
person as a wrongdoer incurs liability towards someone who actually suffered 
damages. As the court held that liability can only be incurred by the 
wrongdoer where he acted negligently or deliberately, it followed that ‘to hold 
otherwise would be to impose a general strict liability on the wrongdoer, in 
other words to make him nothing else than an insurer’.216  
 
Vicarious liability at common law is also a form of strict liability based on a 
particular relationship where the conduct of the one causes indirect liability to 
the other.217 An employee or agent could, for example, cause environmental 
damage by his negligent conduct during the course of his employment, 
mandate or authority, for which his employer, mandator or principal can then 
be held vicariously liable.218 
 
 
 
                                            
214 De Groot 39 3 4 2, 39 3 5; Voet 43 24; see also Baldric Farms (Pty) Ltd v Wessels 1994 3 
SA 425 (A); Wassung v Simmons 1980 4 SA 753 (N) 760; Thormahlen v Gouws 1956 4 SA 
430 (A); Cape Town Council v Benning 1917 AD 315. For a more comprehensive discussion 
of all these actions, see the previous edition of Van der Walt JC & Midgley JR Delict: 
Principles and cases (1997) pars 25–30. 
215 2001 1 SA 105 (SCA); see also par 4.2.3.3.2 above. 
216 See par 127 of the judgment. 
217 Neethling et al 338; see in this regard Calitz K “Vicarious Liability of employers: 
reconsidering risk as the basis for liability” 2005 (2) TSAR 215; see also Faure & Skogh 159 
who hold that the benefit of vicarious liability for environmental damage is that public 
enforcement is simplified and effective in that there is usually a solvent party to turn to. See 
also for a comparison the USA statutory position on the attachment of the liability of 
subsidiaries to their parent companies in terms of CERCLA § 107(a), see chap 7 par 7.6.2.2 
below, as well as Bowers JM “A Parent Corporation’s Potential Liability for Act of Its 
Subsidiaries” http://www.mobar.org/journal/ 1997/mayjun (last accessed on 26 August 2008). 
218 Calitz 215; Atkins NG “Contractual Liability: Public liability insurance” 1992 (21) 
Businessman’s Law 207 209 evaluates the requirements that have to be met to hold a 
principal vicariously liable for the wrongful conduct of his independent contractors. 
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4.2.4.5.4 Proposed strict liability regime for environmental damage 
  
Although strict liability does apply to environmental situations as discussed  
above, it is submitted that the application is very limited. It is proposed that a 
general strict liability regime can easily be extended for application where 
environmental damage is caused by pollution.219 The reasoning is that 
participation in polluting production processes is not that far removed from the 
risks in a product liability scenario, where more than one potential wrongdoer 
could be the cause of harm or loss. 
 
The classic argument for the introduction of a strict liability regime is that it 
increases the plaintiff’s chances to receive compensation, and it also assists 
in deterrence. A strict liability regime provides the optimal incentive not only 
for the polluter to take effective care, but also forces the plaintiff to do so as 
his contributory fault could provide the polluter with a defence, which provides 
for effective deterrence.220 This regime will be in accordance with both the 
international environmental precautionary principle and with the principle of 
strict liability. Although the latter is not an absolute principle, it must be taken 
into consideration.221 Another benefit is that it also attempts to reinforce or 
facilitate the implementation of the important polluter-pays principle.222 
 
It is submitted that this type of regime will contribute to alleviate the burden of 
proving fault, especially negligence. It can also offer the additional benefit in 
providing a practical allocation mechanism of the loss according to the 
introduction of a statutory joint and several liability. Persons who could 
potentially have caused or contributed to a specific pollution occurrence must 
be held jointly and severally liable for the ensuing damage. A person can only 
deny his liability where he can prove that the loss was caused solely by a 
                                            
219 See also Faure (ed) 31 et seq who endorses this idea and justifies it not only from a legal, 
but also from an economic perspective. A more detailed examination of the latter sadly cannot 
be included in this thesis. 
220 Faure (ed) 27 et seq. 
221 See chap 3 pars 3.3.2.1, 3.3.2.3 above. 
222 See chap 3 par 3.3.2.2 above. 
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force majeure occurrence or by the intentional or negligent conduct of 
another. Where he contributed to the loss, he can limit his liability to reflect 
only his share in causing the loss, provided he can prove its extent. 
 
As the fault element is not the greatest civil liability problem in issue, importing 
a strict liability regime for environmental pollution damage will not offer 
solutions to the other issues such as wrongfulness and to the nature and 
extent of actionable damages. 
 
Although this type of regime eases the plaintiff’s burden of proving and 
allocating liability, it would force potential polluters to increase their insurance 
cover. This would lead to the internalisation of these costs, which then revert 
back to the purse of the consumer or of society in general. It will on the other 
hand, especially in an environmental insurance context, bring the plaintiff a 
few steps closer to a successful claim against the polluter, or against his own 
insurer or the insurer of the polluter. 
 
4.2.4.6 Voluntary assumption of risk  
 
Voluntary assumption of risk is not a form of consent to injury or risk of injury 
that serves as a ground of justification, but is conduct that cancels the 
element of fault.223 In the absence of fault, delictual liability cannot be 
incurred. Blame in the form of contributory intent falls on the injured party. 
Where the acting party consciously takes an unreasonable risk, the 
defendant’s negligent conduct is cancelled.224 
                                            
223 See in general the discussion by Van der Walt & Midgley 140, 211. 
224 Netherlands Insurance Co of SA Ltd v Van der Vyfer 1968 1 SA 412 (A); see also Knobel 
JC and Steynberg L “Vrywillinge aanvaarding van risiko en medewerkende opset” 2003 (66) 
THRHR 695; as confirmed by Neethling et al 154. 
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4.2.5 Causation 
 
4.2.5.1 General 
 
Causation is discussed as the fourth requirement for general delictual 
liability,225 and is notoriously difficult to prove in actions involving pollution 
damage, especially where there is a gradual pollution that was caused over a 
long period of time,226 where the pollution manifests itself in a place other than 
the area in which the initial pollution was caused, where there is contributory, 
joint or multiple causation, or where the pollution causes a prospective loss.227 
An example of the problems confronting a claimant in this type of situation 
would be where a number of farmers dump fertilizers in a river, and the 
damage only manifests much later downstream where the ecological balance 
is severely disturbed. This could potentially cause a loss to the farmers who 
draw water downstream as drinking water for their cattle or wild game. 
 
Causation gives rise to two distinct questions. The first is the question 
regarding factual causation, on whether the conduct caused or materially 
contributed to the harm that gives rise to the claim. The second is the 
question on legal causation, that is whether the harm is not too remote and is 
linked sufficiently closely or directly to justify ensuing legal liability.228  
Furthermore, it becomes problematic to determine the degree of causation 
where more than one person causes damage in the form of either multiple or 
contributory causation, and to determine the resulting proportion of liability for 
a specific portion of the damage so caused. In the words of Honoré, 
                                            
225 Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corporation Ltd v Koch; Van der Walt & Midgley 196; 
Neethling et al 159. 
226 See chap 6 par 6.3 on long-tail liability. 
227 See specifically Van der Walt CFC “Deliktuele aanspreeklikheid weens nadeel deur 
onbekende lede van ‘n groep toegebring” 1995 (58) THRHR Part I 421; Part II 613; see also 
Visser (2004) 138. 
228 Kantey & Templer and Another v Van Zyl NO 624; Minister of Safety and Security v 
Carmichele (SCA) 327; Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 448; Minister of 
Police v Skosana 1977 1 SA 31 (A) 34; see also Schlemmer E “Oorsaaklikheid in die 
Versekeringsreg” 1997 (3) TSAR  531 532. 
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‘[c]ausation is one thing and quantification is another, though I readily 
concede that it is not always possible to distinguish clearly between them’.229 
 
4.2.5.2 Factual causation 
 
The loss or damage must be caused by wrongful, culpable conduct. Where 
there is no factual nexus between a specific act (either a commission or an 
omission) and the loss or damage suffered, the wrongdoer cannot be held 
liable in delict. It is a question of fact whether such a causal link exists, and 
whether one fact arises out of another.230 
 
4.2.5.2.1 Test for factual causation 
 
In most cases this is determined by the application of the conditio sine qua 
non or ‘but for’ test.231 This is used to determine whether a certain act or 
conduct had a certain result, and is recognised as the most simple and 
practical way in which to determine factual causation. Where the unlawful 
conduct is taken out of the equation, causing the result also to fall away, a 
causal nexus in fact does exist.232 The ‘but for’ test has an all or nothing 
effect.233 The conduct, therefore, must be a sine qua non for the result. The 
application of the test is a matter of everyday common sense, and calls for ‘a 
retrospective analysis of what would probably have occurred, based upon the 
evidence and what can be expected to occur in the ordinary course of human 
                                            
229 De Klerk v ABSA and others pars 33, 36, 42; Burger v Union National South British 
Insurance Company 1975 4 SA 72 (W) 74; see the decision in First National Bank v 
Duvenage 2006 5 SA 319 (SCA) 324; see also the views of Visser (2004) 138; and Knobel JC 
“Die Samehang tussen Onregmatigheid en Skade” 2005 (68) THRHR 645. Knobel is of the 
opinion that it might be the proper approach to address the issue of the existence of loss and 
a causal connection first, before other requirements for delictual liability are tested and 
applied, in cases where this is most practical; see also Reinecke MFB “Die Elemente van die 
Begrip Skade” 1976 TSAR 26 38; as well as Reinecke MFB “Nabetragtinge oor die Skadeleer 
en Voordeeltoerekening”1988 (21) De Jure 221 225, who states that once damage has been 
established by a comparative method, it has also been demonstrated that the damage-
causing event is a conditio sine qua non of the damage. 
230 S v Mokgethi 1990 1 SA 32(A); Neethling et al 169. 
231 Minister of Police v Skosana 31; Minister of Safety and Security v Carmichele (SCA) 327; 
Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 449; Da Silva v Coutinho 128; see in 
general the discussions in Van der Walt & Midgley 198; Neethling et al 161. 
232 Minister of Police v Skosana  43. 
233 Minister of Finance and others v Gore NO 125. 
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affairs rather than an exercise in metaphysics’.234 Authority exists for the 
argument that it is not a test, but rather only an expression of a foregone 
conclusion.235 
 
4.2.5.2.2 Problems in application of test 
 
Where there is a situation of multiple causation,236 concurrent causation237 or 
cumulative causation,238 or where, as is theoretically possible in most 
situations regarding pollution damage, a single act may cause an endless 
chain of events, the problem needs to be addressed not only by the 
application of the principle of causation on its own. It could in the first instance 
be addressed by the fact that the wrongdoer will only incur liability where his 
conduct, which caused the damage, was also wrongful,239 as well as 
culpable.240 Where there are multiple wrongdoers who contribute to the loss, 
the court must first determine how far the defendant’s acts or omissions are 
causally linked to the damage in issue, and then how much they deviated 
from the objective norm of the conduct required by a bonus paterfamilias.241 In 
Germany, for example, the fact that a polluter could have been the cause of 
the pollution is deemed to be sufficient to hold such a polluter jointly liable with 
                                            
234 International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley 1990 1 SA 680 (A) 700; Minister of Finance 
and others v Gore 125; Van der Walt & Midgley 198 explain that the application of the test 
requires a particular process of reasoning, as a method of mental elimination has to be 
applied by hypothetically eliminating the defendant’s positive conduct from a complex set of 
circumstances.  
235 Minister of Safety and Security v Carmichele (SCA) 329; Minister of Safety and Security v 
Van Duivenboden 449; see S v Mokgethi for an effective determination of causation without 
specific reference to the conditio sine qua non-test; Visser PJ, Potgieter JM, Steynberg I & 
Floyd TB The Law of Damages 2nd ed (2003) (hereinafter ‘Visser et al’) 43 state that conditio 
sine qua non is the only way of expressing a factual nexus that has already been determined, 
yet that it is no real test for causation; see also Neethling et al 165–171 for a discussion of the 
fact that the ‘test’ is merely an ex post facto way to express a pre-determined causal nexus. 
236 See the discussion of multiple wrongdoers in par 4.2.4.4; see in this regard Van der Walt 
CFC (1995) Part I 421; also 613 in Part II. 
237 Visser et al 89 consider the assessment of damages in a situation of, in their words, a  
‘double (multiple) or alternative (concurrent) causation’. 
238 See in general Van der Walt & Midgley 199, 201 on this type iof causation; Visser PJ 
“Conditio sine qua non” 1989 (52) THRHR 558 562. 
239 Par 4.2.3 above on the requirement of wrongfulness. 
240 Par4.2.4 above on the requirement of culpability or fault. 
241 Jones NO v Santam Bpk 555; see also the more detailed discussion of contributory fault 
discussed under par 4.2.4.4 above; Van der Walt & Midgley 201 advocate that once a factual 
link is established, the relevance of these links in law should be established, which involves 
appraising legal causation policy issues such as the divisibility of harm and the onus of proof. 
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other polluters who fall in the same category.242 In the Netherlands and in the 
USA a market-share allocation is applied.243 No proof of actual causation is 
required. In South Africa the Apportionment of Damages Act244 applies where 
it can be proven that more than one person’s conduct caused the same 
loss.245 
 
Based on principles of policy and fairness, the law cannot allow limitless 
liability as can very well be the case in a pollution situation, and one must 
determine to which extent or limit a person should be held liable for damages 
caused.246 In the first instance, all the other requirements for delictual liability, 
such as wrongfulness and fault, must be present, and then an additional test, 
namely one to test for legal causation as discussed below, must be applied.247 
 
4.2.5.2.3 Novus actus interveniens 
 
Where a new, independent unconnected and extraneous factor or event 
occurs (a force majeure occurrence) or intervening conduct by a person (by 
the plaintiff himself or conduct by another individual) a new intervening cause 
or novus actus interveniens occurs. As this intervenes with the factual chain of 
events, the causal connection is extinguished.248 It is possible that the new 
intervening cause diminishes or erodes physical evidence of the initial 
damage-causing conduct. It must also be kept in mind that gradual pollution 
                                            
242 See the views of Fuggle & Rabie 97; see also Kerr 9. 
243 For an international perspective, see Snijder E “Van market-share liability naar pollution 
share liability?” 1990 TMA 6. 
244 Act 34 of 1965. 
245 S 2(1); see the full discussion of joint liability in par 4.2.4.4 above; the court in First 
National Bank of South Africa Ltd v Duvenage 319, 325 also held that, as a practical measure 
in specific circumstances, the issue of causation must be addressed first, before other 
requirements are tested and applied; Knobel (2005) 645 also argues that it might be the 
proper approach to address the issue of the existence of loss and a causal connection first, 
before other requirements for delictual liability are tested and applied, in cases where this is 
most practical. This is though not the standard procedure in most situations concerning the 
determination of delictual liability, where wrongfulness and fault of the conduct is usually 
tested before testing for causation and loss. 
246 See Neethling et al 159, 171. 
247 See par 4.2.5.3 below. 
248 Standard Chartered Bank of Canada v Nedperm Bank Ltd 1994 4 SA 747(A) 765; S v 
Mokgethi 46; Van der Walt & Midgley 207 expain that the causative potency of the 
defendant’s original conduct is neutralised by such a novus actus. 
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damage can also be aggravated by a new intervening cause. Care must be 
taken to review the facts and circumstances of each situation carefully, to 
determine whether the new occurrence actually stops the factual chain of 
events, whether it was foreseeable,249 or whether the chain is in fact not 
interrupted and where the application of legal causation could limit or reduce 
the original actor’s liability.250  
 
4.2.5.3 Legal causation 
 
Where all the other requirements for delictual liability have been met, legal 
causation is used to limit potential endless factual causation.251 Open-ended 
policy standards must be interpreted in terms of the Constitution and have to 
be applied to test for legal causation. Legal causation is used to determine 
whether a consequence is too remote to justify liability. Various policy 
considerations, based on the flexible criteria of reasonableness, fairness and 
justice, as well as the more classic theories of adequate causation,252 of 
fault,253 of direct consequences,254 as well as the more practical theory of 
reasonable foreseeability,255 can be applied.256  For many years the theory of 
reasonable foreseeability was held to be the most decisive theory.257  
                                            
249 OK Bazaars (1929) Ltd v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd  2002 3 SA 688 (SCA) 697. 
250 See in this regard Knobel JC “Novus Actus Interveniens and Causation in the Law of 
Delict: A Reappraisal in Anticipation of New Legislation” 2004 (67) THRHR 409. 
251 Relevant case in law includes Minister of Safety and Security v Carmichele (SCA) 332; 
Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 451; S v Mokgethi 39; International 
Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley 700; Knobel (2005) 645; Neethling et al 159. 
252 As discussed extensively by Van der Walt & Midgley 177, 207; see also Neethling et al 
176. 
253 Standard Bank v of South Africa Ltd v Coetsee 1981 1 SA 1131(A) 1139. 
254 As cnsidered by Van der Walt & Midgley 206; see also Neethling et al 178;  
255 Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corporation Ltd v Koch 152, 158; Smit v Abrahams 1994 
4 SA 1 (A) 19. It is submitted that where foreseeability is addressed, it must be kept in mind 
that foreseeing mere ‘pollution’ is insufficient as it is too wide, but that the nature and extent of 
the pollution should at least be foreseen. This supports the judgement in Cambridge Water 
Co v Eastern Countries Leather plc [1994] 1 All ER 53: see the discussion of this case in 
context of UK law as discussed in chap 7 par 7.3.3.2.3 below.  
256 Neethling et al 173. 
257 S v Mokgethi; see in this regard Neethling J and Potgieter JM “Deliktuele Aanspreeklikheid 
weens Bevrugting as gevolg van ‘n Nalatige Wanvoorstelling: Die Funksies van 
Onregmatigheid, Nalatigheid en Juridiese Kousaliteit” 2000 (63) THRHR 162; see in general 
the examinations by Van der Walt & Midgley 168, 173, 202, 208; also Neethling et al 173, 
192. 
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In recent judgments the application of the more flexible criteria, in accordance 
with the principles of the Constitution, have been preferred,258 not as the only 
criterion but with the other theories and criteria still playing a subsidiary 
role.259 Which theory or theories will assist in each given situation, depends 
on policy considerations and whether justice will be served.260 
 
4.2.6 Damage or Loss 
 
4.2.6.1 General 
 
The purpose of a delictual claim is to enable the party prejudiced by the delict 
to claim compensation for damage and satisfaction from the wrongdoer for the 
harm caused.261 Damage can therefore be defined as ‘the diminution, as a 
result of a damage-causing event, in the utility or quality of a patrimonial or 
personality interest in satisfying the legally recognised needs of the person 
involved’.262 It is the monetary equivalent to compensate for or eliminate the 
detrimental impact upon any patrimonial or non-patrimonial interest deemed 
worthy of protection by the law.263 As a general rule, not all damage suffered 
is compensable. As the law of damages as an independent subject is 
extensive, only the aspects that are most relevant to the scope of this study 
are discussed.264 Problematic issues relating to the nature and quantification 
                                            
258 For relevant case law on this point, see S v Mokgethi 39; OK Bazaars (1929) Ltd v 
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 699; International Shipping co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley 700; 
Smit v Abrahams 18. 
259 Standard Chartered Bank of Canada v Nedperm Bank Ltd  765; S v Mokgethi 40; see also 
Neethling et al 175. 
260 Van der Walt & Midgley 169 note that even when assessing negligence the focus appears 
to have moved away from foreseeability and preventability to the actual more objective 
standard; this is also confirmed by Neethling et al 176. 
261 Van der Walt & Midgley 43, 217; Neethling et al 195; see the decision in First National 
Bank of South Africa Ltd v Duvenage 319, 325; and also the views of Knobel (2005) 645. 
262 Visser et al  24. 
263 As stated by Neethling et al 196; see also Van der Walt CFC “Die 
Voordeeltoerekeningsreël – Knooppunt van Uiteenlopende Teorieë oor die Oogmerk van 
Skadevergoeding” 1980 (43) THRHR 1 at 5; Standard Chartered Bank of Canada v Nedperm 
Bank Ltd 76. 
264 See Neethling et al 195 n 3 for a comprehensive list of authoritative works on the South 
African law of damages.  
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of damage to the environment in an insurance context are also dealt with in 
chapter 6 below.265 
 
The burden of proving damages on a balance of probabilities lies upon the 
plaintiff.  The term ‘damages’, for purpose of this thesis, includes patrimonial 
or pecuniary damages, as well as non-patrimonial damages.266 Patrimonial 
loss can be directly expressed in money, its extent can be ascertained with 
greater precision and it is of the same nature as the impaired patrimonial 
interest infringed upon, whereas non-patrimonial loss is only indirectly 
measurable, is assessed by an equitable estimate, is different in nature and 
has no true relationship with the impaired interest.267 For wrongfulness, the 
question is whether there is an infringement of interests in violation of the 
legal norm. The law is concerned with the diminution in utility or quality of 
interests where an assessment of damages must be made.268  
 
Patrimonial damages (damnum iniuria datum), may be claimed with the actio 
legis Aquiliae, and non-patrimonial or non-pecuniary loss for the wrongful and 
intentional injury to personality (iniuria), may be claimed with the actio 
iniuriarum as infringements upon fama, corpus, dignity, privacy, and to a 
lesser extent feelings and identity are afforded recognition and protection in 
our law.269 Lastly, compensation for the wrongful and negligent impairment of 
bodily or physical-mental integrity can be claimed with the action for pain and 
suffering.270 Claims that are very relevant where environmental damage 
infringes upon a person’s physical and mental integrity, namely, claims for 
pain, suffering and disfigurement, as well as claims for the loss of, or for 
                                            
265 See chap 6 par 6.6 below. 
266 The differences in opinion of whether ‘damages’ refers only to patrimonial losses or also to 
non-patrimonial loss, is of an academic nature and is not dealt with in this work. See in this 
regard the general discussion by Neethling et al 197– 199. 
267 As described by Visser et al 32. 
268 See Visser et al 35; it is important to note as stated by the authors at 36 that neither 
wrongfulness nor fault qualifies damage, even though the general statement that damages 
‘flows’ from wrongful and culpable conduct, could create this impression. 
269 Neethling et al 5, 15 confirm that in some cases negligent conduct has been accepted as 
the fault requirement for claims under this action, whereas claims based on strict liability can 
also occur.  
270 Neethling et al 5; 13, this action only developed in Roman-Dutch law and was unknown in 
Roman law. It has also in its development and application by our courts been strongly 
influenced by English tort law as discussed in chap 7 par 7.3.3.2.5, 7.3.3.2.4. 
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shortened, life-expectancy, loss of amenities of health and life, and emotional 
shock are also included under this action.271 
 
4.2.6.2 Patrimonial loss 
 
4.2.6.2.1 General description and extent 
 
One’s patrimony can be described as the sum-total of a person’s rights, duties 
and expectations.272 ‘Patrimonial loss’ can be defined as ‘the diminution in the 
utility of a patrimonial interest in satisfying the legally recognised needs of a 
person entitled to such interest’ and as ‘the loss or reduction in value of a 
positive asset in someone’s patrimony or the creation of or increase in the 
negative elements of his patrimony’.273  
 
Positive elements include real rights, intellectual property rights and personal 
rights, as well as expectations of patrimonial rights or benefits. Negative 
elements include patrimonial debts or expenses, or an expectation thereof.274 
Loss in the form of damages can therefore be caused by either the loss of a 
patrimonial element,275 by the reduction in the value of patrimony276 or by the 
creation, acceleration or increase of a debt or even the expectation thereof.277  
 
As a general rule, the market value of a person’s estate or patrimony 
determines the monetary value thereof. The following forms of patrimonial 
                                            
271 As identified by Neethling et al 15. 
272 Rudman v Road Accident Fund 2003 2 SA 234 (SCA) 241; Visser et al 45; see also 47 for 
criticism by Reinecke that the definition is too wide, as ‘rights’ also include personality rights, 
and too narrow, as protection of other interests that are not subjective rights is also 
envisaged; Neethling et al 202. 
273 Visser et al 45 as to a ‘patrimonial debt’. 
274 Visser et al 45 et seq. 
275 For example, where property such a agricultural land has been damaged or destroyed, or 
where the expectancy to use it is lost; see in this regard Smit v Abrahams 17; see in general 
also Neethling et al 203. 
276 Where the object of a patrimonial right has been infringed, for example, the right to earn 
income or make a profit has been damaged or destroyed; see in this regard Rudman v Road 
Accident Fund 241. 
277 In Smit v Abrahams 17, 20 the court held that incurring costs for renting a vehicle for a 
reasonable time where the plaintiff had no other alternative was reasonable and a damages 
claim succeeded; see in general Visser et al 56; see also Neethling et al 203. 
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loss can be distinguished and are relevant to the concept of environmental 
damage caused by pollution. 
 
4.2.6.2.2 General damages  
 
The damages include loss of past or future profit (lucrum cessans), which is 
the loss of patrimonial expectancy that would have materialised with a 
sufficient degree of certainty.278 All other damage falls under direct damages 
(damnum emergens) which is the loss caused directly by the conduct causing 
the damages.279 Forms of damage recognised as lucrum cessans in practice 
include future expenses due to the damage-causing event,280 loss of earning 
capacity,281 business or professional profit282 or of prospective support,283 and 
the loss of a chance to gain a benefit. In terms of the loss of chance doctrine 
our courts in principle allow a claim for the loss of chance or possibility to 
exploit.284 This is relevant where damage to the environment could prevent or 
limit a person from exploiting his land, for example, where unsightly pollution 
damage prevents him from continuing a tourism enterprise of running a viable 
game farm, or where soil and water pollution could impact on potential 
farming activities. It still remains notoriously difficult to calculate the monetary 
value of the above losses. 
 
                                            
278 For example, loss of future earnings or income, or the loss of a chance to gain certain a 
benefit; see in general the discussions by Van der Walt & Midgley 222; by Visser et al 58; and 
by Neethling et al 206. 
279 See , for example, the discussion of ‘property damage’ in chap 6 par 6.6.2.3 below. 
280 De Klerk v ABSA Bank and others; Neethling et al 207. 
281 Dippenaar v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1979 2 SA 904(A) 917; President Insurance Co Ltd v 
Mathews 1992 1 SA 1 (A) 5; see also Neethling J “Persoonlike Immaterieelgoedereregte: ‘n 
Nuwe Kategorie van Subjektiewe Regte?” 1987 (50) THRHR 316; the opinion of Van der Walt 
& Midgley 223 is supported that it is not a claim for future loss of earnings, but for loss of 
earning capacity that could generate future income. 
282 In Transnet Ltd v Sechaba Photoscan (Pty) Ltd 2005 1 SA 299 (SCA) 305 the court held 
that there is no historical foundation, and nothing in principle, that can be see as a justification 
to prevent a claim for loss of profit under a delictual damages claim. 
283 See in this regard Neethling et al 207. 
284 For relevant case law, see SDR Investment Holdings Co (Pty) Ltd, Springgrove Cellar 
(Pty) Ltd, Zorgvliet Farms & Estates (Pty) Ltd v Nedcor Bank Ltd, Honey & Partners 2007 4 
SA 190 (C) par 56; De Klerk v ABSA Bank and others par 28. 
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The case of Truck and General Insurance Co Ltd v Verulam Fuel Distributors 
CC and another285 provides some guidance on the question on whether a 
claim for ‘damages’ includes a claim for clean-up costs under South African 
law. An indemnity clause in an insurance policy in respect of liability to third 
parties for property damage was interpreted and found to include cover for the 
insured’s liability to pay clean-up costs for ecological damage caused. The 
court warned that it would advise policyholders to include cover eo nomine for 
clean-up and rehabilitation costs in order to prevent unnecessary disputes.286 
The assessment and quantification of ‘clean-up’ costs are less difficult than in 
the case of future losses as real expenditure forms the basis of these claims, 
as discussed below.287 
 
4.2.6.2.3 Indirect or consequential damages 
 
Whereas direct damages are the immediate or direct result of the loss-
causing event, indirect or consequential damages are the losses that flow 
from the direct loss caused by the loss-causing event, and are often not 
recoverable as being ‘too remote’ to justify a claim.288 Special or ‘extrinsic’ 
damages are damages that are not presumed to be the consequence of a 
damage-causing event, and must be specially pleaded and proved, and 
include all pecuniary expenses and losses up to date of trial.289  
 
4.2.6.2.4 Damage to property 
 
Where the physical object of a real right is damaged, the term ‘property 
damage’290 is used, even though the term can be given a broader meaning. 
Damage to ‘property’ in the context of environmental damage includes but is 
                                            
285 2007 2 SA 26 (SCA); see also as discussed in chap 3 par 3.4.2.5.1, par 3.5.3.5 above. 
286 Special Risks Underwriters Yesterday’s Policies won’t meet tomorrow’s needs: The PLIP 
policies (1992) 3. 
287 Chap 6 par 6.6.2.3.3 below. 
288 For a more detailed consideration of ‘remoteness’, see Neethling et al 204; Neethling et al 
171; see also Visser et al 59. 
289 See in this regard the examination by Visser et al 60. 
290 So-called ‘saakskade’. 
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not limited to the diminution of the value of property,291 compensation for the 
loss of use of occupied space,292 discomfort caused by the harm,293 as well as 
the cost of repair, replacement, clean-up, restoration and rehabilitation of the 
property or one of its components. In the case of Truck and General 
Insurance Co Ltd v Verulam Fuel Distributors CC and another discussed 
above, ‘property damage’ was interpreted and insurance cover against 
property damage was found to include cover for environmental remediation 
costs. 
 
‘Stigma damages’ are a very important component of ‘property damage’, 
specifically where pollution damage is concerned, and are caused only by the 
public’s perception of damage.294 This perception causes the diminution of 
market value due to the public’s perception of the reduced value of the 
property because of its proximity to contamination.295 Stigma damages also 
occur where land was physically damaged yet cleaned up but where a 
reduction in market value due to the stigma of possible residual contamination 
or even the knowledge that the land was contaminated, occurs. Damage to 
interests in private goods or property as well as damage to interests in public 
goods such as in the communal environment can occur.296 It is submitted that 
stigma damages are just as real as a factual reduction in the value of land, 
and should be actionable in specific circumstances where an owner of 
                                            
291 Paola v Jeeva NO and Others 2004 1 SA 396 (SCA) 404. 
292 See, for example, the Finnish 1994 Environmental Damage and Compensation Act that 
provides that a “reasonable” compensation may be provided for a plaintiff for non-pecuniary 
losses linked to the reduced use of his property. The term ‘reasonable’ is to be defined in 
terms of duration of the nuisance and the degree to which the plaintiff could have reduced or 
prevented it.  
293 In the case of Lopez Ostra v Spain (1995) 20 EHRR 277, recognition was given to 
infringement of use of property where the court held at 295 that ‘Naturally, severe 
environmental pollution (in this case bad smells from a neighbouring tannery) may affect 
individuals well-being and prevent them from enjoying their home environment in such a way 
as to affect their private and family lives adversely without however, seriously endangering 
their health’. 
294 See in this regard Fogleman V Environmental Liabilities and Insurance in England and the 
United States (2005) (hereinafter ‘Fogleman’) Part A 394 for a consideration of the nature and 
extent of stigma damages. 
295 See especially Director: Mineral Development Gauteng Region and Sasol Mining (Pty) Ltd 
v Save the Vaal Environment 1999 2 SA 709 (SCA) par 6(e) where rumours of a proposed 
open-cast mine affected property values in the area. 
296 Faure & Skogh 319 acknowledge endangered species as an example of international 
public goods. 
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property, for example, manages to sell his property for far less than its 
objective market value due to the stigma attached to his property. 
 
4.2.6.2.5 Pure economic loss 
 
Pure financial or economic losses do not result directly from property damage 
or personal injury, and include, for example, wasted expenses incurred and 
profits foregone, revenue losses and affected reputation.297 Claims for pure 
economic loss are regularly brought under environmental insurance cover, as 
damage to the environment does not per se cause damage directly to a 
person or to his patrimony, but usually has the potential to cause pure 
economic loss. This will especially be the case where the ‘natural 
environment’ as such is damaged.298 Although this loss is just as real as any 
other loss suffered, the right not to suffer a pure economic loss is not 
entrenched as a fundamental right in the Constitution, and does not enjoy the 
same reinforced protection as the other fundamental rights.299 Causing pure 
economic loss is not prima facie wrongful, whereas breach of the duty to 
prevent property damage is prima facie wrongful, as the right to property is a 
constitutionally entrenched right.300  
 
Nationally,301 as well as internationally302 courts have been reluctant to allow 
claims for pure financial or economic losses. It remains difficult to define and 
                                            
297 Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising Standard Authority SA pars 
1, 13; Minister of Finance and others v Gore NO 138,140; Minister of Finance and others v 
Gore NO 138; Kantey & Templar (Pty) Ltd v Van Zyl NO  611, 625–628; Commité Maritime 
International CMI Yearbook:Admissibility and Assessment of Claims for Pollution Damage 
Part II (1993) 95. 
298 See in general chap 2 par 2.2.4.2, also chap 2 n 28 on the concept of ‘nature’ and the 
‘natural environment’; claims for pure economic loss under environmental liability insurance 
policies  is also dealt with in chap 6 par 6.6.2.6 below.  
299 See in this regard Neethling & Potgieter (2004) 481.  
300 The right to property in s 25 of the Constitution; see in this regard Knop v Johannesburg 
City Council 26; Neethling & Potgieter (2004) 481. 
301 A claim in South Africa was disallowed in the Steenkamp-case as discussed in this 
chapter, and in Minister of Law and Order v Kadir; but was allowed in Joubert v Impala 
Platinum Ltd 1998 1 SA 463 (B). 
302 For an international perspective, see Bussani M, Palmer VV & Parisi F “Liability for Pure 
Economic Loss in Europe: an Economic Restatement” 2003 (51) (hereinafter ‘Bussani et al’) 
The American Journal of Comparative Law 113 161; in the USA claims were disallowed, for 
example, in Adkins v Thomas Solvent Company 440 Mich 293 487 NW2d 715 (1992); Robins 
Footnote continues on the next page. 
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claim for a non-speculative and substantial economic loss, and to distinguish 
between consequential losses, the losses sustained because of damage to 
property, and pure economic losses that are sustained without the 
interposition of related physical damage.303  
 
Where there is environmental damage, a ‘ricochet loss’ where the direct 
damage caused to the primary prejudiced party results in economic losses for 
the secondary prejudiced party, and ‘transferred loss’ where physical damage 
of the property of the primary prejudiced party is passed contractually to a 
third party who then incurs only economic loss, are classic or standard forms 
of pure economic loss.304 Where a party places his reliance upon flawed 
information or professional services, he could incur pure financial or economic 
losses where he acts upon this reliance to his detriment.305 This appears to 
have been the situation in the Steenkamp case discussed below. 
 
Although it is not easy, it still remains possible to successfully recoup pure 
economic losses under the South African law of delict, provided that the 
defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty to act in the circumstances where the 
defendant acted negligently in causing the pure economic loss.306 As the 
conduct that causes a person pure economic loss is not prima facie wrongful, 
                                            
Dry Dock & Repair Co v Flint US Supreme Court 275 US 303 (1927); General Public Utilities 
v Glass Kitchens of Lancaster Inc., 374 Pa Super 203 542A2d 567 (1988); and Chance v BP 
Chemicals Inc 77 Ohio st3d 17 670 NE2d 985 (1996); but were allowed in Brown v 
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB 
Litigation) 35 F3d 717 (3d Cir 1994); and Terra-Products Inc v Kraft General Foods Inc 653 
NE2d 89 (Ind Ct App1995); Local Joint Executive Bd. & Culinary Workers Union, Local No. 
226 v Stern 98 Nev 409.651 P.2d 637 (1982); Burgess v M/V Tamano 370 Supp 247 
(DMe1973). 
303 The so-called “bright-line rule” as put by Larsson 395; see Faure (ed) 136 for an extensive 
discussion of the scope of this rule; see also Van der Walt & Midgley 93 for a South African 
perspective. 
304 See Bussani et al 118 for these examples. 
305 Bussani et al 120; see also 121 for an international perspective on the possibility of 
recovering damages based on such a reliance. 
306 Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Beperk 1979 3 SA 824 (A); Minister of 
Finance and others v Gore NO 140; Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v 
Advertising Standards Authority 468; Scott (1995) 158; for an early discussion see Basson 
DA “Die Nalatige Veroorsaking van Suiwer Ekonomiese Verlies” 1983 (1) Codicillus 8; Van 
der Walt & Midgley 93; It is important to emphasise that the phrase ‘duty of care’ should be 
used with caution where it is used to describe the South African concept of ‘legal duty’, as it 
must not be seen as an acceptance of the concept of the English law ‘duty of care’ that does 
not form part of our law. This has been addressed in par 4.2.3.3 above.  
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wrongfulness depends entirely on the breach of the general legal duty that 
rests upon persons not to cause damage to others.307 Once again the criterion 
remains one of reasonableness.308  
 
The following case serves as an illustration of the reluctance of the courts to 
allow these claims. In Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern 
Cape309 a delictual claim for pure economic loss was heard by the 
Constitutional Court.  The provincial tender board failed to adhere to 
prescribed tender procedures and awarded the tender to the plaintiff, who was 
unaware of the failure and incurred costs and expenses in anticipation of the 
completion of the project. The board denied their contractual liability based on 
the fact that there could be no contract due to their procedural failure.  The 
plaintiff’s delictual claim for pure economic loss was based on the board’s 
wrongful conduct as they failed to comply with their general duty of care 
towards tenderers. He failed to recover his losses as the court held that The 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act310 does not include damages in the 
list of remedies available for a failure of administrative justice. The Act does, 
however, allow for an award of ‘compensation’ in exceptional circumstances, 
which circumstances were absent and therefore found to be irrelevant in this 
case.311 The court was also not prepared to acknowledge a general duty in 
law to prevent pure economic losses, and had to disallow the claim as the 
conduct of the state tender board was found not to be wrongful.312 This will 
also apply where the conduct of the State, by allocating a permit, for example, 
allows a third person to act in such a way that causes environmental damage. 
 
Some countries contain express statutory measures that allow claims for pure 
economic or financial losses to avoid the complications of such a claim.313 
                                            
307 Minister of Finance and others v Gore NO 138. 
308 Van der Walt & Midgley 94 specifically also discuss the issue of the duty to prevent pure 
economic loss in their discussion of wrongfulness. 
309 2006 (SCA) specifically 141, 149, 152, 156. 
310 Act 3 of 2000. 
311 S 8(1)(c)(ii)(bb). 
312 See the discussion of this case in the context of wrongfulness in par 4.2.3.3.5 above. 
313 See, for example, the 1994 Finnish Act for an exception to the general principle that pure 
economic loss is not claimable. This statute expressly allows claims where the loss or 
Footnote continues on the next page. 
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This is not the current position in South African law. An exception is, however, 
readily accepted internationally in marine pollution cases where the claims of 
fishermen and beachside tour operators for financial losses suffered due to 
marine pollution are readily acknowledged.314 The provisions of the proposed 
consumer protection legislation specifically enables a consumer to claim the 
‘harm caused that includes a claim for “economic loss”‘, as described in the 
Bill.315 
 
4.2.6.2.6 Natural resource damages 
 
These include damages caused to the environment per se and not specifically 
damage to property as discussed above,316 and include damage to 
biodiversity and to the landscape.317 It is extremely difficult to put a price tag 
on public air, water, wildlife and scenery. Claims cannot include damage to 
the ‘voiceless elements of nature’ that do not in some way or another affect 
the interests of a person.318 A more comprehensive discussion of restoring 
natural resources or elements thereof after pollution damage occurred is 
provided in the examination of the quantification of damages below.319 
 
                                            
reduction of professional use of natural resources due to pollution leads to financial losses for 
fishermen and beach-front tourism operators; see also the discussion in chap 6 par 6.6.2.6 
below. 
314 Larsson 395; as well as the USA case Petition of Cleveland Tankers Inc (The Jupiter), 791 
F Supp 669 (ED Mich 1992);  the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OSCLA) Fisherman’s 
Contingency Fund 43 USCA δδ1841–1846. 
315 ‘Harm’ includes ‘death, injury, illness, loss of or physical damage to property and any 
economic loss’ (own emphasis), which may be claimed in terms of s 61(5) of the Consumer 
Protection Bill 2008; see also par 4.2.4.5.2 for a brief examination of the provisions of the Bill. 
316 See par 4.2.6.2.4 above. 
317 Once again reference may be made to Lopez Ostra v Spain (1995) 20 EHRR 277 where a 
claim was allowed not for the detrimental effect that a bad smell had on the value of the 
surrounding properties, nor for the damage to the health of the occupiers of the properties, 
but for the infringement of their general well-being that prevented them from enjoying their 
home environment and that affected their private and family lives adversely; Faure (ed) 138; 
see also Director: Mineral Development Gauteng Region and Sasol Mining (Pty) Ltd v Save 
the Vaal Environment 1999 2 SA 709 (SCA) par 6(c) that pollution from a strip mine would 
destroy the ‘sense of place’ of the wetland in question. 
318 This links specifically to chap 1 that nature is to be protected for the sake of mankind and 
not only for nature’s sake. 
319 See par 4.2.6.4.4 below. 
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4.2.6.2.7 Prospective damages 
 
Future or prospective damages are defined as patrimonial or non-patrimonial 
damages, which will with a sufficient degree of probability or reasonable 
possibility, materialise after the date of assessment of damage resulting from 
an earlier damage-causing event.320 What is required is at least a reasonable 
possibility, which will have to be interpreted in each specific situation 
depending on the facts and circumstances before the court. It can consist of 
either the delay of a future profit, such as a reduction in agricultural 
productivity or utility due to pollution of the land, or the acceleration of future 
expenses such as increased clean-up costs of the pollution on the land. 
 
As damage is relative to time, damage can be divided into (a) damage caused 
before the accrual of the cause of action; (b) damage from the moment of 
liability until the moment of commencement of the action; and (c) damage 
from the time of commencement of the action up to the time of the judgment. 
Visser et al note that its basis in all of these situations remains founded on the 
present impairment of a future expectation.321 
 
Not only the present events but also probable future events that co-determine 
the expectancy have to be taken into account.322 The court found that 
damages cannot be limited to only those suffered at the time of the delict, and 
that a claim for future losses would not constitute an improper benefit.323 
 
Internationally, claims for prospective losses caused by pollution damage are 
increasingly addressed. There has not yet been a satisfactory analysis of this 
concept in South African law, although one is urgently required. 
‘Compensation for prospective or future damage undoubtedly plays a 
                                            
320 See in general Visser et al 116; see also Visser (2004) 137. 
321 Visser et al 117. 
322 Very little case law exists. See, however, General Accident Insurance Co SA Ltd v 
Summers; Southern Versekeringsassosiasie Bpk v Carstens NO; General Accident Insurance 
Co SA Ltd v Nhlumayo 1987 3 SA 577 (A) 613.  
323 General Accident Insurance Co SA Ltd v Summers; Southern Versekeringsassosiasie Bpk 
v Carstens NO; General Accident Insurance Co SA Ltd v Nhlumayo 615. 
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significant role in our legal practice. It is therefore all the more puzzling why 
this concept has not been the subject of more theoretical analysis.’324  
 
Prospective losses can be described as ‘the total or partial frustration of an 
expectation that a patrimonial asset will accrue or that a personality interest 
will exist, or it can be the creation of an expectation of debt’.325 Forms of 
prospective loss include future expenses, loss of future income, prospective 
maintenance, business, contractual or professional profit, and a loss of 
chance to receive a patrimonial benefit. 
 
Another complication that contributes to the problem is the refusal of courts to 
allow a claim for prospective damage on its own, as it may only be awarded 
as ancillary to accrued damages.326  The universal issues regarding claims for 
prospective losses are also examined in chapter 6 below.327 
 
4.2.6.3 Non-patrimonial loss  
 
Non-patrimonial loss is defined as ‘ the diminution, as the result of a damage-
causing event, in the quality of highly personal (or personality) interests of an 
individual in satisfying his legally recognised needs, but which does not affect 
his patrimony’.328 It includes those values allocated to compensate for the 
detrimental impact, change, impairment or disturbance of physical-mental 
integrity or personality interests worthy of protection in law.329 This includes 
compensation for bodily harm, disability, disfigurement, pain and suffering, 
emotional disturbance, shock or distress, injured feelings, infringement of 
reputation or dignity, loss or impairment of present and future earning 
                                            
324 In the words of Visser (2004) 137. 
325 Visser et al 116. 
326 Coetzee v SAR&H 1933 CPD 565; Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 2000 3 SA 274 (SCA) 287; 
Visser et al 123 agree that prospective loss alone is not acknowledged as an independent 
cause of action for a compensation claim as it is not regarded as ‘actual’ damage. 
327 See chap 6 par 6.6.2.6 on the issues relating to obtaining cover against the risk of 
suffering these losses as discussed below. 
328 See Visser et al 94. 
329 As described by Neethling et al 221. 
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capacity, reimbursement of medical and other expenses, loss of amenities or 
quality of life, and a shortened life expectancy.330 
 
These damages are relevant for claims made in terms of the so-called 
‘asbestos cases’ or in case of other illnesses caused by the detrimental 
effects of environmental pollution.331 The valuation of the amount of 
compensation (solatium) for impairment of the plaintiff’s personality remains a 
speculative process.332 The specific facts and circumstances of each case 
must be taken into account for such calculation, and must be based on fair 
and reasonable criteria.333 As specialised matters relating to bodily injuries fall 
outside of the scope of this study, a more extensive discussion of the extent 
and assessment of these injuries and related forms of loss or damage are 
excluded from this thesis.  
 
4.2.6.4 Assessment and quantification of damages 
 
4.2.6.4.1 General introduction to assessment 
  
It is clear that a comparative method must be applied to assess the extent of 
damages suffered. The aggrieved party’s hypothetical patrimonial position, 
prior to the wrongful conduct, must be compared to his current patrimonial 
position after the wrongful conduct, to determine the loss for purpose of the 
                                            
330 Visser et al 97 conclude that the objective element refers to the external or generally 
recognisable manifestation of the impairment, whereas the subjective element is the 
emotional reaction experienced on account of the presence of the objective element; see also 
Neethling et al n 316–329 for an extensive list of cases; Van der Walt & Midgley 218–232 
provide examples of the various forms of damages that can be claimed. 
331 Thousands suffered from vomiting, stomach pains, nausea, breathing difficulties and 
nosebleeds, and seven people suffered a painful death due to the dumping of toxic waste in 
the Côte d’Ivoire(http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid= 284785&area=/ breaking_ 
news/break (last accessed on 27 September 2006); see also Larsson 394–395 for a general 
discussion of these damages. 
332 As stated by Visser et al 125 et seq. 
333 As stated above, these losses have an objective element, being the external manifestation 
of the impairment, and a subjective element on how the injured party perceives the 
impairment. In some cases the emphasis is placed on the former (for example, observing a 
shortened life-expectancy), and in other the latter (for example, experiencing and feeling the 
pain and suffering), see also Neethling et al 222 et seq.  
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claim. This is called the sum-formula doctrine or approach.334 This formula 
offers the benefit that it provides for loss already suffered as well as for 
prospective or future losses, which necessitates a speculative process to deal 
with the future hypothetical situation.335 
 
Damage must be assessed at a specified time. For delictual liability the 
decisive moment is seen as the date of the commission of the delict. Damage 
must be assessed at this time at a standard of value (patrimonial or 
otherwise), followed by the quantification of the exact monetary amount in 
accordance with specific principles of measurement.336 Factors that can affect 
the quantification are the plaintiff’s failure to mitigate damages, his 
contributory negligence and any possible benefits that accrue to him.337 
 
In situations where damage to the environment occurs, it is not always 
possible to determine the loss with absolute mathematical precision. It is in 
the first place difficult if not impossible to place a value on environmental 
damage such as pollution of public air, water, wildlife and scenery, and 
furthermore many losses are also of a prospective and therefore of a 
hypothetical nature.  
 
As a plaintiff cannot be faulted for being unable to quantify his damages 
accurately, the court may set an amount of damages that is based on no more 
than an informed guess.338 The courts require at least a logical basis for the 
calculation of the amount of damages. Absolutely exact quantification may, for 
example, depend on uncertain future events such as the effect of successful 
clean-up as well as nature’s ability to restore itself. It is trite law that the 
                                            
334 Transnet Ltd v Sechaba Photoscan (Pty) Ltd par 15 et seq; Rudman v Road Accident 
Fund 240; see Visser et al 65; 69 for on criticism on this approach and a brief consideration of 
the merits that the alternative ‘concrete concept of damage’ approach offers; see also in 
general Neethling et al 205, 223. 
335 Visser et al 72; see also 125 the examination of the assessment of prospective losses in 
particular. 
336 As stated by Visser et al 84; Neethling et al 217 explain the distinction between 
assessment and quantification of damages. 
337 See the discussion in pars 4.2.4.4 above; and  4.2.6.7 below. 
338 SDR Investment Holdings Co (Pty) Ltd, Springgrove Cellar (Pty) Ltd, Zorgvliet Farms & 
Estates (Pty) Ltd v Nedcor Bank Ltd, Honey & Partners pars 51, 56; see also the discussion 
of the quantification of losses in chap 6 par 6.6.2 below. 
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questions regarding quantification are not decided on a balance of probability, 
but rather on the court’s assessment based on the facts of a particular 
case.339 A best estimate on available evidential material is all that is 
required.340 This cannot be anything more than a speculative process.341 
Where more than one party contributed to the loss or damage, it is sometimes 
impossible to identify with precision exactly which share, part or element of 
the damage each one caused. A pragmatic approach must then be followed 
where divisibility cannot be formulated on the grounds of logic or reason, 
requiring a reasonable guess or estimate. For prospective damage, only 
speculation, general probabilities and assumptions can be used since future 
damage does not factually exist at the time of assessment.342  
 
4.2.6.4.2 Patrimonial damage 
 
In case of damage to or destruction of property, damages are generally 
calculated according to the market value of the property at the place of loss. 
Reasonable repair costs do not necessarily reflect the actual reduction in 
value of the property, as losses such as stigma damages can also occur.343 
Due to the difficulties in assessing the exact quantum of damages where 
natural resource damage is caused, the costs incurred to reinstate the 
resources to their original state is often the preferred assessment method. In 
most of the statutes discussed in chapter 3 above, liability for payment of a 
specific amount is therefore linked to the actual costs and expenses incurred 
for ‘clean-up’ or ‘remediation’ of the environment.344 Alternative wording for 
this concept as found in South African statutes includes ‘reasonable costs to 
remedy the effects of pollution’,345 ‘the expenses to rehabilitate’,346 ‘costs for 
                                            
339 See the judgment in De Klerk v ABSA and others pars 28, 37, 38. 
340 SDR Investment Holdings Co (Pty) Ltd, Springgrove Cellar (Pty) Ltd, Zorgvliet Farms & 
Estates (Pty) Ltd v Nedcor Bank Ltd, Honey & Partners par 58; De Klerk v ABSA par 29, 
Neethling et al 223. 
341 In the words of Visser et al 125. 
342 Visser (2004) 139; Wright v Mediclinic 371; see also Van der Walt & Midgley 225 on the 
importance that allowances must be made for the contingency that the loss would not have 
occurred at all. 
343 See the reference to ‘stigma damages’ in par 4.2.6.2.4 above. 
344 National Water Act s 20(7) in chap 3 par 3.4.4.14 above.  
345 NEMA s 28(3)(f), s 30(a) in chap 3 par 3.4.2 above. 
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the remediation of environmental damage’,347 ‘reasonable expenses for 
rehabilitation costs’,348 ‘costs and expenses to remove pollution’,349 
‘compensatory damages’,350  ‘compensation awarded to cover loss for 
damage to game’,351 ‘costs of making good’ damage to any national heritage 
resource,352 and ‘loss and expenses incurred by any person due to 
contravention of the specific Act’.353 Specific principles also apply to the 
calculation of damages for medical expenses, loss of income, and for claims 
based on nuisance.354 
 
4.2.6.4.3 Non-patrimonial loss 
 
The claim must bear some relation to the extent of the loss suffered, by taking 
into account the nature, seriousness, intensity and extent of the loss. A 
comparative approach must also be followed.355 Courts must also apply the 
principles of fairness and conservatism, yet refrain from allowing sympathy to 
cloud the assessment.356 Courts must take care to see that the award is fair to 
both sides, and not simply award compensation to the plaintiff.357 Awards are 
often made using actuarial evidence and awards made previously in similar 
and comparable cases are used as guidelines, although the latter may not 
restrict the court’s discretion in a specific situation.358 
 
                                            
346 ECA s 31A(2) in chap 3 par 3.4.3 above. 
347 Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act s 38– 46 in chap 3 par 3.4.4.8 above. 
348 National Nuclear Regulator Act s 29, s 35 in par 3.4.4.12 above. 
349 Marine Pollution (Control and Civil Liability) Act s 9(2) in chap 3 par 3.4.4.6 above. 
350 National Forests Act s 59(1)(b) chap par 3.4.4.10 above. 
351 Game Theft Act s 7 in chap 3 par 3.4.4.3 above, that also covers harm or damage caused 
to wild game by the conduct of another. 
352 National Heritage Resources Act s 51(8) in chap 3 par 3.4.4.11 above. 
353 Animals Protection Act s 2(4) and 2(5) in chap 3 par 3.4.4.1 above. 
354 See in general the authoritative work by Corbett MM & Honey DP The Quantum of 
Damages (2001); see Visser et al 405; see also Neethling et al 219; Church J & Church J 
“Nuisance” in Joubert WA( ed) LAWSA (Vol 19) 1st reissue (2002) par 180 on mitigation of 
harm; see par 204 for the value placed on the ‘comfort of human existence’; see also par 205 
on liability for this type of damage; and in the last instance par 216 on locus standi to sue. 
355 Visser et al 107. 
356 De Jongh v Du Pisanie 2005 5 SA 457(SCA) 475; as stated by Visser et al  438. 
357 This warning was issued by the court in Pitt v Economic Insurance Co Ltd 1957 3 SA  284 
(D) 287. 
358 As held in Protea Insurance Co Ltd v Lamb 1971 1 SA  530 (A) 535. 
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 4.2.6.4.4 Prospective loss 
 
Prospective damage should be assessed through a comparison of the 
hypothetical course of events before and after the damage-causing event. 
The former has become the unreal situation, whereas the latter has become a 
reality.359 The possibility of claiming this type of loss is relevant in the context 
of pollution damage and is more extensively discussed in chapter 6 below.360 
Where the policy is a valued policy, it is permissible for the insured to include 
consequential or prospective loss such as lost profits in his claim, provided 
that the insurer agreed that the valuation is prima facie conclusive and that it 
is recoverable. In unvalued policies consequential losses can only be claimed 
where they were expressly included under the cover provided.361 
 
The correct formula to calculate the quantum of prospective damage must be 
found under either the sum-formula approach or the concrete concept of 
damages, with the focus on the withdrawal or deterioration of a particular part 
or element of a person’s patrimony.362 It can be said that the hypothetical 
element of the sum-formula approach renders it more suitable for the 
assessment and quantification of prospective losses. The hypothetical 
position that existed before the damage-causing event that has become 
‘unreal’, and the hypothetical position after the damage-causing event that 
has become real must be compared and the difference seen as the quantum 
of the damage suffered.363 The admissible evidence available must be 
extensive in view of these uncertainties and should include permissible aids 
such as statistical data, relevant experience, probabilities and possibilities, 
and all reasonable deductions and conclusions to supplement factual data.364 
This includes contingencies that are described as ‘the hazards that normally 
                                            
359 Visser et al 120 hold the opinion that when applying the conditio sine qua non ‘test’, the 
comparative method is not actually used as the alleged antecedent is eliminated and the 
consequence then disappears; Van der Walt & Midgley 225 confirm the unavoidable 
interaction between causation and the quantification of loss, as stated previously in this 
chapter in par 4.2.4.4.1 above. 
360  See chap 6 par 6.6.2.2 on ‘compensable damages’. 
361  As confirmed by Merkin 344–347. 
362 Reinecke (1988) 226 supports the idea that the concrete approach offers more 
advantages than the abstract approach. 
363  In the words used by Visser et al 119. 
364  As identified by Visser et al 120 et seq. 
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beset the lives and circumstances of ordinary people’ and that can reduce or 
increase the damages.365 The court must furthermore discount or capitalise 
the amount as the plaintiff receives it in advance.366 
 
Where the damage is caused before the accrual of the cause of action or 
between the time of commencement of the action and the moment of 
judgment, the calculation of the existence and quantum of the prospective 
losses are not that complex, as the court has factual evidence at the time of 
judgment although it was not necessarily available at the time of summons. 
This must affect the amount of compensable damages ordered. 
 
4.2.6.5 Time of assessment 
 
As stated above, the decisive moment for the assessment of damage for 
purposes of delictual liability is generally seen as the date of the commission 
of the delict. As some environmental damage, for example, damage caused 
by slow-seepage, manifests itself only in future, the recognition of the date of 
manifestation of loss in these situations, as the actual date of assessment, is 
required.367 For practical reasons, this has already been included in the 
general discussion of a claim for prospective damages above.368 Where a 
person does not suffer immediate harm due to the wrongful culpable conduct 
of another, but there is a chance of him suffering it in future, the plaintiff only 
has an action once the loss manifests itself.369 This problem is dealt with more 
specifically in chapter 6 below, with specific reference to environmental 
damage and in the context of time clauses in insurance policies.370 
 
 
                                            
365  As stated by Visser et al 128.  
366  SA Eagle Insurance Co Ltd v Hartley 839. 
367 See Neethling et al 206. 
368 Par 4.2.6.4.4. 
369 Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 286; Van der Walt & Midgley 43 explain that harm does not have 
to be contemporaneous with the wrongful conduct, but that the action remains incomplete 
until the harm arises; see also in general Visser (2004) 144; as well as Neethling et al 208; 
see also Corbett & Honey (Part I) 11 in this regard. 
370 Chap 6 par 6.6.2.6 below. 
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4.2.6.6 The ‘once-and-for-all’ rule 
 
In terms of this rule all damage suffered, whether already sustained or 
prospective damage expected in future, must be claimed in a single action, 
before the claim prescribes.371 Due to the time that often lapses between the 
polluting incident and the manifestation of the damage caused, it is often 
difficult to ascertain the exact scope of the damage caused by the pollution in 
time to claim.372 However, where conduct causes a nuisance, a new claim 
may be instituted for every separate incident causing a repetition of the 
nuisance,373 where an unlawful excavation causes incidents of continuous soil 
subsistence, for example. 
 
4.2.6.7 Mitigation of losses and compensating advantages 
 
The prejudiced party has a duty to mitigate his damages and not to allow it to 
accumulate or increase. The burden of proof rests on the wrongdoer to prove 
that the plaintiff did not take reasonable steps to limit or mitigate his losses.374 
 
Also, as a plaintiff is never allowed to recover damages in excess of the actual 
loss suffered, any additional or collateral benefit, or compensating advantage 
that a prejudiced party received due to the wrongful conduct, has to be set-off 
against his claim for damages caused by such conduct.375 Where a plaintiff 
has insurance cover for his losses, the following rules apply: (a) the plaintiff 
may claim damages to compensate for his loss from the wrongdoer, and claim 
from his insurer; (b) where he receives both amounts mentioned in (a) above, 
he has to repay the insurer to the extent that he is overcompensated; and (c) 
the insurer may claim from the wrongdoer in the insured’s name where the 
latter has not claimed from the wrongdoer.376 
                                            
371 See par 4.2.9 below; Van der Walt & Midgley 226 caution that the plaintiff forfeits the right 
to claim for damages that are not included in his first action. 
372 See chap 6 par 6.3 on the discussion of long-tail liability; Oslo Land Co Ltd v Union 
Government 588, 593.  
373 See in this regard pars 4.2.3.4.1; see also Neethling et al 209. 
374 Da Silva v Coutinho 147; see also Sentrachem Bpk v Wenhold 320; Neethling et al 216. 
375 See in this regard Neethling et al 211, 216. 
376 See in this regard Van der Walt CFC (1980) 15. 
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Benefits that are not taken into account when quantifying damages include 
amounts claimed in terms of non-indemnity (including money payable to 
dependants for the death of their breadwinner) and indemnity insurance, 
discretionary payments from statutory and medical funds, discretionary sick 
leave and pension benefits.377 Other exclusions that could be relevant to 
environmental damage claims include savings on income tax where a loss of 
income is suffered,378 or the benefit of concluding a beneficial contract due to 
the delict,379 or where an award was paid as a solatium.380 A benefit can only 
be taken into account where (a) there is a causal link between the damage-
causing event and the benefit; (b) only actual benefits, and not prospective or 
potential benefits may be taken into account; and (c) the benefits must have 
been given with a compensatory purpose or object.381 
 
4.2.7 Remedies and Delictual Actions 
 
4.2.7.1 Locus standi and class actions 
 
See the discussion in chapter 3 above of the legal standing of persons other 
than the State to enforce environmental laws.382 On the possibility of a class 
action, NEMA creates the statutory right to bring a class action to protect the 
rights of various persons, in the public interest and even in the interest of 
protecting the environment.383 It is not required that the pollution or 
degradation should have caused harm to any individual, but merely that harm 
                                            
377 Assessment of Damages Act 9 of 1969 s 1; Dippenaar v Shield Insurance 920; This 
excludes benefits where a statutory or contractual obligation to allow a claim for these 
benefits exists; Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 s 36; 
see also Ngcobo v Santam Insurance Co Ltd; and Neethling et al 211, 212. 
378 Damages to replace lost income are not taxable as they are of a capital nature; see 
specifically Neethling et al 212 n 163. 
379 For a case note, see also Lotz JG “The Sandown Park Case” 1986 (103) SALJ 704; 
Neethling et al 213. 
380 See the discussion of claims for solace money in Neethling et al par 299. 
381 Reinecke (1988) 221, 229; see also Neethling et al 215. 
382 NEMA Chap 7 Part 2; see in this regard pars 3.2.3.4.2, 3.4.2.5.2 above. 
383 NEMA s 32(1)(e); see also the judgment in Raubenheimer NO v Trustees, Johannes 
Bredenkamp Trust and Others 2006 1 SA 124 (C). 
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to the environment itself must be caused.384 It is submitted that class actions 
available to consumers should be extended to class actions for the protection 
of environmental interests.385  The quantification of each individual’s loss 
under a consumer class action would appear to be more difficult as a faulty 
product could affect them all differently, whereas in the case of a public 
interest claim for damage caused to the natural environment, individuals 
would most likely be affected equally.386 
The injured party can institute various actions as discussed below to claim the 
damages or loss that he suffered. 
 
4.2.7.2 The actio legis Aquiliae  
 
This action is instituted to claim damages for patrimonial loss caused by all 
forms of culpable conduct. It devolved both passively and actively, and can be 
ceded to another person, since it is concerned with the recovery of patrimonial 
damage to an estate.387 An existing claim by an owner of land whose land is 
polluted by another can, upon the sale of the land to another, be ceded to the 
new owner.388  
 
4.2.7.3 The actio iniuriarum 
 
This action is instituted to claim satisfaction, in order to provide the injured 
party with personal or psychological satisfaction for the injury to his bodily and 
mental integrity. This action is actively and passively heritable, yet only after 
litis contestatio.389 Because this action is bound to the person of the injured 
                                            
384 See the conclusion in par 2.4 in chap 2 of this work on this issue that damage to the 
environment merely for the environment’s sake, and not for the benefit in some way for 
human beings, is not considered in this study. 
385 Winter G “Perspectives for environmental law – entering the fourth phase” 1989 JEL 46. 
386 For a public interest action brought in an environmental context, see Petroprops (Pty) Ltd v 
Barlow and Another on an application to protect the environment in general in order to 
contribute to environmental protection in the common good. The court voices its concerns on 
185 that the prospect of costs orders can have an undesirable deterring impact on individuals 
drawn into public interest actions , for example, for protection or clean-up and remediation of 
the environment. 
387 As stated by Neethling et al 235. 
388 See in this regard Lascon Properties (Pty) Ltd v Wadeville Investment Co (Pty) Ltd 583. 
389 See in this regard Neethling et al 235. 
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party, it cannot be ceded to another. Awards are assessed according to what 
is right and fair under the circumstances. 
 
4.2.7.4 The action for pain and suffering 
 
A special action, with its roots in Germanic law, may be instituted for the 
compensation of impairment of a person’s personality through his pain and 
suffering. The action devolves both actively and passively, but also only after 
litis contestatio.390 The amount is only for the personal benefit of the injured 
party, and cannot be ceded to a third party.391 Pain and suffering is a very real 
consequence of pollution and damage to the environment, and this action is 
therefore relevant to environmental liability claims.392 
 
4.2.7.5 Various other actions 
 
Although the three actions discussed above cover most delictual claims, 
special actions exist for specific cases that are of some relevance to liability 
for environmental damage. These include actions for which no fault is 
required, the action for damage caused by a person’s animals,393 for damage 
caused by objects thrown or poured from the windows of a building such as a 
factory into the neighbouring environment,394 and for damage caused by 
owners of neighbouring properties to their neighbours.395 These include the 
action for the disturbance of lateral support, the actio aquae pluviae arcendae 
and the interdictum quod vi aut clam as discussed under strict liability 
                                            
390 Above 235. 
391 Although the claim may be instituted on behalf of the injured party or parties by another in 
terms of the class actions discussed in pars 3.2.3.4.2 and 3.5.3.7. 
392 See especially in this regard chap 1 n 3; also http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx? 
articleid=284785&area=/breaking_news/breaki (last accessed on 27 September 2006) on the 
pain and suffering of victims caused by the dumping of  toxic waste by a French company in 
the Côte d’Ivoire, where thousands suffered from vomiting, stomach pains, nausea, breathing 
difficulties and nosebleeds; as well as the suffering caused by asbestosis as was the case in 
Lubbe & Four Others v Cape Plc and related appeals 27-7-2000 (House of Lords). 
393 Actiones de pauperie, de pastu, de feris; Walker v Redhouse  516; see the discussion by 
Knoetze E & Hoctor SV “Liability for Damage caused by and to wild animals” 2000 (21) Obiter 
177 184 on civil liability, and 186 on the actio legis Aquiliae. 
394 Specifically the actio de effusis vel deiectis; and the actio positi vel suspensi.  
395 In this situation see the comprehensive discussion of nuisance in par 4.2.3.4.1 above. 
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above.396 Lastly, a breach of contract that causes patrimonial damage can 
also constitute the delict of damnum iniuria datum.397 
 
4.2.7.6 The interdict 
 
Injunctive relief is a suitable and relevant remedy to address conduct that 
causes or has the potential to cause environmental damage. A court order 
that is mandatory, to compel a person to do something398 or that is prohibitory, 
to refrain from doing something399 is often the best action to be taken in 
environmental context. The purpose of an interdict is to prevent, limit or avoid 
harm, and not to recover compensation or satisfaction.400 The interdict has an 
obvious preventative function and effect, and may limit continuing 
environmental damage and prevent increased future liability for the polluter.  
 
A requirement is that wrongful conduct (either a commission or an omission) 
must occur or be imminent.401 Fault and actual loss or damage are not 
requirements.402 The suffering of loss or damage must be imminent. Lastly, no 
other remedy must be available on an urgent basis to protect the applicant’s 
rights.403 The courts will allow an interdict where other legal remedies are in 
fact available to the applicant, yet only in special circumstances where the 
determination of the exact amount of damages is difficult;404 where further 
harm could be caused to the prejudiced party; or where the respondent does 
not have the necessary financial means to satisfy the applicant’s claim for 
                                            
396 Neethling et al 236; see par 4.2.4.5.1 above. 
397 See the more extensive discussion by Van der Walt & Midgley 58 et seq; see in general 
Van Aswegen A Die Sameloop van Eise om Skadevergoeding uit Kontrakbreuk en Delik LLD 
Thesis University of South Africa (1991) (hereinafter ‘Van Aswegen’); see also  Neethling et al 
240. See the discussion of contractual liability for purposes of this study in par 4.3 below. 
398 For example, to take precautionary measures to prevent the threat of pollution. 
399 For example, to stop industrial activity that is causing pollution. 
400 As amplified in the discussion by Van der Walt & Midgley 212–214. 
401 Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221 227; see in general from a civil law perspective 
Neethling et al 237. 
402 As confirmed in Aruba Construction (Pty) Ltd v Aruba Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2003 2 SA 155 
(C) 175. 
403 For case law on this point, see LF Boshoff Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 
1969 2 SA 256(C) 267. 
404 This is often an option where it is difficult to determine the extent of the pollution damage, 
and one wants to force the cessation of the polluting actions. 
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damages or satisfaction. These are, because of their nature and due to the 
nature of the polluting conduct that cause liability, all relevant as far as 
environmental claims are concerned. 
 
4.2.8 Exclusion, Exemption and Limitation Clauses 
 
It is possible to exclude or limit a delictual claim contractually, or to exempt a 
wrongdoer from delictual liability. As these clauses raise many important 
issues for the vesting of liability and also for insurance coverage, the South 
African as well as the international position is dealt with comprehensively in 
chapter 6 below.405 
 
4.2.9 Prescription of Claims 
 
4.2.9.1 General principles  
 
The general common-law prescription period for delictual and contractual 
claims is three years.406 The prescription period starts running as soon as the 
debt becomes due and the damages are claimable.407 The creditor must have 
acquired knowledge of the cause of action,408 all the elements of the delict in 
question must be present and the identity of the defendant must be known.409 
It is possible for the parties to conclude a ‘standstill agreement’ where the 
liability is negotiated and prescription is suspended.410 It is possible for the 
parties to reach an agreement on a time-bar period, after which the claim 
                                            
405 See chap 6 par 6.5 below. 
406 Prescription Act 68 of 1969 s 11(d) 
407 Prescription Act s 12(1). 
408 The court held in Oslo Land Co Ltd v Union Government 588 that the focus is on the 
damage-causing event in accordance with the ‘single-cause’ theory, and not on the 
manifestation of the damage; also  et al 209; Van der Walt & Midgley 226 consider the effect 
of the ‘once and for all’ rule and prescription on a civil claim. 
409 Prescription Act s 12(3); known as the facta probanda; The court held in Deysel v Truter 
and another 2005 5 SA 598 (C) 609 that a ‘meaningful knowledge of facts’ is required; see 
also Evins v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1980 2 SA 814(A) 838; Neethling et al 243. 
410 See Merkin 323 for a discussion of the effect of this type of agreement. 
 195 
against the wrongdoer is extinguished, even though the prescription period 
was not completed.411 
 
In case of environmental damage claims, the prescription periods are 
relatively short due not only to the nature and magnitude of potential claims 
for environmental damage, but also for the following reasons: (a) The true 
extent of the damage often materialises or emerges only years after the actual 
polluting incident.412 This could complicate potential claims in that a long delay 
could compromise the factual evidence that is required to prove the merits of 
the claim.413 (b) The identity of the polluter can be difficult to determine, as is 
the case in most situations where general environmental damage to natural 
resources was caused over a longer period of time. This is complicated 
further by a situation of concurrent or multiple causation where more than one 
polluter could potentially incur liability. (c) In the last instance, the assessment 
and quantification of the damages within the required time limit is often 
problematic as it can be a lengthy, specialised and costly process. This is 
especially relevant where consequential or prospective losses are concerned 
as discussed above.414 
 
The quantification of these losses is discussed more specifically in an 
insurance context in chapter 6 below.415  The prescription of the insured’s 
claims against his insurer is discussed specifically in chapter 5 on 
environmental insurance cover below.416 
  
 
 
                                            
411 Time bar clauses and their constitutionality and enforceability are examined at length in 
chap 6 par 6.5.2 and par 6.5.4 below. 
412 See in this regard the discussion prospective losses in par 4.2.6.2.7 of the text above; as 
well as chap 6 par 6.6.2.2. 
413 See chap 6 par 6.2 below for the issues regarding the access to sufficient information 
required to properly assess risks for insurance purposes, and to quantify an insurance claim. 
This indicates the problems experienced in practice regarding the assessment of 
environmental damage or losses. 
414 See par 4.2.6.2 and 4.2.6.4 above. 
415 See chap 6 par 6.6 below. 
416 See chap 5 par 5.3.6 below. 
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4.2.9.2 Statutory exceptions 
 
A number of statutory exceptions regarding prescription periods do exist, 
although few are relevant to environmental pollution cases.417 Claims for 
environmental and other damages that fall within the scope of the National 
Nuclear Regulator Act418 prescribe after 30 years from the date of occurrence 
or the last event in the course of a succession of occurrences,419 unless the 
claimant became aware or could reasonably have been expected to become 
aware of the identity of the defendant and the facts that lead to the claim. In 
this situation the claim then prescribes two years from the date on which the 
person became, or should have become, aware of the information.420 
Prescription is suspended from the date on which written negotiations 
regarding a settlement commence until notice of termination of negotiations is 
received from either party.421  
 
The Institution of Legal Proceedings against certain Organs of the State Act 
will regulate claims against the State for environmental damage caused.422 
The Act consolidates prescription periods in general by stating that the 
periods found in Chapter III of the Prescription Act423 apply to all debts, 
including debts owing by organs of the State. It is important to note that this 
Act prescribes a standard notice period before a claim may be instituted.424 
 
                                            
417 Road Accidents Fund Act 56 of 1996. 
418 Act 47 of 1999; for a comprehensive discussion of the Act see par 3.4.4.12; The Vienna 
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage referred to in par 3.4.4.12 above prescribes 
specific prescription periods for claims for nuclear incidents. 
419 S 34(1). 
420 S 34(2). 
421 S 34(3). 
422 Act 40 of 2002. In terms of s 1(iii) a ‘debt’ is defined as ‘any debt arising from any cause of 
action – (a) which arises from delictual, contractual or any other liability, including a cause of 
action which relates to or arises from any – (i) act performed under or in terms of any law; or 
(ii) omission to do anything which should have been done under or in terms of any law; and 
(b) for which an organ of state is liable for payment of damages, whether such a debt became 
due before or after the fixed date (being the date of the commencement of this Act).’ 
423 Act 68 of 1969. 
424 S 3, s 4. 
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4.3 CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY 
 
4.3.1 Introduction 
 
Although liability insurance deals mostly with delictual liabilities, an alternative 
cause of action could be a claim based on breach of contract.425  Although, 
due to the nature of the conduct that mostly causes environmental damage, 
one would not generally readily find contracts between a polluter and another 
in which the polluter undertakes not to pollute, or to clean-up when pollution 
does occur. These agreements do, however, exist. 
 
It is, for example, possible for the government or another authority to identify 
certain industries as potential polluters and to conclude such contracts with 
them in exchange for financial guarantees of some sort that could cover loss 
where a breach of contract occurs, or to issue permits or licences subject to 
contractual warranties or undertakings given by the potential polluter.  
Where a contractual liability for clean-up exists and becomes enforceable, the 
insurance policy covering this liability will be triggered.426 Should a contract be 
breached, normal ex lege remedies for breach of contract, as well as 
remedies expressly agreed to could be enforced against the polluter.427 
Whether these are covered by insurance will depend on the nature of the 
policy and the intentions of the parties.428 
 
                                            
425 See Reinecke et al par 10 for their limited discussion of contractual liability for purpose of 
liability insurance claims. Most studies on environmental liability insurance, for example, those 
by Fogleman, Larsson, Abraham, De Ketelaere, Faure & Skogh and other authorities referred 
to in this study, focus primarily on statutory and delictual or tort liability, and not on contractual 
liability. This type of liability traditionally resorts under alternatives to insurance, which does 
not fall within the scope of this study. 
426 Reinecke et al provide very little text on the insurability of contractual liabilities, and refer to 
it, for example, only where the quantification of loss for purpose of liability insurance is 
discussed in par 300 that ‘[w]here a liability (contractual or otherwise) is the object of the 
insurance, the amount of the liability must of course also be determined’. See also par 582 
that an insured can cover himself for not performing is obligations properly; for case law, see 
Russell & Loveday v Collins Submarine Pipelines Africa (Pty) Ltd 1975 1 SA 110 (A) 139. 
427 See in general the following two authoritative works on South African law of contract: Van 
der Merwe S, Van Huyssteen LF, Reinecke MFB & Lubbe GF Contract General Principles 3rd 
ed (2007) 379; Christie RH The Law of Contract in South Africa 5th ed (2006) 521. 
428 See, for example, other instruments such as performance warranties and indemnity 
guarantees. 
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As contractual liability falls outside of the scope of this study, the conclusion of 
valid and binding contracts, and breach of contract are not discussed 
extensively. A few relevant aspects in an environmental context are, however, 
briefly addressed below. 
 
4.3.2 Concurrent Actions 
 
It is possible for a polluting act or occurrence to give rise to both delictual and 
contractual liability. The prejudiced party must elect one of these causes of 
action, or claim in the alternative where the claims have the same purpose or 
goal. No duplicity of actions for damage can be allowed.429  
 
Obviously all the requirements for both these claims must be met. Some 
requirements such as causation and the principles that govern the 
assessment and valuation of damages do overlap. However, the right of 
election appears to be limited as there is no duty of care to prevent damages 
caused by breach of contract, whereas there is a more generalised duty of 
care in a delictual sense.430 This obviously facilitates bringing a delictual claim 
rather than one based in contract. 
 
Because the damages claimed in delict can be more extensive damages than 
those claimed in contract, for example, consequential losses, lost profits, 
prospective losses, and amounts for bodily injuries, emotional trauma and 
pain and suffering, a delictual claim can prove to be more attractive. 
 
 
                                            
429 Van Aswegen 77 identifies this as a form of strict concurrence of claims, whereas at 76 
she states that if the same set of facts gives rise to claims with separate goals, there is only 
concurrency in the wide sense. 
430 Van Aswegen 81 is of the opinion that this refers as far as pure economic loss is 
concerned. On 82 she considers the possible exclusivity of claims where rules of law or 
contract limit the prejudiced party to contractual claims only. See the effect that pollution 
exclusion and limitation clauses in insurance contracts could have that exclude specific 
claims, as discussed in chap 6 par 6.5 below. 
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4.3.3 Insurability of Contractual Liabilities 
 
Whether contractual liability qualifies as a ‘legally liability’ for purpose of 
liability insurance is examined specifically in chapter 6 below.431 One cannot 
simply deduce that contractual liability is automatically included under liability 
insurance cover, as it will depend on the intentions of the insurer and the 
policyholder whether the cover includes contractual liability cover.432 Most 
liability insurance policies contain a standard clause that excludes contractual 
liability from general liability cover, in order to clarify the extent of the scope of 
the insurance cover provided. It is also possible to ensure contractual 
performance by alternative means, for example, by financial instruments such 
as performance guarantees issued by banking institutions or by insurers. 
 
4.3.4 Remedies in an Environmental Context 
 
4.3.4.1 General remedies 
 
It is possible to conclude a binding contract with a potential polluter in terms of 
which he is obliged to clean-up the polluted environment. In some situations, 
permits or authorisations must be obtained before specific activities can take 
place, for example, before waste disposal sites or industrial and 
manufacturing plants can become operational. The State could, for example, 
negotiate with a potential permit holder to obtain a contractual undertaking 
that it would clean-up environmental pollution prior to issuing the permits or 
authorisations. This could prove to be beneficial as the polluter can be held 
responsible in terms of the agreement to pay the costs of environmental 
remediation. Contractual remedies or other contractual securities have the 
advantage that where a loss occurs, they could offer financial redress in 
addition to a claim for damages, for example, to include a claim for 
administration and valuation costs. It would also be possible to include 
                                            
431 See par 6.5.6.6 below. 
432 As confirmed by Larsson 32. 
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contractual penalty clauses to attempt to cover all potential environmental 
losses.  
 
4.3.4.2 Burden of proof 
 
Proving breach of contract is traditionally easier than proving the elements of 
delict. A contractual duty not to pollute should be no different from any other 
form of contractual restraint, and the same principles that apply to positive 
malperformance, for example, will apply where the duty is breached. 
 
As contractual liability falls beyond the scope of this study, it does not require 
further extensive examination. 
 
4.4 NEGOTIORUM GESTIO 
 
4.4.1 General 
 
In the final instance, a claim can be based on one of the obligations ex variis 
causarum iuris figuris,433 where negotiorum gestio or unauthorised agency 
occurs. This has the potential to lead to civil liability for any environmental 
pollution caused in the process. 
 
An example would include the situation where the government, another 
authority or any individual acts in response to the threat or continuation of a 
polluting incident, and incurs costs and expenses to prevent or minimise loss. 
It would be possible to claim a refund for these out-of-pocket expenses.  
 
Claims based on agency by environmental groups have, however, drawn 
criticism, as it is debatable whether public interest groups have the right to act 
                                            
433 See in general Harms LTC “Negotiorum Gestio” in Joubert WA (ed) Vol 19 LAWSA 1st 
reissue (2002); see also especially par 217 n 2. 
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on behalf of society in general and then institute a claim based on 
unauthorised agency.434 
 
 
4.5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Although civil or common-law claims provide the most attractive and 
comprehensive solution to claim for environmental damage, these claims are 
clearly not without their complications. Due to the distinctive issues relating to 
these claims, an entirely new field of law, internationally referred to as toxic 
tort law, has emerged. The general principles of the law of delict offer the 
advantage that they are flexible and that a vast field of case law has 
developed that can provide guidance in environmental damage cases. These 
delictual principles have to be adapted to accommodate the difficulties 
encountered when dealing with these claims. As issues relating to civil liability 
claims have been addressed extensively in the tort law of other countries such 
as the UK and the USA, solutions gleaned from other legal systems can be 
supplied for lacunas and deficiencies in the South African law of delict.435  
 
In the first place it is required that the conduct of the polluter must be 
wrongful. Liability will only ensue where conduct is in the form of an omission, 
and where a legal duty to act, a duty if care, rests on the polluter. The 
inclusion of section 24 in the Constitution has created a firm basis for such a 
duty to act in order to prevent damage to the environment.436 It is only 
possible to claim for pure economic loss where a legal duty to act has been 
breached. 
 
Failure to act in accordance with a rule of law is recognised as an actionable 
omission. The constitutional right to the environment has informed the general 
criterion of public policy in that it has provided more clarity regarding the 
                                            
434 For the European position on the merit of claims based on agency see the evaluation in 
Larsson 538. 
435 See in this regard chap 6 and chap 7 below. 
436 See the conclusion in chap 3 par 3.6 above. 
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determination of the wrongfulness of conduct that causes environmental 
damage. The following actionable omissions have been found to be relevant 
to the scope of the discussion in this study. Where there is an omissio per 
commissionem by the polluter in that he creates a potential polluting situation 
and fails to remove the danger. Another situation would be where the polluter 
fails to control a dangerous object or substance that is in his possession or is 
under his supervision or control. The failure to act in accordance with other 
environmental statutes such as NEMA, the ECA and the other statutes 
addressed in this study is recognised as a failure to act in accordance with 
peremptory rules of law.437 Where a person holding a particular office allows 
or fails to prevent polluting conduct, or where a special relationship exists 
between the polluter and the prejudiced party that requires the former to act 
and he fails to so, are also deemed to be actionable omissions and therefore 
wrongful. In the final instance, when one creates an impression to protect the 
interests of another and then fails to do so, the failure is also actionable. 
 
Grounds of justification that are relevant in the context of environmental 
damage claims include the following. The rules relating to the doctrine of the 
abuse of rights and nuisance provide firm guidelines to determine   
wrongfulness in most cases where environmental pollution is caused. 
Although the doctrine of nuisance does not form part of our law, the rules 
pertaining to this tort have informed our doctrine of abuse of rights. To 
determine wrongfulness, a balance of the interests of the parties is required. A 
polluter may only exercise his rights, for example, the rights to use his 
property, to his benefit where the infringement that this causes upon the rights 
or interests of another is not excessive or unreasonable. Although the danger 
lies therein that it can be notoriously subjective and personal, an interference 
with environmental aesthetics should be acknowledged as actionable where it 
appears from the facts and circumstances to be unreasonable. This will 
require careful consideration by the courts. 
 
                                            
437 For an examination of the relevant statutes, see chap 3 par 3.4 above. 
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Where it is impossible for a polluter to act to prevent pollution damage, or 
where the prejudiced party has consented to or voluntarily assumed the risk of 
damage, the actions by the polluter are justified and therefore not wrongful. 
Where the polluter is authorised by statute or other authority to act in a 
manner that causes environmental damage, his conduct is justified. Although 
this will seldom be the case, a state of necessity that requires a polluter to act, 
or his actions in self-defence that cause environmental damage and harm or 
loss to another, will also be recognised as grounds of justification.  
 
Once it has been proven that the polluter’s conduct or omission is wrongful, 
the plaintiff has to prove that fault was present, in that the polluter’s conduct 
was intentional or negligent. The conduct of the polluter must meet the 
standard of that of the reasonable person who would have foreseen that his 
conduct would cause environmental damage. Greater environmental 
awareness regarding the environment has had the effect that a higher 
standard of care to foresee and prevent environmental damage has been 
recognised than in the past. 
 
The introduction of strict liability regimes in our law438 and the proposal in this 
study that a statutory strict liability regime must also be established for 
environmental damage liability can provide relief as far as proving the element 
of fault is concerned. This can clearly be justified in terms of the risk-danger 
theory that is based in a person’s participation in a high-risk activity that 
concerns the environment. It can also be justified by the interest or profit- 
theory where a person exploits the environment to his advantage and in the 
process causes environmental damage. This will ease the burden of proof 
that currently rests on the prejudiced party to prove all the elements required 
for delictual liability. The burden of proof shifts to the polluter to prove one of 
the defences against strict liability, which include force majeure and 
contributory negligence by the prejudiced party. 
                                            
438See the consideration of the Genetically Modified Organisms Act discussed in par 3.4.4.4; 
the Consumer Protection Bill in par 4.2.4.5.2 above, and the existence of strict liability 
regimes in terms of the doctrine of abuse of rights discussed in par 4.2.3.4.2, and in terms of 
the common-law actions, for example, the interdictum quod vi aut claim discussed in par 
4.2.7.5 above. 
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Although it has the potential to undermine the consistent implementation of 
the polluter-pays principle, it is possible to place a statutory limit on the 
amount for which the polluter can incur liability. The statutory cap must remain 
within reasonable limits for the situation to which it applies. This will keep the 
success of obtaining effective damage compensation realistic, without 
unnecessarily endangering or threatening the solvency of polluting industries. 
 
The arguments against a strict liability regime include the fact that the 
potential liability will force persons to increase their insurance cover, provided 
cover is available in the insurance market, which will cause an internalisation 
of costs.  
 
Where contributory fault requires the apportionment of damages, the 
determination of the extent of each party’s contribution to the damage remains 
a problematic issue, and will depend on the application of the Apportionment 
of Damages Act, and the court’s discretion based on the facts and 
circumstances of each case. The difficulty in proving the extent of a party’s 
contribution to pollution damage will require a pragmatic approach based on a 
reasonable guess or estimate. 
 
The introduction of a statutory joint and several liability will provide an 
additional effective allocation mechanism where there is more than one 
potential polluter in a specific situation. Once again, the burden of proof will 
shift to the polluter who has to prove that the damage was caused either by 
force majeure, or by the culpable conduct of another. Where he alleges that 
another’s contributory negligence diminishes the extent of his liability, he will 
have to prove his share in causing the damage. Where the introduction of a 
statutory joint and several liability appears to be impossible, impractical or 
ineffective, another allocation method such as the market-share liability as 
applied in the Netherlands and in the USA could provide an alternative 
solution. 
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Many of the problems encountered with environmental damage claims 
concern the requirement of causation. This is especially the case where 
damage is caused by gradual pollution that occurred over a long period of 
time and could potentially have been caused by various polluters. The 
introduction of a joint and several liability regime could also address these 
issues. The difficulties in providing factual proof of the identity of the polluter 
and the extent of his liability are extensive. Physical proof can be eroded or 
diminished over time. Pollution damage can also be aggravated by external 
circumstances such as a novus actus interveniens. The application of the 
conditio sine qua non-test to prove factual causation does not appear to be 
consistently effective in environmental pollution cases, and courts will have to 
approach the problem with circumspection. The open-ended policy standards 
that are required to determine legal causation have to be informed and 
interpreted primarily in accordance with constitutional values. Other flexible 
criteria such as reasonable foreseeability and adequate causation will still play 
a subsidiary role.  
 
The last delictual requirement concerns damages. Issues relating in general 
to the concept of ‘general damages’ that include damnum emergens and 
lucrum cessans do not pose as many problems as some of the other forms of 
damages discussed in this study. 
 
As the fundamental right to property is entrenched by section 25 of the 
Constitution, it is prima facie wrongful to cause damage to another’s property. 
The determination of the exact scope of what ‘property damage’ entails in an 
environmental damage context poses some challenges. In order to entertain 
claims for environmental damage, it is submitted that the concept must 
incorporate the following: diminution of property value, compensation for loss 
of use and enjoyment of the property, discomfort, clean-up, repair, 
replacement and rehabilitation costs. 
 
A specific form of damage that has not yet received a lot of attention in South 
African law is stigma damage. This type of damage relates to the reduction of 
the value of property based purely on the public’s negative perception that the 
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property was in some way affected by pollution. This is in some cases 
inevitable even where the property has been restored to its original state. It is 
submitted that the effect that stigma damage has on a person’s patrimony is 
just as real as other forms of direct damage, and that it should be possible to 
claim for this form of damage.  
 
Internationally courts are reluctant to allow claims for pure economic loss. As 
causing pure economic loss is not directly linked to property, it is not seen as 
prima facie wrongful. A claim for this type of loss will only succeed where it 
was caused by the polluter’s failure to act in accordance with a recognised 
legal duty to act. Damage caused to the ‘natural environment’ that affects the 
aesthetic appeal of property usually causes pure economic loss. A damage 
claim cannot include damage merely to the ‘voiceless elements of nature’, 
unless the damage to these natural resources detrimentally affects or 
prejudices the interests of a person.  
 
Currently, very few statutes define or describe the extent of the damages that 
can be claimed under environmental damage claims. The scope of the 
various forms of environmental damage that can be caused by an 
infringement of statutory provisions should be defined more effectively in the 
specific statutes. The possibility to claim pure economic loss, stigma loss and 
to claim for loss of use of natural resources and their aesthetic appeal needs 
to be extended. A claim for ‘economic loss’ is included under remedies in the 
proposed Consumer Protection Bill and can serve as an example of the 
statutory recognition that this type of loss can be claimed in a specific 
situation.439 
 
Prospective losses are a reality where environmental damage that is caused 
by pollution occurs. A claim for future losses cannot constitute an improper 
benefit and must, due to the once-and-for-all rule, be allowed, provided that 
their exact nature and extent are determined at the time of claim. This will of 
course require some speculation, but once again, courts will have to follow a 
                                            
439 See the discussion in chap 6. par 6.6.2.6 below. 
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pragmatic approach and base their award on a reasonable estimate. The 
principle remains that prospective losses can only be claimed where they are 
claimed ancillary to accrued damages. 
 
The quantification of these forms of damage remains a complicated process. 
Reasons include the fact that it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the 
loss of natural resources with mathematical precision. Pure economic loss 
and prospective loss are also of a hypothetical nature, which requires the 
court to base the quantification of its award on the best available evidence 
before it. In these situations the court could rely on permissible aids such as 
general statistical data, relevant experiences and other probabilities and 
possibilities to supplement actual factual data. An effective measure of natural 
resource damages is, in most cases, the actual clean-up or remediation costs 
and expenses incurred. 
 
The remedies available to the plaintiff include a claim for damages in terms of 
the actio legis Aquilia, the actio iniuriarum and the action for pain and 
suffering. The plaintiff can also obtain injunctive relief. Three common-law 
actions that are of relevance to environmental damage claims include the 
action for damage caused by another’s animals, the action for damage 
caused by objects or substances thrown from buildings and for damage 
caused by a person to neighbouring property.  
 
The time at which prescription of the claim starts to run is the time when the 
damage or loss manifests itself. This will be the decisive moment on which the 
plaintiff becomes aware, or should reasonably have become aware that he 
has suffered a loss, what caused the loss and the identity of the defendant. 
The common-law prescription period of three years for a civil damages claim 
is relatively short, because obtaining the required information to institute an 
environmental claim in time could be problematic. Complications in this regard 
include that the damage might only manifest a long time after the polluting 
incident and the long delay could compromise factual evidence. It could take 
time to determine the true identity of the polluter, and to assess and quantify 
the extent of the damages claimed especially where prospective loss or pure 
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economic loss is suffered. Specialised statutes should provide for more 
realistic periods.440 
 
The possibility of a successful civil damages claim also offers a final benefit 
that deserves mentioning, namely that it can act as a powerful deterrent to 
discourage potential polluters from causing damage to the environment.  
 
Where the polluter is contractually bound to prevent pollution or to refrain from 
polluting the environment, and he breaches the contract, the normal remedies 
for breach of contract, whether ex lege or agreed upon, apply. The polluter 
could be held liable for contractual damages to compensate for the damage 
suffered by the prejudiced party. It should be noted that consequential loss 
could only be claimed where the parties reached an agreement to that effect. 
Issues surrounding the extent and quantification of damages as discussed in 
this chapter will also be relevant in a claim for contractual damages. As a 
detailed discussion of contractual liability falls beyond the scope of this study, 
the issue is not addressed in greater detail. 
 
The last source of a legal obligation that could relate to an environmental 
damage claim is unauthorised agency. In this situation, the agent who acted 
on behalf of another in preventing or cleaning-up environmental damage can 
claim all the reasonable costs and expenses incurred in the process. 
  
As a civil liability regime is, on its own, clearly insufficient, a more 
comprehensive compensation system is required. This would entail a system 
where statutory and civil liability complement each other as recommended in 
the preceding chapter,441 combined with effective insurance coverage to 
ensure that liability claims can be met. The latter point is discussed in the next 
chapter. 
 
                                            
440 The effect of long-tail liability of insurers is examined in detail chapter 6 par 6.3 below. 
441 See chap 3 par 3.6 for the call for the increase in the introduction of statutory civil damage 
claims. 
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Insurance plays a huge role where environmental risks are concerned. Even 
where a prejudiced party has succeeded in proving his claim, whether 
statutory or civil, against the polluter, the latter may not have sufficient funds 
to satisfy the claim. Where the polluter has sufficient liability insurance cover, 
the expectation is that the prejudiced party will receive payment to cover his 
losses. The right to claim from the insurer, however, vests in the polluter. The 
success of the claim, and the eventual payment of the funds received from the 
insurer to the prejudiced party, depend on the polluter’s conduct. The 
prejudiced party is therefore, even where there is third-party or liability 
insurance cover, not always guaranteed to receive the amount of damages 
that he is entitled to. The issue of the insurability of liability for environmental 
damage under third-party insurance, and the possibility of introducing first-
party insurance to the benefit of a third party are discussed in the next 
chapter. 
 
Where a prejudiced party fails to succeed in a claim against the polluter, 
where the latter’s identity is unknown, or where the prejudiced party has 
himself caused the environmental damage, he may have a claim to recover 
the environmental damage from his insurer in terms of his first-party insurance 
cover. The position regarding claims for environmental damage under first-
party insurance cover is also discussed under the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE COVER 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
5.1.1 General 
 
History has taught us that the famous saying that ‘where liability goes, 
insurance is sure to follow’1 does not necessarily apply where environmental 
pollution insurance coverage is concerned. On the other hand, the availability 
of insurance is directly influenced by the probability that a certain type of loss 
or liability may be incurred. The fact that environmental pollution damage and 
ensuing liability has become more of a certainty than an uncertainty over the 
last decade has led to a recent increase in environmental or pollution 
insurance cover offered in the insurance market.2  
 
Although this chapter primarily covers the position in South African law, it also 
includes references to international authorities that confirm and illustrate 
similar or corresponding principles. 
 
5.1.2 Interaction between Liability and Insurance 
 
There is support for the view that the limits of liability should be determined by 
the insurability of certain risks.3 Although insurability can be seen as an 
                                            
1 See Abraham KS “Cleaning up the environmental liability insurance mess: Monsanto 
Lecture” 1993 (27) Valparaiso University Law Review 601 with reference to the statement by 
Traynor J in the case of Escola v Coca-Cola Bottling Co 150 P2d 436 (Cal 1944) 441. 
2 As stated by Havenga P “Liability for Environmental Damage” 1995 (7) SA Merc LJ  187 
188; Van Niekerk JP “Liability Insurance: Successive but Overlapping ‘Claims-made’ Policies 
and a Question of Quantum” 2006 (18) SA Merc LJ 382 (hereinafter ‘Van Niekerk (2006 
SAMLJ)’) notes that as in many delictual actions there is an insurer behind both parties, 
insurance law has become the new law of delict. 
3 See the discussion by Faure M & Grimeaud D “Interdependencies between Liability and 
Insurance” chap VIII in Faure M (ed) Tort and Insurance Law Vol 5: Deterence, Insurability 
Footnote continues on the next page. 
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argument to define the rule of efficient liability, the insurability of a risk should 
not be a limiting factor that restricts or enforces legal liability, as the latter 
must remain an objective evaluation and not be affected or hampered by 
insurability issues.4 Only once loss or liability has been established, must its 
insurability be evaluated. Harpwood is of the rather realistic opinion that it is 
not worth the trouble and expense of claiming in tort at all unless the 
defendant is in fact insured, or is very wealthy.5 The influence of insurance on 
a decision regarding liability would move the focus away from the question as 
to whether the parties met the due standard of care to establish civil liability. It 
is submitted that it would also cause an inequality, as the same objective 
criteria are not applied to the parties, but their economic positions and ability 
to obtain insurance cover affect the outcome of the decision regarding 
liability.6 And it remains a fact that lawmakers will always define liability 
broader than insurers are willing to define their cover.7  
 
Liability and insurance clearly remain congruent in that a fault-based liability 
regime will lead to an increase in first-party insurance, whereas strict liability 
would lead to increased third-party insurance.8 Legislators should not be 
affected by the issue of the insurability of an environmental damage risk when 
creating a liability regime for that specific risk. The availability of insurance in 
the market should also play no role in the objective assessment of liability, 
                                            
and Compensation in Environmental Liability: Future Developments in the European Union” 
(2003) 207 (hereinafter ‘Faure (ed)’).  
4 In the opinion of Faure (ed) 207; Winter RA “Liability Insurance, joint tortfeasors and limited 
wealth” http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi= B6V7M-4KF6BPH-1 
(last accessed on 18 July 2006) 16 illustrates by his extensive publication the theory of how 
tort rules and liability insurance decisions interact; see also Sieburgh CH Toerekening van 
een onrechtmatige daad (2000) (hereinafter ‘Sieburgh’) 235 for a consideration of the 
importance of separating the determination of liability from the fact that insurance coverage 
for the liability exists. 
5 See Harpwood V Modern tort law (2005) 5. 
6 This would be contrary to s 9(1) of the Constitution that ‘[e]veryone is equal before the law 
and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law’. Although economic position is not 
one of the factors listed in s 9(3), in my opinion it remains an unjustified inequality of the 
application of legal rules. 
7 See in this regard Busenhart J “The insurability of ecological damage” 2004 (March) 
Environment Business Magazine 26. 
8 As stated by Faure (ed) 210; according to Faure M & Skogh G The Economic Analysis of 
Environmental Law and Policy (2003) (hereinafter ‘Faure & Skogh’) 263 who are of the 
opinion that in a strict liability regime the incentive to take care is actually reduced. 
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although it is taken into account where the open-ended criteria for the 
determination of liability are interpreted.9  
 
5.1.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Insurance over Civil Liability 
 Claims 
 
5.1.3.1 Advantages 
 
The greatest advantage of insurance is that it plays an important social role by 
selling safety to consumers.10 The various reasons why insurance is preferred 
to civil liability compensation claims are that the civil or tort claims are inexact, 
costly to administer, take longer to finally deliver compensation, and a greater 
burden of proof rests on the plaintiff to prove a civil claim than to succeed with 
an insurance claim. The difficulty in proving causation and the nature and 
extent of damages suffered creates a huge hurdle for the plaintiff.11 Although 
civil liability claims still have merit in those situations where the law has a 
distributive goal of favouring indigent plaintiffs at the expense of wealthier 
wrongdoers,12 insurance does appear to offer a better solution.13 It is 
submitted that obtaining due compensation from insurance is obviously a 
faster and cheaper process than the one required for obtaining an order for 
the payment of civil damages.   
 
 
 
 
                                            
9 See the discussion by Niekerk JP “The Effect of Insurance on the Imposition of Civil Liability: 
A Review of and some Preliminary Thoughts on Recent Judicial Announcements” 1999 (11) 
SA Merc LJ 514 specifically 516 et seq on the influence of insurance on the determination of 
the delictual criterium of wrongfulness; see also Faure (ed) 211 that the choice of liability 
regime and the scope of liability should primarily be determined by objective legal rules, and 
‘not according to vague notions concerning insurability’. 
10 As stated by Wansink JH “Verzekering, een Juridisch Product in een Kritische Buitenwereld 
– Een Impressie uit Nederland” 1999 (4) TSAR 706. 
11 See the discussions in chap 4 par 4.2.5 and par 4.2.6 above. 
12 This is in terms of the approach known as the ‘deep pocket’ approach. 
13 See Faure & Skogh 280–283 who are of the opinion that the chances that circumstances 
cause the prejudiced party to remain uncompensated in a civil liability regime, are definitely 
greater than where there is insurance, as the risk for incomplete compensation in tort law is 
higher due to various factors as discussed in their study. 
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5.1.3.2 Disadvantages 
 
One should, however, not lose sight of the potential of the internalisation of 
the costs of insurance. Polluters make the consumer pay to cover possible 
risks leading to insurance claims, as comprehensive insurance is very costly. 
The insurance costs are therefore relayed directly to the consumer, which 
means that the polluter-pays principle14 is in reality not applied effectively. The 
much quoted statement made by Traynor J in the 1940s in California, that ‘the 
risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the 
public as a cost of doing business’, reflects the true nature of insurance in that 
a risk is spread among many individuals, who in principle should not be 
expected to shoulder the load of the polluter’s liability for environmental 
damage he has caused.15 
 
 
5.2 OVERVIEW OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE IN AN 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT 
 
5.2.1 Description 
 
For the purposes of this study it is sufficient to describe insurance as a 
contractual arrangement between the insurer and the policyholder for the 
transfer and distribution of risk in exchange for the payment of a certain 
premium, and that the risk covered concerns the uncertainty of the occurrence 
of events enumerated in the agreement.16  
                                            
14 The polluter-pays principle as addressed in chap 3 par 3.3.2.2 above. 
15 Escola v Coca-Cola Bottling Co 441. 
16 In accordance with Reinecke MFB, Van der Merwe S, Van Niekerk JP & Havenga P 
General Principles of Insurance Law (2002) (hereinafter ‘Reinecke et al ‘) par 5; see also 
Wansink JH Het nieuwe schadeverzekeringsrecht en Oude olielampjes en dwaallichtjes 
Oratie van 28 maart 2006 bij de aanvaarding van het ambt van bijzonder hoogleraar op het 
gebied van het verzekeringsrecht aan de Universiteit van Leiden 3 for confirmation of the 
principle that what is required, is the subjective awareness in the minds of the parties at the 
time of conclusion of the insurance contract that the loss-causing occurrence is in fact 
uncertain, as provided for in art 7:925 BW, and for relevant case law in this regard; see also 
Reinecke MFB “Interesting aspects of the new Belgian insurance act: a few comparative 
remarks from a South African point of view” 1993 (1) TSAR 91 92 for the commendable 
Footnote continues on the next page. 
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5.2.2 Elements of Insurance 
 
5.2.2.1 General description 
 
Insurance requires a contract between an insurer and an insured (hereinafter 
the ‘policyholder’) whereby the insurer undertakes in return of payment of a 
price or premium to render an insured a sum of money, or its equivalent, on 
the happening of a specified uncertain event in which the insured has some 
form of interest.17 The contract must be lawful and not contrary to the 
Constitution, other statutes or to principles that determine civil legality.18 This 
applies especially to the nature and effect of contractual pollution exclusion 
clauses in insurance contracts and is discussed extensively in chapter 6 
below.19 
 
It is a basic rule of insurance law that insurance is to cover fortuities and not 
certainties. A loss is not fortuitous if it is, for example, the result of the natural 
behaviour of the subject matter insured, or a result of the intentional act of the 
insured, or due to ordinary wear-and-tear, natural deterioration or internal 
deficiencies of the subject matter that would eventually cause damage in any 
case.  
 
This principle complicates the insurability of post-remedial risks also known as 
‘brownfield’ risks.20 Where an owner acquires a brownfield site, which is a site 
that has been cleaned up and can be redeveloped, there is an unavoidable 
transfer of all existing environmental liabilities, some of which are obviously 
known. Post-remedial liabilities mostly include known conditions and their 
exacerbation, clean-up cost overruns and even some unanticipated 
                                            
definition of the contract of insurance as provided in the Belgian Wet op 
landesverzekeringsovereenkomst, which is examined in chap 7 par 7.4.4.1 below.  
17 Lake v Reinsurance Corporation Ltd 1967 3 SA 124 (W) 127; see also Reinecke et al par 
100 for an identification of the essential elements of insurance contracts. 
18 Reinecke et al chap 6.3; also par 284 that the insured may not enjoy cover for his 
intentional conduct. Where his conduct is negligent public policy will dictate whether it is 
lawful or not for purpose of insurance cover. 
19 See chap 6 par 6.5. 
20 Chap 2 par 2.3.3.5.3 and chap 2 n 202 for a description of a ‘brownfield site’. 
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conditions. Site pollution liability policies provide cover only where the policy 
clearly provides cover for these specific losses. This type of insurance cover 
is expensive and is usually obtained to facilitate the sale of a contaminated 
yet cleaned-up site where the new owner requires a security that he will be 
adequately indemnified for future costs.21 
 
5.2.2.2 Insurable interest 
 
Both the concept of insurable interest and its role in insurance have been 
uncertain.22 Insurable interest includes every interest in property or life that is 
not illegal or immoral. But whether it is a validity requirement for an insurance 
contract has been the subject of debate. It has been argued that as insurable 
interest is an English-law and therefore foreign concept, its introduction into 
our insurance law was unnecessary.23  Briefly, the position in South African 
law is that where an insured suffers loss or damage, an insurable interest 
existed. The concept ‘loss or damage’ in law, which is discussed extensively 
in chapters 4, 5 and 6, has bearing upon and informs the concept of ‘insurable 
interest’ and its presence in an insurance relationship.24  Both property loss 
and other loss or damage, for example, natural resource damages as 
discussed in the context of first-party insurance cover below, as well as legal 
liability incurred for causing loss or damage to another via the environment, 
indicate the presence of an insurable interest and would trigger insurance 
cover.25 
 
Ascertainable interests as well as future interests could serve as insurable 
interests for purpose of insurance cover, and must exist at the time when the 
                                            
21 As stated by Neuman S “Adequate Insurance Coverage for Post-Remedial Risks” 2007 
Environmental Claims Journal 26 27; Larsson M The Law of Environmental Damage: Liability 
and Reparation (1999) (hereinafter ‘Larsson’) 525 explains that it should be noted that 
knowledge of loss disqualifies the risk from cover, yet not the knowledge of a potential loss. 
22 See the detailed discussion by Reinecke et al pars 34–38. 
23 See the opinion of Van Niekerk JP “Maintaining the Principle of Indemnity: Theory and 
practice” 1996 (3) TSAR 572; see also in this regard Schulze WG “Extension Clauses in 
Insurance Contracts – Uncertainty Rules OK?” 1997 (9) SA Merc LJ  64. 
24 See in this regard Reinecke et al par 26. 
25 For a general discussion of interests that qualify as insurable interests in South African law, 
see Reinecke et al chap 3.2.2; and chap 3.3.2. 
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cover is triggered.26 The potential triggers that trigger cover specifically in 
respect of environmental insurance are discussed in chapter 6 below.27  
 
Where the pollution coverage is in the form of capital insurance, the insurer is 
liable to pay the insured the agreed amount. Where pollution insurance is in 
its nature indemnity insurance, it must be kept in mind that as the essence 
and purpose of indemnity insurance remains one of indemnity, the extensive 
discussion of liability for environmental damage in the preceding chapters, 
and the nature and extent of damages covered are crucial for an effective 
study of pollution damage insurance.28 
 
As this study does not lend itself to an extended discussion of insurable 
interest per se, this brief summary should suffice. 
 
5.2.2.3 The premium 
 
The payment of some form of premium is an essential element of insurance. 
Where pollution insurance cover forms part of a more general cover, for 
example, a property owner’s policy, the premiums are not as high as in the 
case of specialised environmental pollution insurance. The additional benefit 
that insurance in an environmental context offers is that it promotes the 
enforcement of duties to protect the environment through the adaptation of 
insurance premiums, depending on the policyholder’s risk management and 
profile. A risk reduction could lead to lower premiums and reduced 
deductibles.29 Although the assessors in the property insurance industry and 
in the liability insurance industry are experts at calculating and pricing the risk 
                                            
26 As stated by Reinecke et al pars 67et seq.  
27 See chap 6 par 6.3 below; Reinecke et al par 64 formulate it as the time of materialisation 
of the peril insured against. Although ‘materialisation’ creates the impression of ‘acts 
committed’, ‘occurrence’ or ‘loss occurrence’, in context of pollution damage the term can 
refer to various triggers which does not necessarily include only these two triggers as 
mentioned. 
28 See Reinecke et al pars 109; see also chap 4 par 4..4 above. 
29 Faure & Skogh 263 support the argument that it would be more beneficial to offer a 
deductible rather than to obtain cover to insure minor environmental losses; see also Larsson 
108 for a more detailed discussion of the role of premiums as an environmental compliance 
mechanism. 
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they insure, the uncertainties relating to the predictability of the risk of 
environmental damage causes a general over-inflation of premiums for 
pollution cover.30  
 
5.2.2.4 Insurer’s duty to indemnify 
 
In general, the insurer is liable to deliver direct compensation in the form of a 
reinstatement, or indirect compensation in the form of money.31 This will be 
the case for first-party insurance such as property insurance as discussed 
below. In the context of indemnity insurance, the insurer’s performance 
usually consists of the payment of monetary damages to a third party. See the 
discussion in chapter 6 below on the various issues surrounding the extent of 
the indemnification. 
 
5.2.2.5 Risk and causation 
 
Risk can be described as the possibility and probability of an undesirable 
change in circumstances or the possibility or probability of harm.32 Insurance 
contracts are usually based on the assumption that the risk has not yet 
materialised and is not a certainty, as already discussed above.33 Risk that is 
altered or increased during the insurance period is clearly excluded from the 
original cover.34 Contractual clauses are usually included to limit or exclude 
risks from cover. These are dealt with in great detail in chapter 6 below.35 The 
risk that materialises must cause the insured loss, harm or liability.36 As 
causation also remains one of the key issues of environmental damage 
insurance, it is addressed extensively in chapter 6 below.37 
                                            
30 See in this regard Faure & Skogh 264; see also chap 6 par 6.2 on the predictability of the 
risk as a specific issue in environmental insurance. 
31 See in general Reinecke et al par 116. 
32 As stated by Reinecke et al par 261; see also in this regard par 265. 
33 See par 5.2.2.1 above; see also in this regard chap 6 par 6.1 n 1 below. 
34 See in this regard Lourens v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd 1986 3 SA 373 (A) 
384. 
35 See chap 6 par 6.5 below. 
36 See in general Reinecke et al par 10.4 on causation in insurance law, par 277 that ‘there 
must be a link between the peril and the loss or occurrence as described in the contract’. 
37 See chap 6 par 6.4 below. 
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5.2.2.6 Duty of disclosure 
 
All insurance policies are subject to the duty of good faith.38 The policyholder 
must disclose every material fact or circumstance known to him, or which he 
is deemed to know or should have known, to the insurer prior to conclusion of 
the contract, as well as during the existence of the contract where he is 
required to do so.39 What is material will depend on the application of the 
reasonable person test.40 Failure to disclose could render the contract 
voidable at the election of the insurer who may resile from the contract or 
exclude a specific risk from cover. It is also possible to claim delictual 
damages for damage or loss caused by the misrepresentation. 
 
In case of pollution insurance sufficient information relating to the potential 
risks and their extent is crucial for purposes of risk determination and for 
providing effective insurance cover to the insured. On the flip side of the coin, 
sufficient information is crucial for the insurer’s insurance business. Any 
knowledge that a site is contaminated, or that a process causes pollution, or 
that these have the potential to cause pollution or to cause pollution to 
eventually migrate to other properties or public property, should be disclosed. 
It is obviously more difficult to expect full disclosure of environmental pollution 
risks if the policy is a general public or private liability policy or where the 
cover is provided under another type of general policy such as a homeowner’s 
policy, than can be expected where the policy specifically provides 
environmental pollution coverage.  
 
Where the policyholder has to do a due diligence investigation and complete a 
proposal form based on a questionnaire, proving misrepresentation becomes 
                                            
38 As held in Mutual & Federal Insurance v Oudtshoorn Municipality 1985 1 SA 419 (A) 433; it 
should be noted in passing that there is no standard duty of good faith in the general South 
African contract law; see also Fogleman V Environmental Liabilities and Insurance in England 
and the United States (2005) Part B (hereinafter ‘Fogleman’) 1574 on the impact of the duty 
of good faith as acknowledged in the UK on the duty to disclose information. 
39 See in general the discussion on the extent of the duty to disclose in Reinecke et al par 
7.5.2; see also Fogleman 1574 who evaluates the duty to disclose only material facts. 
40 See Reinecke et al par 199 for a discussion of the test; see also Liberty Life Association of 
Africa Ltd v De Waal 1999 4 SA 1177 (SCA) following the judgment in Mutual & Federal 
Insurance v Oudtshoorn Municipality 435. 
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easier.41 The application does not form part of the insurance contract unless it 
is expressly included as part of the policy.42 This is usually done by way of a 
‘basis of contract’ clause which declares as follows: (a) that the policyholder 
confirms that he has investigated his responses; (b) that he warrants that they 
are correct;43 (c) that the insurer issues the policy on the basis of these 
responses; and (d) that the proposal forms part of the insurance policy.  
 
5.2.2.7 Duty to mitigate loss 
 
Although it is an implied duty, some policies specifically state that the 
policyholder has the duty to mitigate his losses.44 In an environmental 
insurance context this offers the benefit that a policyholder has to act 
proactively in order to prevent environmental harm, which ensures compliance 
with both the precautionary principle45 and with the principle of preventative 
action in international environmental law.46 
 
5.2.2.8 Quantification of loss or damage 
 
Once a loss has occurred, the claim has vested and the insurer’s liability in 
terms of the policy has been determined, the loss must be quantified. In order 
to avoid the problematic issue of compensation valuation and quantification, 
clauses in the policy document such as a reinstatement clause, a valued 
policy or a policy for new value may offer some relief.47 These will be of great 
                                            
41 De Meo RA, Eldred C, Utiger LA, Scruggs LS “Insuring against Environmental Unknowns” 
Fall 2007 Journal of Land Use and Environmental Law 23 discuss the inadequacy of liability 
insurance products, and argue that the proposer’s duty of due diligence is an integral step to 
ensure effective insurance cover. 
42 See Fogleman 1575 on general insurance practice in this regard. 
43 Care must be taken to ensure that the policyholder is in fact providing a warranty, and that 
it is not merely a representation of fact, due to the serious nature of the consequences of a 
breach of warranty. 
44 See Reinecke et al par 10.6 for a discussion of the policyholder’s duty to minimise his 
losses; see especially the examination in Fogleman 599 on the 1966 version of the CGL 
standard policy that expressly requires the policyholder to prevent or mitigate his losses. See 
also the discussion in chap 6 par 6.5.3 on the history and effect of the wording of the various 
pollution exclusion clauses in CGL policies over time. 
45 As referred to in chap 3 par 3.3.2.1(b) above. 
46 As referred to in chap 3 par 3.3.2.1(c) above. 
47 See in general Reinecke et al par 300 for a discussion of the general principles of 
quantification of a claim and the value of these clauses; see also Reinecke et al chap 16.2 for 
Footnote continues on the next page. 
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value where the reinstatement refers to the remediation or clean-up of the 
environment, as the value as determined in the policy will apply irrespective of 
the real remediation costs. As the issues of quantification are universal and 
extensive, they are addressed specifically in chapter 6 below.48 
 
5.2.2.9 Subrogation 
 
The insurer retains his rights of subrogation, ex lege or contractual, to conduct 
proceedings against the third party who caused the loss or damage to the 
insured. This will apply specifically in a situation where a policyholder 
succeeds in claiming under his first-party insurance for damage caused by 
another to the insured interest. The claim of the insurer against the third party 
is an independent claim, and in an environmental context will also resort 
under the evaluation of liability discussed in chapters 3 and 4 above.49 
 
Issues regarding the interpretation of insurance contracts in general and the 
pollution exclusion clause in particular, are discussed not in this chapter, but 
in chapter 6 below.50 
 
5.2.3 Classification of Insurance Contracts 
 
5.2.3.1 General criteria 
 
The general criteria for classification include (a) the nature of the interest 
insured; (b) the nature of the risk; (c) the way in which the amount recoverable 
under the policy is determined; and (d) the way in which the insurer’s profits 
are distributed.51 Some or all of these criteria are applied in the classification 
of the types of policies that offer environmental insurance cover. 
                                            
an examination of reinstatement as the performance due by the insurer; see Merkin RM 
Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance 8th ed (2006) (hereinafter ‘Merkin’) 337–345 specifically for an 
examination of the distinction between the measure of indemnity under a valued and an 
unvalued policy. 
48 See par 6.6 below. 
49 For a general discussion of these aspects of subrogation, see Reinecke et al pars 390–399. 
50 See par 6.5.5 below. 
51 As identified by Reinecke et al par 8. 
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5.2.3.2 Indemnity and non-indemnity insurance 
 
Whereas the nature of indemnity insurance is to indemnify the insured, the 
principle of indemnity does not apply to non-indemnity or capital insurance. 
The difference lies in the nature of the insurable interest. For indemnity 
insurance the interest reflects a financial loss or damages and is therefore of 
a patrimonial nature, and for capital insurance the interest is regarded as non-
patrimonial in substance.52 Health, bodily injury and life insurance fall under 
the latter, and as they fall outside the scope of this study, they are not 
examined in greater detail.53 Where insurance is, however, classified 
according to the nature of the event insured against, it might ‘cut across the 
fields of both indemnity and non-indemnity insurance’.54 
 
For purposes of this study, indemnity insurance can basically be divided into 
property or asset insurance, as dealt with in the examination of first-party 
insurance below,55 and liability insurance. The latter is examined in the 
context of first-party insurance to the benefit of a third party and third-party 
insurance in the text below.56  
 
 
5.3 ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE INSURANCE 
 
5.3.1 General 
 
At a first glance, insuring one’s liability against pollution damage appears to 
be a mere matter of obtaining liability insurance cover. Internationally, 
environmental damage claims were traditionally made against the insurers in 
terms of ‘Comprehensive General Liability Policies’ or ‘Commercial General 
                                            
52 As stated by Reinecke et al par 9. 
53 See par 5.3.2.7 below for a brief classification of environmental insurance policies. 
54 In the words of Reinecke et al par 11. 
55 As discussed in par 5.3.2.3 below. 
56 See par 5.3.3 and par 5.3.4 below. 
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Liability Policies’ (hereinafter referred to as ‘CGL’).57 Over the years insurers 
have adapted their policies to trends and incidents in the insurance market to 
the extent that it has become nearly impossible to succeed with pollution 
claims under these policies.58 In South Africa the first steps to allow cover in 
this regard were made by the extension of the PLIP Policies59 to cover liability 
due to environmental damage caused by pollution. Over time, cover has been 
affected due to the increased inclusion of pollution exclusion clauses into 
policies. This has been the case globally, as discussed extensively in chapter 
6 below.60 
 
In addition to the cover provided under the more ‘general’ insurance policies 
such as property and pure liability policies, there is a limited availability of 
specialised environmental insurance policies both in national and international 
markets.61 Due to the complexities within their specialised industry, 
environmental insurance underwriters have always been on the cutting edge 
of new products and new wordings.62 The reality remains that pollution liability 
policies are expensive and uncommon in the general insurance market.63 
Specialised environmental liability products are discussed in this chapter 
below,64 whereas the terminology used in these policy documents is 
examined in chapter 6 below.65  
 
To summarise, insurance against environmental damage claims can broadly 
be divided into first-party insurance, for example, property and life insurance, 
                                            
57 See the discussion of the history and current statutes of the CGL policy in chap 6 par 6.5.3 
below. 
58 Insurers continued to add more exclusion and limitation clauses by issuing policy revisions 
on a regular basis to effectively narrow the scope and extent of the cover provided; see in 
general the discussion in chap 6 par 6.5 below. 
59 Special Risks Underwriters Yesterday’s policies won’t meet tomorrow’s needs: The PLP 
policy  (1992) 3.  
60 See chap 6 par 6.5 below. 
61 As stated by Abraham 602. 
62 See the opinion held by Siesko DM & Weiss N “Use and Evolution of the Claims-Made 
Policy Form in Environmental Insurance: Selected Issues” 2008 (20) Environmental Claims 
Journal 39 (hereinafter ‘Siesko & Weiss’) 53 in this regard. 
63 Italiano ML “Environmental Impairment: Dealing with the Legalities” 1990 (August) Risk 
Management 38 (hereinafter ‘Italiano’) 39 refers to and endorses this finding of the General 
Accounting Office Report in the USA in this regard. 
64 See par 5.4.4 below. 
65 See par 6.5.6 below. 
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disability and health insurance as a hybrid form, and liability insurance as a 
form of third-party insurance. Pollution-related claims brought by third parties 
against a policyholder are obviously better suited under liability insurance 
cover. These forms of insurance and specific refinements of the cover 
provided and their application in the field of specifically pollution-related 
insurance claims are discussed in this chapter. 
 
5.3.2 First-party Insurance 
 
5.3.2.1 Nature of first-party insurance 
 
The aim of first-party insurance is to obtain compensation for restitution of the 
first-party interest, and is generally more effective than a civil liability claim. 
The insurer is liable to deliver direct compensation in the form of a 
reinstatement, or indirect compensation in the form of money. It is the 
possibility of reinstatement that makes this type of cover attractive for 
purposes of the remediation of environmental damage. A potential plaintiff or 
claimant can protect himself prior to the polluting occurrence by obtaining 
specialised private first-party insurance cover.66 Property, fire, all-risk car and 
life and personal injury policies are all forms of first-party insurance that offer 
incidental pollution damage cover.67 
 
5.3.2.2 Advantages and disadvantages of first-party cover 
 
The advantages include that it is easier to provide effective compensation for 
environmental harm under first-party insurance, as it is easier for insurers to 
narrow down the risk pools for first-party insurance than it is for liability 
insurance.68  
                                            
66 See in this regard Havenga in Faure M & Neethling J (eds) Aansprakelijkheid, risico en 
onderneming: Europese en Zuid-Afrikaanse perspectiven (2003) (hereinafter ‘Faure & 
Neethling’) 137. 
67 See in general Bocken H “Alternatives to Liability and Liability Insurance for the 
Compensation of Pollution Damages: Part I” 1987 (4) TMA 83 for an identification of the 
possible policies. 
68 Faure (ed) 208 states as follows, that in third-party insurance, however, ‘[t]he insured will 
not know whether he hits a poor or a rich victim’. 
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The disadvantage of first-party cover for pollution risks is that the policyholder 
or prejudiced party has to carry the financial burden of paying for the 
protection of his own interests, because he is unable to pass these costs on to 
the polluter which is clearly a violation of the polluter-pays principle.69 
Amounts that are effectively paid out under first-party insurance are usually 
lower than amounts paid out in terms of a civil liability scheme and liability 
insurance.70 
 
5.3.2.3 Property Insurance 
 
5.3.2.3.1 General description 
 
Property policies cover any impairment, loss or damage sustained directly by 
the policyholder by the realisation of a risk concerning the policyholder’s 
property. Some property policies are all risks or multi-peril policies, such as a 
general homeowner’s policy, whereas others are for named perils only, for 
example, a fire insurance policy.71 Property insurance policies often include a 
classic first-party insurance cover component as well as a third-party 
insurance component. The latter provides cover for a liability incurred due to 
the infringement of someone else’s interest, and is thus a form of liability 
insurance, which is discussed under that heading below.72 
 
5.3.2.3.2 Nature of and requirements for property insurance 
 
First-party property insurance provides cover for the protection of one’s own 
interest, such as insurance cover for fire or flood damage to property.73 
                                            
69 As in accordance with the polluter-pays principle as discussed in chap 3 par 3.3.2.2 above; 
Faure & Skogh 280 also comment on this disadvantage of first-party insurance cover. 
70 As stated by Faure (ed) 218. 
71 See in general Howard MH & Mackowsky MA “Defending claims for environmental damage 
under first-party property insurance policies” 2002 (Spring) Tort & Insurance Law Journal  883 
(hereinafter ‘Howard & Mackowsky’) 886 for a discussion of the various types of policies. 
72 See par 5.3.4 below. 
73 Larsson 525 argues that it therefore covers all property damage and acknowledges that it 
includes even damage with ecological dimensions. 
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Policyholders are protected irrespective of any tort liability. Cover is usually 
obtained for the maximum potential loss that the policyholder may suffer.74  
 
General requirements for coverage are (a) direct physical loss or damage;75 
(b) caused to the insured property; (c) in which the policyholder has an 
insurable interest; (d) caused by or resulting from a covered fortuitous event;76 
(e) during the policy period. Cover is clearly not provided for damage that the 
policyholder knew was in progress prior to the inception of the policy. 
 
It is less likely that cover for pollution-related claims will be provided under a 
property policy than under a liability policy.77 There are specialised property 
policies available in the market that are specifically designed to cover pollution 
damages.78 It has, however, been general practice since the 1960s to 
severely limit cover by the inclusion of specific exclusion clauses for damage 
caused by ‘pollution and contamination’ in property policies as well.79 These 
clauses are discussed extensively in chapter 6 below.80 
 
5.3.2.3.3 ‘Insured property’ 
 
The term ‘insured property’ often requires interpretation in disputes between 
an insurer and a policyholder. It seldom includes the soil or the water under or 
adjacent to the property, where, for example, there is a stream or river that 
forms the boundary of the property. Whether this will be the case will depend 
                                            
74 See Fogleman 622 for an evaluation of the distinction between property and liability policies 
based on these elements. 
75 Howard & Mackowsky 909 state that damages resulting from delay, loss of market, 
interruption of business and lost profits are not seen as direct physical losses. 
76 The following practical description of the term ‘fortuitous’ can be found in the Restatement 
of Contracts §291: ‘a fortuitous event is an event which, so far as the parties to the contract 
are aware, is dependent on chance’; Howard & Mackowsky 897 declare that the modern 
trend remains to view fortuity from the subjective standpoint of the individual policyholder. 
77 See in this regard the pollution exclusion clauses found in first-party insurance policies as 
examined extensively in chap 6 par 6.5 below, and the limited extent of damages claimable 
as evaluated in chap 6 par 6.6 below. 
78 Bocken H “Alternatives to liability and liability insurance for the compensation of pollution 
damages: Part 2” 1988 (1) Tijdschrift voor Milieuaansprakelijkheid  83 provides examples of 
these policies. 
79 See specifically Fogleman 1580 for applicable case law in the UK in this regard; and see 
628 on the position in the USA. 
80 See the extensive discussion in par 6.5 below. 
 226 
on the exact scope of the policy and on the interpretation of the specific 
description of ‘insured property’. In some situations ‘covered property’ 
includes property ‘owned, used, intended for use, or for which the policyholder 
is responsible or legally liable for’.81 
 
5.3.2.3.4 ‘Physical loss or damage’ 
 
The exact meaning of ‘direct physical loss or damage’ is often contested. It is 
often found to exclude a decrease in property value, pure economic loss and 
consequential or intangible loss. The word ‘direct’ in this context has been 
interpreted as meaning ‘proximate’ or ‘dominant’.82 
 
5.3.2.3.5 ‘Caused by or originating from’ 
 
The requirement that the damage must have been ‘caused by or originating 
from’ has been held to mean that the incident was the ‘efficient proximate 
cause’ of the damage.83 Alternative wording used is that the policy covers 
‘resulting’ or ‘ensuing’ property damage or loss.84 
 
5.3.2.3.6 Period of cover 
 
Standard property policies provide that the insured property must be damaged 
during the period of cover, which then in accordance with the ‘manifestation’ 
or ‘loss occurrence’ trigger would disqualify any claim for gradual or long-tail 
pollution under these property policies.85 Cover is provided for a specific 
number of ‘insured events’, and for each of these deductibles, self-insured 
                                            
81 See specifically Howard & Mackowsky 892 for case law that even includes cover for 
property ‘held in trust’. 
82 See in this regard Columbiaknit Inc v Affiliated FM Insurance Co 1999 WL 619100 (D Or 
Aug 4 1999).  
83 Howard & Mackowsky 894 confirm that this has been held in the majority of USA case law. 
84 Chesler RD & Schulman JL “Key Concepts in Property Insurance for Water Loss” 2007 
(October) Environmental Claims Journal 249 (hereinafter ‘Chesler & Schulman’) 251 provide 
and examine examples of this type of policy wording and its application in relevant case law.  
85 Howard & Mackowsky 895 confirm that this is the general rule, and that in the majority of 
cases it was held that there is no cover where damage manifests itself subsequent to the 
policy period; see the detailed discussion of ‘long-tail liability’ in chap 6 par 6.3 above. 
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retentions and limitations of claim apply.86 Property policies generally contain 
lower limits of indemnity when compared to liability policies. 
 
5.3.2.3.7 Exclusions from cover 
 
Insurers are constantly evaluating their policies to minimize their exposure to 
risks. Standard exclusions from property policies include some of the 
following. 
 
Fraudulent conduct or intentional realisation of the risk by the policyholder 
excludes claims from cover. Other exclusions from cover often include 
exclusions of very large claims, or where a claim is for a loss caused by an 
occurrence of gradual and non-accidental damage.87  
 
Claims for damage caused to the property by ‘inherent vice’ or ‘latent defect’ 
that is not discoverable upon reasonable inspection are excluded under the 
policy. An ‘inherent vice’ refers to the situation where the internal composition 
of the property or some aspect thereof causes its damage or destruction.88  
 
Damage caused by normal ‘wear, tear and deterioration’, and by ‘rust and 
corrosion’ is as a general rule excluded from cover.89 
 
As the infiltration of water onto premises can have catastrophic results, claims 
for water damage or ‘water losses’ are mostly excluded. The management of 
                                            
86 Howard & Mackowsky 900 warn of the complications that arise where a single event can be 
caused by single or multiple causes, as is also addressed in greater detail in chap 6 par 6.4.3 
below. 
87 See specifically chap 6 par 6.5 on the extensive examination of the issues relating to these 
exclusions. 
88 In the words of Howard & Mackowsky 904 in their discussion of case law, that the property 
must ‘contain the seeds of its own destruction’. 
89 Howard & Mackowsky 905 elaborates that is covers the degeneration of the substance of 
an object arising from decay, corrosion or disintegration, and is especially relevant in an 
environmental context where these cause leaks in underground storage tanks, causing 
seepage of toxic substances; see in this regard SW Energy Corp v Continental Insurance Co 
974 P2d 1239 (Utah 1999). 
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a water damage claim is time-consuming and damage such as mould, decay, 
rot and structural damage is often costly to repair or remedy.90 
 
A typical property policy exclusion concerns loss caused by ‘the enforcement 
of any law or ordinance’ that regulates the construction, use, repair or removal 
of the property. It is important to note that this has the potential to affect a 
claim to recoup statutory ‘clean-up costs’.91 
 
The specific interpretations of various elements of pollution exclusion clauses 
that are of relevance to policies that provide property cover are discussed in 
chapter 6 below.92 
 
5.3.2.3.8 Additional cover 
 
It is also possible to obtain ‘clean-up cost’ insurance, as well as ‘debris 
removal’ cover, as discussed below, under specialised property insurance 
cover.93 Some policies also provide limited coverage for the process of 
‘pollutant removal’.94 Property policies often contain a ‘debris removal’ clause 
that covers removal of the remains of the insured property, in which case 
‘debris’ then serves as a synonym for the ‘insured property’ itself, unless 
debris is very specifically defined.95 
 
Where a ‘brownfield site’ is insured, cover is provided for post-remedial 
liabilities that could also include known conditions. Site pollution liability or 
‘SPL’ policies provide cover only where the policy clearly intends to provide 
                                            
90 This is especially relevant due to increased flooding and a worldwide increase in violent 
storms, which is being blamed on global warming; see in this regard also Chesler & Schulman 
249. 
91 Howard & Mackowsky 908, however, recognise that the exclusion does not apply where the 
occurrence of the insured event results in the application of such a law or ordinance. 
92 Par 6.5.3. 
93 As referred to by Larsson 528; see also Fogleman 625 for an evaluation of this type of 
clause in view of relevant USA case law. 
94 According to Howard & Mackowsky 900 ‘pollutants’ are usually specifically defined. 
95 An example is a clause that provides cover ‘within the sum insured, for expenses incurred 
in the removal of debris of the property covered which may be destroyed or damaged by the 
peril insured against.’; see also Howard & Mackowsky 898 who state that the clause is usually 
qualified and provides only for limited cover for the removal of only specific forms of debris. 
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cover for these specific losses. The purpose of this type of insurance cover is 
usually to facilitate the sale of a contaminated yet cleaned-up site where the 
new owner feels that he will be adequately indemnified against future 
claims.96 Tailored ‘SPL’ policies usually provide cover for clean-up costs for 
known or unknown pre-existing conditions, third-party bodily injuries and third-
party property damage that could include a claim for the diminution of third-
party property values, or even natural resource damages.97 Cover obviously 
depends on the disclosure of the known risks when obtaining the insurance.98 
 
5.3.2.3.9 Claims procedures 
 
Property policies mostly require the policyholder to give ‘prompt’ or 
‘immediate’ notice to the insurer of the loss within specified time limits, which 
provides the insurer with the opportunity to investigate, determine or adjust a 
claim.99 The interpretation of whether the policyholder complied with this 
provision will clearly depend on the facts and circumstances, as well as the 
policy wording, of each case. First-party insurance policies generally contain 
suit limitation clauses that determine the time period within which the 
policyholder must sue the insurer upon rejection of his claim by the latter.100 
 
5.3.2.3.10 Burden of proof 
 
For ‘all risk’ policies the policyholder typically carries the burden of proving 
that the damage to the insured property was caused by a proximate insured 
                                            
96 See in general Neuman 27 on the insurability of these sites. 
97 As identified by Neuman 28. 
98 See in general also Ferrey S “Converting brownfield environmental negatives into energy 
positives” 2007 (34) Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 417 420 on the duty of 
disclosure. 
99 Called the ‘claims limitation’ clauses; see specifically the discussion of the validity of time 
bar clauses in chap 6 par 6.5.2 and 6.5.4 below; see also Howard & Mackowsky 912 for a 
discussion of the procedural requirements; see also in general Merkin 695 on the insured’s 
notification obligations. 
100 Howard & Mackowsky 913 hold the view that courts generally uphold suit limitation 
clauses under property policies. 
 230 
peril. The insurer then carries the burden to prove that the claim falls within a 
policy exclusion.101 
 
In case of ‘named-peril’ policies the policyholder shoulders a heavier burden, 
as he has to prove that the damage resulted from one of the specifically 
named perils.102 See a further examination of these two forms of policies 
below.103 
 
5.3.2.4 All risk insurance 
 
5.3.2.4.1 History and nature of cover provided 
 
The principle of universal cover against all risks was peculiarly a Continental 
one. The principle against named perils only developed during the eighteenth 
century. Although a general all-risks policy in its nature provides universal 
coverage, legislation, the nature of the insurance contract and the agreement 
between the parties could lead to certain exclusions from the comprehensive 
cover.104 The benefit of this type of cover is that the policyholder does not 
have to prove any causal link between a specific peril and the loss he 
suffers.105 
 
The use of the term ‘all risk’ insurance is misleading as it appears to the 
average policyholder that the policy covers all loss, however caused, and that 
the nature of the casualty causing the loss is immaterial. This title used for the 
cover provided by a Commercial General Liability insurance policy or ‘CGL’ 
creates a similar impression.106 
                                            
101 See in this regard specifically chap 6 par 6.5 below on the nature of pollution exclusions 
and the burden of proof that rests upon the insurer; see in general also Merkin 308. 
102 Howard & Mackowsky 895 state that in both cases the policyholder still has to prove that 
the loss occurred within the ‘policy period’. 
103 See par 5.3.2.4, and par 5.3.2.5 in this regard. 
104 As identified by Van Niekerk JP The Development of The Principles of Insurance Law in 
the Netherlands from 1500 – 1800 Vol 1 (1998) 347–349. 
105 As reiterated by Reinecke et al par 275; see also Blackshaws (Pty) Ltd v Constantia 
Insurance Co Ltd 1989 3 SA 478 (C) 482. 
106 See the discussion in chap 6 par 6.5.3 below specifically on CGL insurance exclusion 
clauses.  
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5.3.2.4.2 Exclusions from ‘all risk’ cover 
 
As mentioned, legislation, the nature of the particular insurance contract and 
the policy document itself could limit the extensive cover. In the market these 
policies usually include extensive standard exclusion clauses.107 As far as 
pollution-related claims are concerned, pollution exclusion clauses can be 
either an absolute pollution exclusion or merely a qualified or limited pollution 
exclusion clause. The wording that loss caused by ‘pollution or contamination’ 
is excluded from cover is often used. 
 
5.3.2.4.3 Burden of proof 
 
The normal situation applies in that the policyholder has to prove that the loss 
was proximately caused by an insured peril, and that he suffered the loss. The 
burden of proof then rests with the insurer to show that the loss arose from an 
excluded cause and is therefore not covered under the policy, or that another 
defence exists that denies his liability such as prescription of the claim. It 
is important to note that any clause that restricts an insurer’s liability under an 
‘all risks’ policy must, however, be interpreted restrictively.108 
  
5.3.2.5 Named peril insurance 
 
5.3.2.5.1 Nature of cover provided  
 
This form of insurance provides cover for assets and property owned by the 
policyholder, against risks posed by specified named events or perils that 
cause a direct physical loss. This limits the proximate cause to an immediately 
destroying factor. These are usually written on a ‘discovered and reported’ 
basis, and comprehensively cover damage found ‘on, within, under or onto’ 
                                            
107 As confirmed by McGee A The Modern Law of Insurance 2nd ed (2006) (hereinafter 
‘McGee’) 630.  
108 As discussed by Reinecke et al par 275; see also Auto Protection Insurance Co Ltd v 
Hanmer-Strudwick 1964 1 SA 349 (A) 354 in a South African context. 
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the insured property.109 Full restitution under these policies is guaranteed as it 
also provides cover for costs and expenses incurred. 
 
5.3.2.5.2 Burden of proof 
 
In this case the policyholder carries the burden of proving that the loss was in 
fact caused by one of the specific ‘named perils’.110 
 
5.3.2.5.3 Exclusions from cover 
 
Policies often include limitations relating to the type of ensuing loss or 
damage, for example, where it provides cover for loss of use of the property 
only, and not for the deterioration of its value.111 Another form of exclusion 
that is readily found is where ‘water loss’ is excluded from cover.112 Various 
other exclusions are discussed in this chapter as well as chapter 6 below, for 
example, the standard pollution exclusion clauses which can also be found in 
these policies. 
 
5.3.2.6 Additional cover policies 
 
This type of cover mostly includes the ‘removal of debris’ clause that covers 
the expenses incurred to remove debris caused by the direct property loss.113 
Cover for ‘clean-up costs’ can also be taken up at an extra premium in 
addition to the cover provided under traditional first-party property insurance. 
 
It is also possible to include insurance cover for consequential losses suffered 
due to business interruption, which is a reality where damage to 
                                            
109 Larsson 529 states that ‘discovery’ means where the policyholder has ‘become aware’ that 
there is environmental damage on site. 
110 Merkin 308 et seq elaborates on the insured’s obligations as far as meeting his burden of 
proof is concerned. 
111 This limitation is not generic and would depend in each case on the wording of the policy 
reflecting the intentions of the parties to the insurance agreement. 
112 See also in general the ‘water loss’ exclusion referred to in par 5.3.2.3.7 above. 
113 See the explanation of the scope and effect of this type of clause in par  5.3.2.3.8 above. 
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environmental resources, such as clean water, affects a production process 
that depends on the resource.114  
 
5.3.2.7 Health, disability, personal injury and life insurance 
 
As liability may not be settled for these forms of insurance, they are cheaper 
to administer.115 Although environmental damage could potentially cause 
bodily injury, impairment of health or loss of life, the scope of this study is 
limited because it cannot include an extensive examination of these forms of 
damage as well.  
 
5.3.3 Insurance to the Benefit or on Behalf of a Third Party 
 
5.3.3.1 General purpose and extension clauses 
 
It is possible for a first-party or a third-party policy to offer cover to a third 
person who is not the insured. This is usually done by the inclusion of a 
contractual extension clause that extends the cover to allow for claims under 
the policy by persons other than the insured. These are frequently included in 
a variety of insurance policies.116 An example would be where property or fire 
insurance cover also provides cover for the property of the insured as well as 
for the goods of third parties brought onto the insured property. As extension 
clauses are also found in liability policies, they apply to all of the types of 
policies that provide cover for pollution damage. 
 
                                            
114 As discussed by Larsson 529, 532. 
115 In the opinion of Faure & Skogh 280. 
116 See in this regard Schulze WG “Extension Clauses in Insurance Contracts – Uncertainty 
Rules OK?” 1997(9) SA Merc LJ 64; also Schulze WG “Extension Clauses in Insurance 
Contracts – A New Angle” 1997 (9) SA Merc LJ 216; see also Reinecke et al chap 15 for a 
detailed discussion of these ‘third-party contracts’; especially par 431 to 433 on extension 
clauses. See also the Dutch EDI-policy as discussed in this chap par 5.3.3, par 5.4.2 and 
chap 7 par 7.5.4.6 below. 
 234 
This will also be the case where the statutory exception in the Insolvency 
Act117 creates rights for a third party against the insurer of an insolvent 
insured or policyholder.118 
 
Where the insurance is on behalf of the third party, the third party as co-
insured can claim directly from the insurer, regardless of the liability of the 
insured policyholder for the loss. The third party must only prove the causal 
link between his loss and the insured event based on the contractual 
relationship between the insurer and the policyholder. The third party is bound 
to the limits of the coverage provided.119 
 
5.3.3.2 Nature of insurance cover 
 
This type of cover can in general be identified as direct casualty insurance 
taken out by a policyholder for the benefit of unnamed third parties.120 The 
exact structure of these clauses has been hotly debated in South African law 
for some time.121  
                                            
117 Act 24 of 1936. 
118 S 156 states: ‘Whenever any person (hereinafter referred to as the insurer) is obliged to 
indemnify another person (hereinafter referred to as the insured) in respect of any liability 
incurred by the insured towards a third party, the latter shall, on sequestration of the estate of 
the insured, be entitled to recover from the insurer the amount of the insured’s liability towards 
the third party, but not exceeding the maximum amount for which the insurer has bound 
himself to indemnify the insured.’. As this type of direct right by a third party against the 
insurer is acknowledged in this situation, it would not be unusual to also extend this direct 
right to environmental liability claims as is the position in the Netherlands as discussed in 
chap 7 par 7.5.4.6.2 below. 
119 See the Dutch EDI policy as discussed in par 5.3.3, par 5.4.2 and chap 7 par 7.5.4.6 below 
as an example. 
120 In the words of Bocken H “Financial Guarantees in the environmental liability directive: 
Next time better”  2006 (15) European Environmental Law Review 13 21 on the nature of the 
environmental damage insurance or EDI policies; see also 23 that it could also offer effective 
protection where it provides cover upon the insolvency of the insured. 
121 This is illustrated by the following case law that pertains to a variety of insurance contracts 
that intend to benefit a third party who is not the insured. For recent cases, see Pieterse v 
Shrosbee NO 2005 1 SA 309 (SCA) par 9 where the court held that regarding the vesting of 
the rights of nominated beneficiaries in life insurance policies, a contract between the third 
party (as the person who suffers harm or loss due to the pollution) and the promittens (the 
insurer) is established upon the third party’s acceptance of the benefit; in Wessels NO v De 
Jager en ‘n ander NNO 2000 4 SA 924 (SCA) 928 it was held that the third party does not 
have a right once the initial contract to the benefit for a third party is concluded, but that he 
only gets a competency to accept the benefit, upon which his right against the promittens 
vests; for the older yet still authoritative cases on the construction of stipulatio alteri, see 
Mutual Life Insurance Co v Hotz 1911 AD 556; Crookes v Watson 1956 1 SA 277 (A); 
Footnote continues on the next page. 
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It is trite law that where the clause is in effect a stipulation for the benefit of a 
third party, the third party obtains rights against the insurer upon acceptance 
of the benefit. Uncertainty, however, reigns on whether the third party 
receives rights from the original contract between the stipulans and the 
promittens, upon or even before acceptance, and becomes a party to that 
contract,122 or whether he receives rights only against the promittens upon 
acceptance of the benefit in terms of a second independent contract between 
himself and the promittens.123 
 
Where the clause merely makes the proceeds payable to the third party as a 
beneficiary, the cover itself is not extended to include cover for the 
beneficiary.124 Where the intention is to extend the cover, it is proposed that 
the third party does not require an insurable interest at the time when the 
cover is obtained, but that he should at least have such an interest upon 
acceptance of the benefit that affords him the rights against the insurer.125 
The fact that the third party does not pay a premium to the insurer for the 
insurance cover he receives, does not affect the nature of the contract.126 
Reinecke is of the opinion that one cannot require the insured to have an 
insurable interest in the contingent liability of the third party were the contract 
intends to compensate the third party.127 
 
                                            
McCollogh v Fernwood Estate Ltd 1920 AD 204; Croce v Croce 1940 TPD 251; Joel 
Melamed & Hurwitz v Cleveland Estates (Pty) Lt; Joel Melamed & Hurwitz v Vorner 
Investments (Pty) Ltd 1984 3 SA 155 (A); see also Reinecke MFB “Insurable Interest and 
Extension Clauses” 1996 (4) TSAR 784; the issue is also addressed by Scott S “Cession of 
Whole Life Insurance Rights” 2003 (14) Stell LR 89. 
122 Known as the ‘one contract’ approach. 
123 Known as the ‘two contract’ approach; in the early case of Crookes v Watson 288 it was 
held that the beneficiary has a competency to accept, but not a vested right to do so; for a 
similar viewpoint, see Wessels NO v De Jager en ‘n ander NNO 928. 
124 See in general Reinecke et al par 15.2 on the merits of the construction of the stipulation in 
terms of the ‘one contract’ and in terms of the ‘two contract’ approaches. 
125 For a detailed examination of the stipulation see Sonnekus JC “Enkele opmerkings om die 
beding ten behoewe van ‘n derde” 1999 (4) TSAR 594; see also Schulze (1997) 69, and 75 
where he states that the third party’s right to claim directly from the insurer is based on the 
third party’s own insurable interest. 
126 As confirmed by Reinecke et al par 123. 
127 Reinecke (1996) 788, with specific reference to the judgment in Croce v Croce 264. 
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The exact construction will in each situation depend on the facts, the 
intentions of the parties and the construction of the contractual rights of the 
parties.128 
 
Reinecke concedes that the proper understanding of these clauses in the 
context of insurance is hampered by these uncertainties and controversies, 
yet is of the opinion that as this instrument has not yet been fully exploited 
further development can be expected. This view offers authoritative support 
for the implementation of this structure in order to introduce mandatory first-
party insurance for the benefit of a third party for environmental damage 
caused in specific industries.129 What is required, is that the parties express 
their intentions in terms of the contract clearly and precisely in order for their 
respective performances to comply with the required measure of certainty.130   
 
Although the advantages offered by this type of insurance include lower 
transaction costs and easier risk differentiation, Bocken, however, concedes 
that its implementation has not been a huge success in the European market 
due to an apparent lack of demand.131   
 
 
 
                                            
128 Schulze (1997) 225 elaborates on the following possibilities: that upon interpretation some 
clauses may be stipulations to the benefit of third parties, whereas others may be mere modal 
clauses in terms of which a duty in the form of a benefit to the third party has to be performed, 
yet some might be neither; See also the position in the Netherlands as discussed in chap 7 
par 7.5 below; see also in this regard Wansink (2006) 431 par 11.5 for an explanation of the 
statutory position of the prejudiced party’s direct claim against the wrongdoer’s insurer. 
129 See the views held by Reinecke et al 295; Bocken (1987) 84 was initially, however, of the 
opinion that the difficulties of a generalised application of first-party insurance to the benefit of 
a prejudiced party in environmental damage insurance would be too large to overcome, yet 
acknowledged that it would have its use in specific risk situations, for example, where 
hazardous waste is transported. This view that it might enjoy a limited application only within 
specific industries can be supported. 
130 A similar viewpoint is reiterated by Scott S “Begunstigdeaanwysings en sessie in 
lewensversekeringskontrakte” 2002 (4) TSAR  766 777 who states that the parties to the 
contract must regulate their relationship contractually with care and precision to prevent 
uncertainty in this regard. 
131 Bocken H “General Report Theme 1B: Alternative Compensation Systems for 
Environmental Liabilities” presented at the AIDA XIth World Congress New York (2002) 
(hereinafter ‘Bocken (2002)’) 38; see also 39 for a reference to the Dutch 
‘Milieuschadeverzekering’ as discussed in greater detail in chap 7 par 7.4.3.6 below. 
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5.3.4 Third-party Insurance 
 
5.3.4.1 General 
 
In third-party insurance the policyholder pays for the protection of someone 
else’s interests. Liability insurance also offers a means to compensate 
prejudiced parties effectively, and is not solely aimed at protecting 
wrongdoers from the economic consequences of liability. It also serves as an 
instrument to spread costs among larger segments of the public, the other 
policyholders, who benefit from the activity that is the cause of the 
accidents.132 It is further an attractive instrument to provide cover as 
premiums are tax deductible, and policies can be adjusted to suit individual 
needs and financial possibilities.133 Very little South African case law exists on 
liability policies. Due to its history and lack of authority South African 
insurance practice is from time to time obliged to follow or rely on the practice 
in the UK and in other countries. 
 
5.3.4.2 Nature and scope of liability insurance  
 
5.3.4.2.1 History and description of liability policies 
 
The first liability policies were issued in the late 1800s, and developed rapidly 
in sync with the development of liability law, more specifically in sync with the 
tort of negligence.134 Under the South African Short-term Insurance Act135 a 
‘liability policy’ is defined as ‘a contract in terms of which a person, in return 
for a premium, undertakes to provide policy benefits if an event, contemplated 
in the contract as a risk relating to liability, otherwise than as part of a policy 
                                            
132 Bocken (2002) 6 states that although the burden is assumed by the insurer, it is in reality 
funded by the other policyholders. 
133 Bocken (2002) 7 recognises that there are, in his words, less ‘burdensome formalities’ in 
this process of tailoring individual policies. 
134 See in general Fogleman 461 et seq on the historical development. Liability insurance 
developed from simple policies that covered the employer’s liabilities towards his employees, 
to more general public liability policies in use today. 
135 Act 53 of 1998. 
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relating to risk more specifically contemplated in another policy relating to 
another definition in this section occurs’.136 
 
5.3.4.2.2 Legal liability as the trigger of coverage 
 
Liability towards third parties can arise from statute, delict or contract.137  A 
general liability policy usually provides cover against third-party claims for 
bodily injury and property damage due to the negligent act or omissions of the 
policyholder, or for statutory claims that can include claims for environmental 
clean-up costs.138 It is in the public interest that, in the absence of an express 
agreement to the contrary, the insured’s liability based on his intentional or 
reckless conduct is excluded from cover.139 
The insured’s liability towards a third party determines the insurer’s resultant 
liability toward the insured, and it is therefore moot that a ‘legal liability’ must 
exist before any claim against the insurer accrues in terms of liability 
insurance cover.140  This is irrespective of whether the policyholder, who was 
in fact not legally liable, reached a settlement with a third party, which then 
creates a separate liability based on the settlement agreement.141 The form 
and nature of the settlement or compromise to avoid or satisfy claims should 
not influence the issue on whether or not there was an initial valid claim under 
the policy.142 
 
                                            
136 S 1(1)(xix). 
137 As recognised by Reinecke et al 428 et seq; for liability cover based on contractual liability 
see Russell & Loveday v Collins Submarine Pipelines Africa (Pty) Ltd 1975 1 SA 110 (A) 139. 
138 See in general Fogleman V “The Widening Gap in Cover for Environmental Liabilities in 
Public Liability policies” 2007 (June) Journal of Planning and Environmental Law 816; also 
Fogleman 461. 
139 As reiterated by Reinecke et al 206 et seq. 
140 In Daniël Mostert v Cape Town City Council 2001 1 SA 105 (SCA) 117 the court confirmed 
the general principle that a person cannot take out insurance where insurable interest lacks, 
and that no such interest can exist for liability insurance cover unless the policyholder as the 
wrongdoer incurs liability towards a prejudiced party who suffered damages; see the more 
extensive examination of this case in chap 4 par 4.2.4.5.3 above. 
141 See specifically Truck and General Insurance Co Ltd v Verulam Fuel Distributors CC and 
another 2007 2 SA 26 (SCA) pars 15–18 on the insured’s liability towards third parties 
specifically for ‘ecological damage’ caused. 
142 As held by the court in P&O Steam Navigation Co v Youell [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 136; see 
also in this regard the opinion by McGee 636. 
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Some liability policies provide cover not from the moment that the insured 
incurs legal liability towards the third party, but only once the insured’s liability 
has been established by a judgment, another award such as an arbitration 
award, or by agreement.143 Policyholders may often not admit liability or 
conclude a settlement agreement with the third party unless they obtained the 
prior consent of their insurer to do so. 
 
Some policies even contain a specific ‘pay to be paid’ clause in terms of which 
the insured’s claim against the insurer only accrues once the insured has in 
fact compensated the third party in full, and not once the legal liability to pay 
compensation exists or has been established. 
 
It must be stressed that the third party has no rights to claim directly from the 
insurer, unless the policy itself by the inclusion of an extension clause, or the 
law, by example in terms of the Insolvency Act, provides for such a direct 
claim as discussed in above.144 
 
5.3.4.2.3 Liability for breach of contract 
 
Even less case law exists on the insurability of ‘damages’ arising from a 
breach of contract.145 Atkins is of the opinion that contractual damages can 
trigger cover under a public liability insurance policy.146 What ‘legally liable’ for 
environmental damage means for purpose of liability insurance is also 
examined specifically in chapter 6 below.147 As liability depends on the 
judgment, arbitration or agreement, there can be no indication that a 
contractual liability should be excluded automatically from liability insurance 
cover. 
 
                                            
143 As recognised by Reinecke et al 328. 
144 See par 5.3.3 above. 
145 See in general the brief discussion of contractual liability in chap 4 par 4.3 above. 
146 Atkins NG “Contractual liability: Public liability insurance” 1992 (21) Businessman’s Law 
207.   
147 See par 6.5.6.6 below. 
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Breach of contract can enjoy only a limited insurability, obviously where it is 
included in the cover provided.148 Where a contract is binding and 
enforceable, it could serve as a ‘liability claim’ under an indemnity policy and 
can also fall within the scope of the definition of a ‘pollution claim’ where the 
parties intended this liability to fall under the cover so provided.149 Policies 
often exclude contractual liability from general liability cover. An example of 
such a clause reads as follows: ‘Liability assumed by agreement is excluded 
from cover unless liability would have attached to the policyholder 
notwithstanding such an agreement.’150 
 
As stated, most of these issues have not yet been brought before our courts 
and case law is limited. Reference can be made to an atypical case in an 
environmental context in the USA where the phrase ‘legally obligated to pay 
damages’ was given its ordinary and popular meaning to include all forms of 
damage, including damages awarded under a contractual damages claim.151 
 
5.3.4.3 Duty to defend 
 
Primary general liability policies also include either the right of the insurer, or 
the duty of the insurer, to defend the policyholder against third-party claims 
made against him. Insurers often prefer to exercise their right to defend where 
they are of the opinion that the insured may not attempt a proper or effective 
defence, or where they have better resources and a greater chance to 
succeed than the insured. The insurer’s duty to defend remains a separate 
contractual duty and does not automatically form part of the insurer’s duty to 
                                            
148 A similar viewpoint is reiterated by Larsson 32. 
149 As confirmed by Fogleman 1557. 
150 See the example provided by Atkins 208; see in general the discussion of exclusion 
clauses in chap 6 par 6.5 below. 
151 See the discussion by Fogleman 495 on the judgment in Vandenberg v Superior Court of 
Sacramento County 21 Cal 4th 815 88 Cal Rptr 2d 366, 982 P2d 229 (1999) where the 
insured lessee breached the terms of his lease agreement by installing underground storage 
tanks containing waste oil, and subsequently incurred contractual liability where leaks from 
the tanks caused soil and groundwater pollution, causing the landlord to incur liability to pay 
clean-up costs. 
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indemnify the policyholder.152 The duty to defend requires the defence to be 
conducted properly, and continues until the insurer proves that the 
policyholder’s liability does not fall within the cover provided under the 
policy.153 Although the cover provided is usually capped to a monetary limit, 
there is usually no limitation or cap on the costs of defence.154 
 
5.3.4.4 Types of liability insurance cover 
 
5.3.4.4.1 Private liability insurance 
 
Private third-party liability insurance cover is the most traditional form of 
liability insurance in the market.155 This form of cover is provided for under a 
separate policy, yet can also be included under property insurance, 
professional insurance and travel insurance. 
 
5.3.4.4.2 Public liability insurance 
 
The policyholder protects himself against the risk of incurring legal liability, 
usually based on delict or tort, towards unknown third parties. These policies 
can also be self-standing or be incorporated into broader-based policies as an 
optional extension.  Prior to the 1990s most public liability policies covered 
losses arising from pollution without any specific pollution exclusion.156 
  
Public liability policies are traditionally ‘occurrence-based’, triggering the claim 
when the bodily injury or property damage occurs. The wording is as a rule 
not standardised, and the cover provided will clearly depend on the intentions 
of the parties as described by the wording of the policy. Where the 
                                            
152 See also in general Fogleman 482 for a discussion of the scope of the duty to defend and 
the role of extrinsic evidence in the interpretation of this duty. 
153 Fogleman 485 to 491 explains the procedures used in compliance with the duty to defend 
specifically when enforcing CERCLA. 
154 See Fogleman for a discussion of whether costs incurred by an policyholder when 
investigating a contaminated site are defence costs, which are unlimited, or are costs that fall 
under the liability indemnity as provided under the policy, which are in fact capped. 
155 As reiterated by Larsson 119. 
156 As stated by Fogleman 1503. 
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interpretation of the wording is disputed, cover may be compromised.157 This 
issue becomes extremely relevant where claims for the policyholder’s 
statutory liability for clean-up costs are brought under these policies. 
  
5.3.4.4.3 Comprehensive or commercial general liability insurance 
 
This type of policy, known as a ‘CGL’ policy, has been standardised in the 
global insurance industry since the 1940s. It appears to include most types of 
cover that could apply, although this is not really the case as many exclusions 
and limitations are to be found in the policy documents.158 The more 
comprehensive discussion of the continuing revision of these policies, with a 
specific focus on exclusion clauses, follows in chapter 6 below.159 
 
5.3.4.4.4 Excess policies 
 
Excess general liability policies provide cover against claims for bodily injury, 
property losses and other specified harms that are in excess of any primary 
policy. Various layers of excess policies can be obtained. Insurance policies 
that provide cover specifically for environmental damage or liability for such 
damage are excess policies where their purpose is to provide cover for claims 
excluded by the primary policy such as a property policy. An ‘umbrella policy’ 
is also an excess liability policy, yet can provide cover for a loss that is not 
already covered at all under the primary policy. Excess policies usually 
include the right of the insurer to defend a claim against the policyholder, 
                                            
157 See in this regard Fogleman (2007) 817 et seq; in Bartoline Limited v Royal & Sun Alliance 
Plc and another [2007] 1 All ER (Comm) 1043 the court rejected a wide interpretation of the 
word ‘damages’ and denied a claim under a public liability policy for statutory clean-up costs, 
whereas in the only South African judgment on this point, the court held in Truck and General 
Insurance Co Ltd v Verulam Fuel Distributors CC and another that ‘property damage’ included 
clean-up costs for ‘ecological damage’ caused. 
158 A similar impression is created by ‘all risk’ insurance policies, see par 5.3.2.4 above; for a 
comprehensive discussion of the effect of the exclusion of specific risks see chap 6.5 below. 
159 See par 6.5 below. 
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should he wish to do so. There is no duty on the insurer to defend. The limit of 
indemnity cover also usually includes all defence costs.160 
 
5.3.5 Accumulation of Different Coverages 
 
Where first-party and third-party insurance cover is accumulated in an 
environmental pollution situation, the insurer is entitled to enforce the rights of 
his policyholder, who is the prejudiced party who suffers the pollution damage, 
by way of subrogation against the wrongdoer’s or polluter’s liability insurer. 
The complication lies therein that the claim ends up being fought by the 
insurers involved, and the policyholders, that is the wrongdoer and the 
prejudiced party, are excluded from the claims process.161  
 
5.3.6 Prescription of Insurance Claims 
 
5.3.6.1 First-party insurance 
 
Obligations in terms of insurance contracts are subject to the Prescription 
Act.162 The payment, which the insurer owes the insured, prescribes three 
years from the time that the debt becomes due and the action accrues to the 
insured.163 The general rule is that a right of action against an insurer accrues 
on the date on which the insured peril occurs, and that prescription starts to 
run on that date.164 This will be once the event occurred, the identity of the 
insurer and the facts that give rise to the claim are known or would reasonably 
have been known.165 This is especially the case under a first-party policy such 
as a property insurance policy. As there are different triggers for insurance 
coverage as discussed in chapter 6 below,166 the prescription period will start 
                                            
160 See in general Fogleman 465 for a discussion of the various layers of excess policies, and 
also of the extent of cover for defence costs and for examples of clauses that either include or 
exclude these costs from cover. 
161 As reiterated by Faure (ed) 208. 
162 Act 68 of 1969; see also the discussion of the Act in chap 4 par 4.2.9 above. 
163 S 11(d). 
164 Merkin 321 acknowledges that it is in line with the standard accrual rule.  
165 S 12(3); see also Reinecke et al 327 et seq for an examination of these requirements. 
166 See chap 6 par 6.3 below. 
 244 
running from the time when the loss-causing occurrence or event occurs 
where the cover provided is in terms of an ‘occurrence’ based policy.167 
Where cover is provided under a ‘loss occurrence’ policy, the prescription 
period only starts to run on the date on which the damage or loss manifests 
itself and the insured knows or should reasonably have known about the 
damage or loss.168 
 
Prescription is interrupted by service on the insurer of legal process to enforce 
the claim, or by an acknowledgment of debt.169 
 
Parties to an insurance contract can conclude a ‘standstill agreement’ in terms 
of which prescription is suspended. It is also general insurance practice to 
include a time bar clause in an insurance contract that extinguishes the 
insured’s claim against the insurer where the claim is not brought within a 
specific period of time. The constitutionality and enforceability of time bar 
clauses in South African law are examined in chapter 6 below.170 
 
5.3.6.2 Third-party insurance 
 
As far as liability policies are concerned, the insured’s claim starts to prescribe 
once the third party has established and quantified the insured’s liability. This 
will be once a judgment or other award is made or a settlement agreement is 
concluded in the third party’s favour.171 Some of these policies contain a 
specific ‘pay to be paid’ clause in terms of which the insured’s claim against 
the insurer only accrues once the insured has paid the third party in full. 
Merkin is of the opinion that this type of clause does not change the date on 
which prescription of the insured’s claim against the insurer starts to run, and 
                                            
167 See specifically the discussion in chap 6 par 6.3.3.1 below for a detailed examination of 
this type of policy. 
168 See the discussion in chap 6 par 6.3.3.2 below for a detailed examination of this type of 
policy. 
169 See in general the discussion by Reinecke et al 328 for prescription in the context of an 
insurance claim. 
170 See par 6.5.2, par 6.5.4 below. 
171 See also the general discussion in Merkin 322 and also 694 et seq; for example, a 
settlement agreement. 
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that it remains the date on which the third party’s liability has been established 
and quantified. It is submitted, however, that some of these clauses are 
worded in such a way that it is clear that it is the intention of the parties that 
prescription only starts to run on the date on which the insured pays the third 
party in full.172 
 
Where there is a delay between the insurer’s denial of liability prior to a claim 
being brought by the third party against the insured and the date on which 
liability is in fact established and quantified, prescription starts to run on the 
date of denial. In this situation, the insured could take remedial action by 
commencing with an action against the insurer for a declaration as to the 
insurer’s liability in the event that a claim is successfully brought against the 
insured. Prescription is then suspended. The same rules apply where a third 
party has a direct claim against the insurer.173 
 
5.3.6.3 Effect of prescription 
 
It is important to note that agreements that limit prescription do not extinguish 
the insured’s right of action, but only provide the defendant with a defence, 
whereas a time bar clause in an insurance contract extinguishes the insured’s 
claim against the insurer.174 See also the discussion of prescription in a 
delictual context in chapter above.175 
 
 
5.4 SPECIALISED ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE PRODUCTS 
 
5.4.1 General 
 
Over the last decade, insurance ‘freebies’ have dried up because insurers 
have withdrawn or limited cover for pollution damage from general or public 
                                            
172 As reiterated by Merkin 323. 
173 See the discussion by Merkin 323 et seq. 
174 As held by Merkin 323; also the similar viewpoint reiterated by Reinecke et al 328. 
175 See specifically par 4.2.9.2 above. 
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liability policies, and substituted them with specialised environmental 
insurance products developed specifically for this purpose in the insurance 
market.176 Insurers who initially saw the gap in the market and attempted to 
introduce environmental or pollution damage liability policies, were soon 
overwhelmed by the huge numbers and magnitude of claims, which proved 
that they were not to be profitable, and their availability dwindled rapidly. 
Some of these policies are discussed below. 
 
5.4.2 The EDI policy in the Netherlands 
 
In January 1998 the Netherlands introduced and implemented the 
Environmental Dutch Insurance or ‘EDI’ policy in their insurance market. It is 
in nature a first-party insurance for the benefit or on behalf of a third party. 
Where the third party suffers a loss, he may claim from the insurer regardless 
of the liability of the policyholder for the loss. Cover is provided only on the 
contractual terms of the policy and without any influence of tort law. The third 
party must only prove a causal link between the loss and the loss-causing 
event covered by the policy.177 Damages as well as cleaning-up costs and 
legal defence coverage are covered.178 
 
In order to force implementation, this policy was intended to substitute liability 
insurance previously available for these claims. Should a polluter not have 
EDI cover, he will be personally liable to pay the claim and will not be able to 
                                            
176 See Kalis PJ, Reiter TM, Segerdahl JR Policyholder’s Guide to the Law of Insurance 
Coverage Part 2 (2004) chap 12 pars 12–03 on examples of specialised pollution liability 
coverages; for more examples of specialised insurance instruments available in the 
marketplace see http://www.environmentalinsurance.com/ss04.html (last accessed on 21 
February 2008). 
177 See the universal issues and problems relating to causation as discussed in chapter 6 par 
6.4 below. 
178 See the position as explained by Bocken (2002) that EDI cover in other countries such as 
Sweden and Finland essentially only provides compensation payable to third parties upon the 
insolvency of the insured wrongdoer. This is also the case in South African law as discussed 
in par 5.3.3.1 above 
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claim under any other liability policy. He is also precluded from claiming his 
legal costs from any other insurance source.179  
 
5.4.3 The EIL and the ERI policies in the United States 
 
Two specific insurance policies developed in the USA. Environmental 
Impairment Liability or ‘EIL’ policies usually cover third-party bodily injury and 
property damage, clean-up costs and defence costs. They are expensive and 
also difficult to find in the market due to their lack of profitability,180 yet 
indirectly add the benefit that they encourage acceptable environmental risk 
management by policyholders. As these policies are more straight-forward 
than the CGL-policies discussed in chapter 6 below, they allow courts to 
respect the sanctity of contract during interpretation or construction by 
simplifying the process of upholding the reasonable expectations of the 
insured as well as the reliance interest of the insurer.181 
 
A special named-peril insurance, namely an Environmental Remediation 
Insurance or ‘ERI’ policy, was developed in response to the effect of CERCLA 
in the USA.182 It is a form of first-party insurance for previously undetected 
and pre-existing land contamination of commercial properties. Although ERI 
does not address third-party liability in the way that the EIL does, cover could 
be extended to include off-site clean-up of a third party’s property. The cover 
could also be enhanced to cover contamination that occurred after the policy 
was taken up, on a ‘discovered (where the policyholder becomes aware of the 
damage) and reported (to the insurer at risk at that time)’ basis. This form of 
insurance covers environmental damage found ‘on, within, under or onto’ the 
insured property that has to be remedied in accordance with environmental 
laws.183 
                                            
179 See also the detailed discussion by Wansink H “A new Environmental Damage Insurance 
Policy (EDI) in the Netherlands” 1998 (May) The Bulletin on Pollution, Products and New 
Technologies (AIDA) 12. 
180 Italiano 39 refers to, and reiterates this view as reported in the USA General Accounting 
Office Report. 
181 Italiano 40 also endorses this as one of the benefits that the EIL policies offer. 
182 See the more detailed discussion of the position in the USA in chap 7 par 7.6 below. 
183 As identified and examined by Larsson 529. 
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5.4.4 Other Environmental Insurance Policies 
 
5.4.4.1 First-party property insurance 
 
First-party pollution policies offer cover for property damage, on-site bodily 
injury and the cost of the remediation of accidental contamination on the 
policyholder’s own sites. Property transfer policies offers wide coverage that 
include property damage, economic loss such as the diminution of third-party 
or first-party property, loss of rental income, clean-up costs, on- or off-site 
bodily injuries and personal liability of, for example, directors, administrators 
and trustees. Under a specific policy of homeowner’s cover for undetected 
contamination cover is provided for very specific risks and defects, and is only 
provided once a property has been registered with a central body,184 screened 
and assessed for potential contamination. Cover does not include personal 
injury, blight and contamination after completion of the sale, and is usually 
capped to specific property values.185 
 
5.4.4.2 General environmental liability or impairment insurance 
 
A specialised policy that offers extensive coverage is the general 
environmental impairment liability policy.186 Cover can be provided for 
business interruption by policyholder or third-party claimants, diminution of 
third-party property value, loss of income, natural resource damage, 
relocation costs and loss arising out of asbestos removal. International 
insurers like Zurich, AIG Environmental, XL Capital and Kemper 
Environmental, for example, offer cover under the following specialised 
environmental insurance policies: (a) the EIL or ‘environmental impairment 
liability’ policy; (b) the ECL or ‘environmental clean-up and liability policy; (c) 
the REEL or ‘real estate environmental liability’ policy; and (d) the CPL or 
                                            
184 In most cases this will be the ‘National House-Building Council’. 
185 See also in general Fogleman 1588. 
186 Known as ‘EIL’; or also ‘pollution legal liability’ or ‘PLL’ policies. 
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‘contractors pollution liability’ policy.187 Other examples of insurance products 
available from a variety of insurers include specifically tailored policies as 
considered below. 
 
5.4.4.3 Pollution in place insurance 
 
This policy offers cover where there is already a low-level contamination on 
the insured property yet where no clean-up is required at that time. It covers 
any future liabilities of the policyholder to clean-up the property, and covers 
building, soil, groundwater as well as air pollution. 
 
5.4.4.4 Remediation or clean-up cost cap insurance 
 
Stop-loss remediation cover provides for unforeseen costs incurred by owners 
of property and property developers for the remediation of contaminated land, 
and are known as ‘remediation or clean-up cost cap policies’ as they offer 
additional cover for costs that exceed the cover provided by other policies. 
This form of insurance covers the economic risks where remediation costs 
exceed the projected costs during a remediation project. This is a very real 
scenario as the evaluation and assessment of the exact reinstatement or 
remediation costs and expenses remain an inexact and uncertain science. 
Cover includes off-site or third-party property clean-up costs for pollution that 
originated from the subject site and migrated to other sites. 
 
5.4.4.5 Real estate pollution insurance 
 
This specific form of policy covers lenders such as banks or other financial 
institutions against unknown pre-existing as well as new polluting conditions 
that occur on the property held as collateral for a loan or mortgage facility. Its 
main focus is to offer cover for pollution that manifests after the inception of 
                                            
187 These are some examples provided by one of the larger international insurers namely 
Zurich, at http://www.zurichna.com/environmental_liability_insurance.htm.(last accessed on 
17 August 2008). 
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the policy, and also covers the diminution of a property’s market value due to 
an on-site pollution condition. 
 
5.4.4.6 Post-remediation insurance 
 
This type of policy can be implemented after a successful remediation project 
was signed off, and covers own property on a first-party basis, for insured 
property from which the pollution emanated or originated, and also contains a 
third-party insurance component. The latter offers cover for potential future 
liabilities for contamination of the adjacent or down-gradient properties of third 
parties to which the pollution migrated.  This also covers owners and 
operators on properties against claims from successors in title who incur the 
later liabilities, or where state regulation becomes stricter and further clean-up 
is required. This type of policy intends to provide cover for claims that cannot 
be brought under other policies due to policy time clauses or triggers as 
discussed in chapter 6 below.188 
 
5.4.4.7 Toxic mould liability insurance 
 
Due to the increasing awareness of the effects of toxic mould overgrowth, this 
recent addition to the stable of policies provides cover for the owners of 
property contaminated by mould, as well as for construction contractors in 
respect of defective measures or procedures that caused the mould growth, 
and contractors who test for mould or carry out the mould remediation or 
restoration.189 
 
5.4.4.8 Lead poisoning liability insurance 
 
Cover is provided against liability for lead exposure, usually from lead-based 
paints, on residential property in pre-1978 homes. Lead exposure and 
                                            
188 See chap 6 par 6.3 below. 
189 See Goodman GA “Insurance Triggers as Judicial Gatekeepers in Toxic Mold Litigation” 
2004 (57) Vanderbilt Law Review 241 for a comprehensive discussion of the insurability of 
claims based on damage caused by toxic mould. 
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subsequent poisoning increases due to remodelling, renovation, 
weatherisation and poor property management that increase lead release. 
 
5.4.4.9 Sick building syndrome insurance 
 
Also seen as a ‘new risk’ such as asbestos and toxic mould risks, SBS 
policies provide cover for claims due to bodily injury such as sickness, fatigue 
and mental distress caused by SBS.190 
 
5.4.4.10 Asbestos liability insurance 
 
Cover under this policy is limited only to claims by asbestos consultants and 
testers, as well as asbestos abatement contractors, land developers and 
schools active within the contaminated area relating to the removal of 
asbestos. No retroactive or long-tail liability cover for the initial is provided for 
the victims of asbestosis. 
 
5.4.4.11 Facility pollution liability 
 
Various policies are available for different industries and facilities. Examples 
include cover for airports and filling stations where huge quantities of fuel are 
stored, industrial sites, hospitals in respect of the dangers of pollution caused 
by medical waste, dry cleaners for the release of harmful cleaning agents, 
waste water treatment facilities and others. One of the oldest specialised 
insurance policies in the market offers cover for the liabilities of waste 
disposal contractors, operators of waste disposal facilities and transporters of 
waste. In most countries these policies are mandatory for operators within the 
waste disposal industries. Due to their specialised nature and the extensive 
statutory regulation of liabilities within the waste disposal industry, no detailed 
discussion can be included in this thesis. 
 
                                            
190 For more on SBS or ‘sick building syndrome’, see chap 6 par 6.5.6.7 below. 
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5.4.4.12 Underground or aboveground storage tank cover 
 
Cover is provided to satisfy the financial responsibility requirements set for 
operators of these storage facilities by the State or other authorities, and 
includes cover for third-party bodily injury and property damage, as well as 
corrective action coverage for mandatory remediation after the release of 
pollutants.191 
 
5.4.4.13 Owner-controlled insurance policies 
 
Property owners and property managers can purchase bespoke cover by 
tailoring cover that includes general, public, professional and pollution liability, 
as well as cover for asbestos and lead abatement, business interruption and 
so forth. The cover will depend on the risk profile of the policyholder as 
determined by a multitude of variables of each specific case or situation and 
depend on the capacity of the insurer to provide cover. 
 
5.4.4.14 Secured debtor or creditor environmental risk insurance 
 
Where a borrower who has secured his loan by a mortgage on his property 
defaults due to pollution conditions on or relating to that property, the policy 
provides cover for the outstanding loan balance. It can also be extended to 
provide cover for other third-party claims resulting from pollution conditions. 
Lender liability offers cover for a lender who has an interest in property 
provided by the borrower or a surety for the latter as a security for the 
borrower’s loan.192  
 
 
 
 
                                            
191 For more on pollution through the seepage of pollutants from storage facilities, see chap 6 
par 6.3.3 on long-tail liability issues. 
192 These include financial institutions, property developers, property portfolio managers and 
the like. 
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5.4.4.15 Policies for professionals and contractors 
 
Cover under these policies is provided for the liabilities of persons involved in 
a professional capacity in the environmental field, such as environmental 
consultants and environmental laboratories. Most contractors such as 
industrial, construction and related activities, cleaning and remediation 
contractors can potentially incur huge liabilities for pollution damage caused to 
sites that they occupy for their operations. ‘Contractor’s Pollution Liabilities’193 
policies offer cover for mostly the inadvertent causing or aggravation of 
pollution or contamination. 
 
 
5.5 MANDATORY INSURANCE COVER 
 
5.5.1 General 
 
Examples of existing mandatory insurance schemes include compulsory 
insurance cover for employees in employment relationships, for the carriage 
or transport of goods, and relating specifically to the environment, the 
mandatory insurance required in the nuclear and oil and petroleum 
industries.194 In some countries such as Belgium, for example, liability 
insurance cover for specific environmental risks is mandatory.195 
 
The questions remains whether the introduction of additional schemes in 
other industries and for other activities identified as high risk, will offer a 
solution to solve the current problems experienced with pollution insurance 
claims. Faure correctly argues that although this approach has merit, the 
existence and development of an effective liability system remains of primary 
importance.196  
                                            
193 Known as ‘CPL’ policies. 
194 See the discussion in chap 3 par 3.3.4.4.2 and par 3.3.4.4.3 above. 
195 As addressed by Bocken (2002) 7; see also chap 7 par 7.4 on the position in Belgian law. 
196 Faure M & Hartlief T “Aansprakelijkheid en verzekering voor nieuwe risico’s” in Faure M & 
Neethling J (eds) Aansprakelijkheid, risico en onderneming: Europese en Zuid-Afrikaanse 
perspectiven (2003) (hereinafter ‘Faure & Hartlief’) 53. 
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5.5.2 Advantages of Mandatory Insurance 
 
The main advantages and benefits of implementing a mandatory or 
compulsory insurance scheme include the increased expected utility of the 
responsible parties. The problem, however, is that it creates a social loss, by 
forcing people to buy insurance that they would not normally have bought. 
Care must be taken to weigh the interests of these persons against the benefit 
that society gains by ensuring that insurance cover exists. The danger exists 
that the risk premium can be higher than the objective value of the risk.197 
 
It also contributes to efficiency in that the policyholder receives compensation 
to cover his losses from the insurer, who has to exercise control over and 
monitor the behaviour of his policyholder.198 
 
Mandatory cover can provide a solution for the prejudiced party irrespective of 
the liquidity of the polluter, for example, in the event of the policyholder’s 
insolvency. 
 
5.5.3 Disadvantages of Mandatory Insurance 
 
The potential disadvantages or dangers of mandatory insurance include (a) 
that it can cause a concentration in and inflated dependence upon insurance 
markets; (b) another side-effect is the danger of increasing over-insurance 
caused by the lack of information on development risks and unpredictable 
hazards; (c) the necessity of increased co-operation with insurers and its 
effect on the market; (d) the imposition of a duty on insurers to accept their 
duties to provide cover in terms of the mandatory coverage required, where 
the market is unable to actually cover these risks.199 In practice it appears to 
                                            
197 See also the view of Faure (ed) 180 et seq in this regard. 
198 Faure & Skogh 270 explain that insurance by which the insurer compensates losses at 
certain specified contingencies, as is the case in industrial accident insurance, is equivalent to 
a guarantee and has the advantage that it provides greater financial security.  
199 As identified by Faure (ed) 185–189; see also the view by Faure & Skogh 277. 
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be unsuitable as insurers are clearly reluctant to provide cover;200 (e) the 
management of such a scheme remains a costly exercise.201 A possible 
solution would be to place mandatory financial caps on the cover provided by 
mandatory insurance products. 
 
5.5.4 Merits of Implementation 
 
Faure concedes that it appears as if the disadvantages of mandatory 
insurance outweigh its advantages and the benefits that it can offer.202 
Bocken argues that mandatory insurance has the potential of providing a 
solution to insurance claims issues, but that it can only be effective where the 
operators who are required to obtain the cover actually do so. He concedes 
that mandatory insurance should, however, always be supported or 
strengthened by a back-up fund set up either by the insurers or by the 
government or another authority, in order to provide some form of additional 
security to prejudiced parties.203  
 
It may in the last instance also appear that mandatory insurance schemes can 
only become a reality where the market buys into this type of insurance and 
the specific policies become available in the market. 
 
 
5.6 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Insurance claims that relate to situations where environmental damage 
occurs, fall within two broad categories of indemnity insurance.  It is possible 
to claim for pollution damage to property in terms of the cover provided by a 
first-party insurance policy. First-party cover against pollution damage is also 
provided under general fire, all-risk car and personal injury policies. Where a 
                                            
200 Faure & Hartlief concede that this also appears to be the case in the insurance market in 
the Netherlands; see also the similar viewpoint reiterated by Fogleman 1069.  
201 This disadvantage is also identified by Faure (ed) 208 et seq. 
202 See Faure & Hartlief 53. 
203 Bocken (2002) 12 states that this has seldom been the case where mandatory 
environmental insurance is concerned. 
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polluter becomes liable to compensate a prejudiced party for the damage 
caused, the polluter can claim under his third-party or liability insurance cover. 
In some cases, a single policy, for example, a property insurance policy, can 
provide both types of cover. 
 
The advantages of first-party insurance are that it provides more effective and 
direct compensation to the prejudiced party, and that the insurer’s risk 
determination is easier. The disadvantage of first-party insurance cover is that 
the prejudiced party has to finance his own indemnification. The polluter-pays 
principle is not implemented. Amounts paid out under first-party cover are 
usually less than those paid out under third-party cover. The term ‘property’ in 
property insurance policies is usually defined in such a way that it excludes 
elements of the natural environment from cover. It seldom includes 
groundwater beneath the insured property, for example. It is standard practice 
to include extensive pollution exclusion clauses in these types of policies, 
which either completely exclude or limit pollution claims. The nature and effect 
of these clauses are discussed in detail in the next chapter. It is therefore 
necessary for an insured to obtain additional pollution damage insurance, 
specifically named peril insurance, in order to ensure that he enjoys 
comprehensive cover. 
 
It is important to note that even where a policy is identified as ‘all risk’ or 
‘comprehensive’ insurance, the policy does not necessarily cover all possible 
risks as these policies also contain pollution exclusion clauses. 
 
Where a polluter has third-party insurance cover, his claim against his insurer 
is triggered when he incurs legal liability against a prejudiced third party. 
Liability can be based on delict, unauthorised agency or breach of contract. 
Cover for liability due to a breach of contract is, as a general rule, not 
assumed. It must appear clearly from the intentions of the insurer and the 
insured that they intend to include this type of liability in the cover provided by 
the policy. In short, liability depends on a judgment, for example, where 
damages are awarded based on a delictual claim, an award made by an 
independent tribunal or forum, or an agreement. 
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Prejudiced third parties do not have direct access to the compensation paid 
out to the polluter under a liability insurance claim, unless the nature of the 
policy is a first-party to the benefit of a third-party insurance policy. It is 
possible for a first-party insurance policy to contain an extension clause that 
extends the cover to a third person who is not the insured. Where this clause 
is intended to be a stipulation for the benefit of a third party, the third party is 
only entitled to exercise his rights against the insurer once the third party 
accepts the benefit. This extension of cover enables prejudiced third parties to 
evade the burden of instituting a liability claim against the insured, and to 
claim directly from the insurer. The claim by a third party is only possible 
where the policy intends to create this benefit. 
 
Due to the current debate on the exact structure of the stipulation for the 
benefit of a third party, it is necessary to word these clauses carefully in order 
to ensure that it is quite clear when the third party may exercise his right, and 
against whom he may do so. It is submitted that the stipulation itself is a 
contract between the insurer (as the promittens) and the policyholder (as 
stipulans) in terms of which the insurer must offer the benefit to the third party, 
who then, upon acceptance, obtains a right against the insurer to claim the 
benefit in terms of a separate agreement between them. It is not possible for 
the third party to be a party to the insurance contract upon its initial 
conclusion, even before the third party is aware of the benefit contracted on 
his behalf, or in accordance with the opinion of some writers, even before his 
existence. Where the insurer fails to act in accordance with the initial 
insurance contract, for example, where he does not offer the benefit to the 
third party, the insured remains the contracting party who must enforce the 
stipulation. 
 
The introduction into South African law of a general right of a third party to 
claim directly from the insurer, that applies in Belgium and the Netherlands as 
discussed in chapter 7 below, must be considered. It is proposed that 
mandatory first-party insurance to the benefit of third parties, who are 
prejudiced by pollution damage, must be prescribed for specific industries. 
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This should apply only to those industries that pose a high pollution risk to 
society. Examples of these industries include those that manufacture 
hazardous substances such as chemicals, or those where polluting 
substances that are caused by manufacturing or mining activities, for 
example, are released into the environment. It is not clear whether the 
insurance industry has the capacity to implement such a scheme. Where a 
potential polluter enjoys some general liability cover under his existing 
policies, usually at a cheaper premium, the introduction of a mandatory 
excess policy could at least provide greater security to the persons prejudiced 
by his conduct. The risk premium must, however, not exceed the objective 
value of the risk. It also contributes to efficiency in that the policyholder 
receives compensation to cover his losses from the insurer, who has to 
exercise control over and monitor the behaviour of his policyholder. The 
prejudiced party will receive compensation irrespective of the liquidity or 
solvency of the polluter. 
 
The potential disadvantages of mandatory insurance are an inflated 
dependence on insurance markets and the co-operation of insurers, the 
danger of increasing costly over-insurance, and the danger that the market 
will be unable to actually cover these risks. A possible solution for insurers 
would be to place mandatory financial caps on the cover provided by 
mandatory insurance products. Where persons are required to increase their 
insurance cover, it causes an inevitable social loss. It also causes an 
internalisation of costs, which counters the implementation of the polluter-
pays principle. Moreover, the enforcement and management of such a 
scheme also remains a costly exercise, and the success of mandatory liability 
insurance cover will depend on stricter statutory control to ensure compliance 
within the various industries. Due to the current lack of mandatory insurance 
for pollution damage, and due to the delays in the implementation of new 
environmental legislation in general, this will not become a reality in the near 
future.  
 
The right of the insurer to defend the policyholder against the claim brought by 
the prejudiced third party remains a separate contractual duty and does not 
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automatically form part of the insurer’s duty to indemnify the insured under the 
cover provided. 
 
Because it is problematic for the insured to obtain sufficient information 
regarding the extent of the environmental damage caused, in order to institute 
a claim against his insurer, the prescription periods for these claims, whether 
statutory or contractual, remain relatively short. It is submitted that the 
prescription periods for both civil liability and insurance claims that relate to 
the environment must be regulated by statute. Time bar clauses in insurance 
contracts should not limit time periods to less than the prescribed statutory 
minimum. These minimums should reflect a realistic time for the plaintiff or 
insured to determine the merits and quantify his claim. 
 
The last decade has seen the development of specialised environmental 
liability insurance products that provide named peril cover for specific polluting 
events. These policies are, however, expensive and seldom procured by the 
smaller polluting industries, which still only maintain general liability insurance 
cover in the expectation that it will be sufficient to cover their liabilities. As 
indicated in the discussion in chapter 6 that follows, this type of cover is 
usually, due to the extensive damage that pollution can cause, woefully 
inadequate. Insurance claims relating to environmental damage introduce so 
many new complications into the field of insurance law that rapid change is 
required to provide solutions for these situations. The following serve as 
examples. Although insurance in general provides cover against fortuities, this 
standard principle is complicated by the post-remediation risks posed by 
brownfield sites that are known to the insurer and the insured. Cover can only 
be provided for these risks under expensive and specialised ‘site pollution’ 
liability policies, where they are available in the market. Other examples of 
‘new risks’ that complicate matters concerning insurability include risks posed 
by asbestos, lead and toxic mould pollution, and risks posed by sick-building 
syndrome or ‘SBS’. 
 
Standard specialised policies have been introduced in the Netherlands and in 
the USA. The Netherlands introduced and implemented the Environmental 
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Dutch Insurance or ‘EDI’ policy in their insurance market that is a first-party 
insurance on behalf or to the benefit of a third party. Cover is provided for 
damage, clean-up costs and legal defence. To enforce implementation, this 
policy substitutes other liability insurance cover for these claims. A polluter 
who does not procure EDI cover incurs personal liability and cannot claim 
under any other liability policy. He is also precluded from claiming his legal 
costs from any other insurance source.204  
 
In the USA, Environmental Impairment Liability or ‘EIL’ policies usually cover 
third-party bodily injury and property damage, clean-up costs and defence 
costs. They are expensive and also difficult to find in the market due to their 
lack of profitability, yet indirectly add the benefit that they encourage 
acceptable environmental risk management by policyholders. A special 
named peril insurance, namely, Environmental Remediation Insurance or 
‘ERI’ policy, was also developed in response to the effect of CERCLA in the 
USA. It is in essence a form of first-party insurance for previously undetected 
and pre-existing land contamination of commercial properties. The ERI policy 
does not provide cover for third-party liability, yet cover can be extended to 
include off-site clean-up of a third party’s property. The cover could also be 
enhanced to cover contamination that occurred after the policy was issued on 
a ‘discovered and reported’ basis. 
 
Where it appears that insurance cover was procured for damages that fall 
within the scope of ‘environmental damage’ or ‘liability’ for ‘environmental 
damage’ as discussed in the preceding chapters, a successful claim brought 
under the policy is not a certainty. Various issues complicate the insurance 
claims brought under the environmental damage and environmental damage 
liability policies in question. These issues are of a universal nature and are 
addressed extensively in the next chapter. 
                                            
204 See the full discussion of the EDI in chap 7 par 7.5.4.6 below. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
UNIVERSAL KEY ISSUES IN POLLUTION DAMAGE 
INSURANCE COVERAGE 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Pollution insurance poses its own unique challenges in the insurance market. 
This chapter is dedicated to a discussion of the universal key issues and 
complications relating to insurance claims in an environmental context.  
 
The most logical starting point for a discussion of pollution damage insurance 
and responsibilities would be to address the predictability of the risk and to 
establish the nature of the liabilities covered under a liability insurance policy. As 
can be seen from the discussion on civil liability in chapter 4 above, proving all 
the requirements to establish civil-law or common-law liability for an 
environmental damage claim remains complicated. 
 
Moreover, the vesting of the claim or trigger of the insurance claim that 
determines which one of various insurers can be held liable to provide cover, for 
example, in a situation of gradual pollution or where a long-tail liability occurs, 
deserves attention. The question as to whether one can insure against loss or 
damage that has already occurred at the time of obtaining cover but which is not 
apparent, and whether one enjoys cover for prospective losses that will only 
occur in future, also causes complications in the insurance market.1 
 
                                                 
1 Larsson M The Law of Environmental Damage: Liability and Reparation (1999) (hereinafter 
‘Larsson’) 119 states ‘that you cannot insure a house that has already burnt down,’ as cited from 
a comment made by Dr Spühler at the Seminar on ‘Environment and Insurability’ Paris 1994 
(November); see also Reinecke MFB, Van der Merwe S, Van Niekerk JP & Havenga P General 
Principles of Insurance Law (2002) (hereinafter ‘Reinecke et al’) par 306 on the insurability of 
expectancies. 
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Great uncertainty also reigns regarding the meaning of terms such as ‘property 
damage’, ‘natural resource damages’, ‘bodily injury’, and ‘sudden and accidental’. 
The interpretation or construction of these words and phrases has been the 
source of extensive litigation between insurers and policyholders, as can be seen 
from the discussion below.2 
 
Finally, the problems regarding causation need to be addressed, as it is often 
difficult for the prejudiced party to prove the nature and extent of pollution or its 
source. This is especially the case where there is a general atmospheric or 
groundwater pollution. A situation where there is multiple or collateral causation 
has the potential of adding further complications, for example, where there is a 
broad distribution of various pollutants each contributing to the damage, or where 
an interaction or synergy between various pollutants occurs. Determining the 
source and exact scope of damage or loss and whether they are causally linked 
is time-consuming, specialised and costly, and in some situations downright 
impossible.3 
 
Once the insured proves that he has suffered a loss, or proves his liability to 
compensate the loss suffered by another, contractual exemptions of liability could 
deny the claim of the insured,4 the claim could have prescribed,5 or deductibles 
could reduce the amount recoverable.6 Even where liability is proven and 
                                                 
2 See the following statement by Mole A: ‘Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words shall 
never hurt me - although, unless carefully chosen, they may have a somewhat unfortunate effect 
on my financial affairs’, as cited by Clarke M “Liability Insurance on Pollution Damage: Market 
Meltdown or Grist to the Mill?” 1994 The Journal of Business Law 547; see the discussion of 
interpretation in par 6.5.5 below. 
3 Van der Walt CFC “Deliktuele aanspreeklikheid weens nadeel deur onbekende lede van ‘n 
groep toegebring” 1995 (58) THRHR Part I 421; see also Part II 613. 
4 See the full discussion of the operation of exclusion, exemption and limitation clauses in par 6.5. 
5 For the prescription of civil-law claims in South African law, see the discussion in chap 4 par 
4.2.9 above, and for prescription of insurance claims the discussion in chap 5 par 5.3.6 above. 
6 See Abraham KS “Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance” 1988 (88) Columbia Law 
Review 942 951 for role of deductibles in improving loss avoidance by the insured. 
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coverage actually exists, a financial claim may prove to be unsuccessful due to a 
lack of funds or the insolvency of the polluter.7 
 
A separate issue concerns the great challenges posed by the transboundary 
nature of pollution damage claims, and the application of solutions proposed 
under various international law regimes.8 In chapter 6 of The National 
Environmental Management: Air Quality Act9 dealing with international air quality 
management, the Minister has the power to prescribe measures and enforce 
clean-up of transboundary air pollution caused by the migration of air pollutants 
into the jurisdiction of another country.10 Due to the elaborate and specialised 
nature of international law and its complex application, the specific topic is not 
dealt with in greater detail in this thesis.  
 
As a brief illustration of transboundary liability that is relevant to South African 
law, reference can be made to the Lubbe case that was heard in the House of 
Lords in the UK, regarding a claim based on a polluting incident that occurred in 
South Africa.11 The court found that where a holding or parent company 
exercises ‘significant control’ over its polluting subsidiary, the former can incur 
                                                 
7 For a comprehensive discussion of the effect of insolvency on insurance claims, see De 
Ketelaere K (ed) et al Handboek Milieu- en Energierecht (2006) (hereinafter ‘De Ketelaere’) 1359; 
the viewpoint of Larsson 571 can be endorsed, that a potential solution in this situation would be 
to implement alternatives to insurance and rather require persons to obtain and present 
mandatory financial securities when participating in a specific activity or industry that poses a risk 
of causing damage to the environment. 
8 Henderson A “A step forward or a slap in the face? Lubbe & Four Others v Cape Plc and related 
appeals 27-7-2000 (House of Lords)” 2000 (October) De Rebus 47; Winstanley T 2000 
(November) De Rebus 56; see also Larsson 542 for guidelines on the assessment of monetary 
damages for transboundary water pollution.  
9 Act 39 of 2004 as examined in chap 3 par 3.4.4.9 above. 
10 S 50. 
11 Lubbe & Four Others v Cape Plc and related appeals 27-7-2000 (HL); see also the 
International Law Commission Draft Principles on Environmental Liability specifically regarding 
transboundary pollution damage UN Document A/59/10 as published in 2005 (17) 155 Journal of 
Environmental Law; Van Dunne JM “Transboundary pollution and liability issues: private law vs 
public international law approaches” 1999 Acta Juridica 303; Sandrock O “German and European 
drafts on choice of law rules applicable to delictual liability: the direct claim against the insurer” 
1999 (4) TSAR 734 753 who reports that EU countries appear to be unanimous in that either the 
law that governs the delictual liability, or the law that governs the insurance contract can be 
applied. 
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liability for the actions of the subsidiary even though they are not in physical 
proximity.12  
 
These key issues are examined under separate headings below. 
 
 
6.2       PREDICTABILITY OF RISK 
 
6.2.1 General 
 
Effective insurance practice requires a justified and appropriate risk 
differentiation.13 Adapting the various policies to individual risks controls moral 
hazard and adverse selection.14 
 
6.2.2 Lack of Information 
 
It is difficult for insurers to obtain sufficient information to estimate the frequency 
and severity of potential losses where new risks are concerned, as they have to 
determine low-risk and high-risk situations for effective risk differentiation in a 
very uncertain and newly emerging global market.15 Faure states that insurers 
                                                 
12 See Winstanley 56 for a more detailed discussion of corporate liability. 
13 See in general Faure M (ed) Tort and Insurance Law Vol 5: Deterrence, Insurability and 
Compensation in Environmental Liability: Future Developments in the European Union (2003) 
(hereinafter ‘Faure (ed)’) 125; see also Reinecke et al chap 10.1 on the management and transfer 
of risk;  Faure M & Skogh G The Economic Analysis of Environmental Law and Policy (2003) 
(hereinafter ‘Faure & Skogh’) 113–119 consider the effect of risk perception and the principles of 
risk determination in insurance practice specifically for incidents that cause environmental 
damage. 
14 Abraham 946 states that liability insurance must attempt to find the balance between complete 
ignorance of the risk, and complete knowledge of it, but cautions that this process is severely 
undermined by adverse selection, moral hazard, which is in essence an information problem, and 
generalised uncertainty in the development of the market and of industry and technology.  
15 See Italiano ML “Environmental Impairment: Dealing with the Legalities” August 1990 Risk 
Management 38; Faure & Skogh 241 state that information is not only necessary for risk 
differentiation, but also for the effective reduction of risks especially where occupational health 
hazards are concerned, some of which are caused by pollution; see also in this regard Wansink 
JH “Ontwikkelingen in de Werkgeversaansprakelijkheid voor Beroepsziekten: Aanleiding voor een 
nieuwe AVB-polis?” 1996 (6) Aansprakelijkheid en Verzekering 140 149. 
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are at risk because there is very little information in the market to determine the 
insurability of new risks, yet there is a demand for cover. They are forced to 
protect their interests by increasing premiums and by introducing mechanisms 
and creating onerous obligations that the insured must meet to prevent and 
manage the risk occurrence. The effect is that the insured does not always 
receive satisfactory indemnification.16 An example of such an obligation is the 
policyholder’s duty to comply with prescribed due diligence procedures.17 
Mendelowitz concurs that ‘[n]o underwriter can do more than guess the extent - if 
any - to which an insurance premium should be adjusted to reflect the possibility 
that the insured may, during the term of the policy, incur a liability which was 
previously unheard of’.18 
 
It is submitted that the constitutional right of access to information as well as the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act19 in South Africa as discussed 
extensively in an environmental context in chapter 320 above, will prove 
invaluable for environmental claims.21 
 
6.2.3 Foreseeability and Assessment of Risks 
 
The assessment of environmental risks requires specialised expert technical 
knowledge and judgment. The property and liability insurance industries are 
expert at calculating and pricing the risk that they insure, yet the predictability of 
                                                 
16 Faure M & Hartlief T “Aansprakelijkheid en verzekering voor nieuwe risico’s” in Faure M & 
Neethling J (eds) Aansprakelijkheid, risico en onderneming: Europese en Zuid-Afrikaanse 
perspectiven (2003) (hereinafter ‘Faure & Hartlief’) 49. 
17 De Meo RA, Eldred C, Utiger LA, Scruggs LS “Insuring against Environmental Unknowns” 2007 
(Fall) Journal of Land Use and Environmental Law 23 caution that where the integral step of due 
diligence is lacking, the ‘existence of environmental liability insurance will only yield futility and 
frustration.’ 
18 See the Paper by Mendelowitz M “Insurance Cover for the Long-tail and the Unforeseeable” 
delivered at AIDA World Conference (Morocco June 1998). 
19 See the full discussion of this Act in chap 3 par 3.2.3.4 above. 
20 Par 3.2.3.4. 
21 For an illustration see the judgment in The Trustees for the Time Being of the Biowatch Trust v 
The Registrar: Genetic Resources and others Case No 23005/2002 where it was held that 
Biowatch established a clear right of access to information regarding field trials and the 
commercial release of genetically modified organisms that Biowatch claimed could be harmful. 
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environmental risks remains a challenge and impacts negatively on the pricing of 
premiums.22 Factors that impact on this assessment include the severity and type 
of damage, the frequency of the damage occurring, and of course the trigger of 
retroactive liability as discussed below,23 as well as the uncertainties pertaining to 
causation as discussed in chapter 4 and elsewhere in this chapter.24 
 
6.2.4 Potential Solutions 
 
It is nearly impossible to foresee all eventualities in the environmental insurance 
market. Abraham argues that the demise of products in the environmental liability 
insurance market is a clear symptom of the high levels of uncertainty created by 
the introduction and implementation of environmental liability regimes.25 The 
rapid expansion of tort liability has increased the frequency and size of those 
claims, which the insurer did not foresee when issuing the policy. 
 
Possible solutions to assist in dealing with this problem include the keeping of 
comprehensive public registers, monitoring via policy and licensing conditions, 
and an increase in environmental impact assessments and ecological audits.26 
 
 
6.3 THE TIME ELEMENT OR TRIGGER OF INSURANCE CLAIMS 
 
6.3.1 General 
 
The time element, also called the trigger of claims under a policy, requires a  
                                                 
22 According to Faure & Skogh 264. 
23 See par 6.3 below. 
24 Par 4.2.5, par 6.4; see Busenhart J “The insurability of ecological damage” 2004 (March) 
Environment Business Magazine 25; see also Reinecke et al par 269 who discuss these 
circumstances that affect the risk. 
25 Abraham (1988) 944; this view was reiterated by Clarke M “Liability Insurance on Pollution 
Damage: Market Meltdown or Grist to the Mill?” 1994 The Journal of Business Law 545. 
26 As supported by Faure (ed) 157 et seq. 
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more intensive study as it, together with the interpretation of pollution exclusion 
clauses, remains the focus of most environmental insurance litigation. The 
insurer incurs the obligation to the insured upon the vesting or trigger of the 
claim.27 One must distinguish the duration of the insurance contract from the 
duration of the cover. It is quite possible that the period of the policy has lapsed, 
but that cover under that policy is triggered at a later stage by an event that 
occurred while the policy was still in force, but where the claim is made only after 
the policy has lapsed. 
 
Environmental damage can in principle be divided into sudden accidental 
damage, gradual damage or damage caused by old burdens of historic 
causation. Where there is a time lapse or delay between the polluting cause and 
the manifestation of its effect, for example, where gradual progressive 
environmental damage is caused, it is problematic to determine against which 
one of several insurers who insured the risk over time the claim vests.28 ‘Long-
tail’ liability or retroactivity also depends on the trigger dates for a claim against 
an insurer to provide insurance cover.29 These triggers have been described as 
                                                 
27 See chap 5 par 5.3 above, and par 6.3.2.2 below for the vesting of insurance claims under 
indemnity insurance cover. 
28 Although the classic division is discussed in the text below, various versions of the trigger rules 
or theories exist. Siesko DM & Weiss N “Use and Evolution of the Claims-Made Policy Form in 
Environmental Insurance: Selected Issues” 2008 (20) Environmental Claims Journal 39 
(hereinafter ‘Siesko & Weiss’) 52 identify the following five rules: (a) the ‘exposure’ rule; (b) the 
‘manifestation’ rule; (c) the ‘double-trigger’ rule that damage occurs when the first exposure of the 
environment to the pollutant occurs, and at the time the damage becomes apparent; (d) the 
‘triple-trigger’ or ‘continuous-trigger’ rule that lasts from first exposure of the environment to the 
pollutant, until the time when damage first becomes apparent; and (e) the ‘actual-injury’ or ‘injury-
in-fact’ rule. Fogleman V Environmental Liabilities and Insurance in England and the United 
States (2005) (hereinafter ‘Fogleman’) 509, on the other hand, recognises the following four 
trigger theories for risks covered by liability insurance policies: (a) the ‘exposure’ theory; (b) the 
‘manifestation-of-loss’ theory; (c) the ‘injury-in-fact’ or ‘actual-injury’ theory’; and (d) the 
‘continuous’, or ‘multiple’ trigger theory discussed from 510 et seq. She also discusses the fact 
that courts often apply the triggers held in asbestos liability cases when determining the trigger in 
other pollution cases; see also 1546. Italiano 41 identifies only the following four theories: (a) the 
‘exposure’; (b) ‘manifestation’; (c) ‘multiple-trigger’; and (d) ‘injury-in-fact’ trigger theories. 
29 Faure (ed) 46 refers to this type of liability as ‘retroactivity’; for more detailed policy examples 
see Kalis PJ, Reiter TM & Segerdahl JR Policyholder’s guide to the Law of Insurance Coverage 
(2004) Part 2 chap 2. 
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‘judicial gatekeepers’ that match specific claims to particular insurance policies, 
and that enable insurers to assess their potential liabilities adequately.30 
 
Any polluting occurrence consists of the following four phases, as illustrated 
below: 
(1)__________(2)__________(3)_________(4)__________ (X) 
 
(1) the polluting occurrence (for example, the release of asbestos into the air); 
(2) the pollution itself (inhaling the asbestos and the absorption into the lungs of 
the person affected, and subsequent damage to lung tissue); 
(3) the manifestation of the damage (eventual coughing, bleeding and 
suffocation); 
(4) the claim against the insurer; and 
(X) payment of compensation.31 
 
The standard trigger theories that are based on these moments in time are 
discussed below. It appears that the time of manifestation of loss or ‘loss-
occurrence’ was the generally preferred trigger in the past,32 whereas insurers 
now appear to move more towards a ‘claims-made’ trigger as a more practical 
alternative for new risks.33 
                                                 
30 In the words of Goodman GA “Insurance Triggers as Judicial Gatekeepers in Toxic Mold 
Litigation” 2004 (57) Vanderbilt Law Review 241, 245. 
31 A version of the schematic illustration by Van Daele G Milieurisico’s goed verzekerd  (2001) 
(hereinafter ‘Van Daele’) 26; see Wansink JH De algemene aansprakelijkheidsverzekering 3rd ed 
(2006) (hereinafter ‘Wansink’) 95 par 2.8 who identifies the following six phases in a liability 
insurance cover scenario, namely (a) the insured’s wrongful conduct; (b) the mere factual 
occurrence that directly causes the damage; (c) the effect of the damaging facts and 
circumstances on the property or person; (d) the manifestation of the damage; (e) the liability of 
the insured towards the prejudiced party, and (f) the notification by the insured to his insurer of his 
liability towards the prejudiced party. 
32 Examples include the ‘exposure’, ‘manifestation’, ‘injury-in-fact’ and ‘continuous-injury’ triggers; 
see Montrose Chemical Corporation of California v Admiral Insurance Company 10 Cal 4th 645 
897 P2d 1 (Cal 1995); see also Goodman 529 who is of the opinion that the ‘manifestation’ theory 
is the best for toxic mould claims, and proposes that lessons learnt from asbestos cases could, 
due to the similar nature of its latent manifestation, also be applied effectively in toxic mould 
cases. 
33 In the opinion of Faure M & Neethling J (eds) Aansprakelijkheid, risico en onderneming: 
Europese en Zuid-Afrikaanse perspectiven (2003) (hereinafter Faure & Neethling’) 9. 
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6.3.2 Application of Trigger Theories 
 
6.3.2.1 General problematic issues 
 
It is necessary to determine which one of various potential insurers becomes 
liable to provide cover where an insured changes his insurers over time, but also 
where property changes hands and the different owners insure with different 
insurers. Where the previous insurer insured in terms of a ‘loss-occurrence’ or 
‘act-committed’ policy, but the new insurer insures in terms of a ‘claims-made’ 
policy, two or more insurers could be liable to provide cover for the same loss, 
and the issue of the allocation of cover arises. 
 
It is also possible for different policies that cover the same risk to follow on each 
other, and a claim could possibly, due to the different nature of the various 
policies, ‘slip through the cracks’ in that no claim is possible under any of the 
policies.34 Where gradual or slow progressive pollution damage occurs, various 
insurers could have provided cover during the lengthy polluting occurrence, and 
their liability or share in liability to cover the damages becomes an issue.  
 
Potential polluters must be made aware of these issues when they obtain 
insurance cover, especially when they change from one insurer to another and 
where the nature of the trigger of the policies differs, for example, where a 
change from cover with a ‘claims-made’ trigger to a ‘loss-occurrence’ trigger is 
made. An example of a recent gradual polluting incident occurred where ACSA 
(The Airport Company of South Africa) was responsible for three slow aviation-
fuel leaks from degraded storage tanks at the OR Tambo International Airport 
that contaminated soil and groundwater in neighbouring residential areas.35 The 
                                                 
34 Where the previous insurer insured according to a ‘claims-made’ policy, and the new insurer 
insures according to an ‘acts-committed’ policy. 
35 http://www.news24.com/News 24/South Africa/0,,2-7-1442_2044822 (last accessed on 26 
February 2007). 
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damage caused over a long period only manifested years later.  The potential 
involvement and liability of various insurers are currently in dispute. 
 
6.3.2.2 Requirements for vesting of claim 
 
The following is required for indemnity insurance: (a) there must have been a 
valid contract of insurance; (b) all suspensive conditions that affect the 
enforceability of the claim must have been met; (c) the peril insured against must 
have occurred during the policy period; (d) the loss must be proximately caused 
by the peril insured against.36 
 
Different types of policies have been developed in the insurance industry to 
provide cover for specific eventualities that have different trigger dates. These 
are examined below. 
 
6.3.3 Classification of Policies according to Triggers 
 
6.3.3.1 The ‘act-committed’ or ‘occurrence-based’ policy 
 
6.3.3.1.1 Nature of cover 
 
The insurance policy in force at the time when the incident, accident or the 
conduct that caused the loss occurred is the policy, which offers cover for the 
damages, irrespective of when the discovery of the wrongdoing is made or 
where the damage manifests itself.37 An ‘occurrence-based’ policy does not 
provide retroactive cover, but can provide a potentially extensive prospective 
cover that is as yet uncertain. This type of liability, known as ‘long-tail’ liability, 
can be extensive as the insurer could be liable for claims even after his 
                                                 
36 See Reinecke et al par 291 for an examination of the requirements for the vesting of a claim. 
37 Larsson 530 and Van Daele 27 examine the status of these policies; see also Wansink 97 for 
an examination of this type of policy in the context of liability insurance. 
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contractual relationship with the insured has ceased to exist. As a general rule, 
the insurer’s liability under a property policy is based on the time of the 
occurrence of the peril and not on the time when the damage manifests itself. 
This may, however, be changed by an agreement.38 
 
It is difficult, and in some situations impossible to determine exactly when the 
polluting incident occurred, as the manifestation or discovery of the damage 
could only occur years after the act was committed, causing a long-tail liability 
for the insurer.39 This will be the case especially where gradual pollution or a 
migration of pollution from one property to another occurs. Warfel, for example, 
argues that each exposure of property to the same contaminant constitutes a 
new occurrence and ‘new’ damage, triggering a multitude of policies, but that it is 
not a ‘continuous-trigger’ as discussed below.40 This view is, however, not 
generally supported. 
 
6.3.3.1.2 Problems regarding the practical application of the trigger 
 
Practical problems include the following: (a) proof of the policy and records could 
have been lost over time; (b) the insurance company no longer exist at the time 
of claim; (c) the original insured no longer exists at the time of claim; (d) there is 
insufficient cover; (e) policy limitations exist, where the cover is reduced in 
certain instances or where policy conditions do not provide for claims of this 
                                                 
38 See in this regard Merkin RM Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance 8th ed (2006) (hereinafter ‘Merkin’) 
104 pars 5–16. 
39 Spier J “Apocalyptische scenarios, De prijs van de onzekerheid na de aanslagen in the 
Verenigde Staten op 11 September 2001 en de daarop volgende economische ellende” in Faure 
& Neethling 9 proposes that the solution to the problem of the retroactive effect on the insurer’s 
liability lies in the increase in ‘claims-made’ policies; Larsson 531 highlights the problem that 
where first-party property insurance is concerned, the insurer at the time of the occurrence 
remains under a latent duty to indemnify the insured until the damage is discovered, even though 
the policy period has expired; Fogleman 1529–1537 evaluates the potential limitless extent that 
this retroactive duty to indemnify could have. 
40 Warfel WJ “Environmental Insurance Coverage Disputes: Is State Legislation the Solution?” 
2005 (September) CPCU eJournal 1 4. 
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nature; and (f) determining exactly when the polluting act was committed is 
problematic, which can eliminate the possibility of a claim.  
 
6.3.3.1.3 Duty to give notice of claim 
 
Some of these policies contain a condition that could be interpreted either as a 
contractual duty or a suspensive condition as known in our law, known as a 
condition precedent in UK law, that requires the policyholder to give notice of a 
claim to the insurer within contractually specified time limits.41 Where the 
policyholder gives the notice outside these limits, this will only preclude his claim 
where the insurer can show that he suffered prejudice as a result of the delay.  
 
The notice must be given within the agreed time or in some cases within a more 
vaguely described ‘reasonable time’.42 The effect of non-compliance or breach of 
this clause depends on the purpose and wording of the clause. It effect is usually 
that the insurer faces no liability unless the insured meets the requirements. 
Where the policy does not expressly require such a notice, the insured has no 
obligation in law to give any notice to his insurer prior to his claim. The policy 
could require the insured to comply with an obligation to notify another entity 
such as a state department or other authority of the occurrence that caused 
damage or harm. This would be in accordance with, for example, statutory notice 
procedures, or obligations to give notice imposed by permits or licences to 
operate facilities. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 See also Merkin 250; also 695 et seq regarding the extent of the insured’s notification 
obligations under liability insurance policies. 
42 This is in accordance with the ‘notice-prejudice’ rule; see also Siesko & Weiss 44 for the 
application of this rule in ‘claims-made-and-reported’ policies as discussed below in par 6.3.3.4 
below. 
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6.3.3.2 The ‘manifestation’ or ‘loss-occurrence’ policy 
 
6.3.3.2.1 Nature of policy  
 
The insurance policy in force at the time of manifestation of loss is the policy that 
can provide cover for the damage or loss. The date on which the loss-causing 
conduct occurred, is irrelevant for purpose of the insurance claim. Case law in 
the UK, for example, endorses the implementation of the ‘loss-occurrence’ or 
'injury-in-fact’ trigger for coverage of progressive environmental damage under 
liability policies.43 Germany and in France, for example, acknowledge the 
verifiable first discovery of the loss as the trigger for a claim.44 Property insurance 
is usually issued on a ‘loss-occurrence’ basis.45 Coverage clauses in public 
liability policies are also usually ‘occurrence’, ‘event’ or ‘accident’ based.46 
 
6.3.3.2.2  Problems regarding the practical application of the trigger 
 
A problem exists where an insured owner sells his property on which a business 
is located which was an industry that caused environmental pollution. The new 
insured owner continues with the industry, and once the pollution previously 
caused manifests itself, must deal with the claim under his insurance cover.47 
 
 
                                                 
43 Kelly v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Ltd [1990] 1 WLR139. 
44 See the discussion by Hoffman WC “Environmental liability and its insurance in Germany” 1993 
(2) (Winter) Federation of Insurance and Corporate Council Quarterly 147; see also Ladeur K 
“Der Umweltshaftungsfonds – ein Irrweg der Flexibilisierung des Umweltrechts?” 1993 
Versicherungsrecht 257 for the position in Germany. 
45 As reported by Larsson 530; see also the discussion of the nature of first-party property 
insurance in chap 5 par 5.3.2.3 above. 
46 As reported by Fogleman 1543; to date no court in English law or South African law has 
handed down a judgement on what the standard trigger for a claim for past pollution for a claim 
under a public liability policy should be. 
47 See in this regard the detailed discussion by Wansink 100 on the ‘loss-occurrence’ policy in the 
context of liability insurance. 
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6.3.3.2.3 Additional write-back cover 
 
Due to the absolute exclusion of pollution-related risks, some insurers agree to 
write back cover by adding a time element pollution endorsement at an additional 
premium to cover bodily injury and property damage caused by the abrupt 
release of pollutants. Cover is only triggered once the incident occurs and once it 
has been properly reported to the insurer within the periods specified in the 
endorsements. See also for various versions of endorsement, write-back or buy-
back clauses elsewhere in this chapter.48 
 
6.3.3.3 The ‘claims-made’ policy  
 
6.3.3.3.1 Nature of policy 
 
The insurance policy in force at the time the claim is made is the policy which 
covers the damage, irrespective of when the damage was caused or when it 
occurs. Although this type of trigger has often been the focus of criticism,49 it now 
‘constitutes a dominant presence in the specialised liability insurance 
marketplace’,50 and appears to be preferred by most insurers. In a pure claims-
made policy coverage only exists where real claims are made during the policy 
period.  
 
The two requirements for this trigger are that (a) the manifestation of the damage 
must still be present within the period of insurance cover, and (b) the claim must 
                                                 
48 See par 6.5.3.8 below. 
49 Spier J “Aansprakelijkheidsverzekeringen: alles en niets” 1997 (4) TSAR 714 722 states that 
even though there are differences between the loss-occurrence and the ‘claims-made’ policies, 
one should question why so much criticism is levelled against the ‘claims-made’ policies, whereas 
the ‘loss-occurrence’ policies are left at peace in that ‘loss occurrence-verzekeringen zich mogen 
verheugen in een rustig bestaan’, although problems in this type of cover also exist; see also the 
considerations of Larsson 530 et seq. 
50 In the words of Siesko & Weiss 41. 
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be made strictly within the period of insurance cover. Most modern policies are 
written on a ‘claims-made’ basis.51 
 
Two variants of this type of policy exist, namely where the claim is made by the 
prejudiced party against the insured, and where the claim is made by the insured 
against his insurer. Although it is usually presumed to be the latter, the wording 
of the policy will in each situation determine the nature of the ‘claim’ referred to.52 
 
6.3.3.3.2 Problems regarding the practical application of the trigger 
 
This trigger can also hold insurers liable for past sins, where manifestation only 
occurs long after the polluting incident occurred. Most of these ‘claims-made’ 
policies are therefore linked to fixed retroactive dates to prevent infinite liability. 
The effect is that where the cause for a claim exists before a specified date, a 
claim may not be lodged in terms of the ‘claims-made’ policy that offers cover for 
claims made after that date. An example of such a policy is the formula known as 
‘claims-made plus three years’.53 The effect of this policy is that it limits the cover 
afforded severely. 
 
The advantages from the insurer’s perspective, therefore, include a more 
predictable risk as the time of cover is finite. The process of risk differentiation 
and adaptation of premiums is more precise. Although the risk of the insurer in 
                                                 
51 See also Van Niekerk JP “Liability Insurance: Successive but Overlapping ‘Claims-made’ 
Policies and a Question of Quantum” 2006 (18) SA Merc LJ 382 (hereinafter ‘Van Niekerk (2006 
SAMLJ)’) 391.  
52 See Wansink 107 for the consideration of this type of trigger to provide effective cover. He 
confirms that this type of cover can be criticised on a social level. Legislators have to intervene by 
the introduction of a ‘circumstances-reporting’ coverage. This affords cover to the insured where 
he timeously notified the insurer during the policy period that he has become aware of 
circumstances that could lead to a claim, even where the claim itself is made beyond the currency 
of the policy period. 
53 Siesko & Weiss 41, however, warn that retroactive date provisions bring with them a great deal 
of additional expense, as complex and lengthy investigations to determine the exact date of the 
polluting incident are required. The expense is though justified in the face of the potential effect of 
paying out a major claim. 
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the short run, for the time during which the policy is in place, is greater, there is 
no liability for potential future claims.  
 
The advantages for the insured are that he generally pays a lower premium as 
he is not charged for cover for certain future claims, but that he is also afforded 
cover for losses predating the inception of the ‘claims-made’ policy.54 This trigger 
also affords other benefits such as higher limits, and the inclusion of the latest 
terms and conditions into policies. 
 
Nevertheless, it holds the following serious disadvantages. Where the insured 
has knowledge of an occurrence, and this is not disclosed before the insurance 
contract is concluded, a misrepresentation is made and the contract becomes 
voidable.55 Cover is then lost. Where the occurrence is disclosed, the potential 
insurer may decide not to conclude a contract, as it already knows that it is at 
risk. Obtaining cover in this situation could then become difficult. 
 
This form of pure ‘claims-made’ policy implicitly allows the policyholder the 
benefit of reporting the claim to the insurer within a reasonable time after the 
policy period has lapsed. This differs from the ‘claims-made and reported’ 
policies discussed below.  
 
6.3.3.3.3 Additional endorsements 
 
Additional ‘tail endorsements’ may be added to policies, in terms of which 
policyholders have to pay an extra premium to have their cover extended to 
earlier retroactive dates.56 
 
                                                 
54 Siesko & Weiss 40 conclude that advantages are offered to both insurers and policyholders 
especially in pollution cases. 
55 Van der Merwe S, Van Huyssteen LF, Reinecke MFB & Lubbe GF Contract General Principles 
3rd ed  (2007) (hereinafter ‘Van der Merwe et al’) 73. 
56 Tail endorsements provide the insured with retroactive or ‘write-back’ cover, as discussed in 
par 6.3.3, par 6.5.3.8. 
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6.3.3.4 The ‘claims-made and reported’ policy 
 
6.3.3.4.1 Nature of policy 
 
Some of the ‘claims-made’ policies are also written on a ‘discovered-and- 
reported’ basis to curtail an indefinite risk and prevent stale claims. ‘Discovery’ 
means that the insured has become aware that there is environmental harm on 
his property, and must then immediately report it to the insurer.57 
 
In some cases, this type of ‘circumstances-reported’ coverage already upon 
report provides cover to the insured.58 In other cases, the third party’s claim must 
have been made against the insured or the loss discovered by the insured, and it 
must also have been reported to the insurer by way of proper notice during the 
period of insurance cover, in terms of the ‘double-anchor’ trigger.59 This is seen 
as a condition precedent for coverage.60 As the condition precedent does not 
form part of South African law, this could be interpreted either as a contractual 
duty or a suspensive condition, depending on the scope of the duty and the 
intentions of the parties, as discussed further in this paragraph.61 The 
interpretation of the words ‘claim’ or ‘notice’ is obviously crucial to determine 
whether cover is provided.62  
 
                                                 
57 In the words of Larsson 529.  
58 See in this regard the extent of the duty to report discussed below. 
59 Siesko & Weiss 42 also emphasise the importance of noting the significant difference between 
the ‘claims-made’ and ‘claims-made and reported’ policies, especially where the operation of 
notices is concerned as explained in the text above; see also Masters LS “Insurance Coverage 
for Environmental Liability in the 1990s” 1997 (10) Environmental Claims Journal 65 et seq on the 
‘single anchor’ where only one occurrence triggers the cover under the policy, and the ‘double 
anchor’ construction of these policies where more than one occurrence or action will trigger the 
policy. 
60 See in this regard Merkin 250, 301; Siesko & Weiss 43 et seq. 
61 Reinecke et al par 256 explain the nature of this specific type of term in South African law. 
62 Siesko & Weiss 44 discuss case law that holds that it should enjoy its ordinary meaning of 
‘assertion of a right’. 
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This issue was dealt with in our law in the case of Van Immerzeel and another v 
Santam Ltd,63 where professional liability cover was provided under two ‘claims-
made’ policies. A limitation or cap in the first policy included all costs and 
expenses under the cover provided, whereas it was not included under the 
second policy. Where the liability claim and related costs and expenses 
exceeded the cap, the insurers of course claimed that the insured’s claim fell 
under the first policy. The insured took the position that as both policies had the 
potential to cover the loss, they could elect to choose under which they wanted to 
claim, which was of course the second with the higher limit.  The trigger of the 
claim was at issue before the courts. The insured was only informed of a 
potential claim by a third party when the first policy was in force. The court held 
that this did not qualify as a ‘claim’. The insured complied with the required 
notification procedure once an actual claim by the third party was made when the 
second policy was in force. The court found that only the second policy with the 
higher indemnity was triggered and provided cover.64 
 
6.3.3.4.2 Problems regarding the practical application of the trigger 
 
Cover may be denied where an insured must give notice of the forthcoming claim 
‘immediately’ or ‘as soon as is practical’ after the loss occurs, and by failing to do 
so, causes the insurer to suffer actual prejudice.65 What is seen as ‘immediate’ 
and whether this requirement has been met, will clearly depend on the facts and 
circumstances of each case, and by application of the ‘notice-prejudice’ rule that 
even where the notice is given outside the policy period, the insurer must grant 
coverage unless he can show that prejudice resulted from the delay.66  
                                                 
63 2006 3 SA 349 (SCA). 
64 See also Van Niekerk (2006 SAMLJ) 387 for a discussion of the majority and minority 
judgments in the Van Immerzeel case. 
65 Fogleman 1572 is of the opinion that although the term ‘immediate’ has been strictly 
interpreted, terms such as ‘as soon as possible’ or ‘promptly’ are less demanding and interpreted 
according to the facts and circumstances of each situation. 
66 Siesko & Weiss 44 identify this as mandatory statutory law in some states in the USA, but in 
45–50 discuss case law where it has been contested; see also par 6.3.2 as the rule initially had 
its origins in ‘occurrence-based’ policies discussed in par 6.3.3.2 above. 
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The notice procedure in a policy must therefore be carefully examined. The most 
demanding notices are those for which an exact time limit is set in the policy. 
Where the duty to give notice is intended to be a modal clause or contractual 
duty,67 failure to comply is a breach of contract and the normal legal 
consequences for breach apply. This could also affect a claim for reciprocal 
performance from the other party. Where it is a suspensive condition, the insurer 
may refuse to pay out any claim until the condition is met within the stipulated 
time. The insured must provide timely notice in accordance with the prescribed 
notice procedure and format agreed upon. 
 
Time limits for both lodging a claim against the insurer and for the additional step 
of initiating court proceedings against the insurer are difficult to meet where the 
claim is for environmental damage, due to the problems of identifying and 
quantifying actual damages suffered.68 
 
6.3.3.4.3 Additional coverage 
 
It is possible to purchase a policy endorsement that provides cover for extended 
reporting periods. This is also charmingly known as ‘tail coverage’. This 
additional cover is often obtained only after termination or cancellation of claims-
made policies. In some cases a policyholder chooses not to purchase the 
additional endorsement and simply renews his policy, and then enjoys the cover 
previously denied.69 
                                                 
67 Also seen as a contractual promise by the insured to notify the insurer. 
68 See the discussion of Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) par 6.5.2. specifically on the 
constitutionality of time bar clauses. 
69 See especially Checkrite Ltd Inc v Illinois Nat Ins Co 95 F Supp 2d 180 (SD NY 2000) in this 
context. 
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6.3.3.5 The ‘continuous-trigger’ theory 
 
6.3.3.5.1 Nature and application of trigger 
 
In terms of this theory all policies in effect (a) at the time of initial exposure; (b) 
during any subsequent period of continuing exposure; and (c) at the time of the 
physical manifestation of the harm or damage provide cover and would have to 
respond.70 It combines the effect of all the previous theories. 
 
6.3.3.5.2 Advantages and disadvantages of trigger 
 
As it is usually difficult, if not impossible, to determine the time of initial exposure 
in a gradual pollution situation, this theory has only limited application. The only 
component of this trigger that can easily be proven is the time of manifestation of 
loss or damage. The application of this theory clearly offers policyholders the 
maximum coverage as in theory all policies are triggered.71 
 
In some cases courts adopt a ‘double-or-triple trigger’ theory, depending on how 
many policies they find, but allocate the cover in such a way that each of the 
insurers does not pay more than he would have paid under a single trigger 
theory.72 
 
One has to question whether this can in most cases be acknowledged as a 
separate trigger, and whether it is not in fact merely an artificial grouping of a 
number of ‘single-trigger’ claims that would have existed independently 
anyway.73 
                                                 
70 Goodman 283 concedes that this theory cannot be applied successfully to asbestos or toxic 
mould cases as the exact time of initial exposure is unknown. 
71 Keene Corp v Insurance Company of North America 667 F 2d 1034 (DC Cir 1981) 1038. 
72 Goodman 268 illustrates this principle in view of relevant case law. 
73 See in this regard the similar views of Warfel 4 in par 6.3.3.1.1 above. 
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6.3.4 Statutory Regulation 
 
It is possible to regulate the application of these trigger issues specifically for 
environmental insurance by statute. The regime of strict and retroactive liability of 
those held liable for soil pollution or land contamination in the UK can serve as 
an example of such a statutory regulation.74 A statutory obligation, in terms of 
which an insured has to clean up affected sites, even though he was not liable for 
the initial polluting incident, could also be seen as a basic example.75  
 
6.3.5 Allocation of Liability between Insurers 
 
6.3.5.1 Justification for allocation 
 
Where an occurrence extends over more than one policy period and more than 
one policy has to respond, the allocation of the liability payable by each triggered 
policy must be determined. The problem becomes more complex where the 
insured did not have insurance during all the years in which the single 
occurrence continued. The allocation of loss allocates loss to the insured for the 
years in which he was self-insured, or was not afforded coverage under existing 
policies due to the operation of exclusion clauses or for other reasons. It serves 
the purpose of preventing the policyholder from benefiting from coverage for 
property damage that took place when it was in reality not paying any premiums 
for that coverage, or was paying a reduced premium, or for its selection of other 
less reliable insurers.76  
 
                                                 
74 S 57 of the UK Environment Act 1995; also s 78A(2) in terms of which the ‘harm and risk’ 
approach is applied. Liability is allocated to a site designated by a local authority where there is 
‘significant harm that is being caused’, or ‘where significant possibility of such harm being 
caused’.  
75 See the full discussion of the position in the UK in chap 7 par 7.3 below. 
76 See Warfel 7 et seq for a discussion of the position in various states in the USA on applying the 
pro rata approach. 
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6.3.5.2 Methods to determine allocation  
 
6.3.5.2.1 Joint and several liability 
 
Fogleman identifies two primary allocation methods that are applied by courts in  
the USA.77 The first is a joint and several liability up to policy limits, which entitles 
the insured to continue selecting policies and claiming under them until the loss 
is paid or the limits are exhausted.78 Insurers can claim contribution from other 
insurers provided that they are entitled to do so.79 Whether this method of 
allocation applies, depends strictly on the wording used in the specific policies.  
 
Where the policy states that ‘all losses’ will be covered, a joint and several 
liability is justified. This then causes a horizontal stacking of policy limits, where 
one polluting occurrence extends over more than one policy period, and the 
insured elects to exhaust the policy for its specific period to its maximum limit 
before moving on to claim from the policy in the next year. Courts are, however, 
not keen on allowing this type of allocation unless it appears that there are 
insufficient funds in any single policy period to cover the loss.80 
 
An example of statutory regulation in South Africa that removes the burden of 
proving causation can be found in The Minerals and Petroleum Resources 
                                                 
77 Fogleman 522. 
78 See also Warfel 6 on the merits of applying of this form of liability where there is an indivisible 
loss, and where technology is not available to determine precisely the amount of property 
damage caused during each policy year; Winter RA “Liability Insurance, joint tortfeasors and 
limited wealth” http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=Article URL&_udi= B6V7M-4KF6BPH- 
(last accessed on 18 July 2006) 1 is of the opinion that liability insurance decisions are the 
outcome of a game rather than a single-agent decision problem. He argues at 3 that while 
expanding joint and several liability which may appear to broaden the scope of an accident victim 
to claim, in reality care has to be taken as it has the opposite perverse effect in that it reduces 
compensation paid to victims and reduces incentives for accident avoidance. 
79 For the legal position of classic double insurance and subsequent contribution, see Reinecke et 
al pars 516–522. 
80 Fogleman 536 considers the practical consequences of horizontal stacking, and concludes that 
in view of the deductibles that exist for each policy period, stacking is not necessarily to the 
insured’s benefit. 
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Development Act81 that provides that ‘irrespective of the Companies Act82 or the 
Close Corporations Act,83 the directors of a company or the members of a close 
corporation are held jointly and severally liable for ‘any unacceptable negative 
impact on the environment, including damage, degradation or pollution 
advertently or inadvertently caused84 by the company or close corporation which 
they represent or represented’. 85 This is also a good example of the introduction 
of statutory retroactive causation, as no time limit is set for such a claim.86 
 
A brief reference can be made here to the provisions of the latest version of the 
Consumer Protection Bill,87 which aims to introduce a joint and several strict 
statutory product liability. This is in line with the strict product liability found in 
most countries. The Bill introduces a regime of strict and joint and several liability 
of producers, importers, distributors and retailers of ‘goods’,88 where any 
consumer is harmed by ‘unsafe’ goods, which the person liable could not 
reasonably have discovered.89 Manufacturers are warned to spend more on 
insurance to cover their liabilities in anticipation of the enactment of these 
                                                 
81 Act 28 of 2002, as discussed in par 3.4.4.8 of the text above. 
82 Act 61 of 1973. 
83 Act 69 of 1984. 
84 Own emphasis. 
85 S 38(2).  
86 See also its effect on the trigger of claims in par 6.3.2 above. 
87 Consumer Protection Bill [B 19D-2008]. Although the Bill was signed on 24 April 2009 it will 
only become operational and fully effective at the end of 2009 or early in 2010, together with the 
Companies Bill and the Competition Amendment Bill which form the rest of the trilogy of Acts, see  
http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?farticleID=4734423&fSection Id=561 “Department of Trade 
and Industry to improve trade laws” (last accessed on 1 December 2008). 
88 S 1 defines ‘goods’ as follows: ‘includes (a) anything marketed for human consumption; 
(b) any tangible object not otherwise contemplated in paragraph (a), including any medium on 
which anything is or may be written or encoded; (c) any literature, music, photograph, motion 
picture, game, information, data, software, code or other intangible product written or encoded on 
any medium or a licence to use any such intangible product; (d) a legal interest in land or any 
other immovable property, other than an interest that falls within the definition.’ 
89 S 61(1) states that any consumer who is harmed by unsafe goods, has the right to hold anyone 
involved in getting the product into the market, irrespective of negligence, liable. for any hazard 
arising from or associated from such risks; joint and several liability is introduced by s 61(3) and s 
61(6). A court determines the extent and monetary value of any damages; specific defences are 
allowed in s 61(4), where a person acts in compliance with a public regulation; where it would be 
unreasonable to expect the producer or supplier to discover the hazard at the time of his 
involvement. ‘Harm’ in terms of s 61(5) of the Bill includes death, injury, illness, loss of or physical 
damage to property, any economic loss. 
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provisions in the near future. Although this type of regime eases the prejudiced 
party’s burden of proving fault and the allocation of liability, it forces producers, 
manufacturers and the like who are affected by the Bill to increase their 
insurance cover, which leads to an increase in product prices due to the 
internalisation of these costs. 
 
It is submitted that this type of regime will contribute towards alleviating the 
burden of proving fault, especially negligence, but more specifically to provide for 
a practical allocation mechanism of the loss according to the introduction of 
statutory joint and several liability.90 Persons who could potentially cause or 
contribute to a specific pollution occurrence are to be held jointly and severally 
liable. A person can only deny his liability where he can prove that the pollution 
loss was caused solely by the faulty conduct of another. Where he contributed to 
the loss, he can limit his liability by proving what his share in causing the damage 
was.  
 
6.3.5.2.2 Proportionate allocation  
 
The second method is a pro rata allocation of the claim in accordance with the 
amounts insured for or the value of the various policies.91 The requirements for 
this type of allocation in accordance with the insurer’s right to claim contribution 
include (a) that the insurer claiming contribution must have discharged his liability 
to the insured; (b) it must have exceeded his proportionate share; (c) it must 
have been in respect of the interest which is the object of the double insurance 
                                                 
90 See also par 6.3.5 on the general methods of allocating liability in insurance contracts that is of 
relevance; see also De Ketelaere 1359 that where a strict liability regime applies, the degree of 
fault of each of the multiple defendants is irrelevant for purposes of the claim of the prejudiced 
party. It will only prove relevant where the defendants take recourse against each other. 
91 See the discussion by Reinecke et al par 260 on the position where there is a multiplicity of 
insurers; also par 522 on the right of contribution and apportionment of loss in this situation; 
Italiano 41 discusses the general approach of a pro rata allocation; see also the views of Warfel 7 
on the effectiveness of a proportional apportionment. 
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that existed at the time of loss; and (d) the double insurance must have been for 
an amount in excess of the loss.92 
 
The application of this approach becomes very complicated where both primary 
and excess policies are involved. Other complications that have to be kept in 
mind include (a) the varying limits of primary policies; (b) the varying layers of 
excess policies; (c) the various excess fees and multi-year policies that are 
involved; and (d) the potential settlement of some of the claims.93 
 
6.3.5.2.3 Other methods of allocation 
 
Fogleman identifies at least six approaches to allocate the claim where an 
occurrence causes progressive environmental damage, namely, (a) the time on 
which the insurer was at risk, based on a ‘pro rata by years’ approach, 
irrespective of policy limits;94 (b) possible policy limits, where the aggregate of 
each policy is added and every insurer pays its share of the loss proportionate to 
its share in the aggregate;95 (c) both the time limit on the risk and the policy 
limits. The aggregate limits are usually apportioned according to both time 
periods and limits unless the application of another standard is justified;96 (d) 
carrying equal shares in the loss, where the loss is simply divided equally 
between the number of insurers of the risk, up to the limit of each insurer’s 
liability; (e) an equitable apportionment in the discretion of the court depending 
on the facts and circumstances of each case, which is seen as the general 
approach unless the policy provides for another allocation; and (f) allocation of 
                                                 
92 See Reinecke et al pars 521. 
93 See these difficulties highlighted by Reinecke et al par 522. 
94 Fogleman 526. 
95 See Fogleman 527 for an example of the calculation of such an allocation. 
96 Fogleman 529 et seq notes that some courts support this approach as the presumptive rule 
unless exceptional circumstances justify the application of a different standard, as this approach 
introduced a degree of certainty and predictability in environmental insurance litigation in 
continuous-trigger cases due to its mathematical approach. This view has merit and can be 
supported. 
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the amount of the damage that occurred during each triggered policy.97 It is 
submitted that the solution is not to be found in a single standard method, but 
that the most suitable one of all these alternatives should be applied by a court 
according to the specific facts and circumstances of each case where an 
allocation is required. 
 
Some of these issues can also be addressed under the examination of the 
principles of causation as discussed directly below. 
 
6.4 Causation and Remoteness of Damages 
 
6.4.1 General 
 
Causation remains an essential requirement for most fault-based and strict 
liability regimes for pollution damage liability.98 There must be a causal link 
between the peril and the loss insured against.99 In general causation remains a 
problematic issue for most civil and even for some statutory claims, but it is 
especially complicated in situations where a pollution damage claim is brought 
under a liability insurance policy and where causation in insurance context must 
be determined. Causation in the context of civil liability has been examined in 
chapter 4 above and should be read together with this discussion.100 
 
Regarding the question whether damage or losses are compensable under 
insurance cover, one has to establish who and what caused the effect, that is, 
the damage or loss suffered by the prejudiced party. In some cases it is 
impossible to determine the actual individual identity of the polluter who causes 
                                                 
97 Fogleman 531 is of the opinion that it is difficult if not impossible in most cases to prorate 
liability because of the difficulty in determining the exact amount of loss caused in each policy 
year, and offers no authorities in case law that illustrate the application of this approach. 
98 See in general the discussion of its application in these regimes in Fogleman 1353 et seq; see 
also De Ketelaere 1355 et seq. 
99 Incorporated General Insurances Ltd v Shooter t/a Shooter’s Fisheries 1987 1 SA 842 (A) 861. 
100 See chap 4 par 4.2.5 above 
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the aptly named ‘orphan damage’.101 These damages rest where they fall, unless 
another compensation mechanism exists that will allow the persons prejudiced 
by pollution to obtain compensation. 
 
To prevent the complications posed by issues of causation as discussed below, 
the USA, for example, relaxes the requirements of causation for claims in terms 
of CERCLA for both pollution damage as well as natural resource damage. The 
pollution damage to simply attributed to ‘potentially responsible parties’ or PRP’s 
in accordance with the proximate cause test, and is discussed in greater detail in 
chapter 7 below.102 
 
Causation is also relevant when the extent of damages has to be allocated, and 
should be read in conjunction with the discussion of the allocation of the liability 
of insurers above.103 
 
6.4.2 Determining Causation 
 
6.4.2.1 Causation in context of insurance 
 
As regards the method of determining causation, Reinecke states clearly that ‘[i]f 
no other intention appears from the contract, it must be assumed that the 
reference to causation was intended prima facie to bear the meaning which is 
attached to the concept in other areas of the law.’104 These areas refer to the 
requirements of causation as applied in the law of delict and the law of contract, 
discussed extensively in chapter 4 above.105 
 
                                                 
101 Winter G, Jans JH, Macrory R & Kramer L “Weighing up the EC Environmental Liability 
Directive” 2008 (June) Journal of Environmental Law 163 (hereinafter ‘Winter et al’’) 172. 
102 See chap 7 par 7.6.2.2.2 below. 
103 See par 6.3.5. 
104 Reinecke MFB, Van der Merwe S, Van Niekerk JP & Havenga P General Principles of 
Insurance Law (2002) (hereinafter ‘Reinecke et al’) par 277. 
105 Chap 4 par 4.2.5, par 4.3. 
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In general, therefore, causation requires a factual causal link between the 
conduct that causes the detrimental effect. In insurance law, this is determined 
by the application of the proximate cause test.106 Once factual causation has 
been established, it is limited by a second enquiry, namely whether legal 
causation was also present.107 
Parties may limit or adapt the application of the proximate cause rule 
contractually by tailoring the policy to reflect their intentions in this regard.108 
 
6.4.2.2 Application of the criteria 
 
Larsson identifies the fundamental criteria of establishing causation for pollution 
liability as the following: The prejudiced party has to prove (a) that the damage is 
associated with the pollutant in time and space and that it is not a unique isolated 
phenomenon. This criterion is severely influenced by the uncertainty as to time 
and space, gradual leaching of pollutants, where the incident is a single major 
catastrophe, and where there is a possible multi-route of persistent non-
degradable pollutants; (b) that the incidence and severity of the damage 
correlates with the concentration and duration of exposure to the pollutant; (c) 
that these correlations are consistent under similar conditions of exposure; (d) 
that damage is specifically and uniquely related to one pollutant but not to any 
other damaging agent. This criterion, however, ignores multiple source pollution; 
                                                 
106 As expressed in the rule in iure non remota causa sed proxima spectatur; see also Reinecke 
par 278 for the application of this rule; Incorporated General Insurances Ltd v Shooter t/a 
Shooter’s Fisheries 862; see also Merkin 114 pars 5–30 et seq for the operation of the proximate 
cause doctrine in the UK.  
107 Reinecke et al par 277 refer to this as the ‘remoteness question’; see specifically chap 4 par 
4.2.5.3 on the discussion of legal causation; most of the countries examined in the comparative 
study in chap 7 of this thesis limit factual causation by legal causation, except for Belgium as 
discussed in chap 7.4 below. 
108 Napier v Collett 1995 3 SA 140 (A) 143; Schlemmer E “Oorsaaklikheid in die Versekeringsreg” 
1997 (3) TSAR 531 537 discusses the principle of pacta servanda sunt on the binding effect of 
these agreements between the insurer and the policyholder on the exact scope of cover provided. 
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and (e) that epidemiological experience is consistent with experimental evidence, 
which is not always available.109 
 
6.4.3 Burden of Proof 
 
It remains a practical problem to provide scientifically sound proof of the specific 
source or cause of pollution damage. The nature and extent of the loss often 
manifests many years after its actual cause causing problems regarding the 
gathering, presentation and verification of evidence. The insured or prejudiced 
party bears the burden of proving that the loss was proximately caused by an 
insured peril, unless a statute has created presumptive liability and placed the 
burden of disproving liability on the polluter or wrongdoer. The insurer carries the 
burden of proving a defence such as a contractual exclusion clause or 
prescription.110 In situations of subsequent causation, a new intervening cause 
can either extinguish the original cause completely, or at least limit its effect and 
subsequently the liability of the wrongdoer.111 
 
6.4.4 Multiple Causation 
 
6.4.4.1 General 
 
Most legal systems struggle with the vexed question of multiple causation. A 
situation where there is multiple causation can exist where the damage is due to 
various polluting causes, where various individuals contribute to a single cause, 
or where a combination or synergy of various pollutants causes or increases the 
effects of the pollution. In general the causes can occur successively or 
                                                 
109 Larsson 540 offers a concise summary of the relevant principles that should apply to factually 
determine causation in practice. 
110 See Merkin 308. 
111 See the discussion by Reinecke et al par 280 on the operation of a novus actus interveniens. 
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concurrently, which requires the determination of the successive or concurrent 
proximate cause.112  
 
6.4.4.2 Potential solutions 
 
6.4.4.2.1 General 
 
The solution cannot simply be found by the application of the basic legal 
principles relating to conduct and causation. Where there are several or joint 
concurrent wrongdoers or tortfeasors who contribute to the loss, one must first 
determine how far the defendant’s acts or omissions are causally linked to the 
resulting damage, and then to what extent they deviated from the objective norm 
of the conduct of a bonus paterfamilias.113 Whether it is possible to find a solution 
by the application of the conditio sine qua non test in the case of group actions or 
‘mass torts’ is not clear. The application of the test in these situations has been 
criticised by various writers.114 
 
6.4.4.2.2 Included and excluded perils 
 
Where an excluded peril precedes an included peril in time and the factual causal 
link is maintained, the initial excluded peril stands as an exclusion from cover. 
Where an excluded peril succeeds an included peril in time, and the factual 
                                                 
112 See Goldenberg EM “The Scope of Insurance Coverage for Pollution Claims in Florida: Full 
Indemnification for Indivisible Clean-up Costs Caused by Multiple Releases” 1999 (Fall) Nova 
Law Review 373 et seq for an extensive discussion of USA case law on multiple causation in 
context of the various trigger theories. 
113 Jones NO v Santam Bpk 1956 2 SA 542 (A) 555; see also the evaluation of the norm of legal 
causation by Schlemmer 532 with specific reference to Mohlomi v Minister of Defence 1997 1 SA 
124 (CC) and preceding South African case law discussed in the judgment; see also Van der 
Walt CFC (1995) 431 (Part I); 614 (Part II).  
114 See also the study by Van der Walt CFC (1995) 431–438. 
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causal link is also still maintained, the initial peril is included and the excluded 
peril is not recognised as a fresh cause of claim and does not enjoy cover.115 
 
6.4.4.2.3 Allocating causation impossible 
 
Where the conduct of one of the members of a group cannot be distinguished 
from the cumulative loss-causing conduct of the entire group, yet it is a 
contributing or significant factor to the loss, his conduct in causing the damage 
should lead to his liability. Where there is more than one possible culprit, 
structured solutions include, for example, the innovative market-share liability in 
the Netherlands, and the market share liability in the USA that developed from 
liability cases in the pharmaceutical industry.116 The burden of proof clearly 
benefits the prejudiced party, as he only has to prove the identity of the 
participants in the specific industry. These potentially responsible parties, also 
known as ‘PRPs’ in the USA, are held responsible for clean-up or have to pay 
substantial civil penalties.117 In Germany all that is required is a possible 
involvement in the damage caused within the particular industry in question.118 
Another alternative would be to hold all the potential polluters jointly and 
severally liable.119 
 
The position in terms of CERCLA for the transport of dangerous substances,120 
where the producer, carrier, person exploiting the process or the storage 
                                                 
115 See again Incorporated General Insurances Ltd v Shooter t/a Shooter’s Fisheries 862; also 
Merkin 118 pars 5–36 on case law in the UK dealing with these principles as set for included and 
excluded perils. 
116 See Snijder E “Van market-share liability naar pollution share liability?” 1990 TMA 141; see 
also chap 7 par 7.6.3.2.1 on the position in the USA. 
117 See Warfel 2 for an examination of the scope of the description. 
118 See in this regard Hoffman 147. 
119 This is also in accordance with s 61(3) of the South African Consumer Protection Bill; see also 
Wansink JH & Spier J “Joint and Several Liability of DES Manufacturers” 1993 1(6) International 
Insurance Law Review 176 (hereinafter ‘Wansink & Spier’) 176 for the early position in the 
Netherlands on the joint and several liability of drug manufacturers, and specifically 180 et seq for 
the views of the authors that joint and several liability could play a significant role in avoiding 
pollution liability. 
120 S 107. 
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facilities, current as well as former owners of land on which the substances were 
dispatched, received or stored, and even the credit providers can potentially incur 
liability, serves as an example.121 In Belgium multiple defendants are also held 
jointly and severally liable and retain a right of recourse against each other. 
 
In the UK, liability is allocated according to the materiality of the wrongdoer’s 
contribution to the risk.122 Care must be taken not to confuse a double insurance 
situation, where it is clear that more than one policy covers the same risk, with 
the situation where successive policies all cover the same liability and the 
proportionate shares of the liability must be determined. 
 
Common law and statutory law provisions that attribute a share of liability 
according to the different degrees of fault, for example, in accordance with the 
degree of contributory negligence of the defendants can also regulate the 
allocation of damages payable.123 One should keep in mind that these solutions 
could lead to arbitrary awards based only on activity or financial involvement and 
not on the actual contribution to environmental damage caused.124 
 
A last complication that deserves to be mentioned in this chapter in the 
discussion of causation is that an act could be considered too remote in terms of 
legal causation, to qualify as the effective cause of the loss.125 
 
 
                                                 
121 As stated by De Ketelaere 1358; see also the Belgian Voorontwerp Decreet Milieubeleid  
(hereinafter ‘Belgian Voorontwerp’) 934. 
122 Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2003] 1 AC 32; see also Fogleman 1546 et seq. 
123 See examples provided in De Ketelaere 1359; see also the discussion of the apportionment of 
damages in South African legislation in chap 4 par 4.2.4.4 and par 4.2.6.4 above. 
124 As cautioned in the Belgian Voorontwerp Decreet Milieubeleid 841 referred to in chap 7 par 
7.4.2.1 below. 
125 See McGee A The Modern Law of Insurance 2nd ed (2006) (hereinafter ‘McGee’) 254 who 
highlights this complication; see the discussion on the operation of legal causation in South 
African law in chap 4 par 4.2.5.3 above, in the UK in chap 7 par 7.3.3.2.3, in the Netherlands in 
chap 7 par 7.5.3.3 and the USA in chap 7 par 7.6.3.2 below. It can be noted that the Belgian law 
does not require legal causation as a criterion to limit factual causation. 
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6.5 EXCLUSION, EXCEPTION AND LIMITATION CLAUSES 
 
6.5.1 General 
 
Another current issue relates to the avoidance and the restriction or limitation of 
claims. Internationally insurers have tried to protect themselves by adding 
exclusion, exemption or limitation clauses to their policies to escape or limit the 
risks and their liabilities to provide cover for pollution damage claims.126 In recent 
years the enforceability and interpretation of these clauses have engendered 
considerable litigation between insurers and policyholders.127 Contractual time 
limits for bringing claims also place pressure on claimants in environmental 
damage liability claims, as gathering information and determining the exact 
scope of the claim are notoriously difficult. Actions of insurers to collude in their 
actions to exclude these risks in the market have left policyholders with little 
alternative than to accept these exclusions.128 
 
6.5.2 Exclusion Clauses in South African Law 
 
6.5.2.1 General principles 
 
Risk is usually contractually limited by means of exemption, exclusion or 
limitation clauses. These clauses were already well known in Roman-Dutch 
                                                 
126 See Reinecke et al par 272.In the USA insurance costs rose dramatically as a result of the 
passing of CERCLA (the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 
Act) in 1980 and ensuing duty to insure; see the detailed discussion of CERCLA in chap 7 par 
7.6.2.2 below; see also Kalis et al chap 10 par 10.04; and Abraham 614 et seq. 
127 Truck and General Insurance Co Ltd v Verulam Fuel Distributors CC and another 2007 2 SA 
26 (SCA); Niekerk JP “The Effect of Insurance on the Imposition of Civil Liability: A Review of and 
some Preliminary Thoughts on Recent Judicial Announcements” 1999 (11) SA Merc LJ 
(hereinafter ‘Van Niekerk (1999)’) 514 522 for an early discussion of the influence of insurance on 
the interpretation of exemption clauses; for an extensive list and details of these cases in the 
USA, see http://www.wnclaw.com/services/insurance/absolute_pollution_exclusion.cfm (last 
accessed on 21 February 2008); http://www.bcltlaw.com/articles/en_0204.html (last accessed on 
25 February 2008). 
128 Faure & Hartlief 64 plead for control of the ‘concurrentie beleid’ or competition control to 
ensure a more varied market. 
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law.129 According to the contractual principle of pacta sunt servanda or sanctity of 
contract, public interest requires that contractual clauses, freely agreed to by 
parties with contractual capacity, are valid and binding upon them and have to be 
observed.130 On the other hand, parties also have the freedom to contract, even 
if it is to their detriment.131 Contractual autonomy is in the interest of society, 
allowing a person to trade freely and informing the constitutional value of dignity 
and equality.132 Contracts that are contrary to public policy are at common law 
illegal or, in some cases merely unenforceable.133 It is, for example, contrary to 
public policy per se to contract out of liability for intentional conduct.134 
 
Whether a clause is a limitation clause, or an exception or exclusion clause 
depends on the intentions of the insurer and the policyholder.135 Although both 
have the same purpose and eventual effect in that the risk is restricted, the 
burden of proof is different and the distinction must be addressed briefly.136 
 
                                                 
129 Grotius Inleidinge tot het Hollandsche Rechts-geleerdheid 3.14.12, Voet Commentarius ad 
Pandectas 21.1.10, Van Leeuwen Het Roomsch-Hollandsch Recht  4.17.2.7; Van der Walt JC & 
Midgley JR Principles of Delict 3rd ed (2005) (hereinafter ‘Van der Walt & Midgley’) 62; Van 
Aswegen A Die Sameloop van Eise om Skadevergoeding uit Kontrakbreuk en Delik LLD Thesis 
University of South Africa (1991) 352. 
130 Barkhuizen v Napier par 15, 24, 70, 71; Reddy v Siemens Telecommunications 2007 2 SA 
486 (SCA) 500; Visser C “The principle of pacta servanda sunt in Roman and Roman-Dutch law, 
with specific reference to restraints of trade” 1984 (101) SALJ 641. 
131 Van der Merwe et al 297; Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 5th ed (2006) 183; Wells 
v South African Aluminite Co 1927 AD 69 at 72; Barkhuizen v Napier par 12; Reddy v Siemens 
Telecommunications 496; Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) 38. 
132 Constitution s 7(1), s 10, s 22; Barkhuizen v Napier par 15, par 57; Reddy v Siemens  
Telecommunications 496. 
133 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd  v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A) 7; South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers 
Ltd 2005 3 SA 323 (SCA) 27; Naude T & Lubbe GF “Exemption clauses – a rethink occasioned 
by Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom” 2005 (121) SALJ 441 (hereinafter Naude & Lubbe’); 
Barkhuizen v Napier par 34; Van Niekerk (1999) 522 on the role of insurance in the interpretation 
of contractual exemption clauses; Kalis et al chap 6 for a discussion of international public policy 
considerations in the interpretation of these clauses. Clauses such as restraints of trade that are 
contrary to public policy are, for example, unenforceable. 
134 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 34; Van der Walt & Midgley 62; Naude & Lubbe 442; Van der 
Merwe 298; Christie 184. 
135 Reinecke et al par 272; and at 318 state prior to the judgment in the Barkhuizen case that ‘the 
validity of contractual time limits may be open to challenge on the grounds that they are 
unconstitutional’. 
136 Eagle Star Insurance C Ltd v Willey 1956 1 SA 330 (A) 334 et seq. 
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6.5.2.2 The impact of the Constitution 
 
As discussed in chapter 3 above, the Constitution has a bearing on the 
enforceability of all contracts, and especially so where a contract contains an 
exclusion, exemption or limitation clause (collectively referred to as ‘exclusion’ 
clauses for purposes of this discussion) that limits or affects one or more 
constitutional rights, for example, the right to the environment as addressed in 
this study. The principle of pacta sunt servanda is thus subject to constitutional 
control and must be interpreted according to constitutional values.137 
 
In terms of the limitations clause in the Constitution, a contractual exclusion 
clause will only be deemed to be constitutionally compliant where it is in line with 
the spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights, such as equality and dignity, 
and therefore not contrary to public policy.138 This has been addressed in a 
variety of cases that were dealt with extensively in chapter 3 above.139  Some of 
these clauses infringe upon a variety of constitutional rights, such as the right to 
equality,140 property,141 free access to courts,142 and the right to freely choose a 
trade, occupation or profession.143  
 
                                                 
137 See the discussion of the limitation of rights in chap 3 par 3.2.3 above; Barkhuizen v Napier 
par 15; also Hopkins K “Insurance policies and the Bill of Rights: rethinking the sanctity of 
contract paradigm” 2002 (119) SALJ 155 160; Reddy v Siemens Telecommunications 495; 
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and another (Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
intervening) 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) pars 54–56; also Christie 18. 
138 S 36; s 172(1)(a): ‘When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court – (a) must 
declare that any law or conduct [own emphasis] that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid 
to the extent of its inconsistency.’ 
139 Barkhuizen v Napier above; Reddy v Siemens Telecommunications 493, 496, 500; South 
African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd; Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom; Brisley v Drotsky 
2002 4 SA 1 (SCA); Johannesburg Country Club v Stott 2004 5 SA 511 (SCA). 
140 S 22 of the Constitution; which becomes very relevant where an insurer insists that an insured 
has to sign a standard-form contract to obtain the necessary insurance cover. In these cases the 
freedom to contract and the right to equality are restricted by this industry practice. See the 
discussion in chap 3 above. A statute that is intended to promote equality and unfair 
discrimination is, for example, the Promotion of Equality and the Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000.    
141 S 25 of the Constitution. 
142 Above s 34. 
143 Above s 22. 
 296 
6.5.2.3 Recent case law 
 
As far as exclusion and limitation clauses specifically in insurance contracts are 
concerned, two recent South African judgments are of great relevance and 
deserve a more detailed discussion. 
 
In Barkhuizen v Napier144 a suit limitation or time bar clause in an insurance 
contract that limited the appellant’s right to seek the assistance of a court was 
constitutionally challenged in our courts. The position can be seen as analogous 
to pollution exclusion clauses. These clauses often occur in statutes and in 
contracts, yet the principles remain the same. The clause in this specific case 
read as follows: ‘If we (the insurer) reject liability for any claim under this Policy 
we will be released from liability unless summons is served … within 90 days of 
repudiation.’  The insured averred that the clause was contrary to public policy as 
it infringed upon his fundamental right of access to the courts.145 Van der Merwe 
et al correctly argue that such a limitation is subject to the ordinary principles of 
the law of contract and is not a matter for prescription.146 The substantive rights 
of a person are not affected by these clauses, but serve to bar the exercising of 
available remedies in law to enforce these rights.147 
 
                                                 
144 See n 67 above. 
145 S 34: ‘Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of 
law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent 
and impartial tribunal or forum.’ Prior to the Constitution it was held in the case of Schierhout v 
Minister of Justice 1925 AD 417 424 that an agreement that deprives someone of seeking 
redress in the court for a future injury or wrong, would be an undertaking contrary to the public 
law of the land and thus contrary to common law; also par 3.2.3 above. 
146 Van der Merwe et al 556; Howard MH & Mackowsky MA “Defending claims for environmental 
damage under first-party property insurance policies” 2002 (Spring) Tort & Insurance Law Journal 
883 (hereinafter ‘Howard & Mackowsky’) 915 hold the opposing view as they are of the opinion 
that the purpose of a suit limitation clause is simply  a contractual modification of otherwise 
applicable statute of limitations; see also the discussion of these suit limitation clauses that are 
generally found in first-party property policies in chap 5 par 5.3.2. 
147 Hopkins 168 sees these clauses as in fact procedural impediments and not prescription 
clauses, which is also the view held by Merkin 321 et seq. 
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In the Barkhuizen case the court interpreted the norm of public policy according 
to the constitutional values discussed in chapters 3 and 4 above.148 The court 
confirmed that it also remains important and in the interests of justice to limit the 
time during which litigation may be launched,149 yet a claimant needs adequate 
and fair opportunity to see judicial redress, and not an impossible short period of 
time to do so.150 Notions of fairness, justice, equity and reasonableness cannot 
be separated from public policy, as simple justice must be done between 
individuals.151 
 
The court held that time bar clauses are not per se unconstitutional, as they too 
may reflect public policy.152  One must first determine what the nature and 
purpose of these clauses are, which then form the substantive part of the 
enquiry, and then whether its function is sufficiently important to justify the 
limitation of a fundamental right which is the proportionality part of the enquiry 
into public policy.153 
 
The clause must be evaluated objectively and the equality of bargaining power 
and the peculiar situation of the bargaining parties must be investigated in order 
to reach a decision on the constitutionality of such a clause.154 As the parties 
were indeed found to have had equal bargaining power, and that no good reason 
existed why the claimant did not claim within the specified time limit or even 
within a reasonable time, the majority of the court found that the enforcement of 
                                                 
148 Barkhuizen v Napier pars 28, 169, 178; as discussed in chap 3 par 3.2.3 and chap 4 par 
4.2.3.2. 
149 Par 47, referring to Mohlomi v Minister of Defence in that delays in litigation protracts the 
disputes and prolongs the uncertainty, and that adjudication of cases gone stale is seldom 
satisfactory as testimony and evidence becomes unreliable or disappears.  
150 See Barkhuizen v Napier par 75 on the maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia; see also Montsisi 
v Minister van Polisie 1984 1 SA 619 (A) 638. 
151 Barkhuizen v Napier par 54, 99; Bafana Finance Mabopane v Makwakwa and Another 2006 4 
SA 581 (SCA) par 21. 
152 Par 48 as well as the judgment in the Mohlomi case n 112 above. 
153 See the view held by Hopkins 168, 173 that the time bar clauses in short-term insurance 
policies are unconstitutional and unenforceable has now been proven wrong in view of the 
judgment in the Barkhuizen case below. 
154 Barkhuizen v Napier par 59. 
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the limitations clause would not be unjust and therefore unconstitutional.155 The 
minority, on the other hand, found that the time agreed upon was unreasonably 
short and the clause too inflexible.156 
 
The case of Truck and General Insurance Co Ltd v Verulam Fuel Distributors CC 
and another also serves as authority where a clause in an indemnity insurance 
policy in respect of cover for liability to third parties for their ‘property damage’, 
was interpreted and found to include cover for the insured’s statutory liability to 
pay clean-up costs for ‘ecological damage’ caused.157 The relevant clause in the 
policy regarding cover for defined events read as follows: ‘Defined events: Any 
accident caused by or through or in connection with any vehicle described in the 
schedule or in connection with the loading and/or unloading of such vehicle 
against all sums including claimant’s costs and expenses which the insured 
and/or any passenger shall become legally liable to pay in respect of … (ii) 
damage to property other than property belonging to the insured or held in trust 
by, or in the custody or control of the insured or being conveyed by, loaded into 
or loaded from such a vehicle.’158 
 
The court found that no restriction existed as to the type of costs, expenses or 
liabilities covered by the policy and that it included statutory liability as well, and 
stated clearly that where the insurer wished to exclude ecological damage from 
property damage, it should have done so expressly.159 
                                                 
155 Above par 86. 
156 Above par 112; see also Wansink JH “Verzekering, een Juridisch Product in een Kritische 
Buitenwereld – Een Impressie uit Nederland” 1999 (4) TSAR 706 714 who states that an 
additional duty rests on the insurer in the Netherlands to notify the insured of a time bar clause in 
the policy when the insurer notifies the insured that the latter’s insurance claim has been rejected. 
The acknowledgement of such a duty is to be endorsed, as the insured is often not aware of the 
time bar clause, and only understands its implications once it is too late to institute legal 
proceedings. 
157 See also the discussion of the interpretation of ‘property damage’ and ‘natural resource 
damages’ in par 6.6.2.3 and par 6.6.2.5 below. 
158 Pars 7, 9 of the judgment. 
159 Par 23 of the judgment; see also the case note on this case by   JP “Case note: Truck and 
General Insurance Co Ltd v Verulam Fuel Distributors CC and another” 2006 (9) Juta’s Insurance 
Law Bulletin 194 (hereinafter ‘Van Niekerk (2006 JILB)’). 
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6.5.2.4 Lack of statutory control 
 
No other legislative measures have been passed in South Africa on the control 
and limitation of specifically exemption, exclusion or limitation clauses, which not 
is the case in other countries.160 The South African Law Reform Commission has 
been involved in a project on unfair contractual stipulations for some time, which 
is currently dormant and has not led to the enactment of any final legislative 
measures.161 
 
Some general statutory measures of limited application are in force that could 
offer some relief to an insured, provided that the contractual exclusion clause 
falls within the ambit of these statutes.162  
 
Where an insurer unfairly discriminates against a specific person, the Promotion 
of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act may affect the contract. 
This would be the case where there is an unfair discrimination in the provision of 
benefits, facilities and services relating to insurance.163 
 
 
 
                                                 
160 For the position in other countries see example The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 of the 
UK, also chap 7 par 7.2.4.1 below; The European Community Council Directive on Unfair Terms 
in Consumer Contracts 1993; the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974; and The Contractual 
Remedies Act 1979 of New Zealand; see also Van der Merwe 326, 300; and Christie 191 on the 
current position on the fairness of contractual stipulations in the general law of contract. 
161 Project 47 of the South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 65 Unreasonable 
Stipulations in Contracts and the Rectification of Contracts; see also Christie 13. 
162 See, for example, the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 s 90 on unlawful provisions of credit 
agreements such as waivers of common-law rights and indemnities that deprive a consumer of 
protection as envisaged by the Act; Gauteng Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7 
of 1996, in terms of which the Provincial Consumer Court can extend protection to consumers 
against unfair business practices, described as any business practice which has or is likely to 
have the effect of unfairly affecting any consumer. What will be held to be fair, will once again 
depend on interpretation in view of public policy and constitutional considerations; and the third 
draft of the Consumer Protection Bill as signed on 24 April 2009, yet not operational. 
163 Act 4 of 2000; see Reinecke et al par 165 for a brief discussion of the effect of this statute on 
insurance contracts in general. 
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6.5.3 History of the Pollution Exclusion Clause 
 
6.5.3.1 General 
 
It is important to do a brief study of the progressive development of exclusion 
clauses in order to understand the continuous attempts by insurers to exclude 
pollution claims in reaction to claims brought against them. The increased scope 
of these clauses illustrated below serves to close all possible loopholes in order 
to avoid most pollution claims. Although the clauses have evolved over time, 
most of them still appear in policies worldwide, either in their original form or with 
slight variations. Policies do not necessarily contain the latest versions issued by 
the various insurance bodies. 
 
Pollution exclusion clauses were included in policies, and pro forma clauses 
were drafted and published in the international insurance industry, since the 
1950s. By the 1970s most liability and property policies contained pollution 
exemption clauses. A Commercial General Liability insurance policy or ‘CGL’ is 
in effect not all that ‘Comprehensive’ due the inclusion of these pollution 
exclusion clauses in the body of the policy, and therefore does not necessarily 
provide a full comprehensive insurance cover for all liability claims, although its 
identifying title does create that impression. Initial versions excluded all pollution 
claims for ‘sudden and accidental’ incidents from cover, which led to extensive 
litigation in the insurance market.164 
 
An early version of the pollution exemption clause contained in the 1973 ISO165 
policy reads as follows: ‘The insurance does not apply … to bodily injury or 
property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of 
                                                 
164 See Stempel JW “Reason and Pollution: Correctly construing the ‘absolute’ exclusion in 
context and in accord with its purpose and party expectations” Tort & Insurance Law Journal 
1998 (Fall) 1; for a summary of the pre-1970 position see Wansink JH (ed) Milieu en Bedrijf: 
preventie, aansprakelijkheid en verzekering (1992) 87. 
165 The Insurance Services Office in the USA (hereinafter the ‘ISO’). 
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smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, 
waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, 
the atmosphere or any water course or body of water, but this exclusion does 
not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and 
accidental.’166 
 
Over time courts interpreted the phrase ‘sudden and accidental’ as meaning 
‘unexpected and unintended’, and interpreted it in favour of insurers as it then 
excluded gradual pollution from cover.167 It must be noted that the actual 
discharge of the pollutant must be ‘sudden and accidental’, and that the ‘sudden 
and accidental’ requirement does not refer to or apply to the ensuing 
environmental damage. 
 
6.5.3.2 The ‘absolute pollution exclusion clause’ 
 
After extensive litigation, insurers reacted by including absolute pollution 
exclusion clauses in policies.168 A new version of a pollution exclusion clause 
was approved in 1986 and reads as follows: ‘The insurance does not apply to 
bodily injury or property damage arising out of actual, alleged or threatened 
discharge, dispersal, release or escape of pollutants… at or from the premises 
                                                 
166 ISO form (GL 00 02 01 73). 
167 Jackson Township Municipal Utilities Authority v Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company 186 
NJ Super 156, 451 A2d 990 (1982); see Fogleman 539 for the various reasons why courts 
interpret the term ‘sudden’ in pollution exclusion clauses as unambiguous and as having only a 
temporal meaning, as well as alternative wordings that could avoid the issue. Justice Grimes in 
Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc v Southeastern Fidelity Insurance Corporation 636 So 2d 700 (Fla 1993) 
705 expressed his view as follows: ‘Try as I will, I cannot wrench the words “sudden and 
accidental” to mean “gradual and accidental” which must be done in order to provide coverage in 
this case.’  
168 See Ellison JN, Lewis RP & Valery BT “Recent Developments in the Law Regarding the 
“Absolute” and “Total” Pollution Exclusions” 2001 (13) Environmental Claims Journal 55. 56; see 
also http://www.wnclaw.com/services/insurance/absolute_pollution_exclusion.cfm (last accessed 
on 21 February 2008) http://www.bcltlaw.com/articles/en_0204.html (last accessed on 25 
February 2008); see also Shelley WP & Mason RC “Application of the Absolute Pollution 
Exclusion to Toxic Tort Claims: Will Courts choose Policy Construction or Deconstruction?” 1998 
(33) Tort and Insurance Law Journal 749 (hereinafter ‘Shelley & Mason’) for a detailed discussion 
of the history and case law relating to the Absolute Pollution Exclusion clause. 
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you own, rent or occupy.’169 The term ‘pollutants’ was defined seperately as ‘any 
solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, 
soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste’.170 
 
The requirement that the incident, event or happening must have been ‘sudden 
and accidental’ was removed. This version of the clause is referred to in the 
industry as the ‘absolute pollution exclusion clause’.171 The name 
‘comprehensive general insurance’ was also changed to ‘commercial general 
liability insurance’ in 1986.172 
 
6.5.3.3 The ‘total pollution exclusion clause’ 
 
In 1988 a ‘total pollution exclusion clause’ that was even wider and also 
excluded damage caused by heat, smoke and fumes, replaced the ‘absolute 
pollution clause’.173 The total pollution exclusion clause also barred claims 
arising from product liability, completed operations as well as specific off-site 
operations conducted by the insured.174 In 1997 the wording ‘from hostile fire’ 
was also included in these exclusions, and any claims relating to the operation of 
waste disposal sites were also specifically excluded from the scope of the total 
                                                 
169 In the words of Shelley & Mason, the terms ‘discharge, dispersal, release or escape’ are 
‘environmental terms of art’ which demonstrate that the Absolute Pollution Exclusion applies only 
to Superfund-type liabilities. 
170 ISO form CG 00 01 11 85; see in this regard Mitchell WJ “CGL Pollution Exclusion Provisions 
and the Sick Building Syndrome” 1999 (January)  Defense Counsel Journal 124 128. 
171 See Mitchell 128; Ellison et al 63 also comment that ‘the term ‘absolute’ is actually a misnomer 
as not all coverage is excluded.’; see Fogleman 434 et seq for the various versions of wording 
used and comments on the differences in wording used; and also 560–565 on the effect of the 
absolute exclusion clause in case law on environmental pollution caused by industrial operations 
in the USA; http:// www.bcltlaw.com/articles/en_0204.html (last accessed on 25 February 2008). 
172 See in this regard Fogleman 431; and 537–548 for extensive case law on the interpretation of 
the terminology ‘sudden and accidental’. 
173 ISO endorsement (CG 21 49). 
174 Fogleman 579 for a comprehensive discussion of the revision and strengthening of the total 
pollution exclusion clause over time; also chap 4 par 4.2.4.5 specifically on strict product liability; 
also Merkin 717 on the nature of product liability in an insurance context; once again the term 
‘total’ is, just as is the case with the word ‘absolute’ a misnomer as not all pollution claims are 
excluded, but that the use of the word does create that impression. 
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exclusion clause.175 In 1996 claims for ‘personal injury’ was also excluded from 
the CGL, and in 1997 a mandatory endorsement for the exclusion for bodily 
injury caused by carbon monoxide followed suit.176 ‘Smoke, fumes vapour and 
soot’ were added to the clause as exclusions in 1998.177 Due to the increasing 
threat of damage caused by toxic mould, fungi or bacteria endorsements in this 
regard were issued in 2002.178 
 
6.5.3.4 The ‘comprehensive exclusion clause’ 
 
The following comprehensive model pollution exclusion clause of the Association 
of British Insurers179 is at the moment the most widely used version in industry, 
and attempts to address most of the issues discussed in this chapter. 
‘A. This policy excludes all liability in respect of Pollution or Contamination other 
than caused by a sudden identifiable unintended and unexpected incident which 
takes place in its entirety at a specific time and place during the Period of 
Insurance. All Pollution or Contamination, which arises out of one incident, shall 
be deemed to have occurred at the time such incident takes place. 
B. The liability of the Company for all compensation payable in respect of all 
Pollution or Contamination which is deemed to have occurred during the Period 
of Insurance shall not exceed $ … in the aggregate. 
C. For the purpose of this Endorsement “Pollution or Contamination” shall be 
deemed to mean (i) all pollution or contamination of buildings or other structures 
or of water or land or the atmosphere; and (ii) all loss or damage or injury directly 
or indirectly caused by such pollution or contamination.’180 
                                                 
175 ISO endorsement (CG 21 55). 
176 ISO endorsement (CG 00 54). 
177 ISO endorsement (CG 21 65). 
178 ISO endorsement (CG 21 67 04 02). 
179 Known as the ‘ABI’. 
180 For an extensive discussion of the process of formulating this final version and the reasoning 
behind the inclusion of each of its components, see Fogleman par 26.2.2.1 and par 27.3.11.1.2. 
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6.5.3.5 Anti-concurrent or lead-in exclusion clause 
 
It is possible for loss to be caused by a peril that is excluded from cover and by a 
contributing cause resulting from an included and therefore covered peril. These 
clauses specifically exclude the entire loss from cover, by stating, for example, 
that a specific loss is excluded ‘even if another peril or event contributed 
concurrently or in any sequence to cause the loss.’181 
 
6.5.3.6 Statutory regulation 
 
Pollution exclusion clauses can also be regulated by governmental legislation, 
although this is not the case in South Africa.182 An exclusion clause could be 
found to be invalid where the insurer (a) fails to comply with any statutory 
provisions regarding the procedures for the approval of the policy language by 
the relevant authority; (b) fails to ensure that the insured was informed of the 
revised language of an endorsement or any renewed policy; and (c) fails to 
follow any statutory formalities prescribed for certain policies.183 
 
6.5.3.7 Bespoke exclusion clauses as a potential solution 
 
Due to the history of these exclusion clauses, it has become necessary to 
counter the effects of generally-worded exclusion clauses, uncertain as they are, 
by adding specific carefully-worded and defined endorsements to insurance 
policies in order to ensure effective insurance coverage. This will create more 
                                                 
181 In the words of Chesler RD & Schulman JL “Key Concepts in Property Insurance for Water 
Loss” 2007 (October) Environmental Claims Journal 249 253; see also the view held by the court 
in Alamia v Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company No 06 Civ 2880, 2007 WL 2005575 
(SDNY 2007) that the operation of these clauses proves fatal to any claim by the insured. 
182 See the comprehensive discussion of the RCRA and CERCLA in the USA, see chap 7 par 
7.6.2 below. 
183 Fogleman 538–584 discusses the position in the USA, and confirms that a court will interpret 
the clause to reflect the legislation, irrespective of the actual language used in the policy itself. 
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legal certainty and is also an attempt to prevent insurers from broadly precluding 
claimants from claiming successfully.184 
 
6.5.3.8 ‘Buy back’ and other endorsements 
 
In reaction to the effect of these extensive exclusion clauses, ‘coverage 
extension’ or ‘buy-back’ endorsements were introduced into the market to write 
back and provide cover at an additional premium for unexpected and unintended 
bodily injury or property damage caused by a specific polluting incident. Various 
versions were issued.185 Most provide cover for only a very specific range of 
activities or pollutants, and require a strict notice period within which the insured 
has to report the incident to the insurer to trigger the risk.186 The policy could also 
require the insured to notify not his insurer, but another entity such as a state 
department or other authority of the occurrence that caused damage or harm. 
This would be in accordance with, for example, statutory notice procedures, or 
obligations to give notice imposed by permits or licences to operate facilities. As 
these ‘time element pollution endorsements’ apply in the context of the trigger of 
the risk, see also the relevant discussion in this chapter above.187 
 
Other general optional endorsements include (a) a ‘named peril limited exception 
for a short-term polluting incident’;188 (b) a ‘limited exception for short-term 
                                                 
184 It is obvious that insurers attempt to exclude every possible eventuality from cover, and rely on 
the broadest possible interpretation of these exclusions in their favour. Ellison et al 56 refer to the 
case of Bodine v Fireman’s Fund Ins Co 1992 where the court so aptly described this position: 
‘Indeed, to take the insurance industry’s suggested application of these exclusions to their 
ultimate conclusion could result in a person being ‘polluted’ by being struck in the face by a 
speeding bullet.’ For a discussion of specific policies in the market that cater for limited 
specialised cover for environmental claims, see chap 5 par 5.4 above. 
185 ISO extension endorsement (CG 04 22) in 1986; and the ISO limited exclusion endorsement 
(CG 24 15) in 1988. 
186 Fogleman 586 provides the following wording as an example of such an endorsement: ‘Cover 
is provided where polluting incident may not last longer than 72 hours, and that is known to the 
insured within 7 days from its beginning and that must be reported to the insurer within 90 days of 
its beginning.’ 
187 See par 6.3 above. 
188 ISO limited exception pollution endorsement (CG 04 28). 
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pollution event’,189 (c) an endorsement that provides more extended cover for 
damage caused by specifically designated pollutants;190 and (d) buy-back cover 
for bodily injuries.191 Where specialised pollution insurance products are 
available in the insurance market, these endorsements are not necessary. 
 
Globally the interpretation and effect of these clauses has always been the focus 
of extensive litigation,192 yet due to the difference in law in various countries, 
states and jurisdictions, and the facts and circumstances that also impact on the 
interpretation provided in each specific case, no standard rules exist to offer a 
general solution for disputes on the content and effect of these clauses. 
Reference must be made to the discussion of the interpretation of the different 
components of these exclusion clauses that follows below.193 
 
6.5.4 Limitation Clauses 
 
6.5.4.1 General 
 
Claims can also be limited rather than excluded from cover. Internationally 
insurers have tried to limit their pay-outs even more by adding contractual 
limitations to escape full liability for huge pollution damage claims in addition to 
the general exclusion clauses examined above.194 
                                                 
189 ISO pollution exclusion endorsement (CG 04 29); Both these endorsements are for incidents 
not lasting longer than 48 hours, and provided that the insurer received notice from the insured 
within 14 days from the end of the polluting incident; more lenient time element clauses found in 
the market that are not in accordance with the ISO model clauses provide cover even where the 
polluting incident does not exceed 168 hours, and where the required notice is given within 90 
days. 
190 ISO limited exception for designated pollutants (CG 04 30). 
191 Fogleman 595 provides examples of these ‘personal injury endorsements’. 
192 Couch GJ Couch on Insurance 3rd ed (1995) 127–132 for a comprehensive discussion; 
Mitchell 129–134. on, inter alia, Essex Ins. Co v Avondale Mills 639 So 2d 1339 1342 (Ala1994); 
Bernhardt v Hartford Fire Ins Co 648 A 2d 1047 (MdApp1995); Advanced Healthcare Resources 
Inc v Merchants Ins Co of New Hampshire NY LJ Oct 2, 1997 (NY SupCt). 
193 See par 6.5.6 below. 
194 See Van Niekerk JP “Maintaining the Principle of Indemnity: Theory and practice” 1996 (3) 
TSAR 572 (hereinafter ‘Van Niekerk (1996)’) 576 that the law does not require all insurance 
contracts to absolutely adhere to the principle of strict indemnity to completely indemnify the 
Footnote continues on the next page. 
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6.5.4.2 Standard limitations 
 
A claim that is included under the cover could be limited contractually by the 
following standard limitations: (a) a limited amount per ‘accident’, ‘insured event’, 
‘happening’ or ‘occurrence’. The functions are to determine (a) the temporal 
coverage of the policy; (b) how many deductibles the insured must bear; as well 
as (c) the maximum amount claimable as a financial cap is placed on the 
policy.195 
 
It remains difficult in environmental claims to determine whether more than one 
occurrence took place during multiple policy periods. An insured who has a limit 
per occurrence would argue that the damage was caused by more than one 
indivisible continuous occurrence, in order to be able to exhaust not a single, but 
various limits.196 Where an insured regularly deposits hazardous waste on a site, 
the question remains whether each dumping is a separate occurrence, of 
whether the entire dumping process is one continuous occurrence.197 This will 
depend purely on the interpretation of the wording and scope of each policy, 
specifically the interpretation or what an ‘accident’ or ‘occurrence’ entails, as well 
as on the facts and circumstances of each specific case. Some cases have been 
decided on reasons of public policy alone.198 An example of clause that has the 
potential to avoid these issues, is the following: ‘all bodily injury and property 
damage arising out of continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the 
same general conditions shall be considered as arising out of one 
 
insured, and therefore allows contractual limitations as deviations from this principle; see also in 
this regard Abraham KS “Monsanto Lecture: Cleaning up the environmental liability insurance 
mess” 1993 (27) Valparaiso University Law Review 601 614. 
195 See Coetzee v Attorney’s Indemnity Fund 2003 1 SA 1 (SCA) where a financial cap was 
placed on the amount of the claim as well as a cost-cap on the costs and expenses incurred by 
the parties; see also Merkin 353–355 for a detailed discussion of these event limits. 
196 Howard & Mackowsky 900 discuss the limits placed on each ‘insurable event’ in property 
policies; see also the relevant descriptions of ‘occurrence’ in chap 6 par 6.5.6.2 below. 
197 Howard & Mackowsky argue that most courts will find that there is one ‘occurrence’ where 
pollution was the result of an uninterrupted continual contamination. 
198 See Fogleman 532 on the reasoning of the courts in various factual situations on this point. 
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occurrence.’199(a) a limited amount per ‘series of events’;200 (b) an aggregate 
claims limit; (c) an average clause where the claim is limited due to under-
insurance; or (d) a time limit, also known as a time element clause that relates to 
the trigger of insurance liability as discussed above.201 Time element clauses are 
especially relevant for buy-back endorsements discussed above.202 
 
6.5.5 Rules of Interpretation 
 
6.5.5.1 Universal rules 
 
6.5.5.1.1 General 
 
‘Ordinary rules relating to the interpretation of contracts must be applied in 
construing a policy of insurance. A court must therefore ascertain the intention of 
the parties. Such intention is, in the first instance, to be gathered from the 
language used, which, if clear, must be given effect to. This involves giving the 
words their plain, ordinary and popular meaning unless the context indicates 
otherwise. Any provision which purports to place a limitation upon a clearly 
expressed obligation to indemnify must be restrictively interpreted.’203 
 
The insured has the burden of proving that the policy provides cover for a 
claimed loss. The insurer, who denies the claim by relying on a contractual 
                                                 
199 Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v Aetna Casualty & Surety Company 255 Conn 295 765 
A 2d 891 (2001).  
200 See Spier (1997) 721 for an examination of clauses regulating serial damages known as 
‘serieschadeclausules’ He states that these clauses are prejudicial to policyholders as they limit 
claims to a single claim for a series of events caused by the same incident, yet cannot be set 
aside merely because they operate unfairly towards the insured. 
201 See par 6.3; see also Kalis et al Part 2 chap 3, and Fogleman 1527 who provide detailed 
policy examples that serve as practical illustrations. 
202 In par 6.3.3.2.3 and 6.5.3.8 above; see also Fogleman 585–590 for comprehensive examples 
of various time element endorsements; See in this regard the general discussion of the position 
in South African law of the legality and enforceability of time bar and other limitation clauses in 
insurance policies in par 6.5.2 above. 
203 Fedgen Insurance Ltd v Leyds 1995 3 SA 33 (A) 28 38; Walker v Redhouse 518; Durban’s 
Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha and Another 1999 1 SA 982 SCA 989.  
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exclusion or limitation clause, then carries the burden of proving that the policy 
does not in fact cover the claimed loss.204 Although the rules of interpretation 
may vary in different countries and states, the following basic universal rules of 
interpretation or construction can be examined briefly. One can agree with 
Merkin that any attempt to lay down the rules of construction for insurance policy 
documents is fraught with difficulty.205 One, however, has to attempt to do so for 
purposes of this study. Another complication is that the fact that there is 
insurance cover, also has in some cases influenced the interpretation of 
exemption and exclusion clauses.206 As the case law dealing with the application 
of the rules of interpretation is extensive in most jurisdictions, it has been kept to 
the minimum in this general discussion. 
 
6.5.5.1.2 Intentions of the parties 
 
The universal primary rule of construction or interpretation of the wording of an 
agreement is to give effect to the intention of the parties to the agreement in 
accordance with the principle of objectivity.207  
 
6.5.5.1.3 Ordinary grammatical meaning of words 
 
Words and phrases must be given their ordinary meaning.208 Exceptions to this 
rule include (a) where the word needs to be interpreted differently to serve the 
                                                 
204 Reinecke et al chap 8.4 for the general principles on the interpretation of insurance contract 
provisions and the basic hierarchy of the rules of interpretation in South African law. 
205 Merkin 55 par 3-02. See as an illustration of issues that are still being debated, the opinion of 
Howard & Mackowsky 918 that as there is no need for the protection of third-party interests under 
first-party insurance as is the case in third-party insurance, the scope of coverage should not be 
decided by the same principles of construction. 
206 See Van Niekerk (1999) 524 on an examination of the case of Government of the Republic of 
South Africa (Department of Industries) v Fibre Spinners & Weavers (Pty) Ltd 1978 2 SA 794 (A) 
where the scope of the insurance cover was held to the determination of the extent of the 
exclusion of the liability of a defendant. 
207 Reinecke et al par 217 state that this is known as ‘the golden rule’ of interpretation; see also 
Stempel 9 who identifies this as an international ‘cardinal’ rule of interpretation. 
208 See Reinecke et al par 220 on this ‘first step in interpretation’; Stempel 31 warns that although 
contract law has a wide deference to actual contract language, one must ‘not make a fortress out 
of a dictionary’.  
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commercial purpose of the agreement or policy in which it is found; (b) where 
other clauses in the policy indicate that a different meaning was intended; (c) 
where a technical meaning other than the ordinary meaning is intended; (d) if the 
court has previously ruled on an interpretation in a similar case, and the word is 
used in the same context, it is preferable that the precedent be followed;209 and 
(e) the meaning as it is universally understood by custom and practice in the 
insurance market must apply. In insurance-contract matters the policyholder’s 
reasonable expectations may more readily countermand textual and formal policy 
language.210  
 
6.5.5.1.4 Words or phrases read in context of the contract as a whole.211 
 
The pressure by insurers to follow the ‘four corners approach’ in that construction 
requires only the narrow scrutiny of the few words in the exclusion clause itself, 
and not to resort to evidence beyond the face of the document or written contract 
cannot be supported. Words must not only be read in contractual context alone. 
‘The overarching principle of contract interpretation is that the court is free to look 
at all the relevant circumstances surrounding the transaction. The entire 
agreement, including all writings, should be read together in the light of all the 
circumstances, even though the effect of this may be to subordinate minor points 
of grammar or punctuation to the sense of the agreement as a whole.’212 
 
                                                 
209 Merkin 56 par 3-03 cautions that as so many variables can be present, one must be reluctant 
to strictly apply the doctrine of precedent. 
210 Stempel  41, however, advocates that a greater reliance must be placed on the expectations 
of the policyholder, as well as on those of the insurer; and at 12 stresses that the expectation 
must clearly at all times be clearly reasonable; see 7–27 for case studies in the USA that serve as 
an illustration of this rule. 
211 Drifters Adventure Tours CC v Hircock 2007 2 SA 83 (SCA) 88; Visser PJ “Case note on 
Drifters Adventure Tours CC v Hircock” 2007 (1) De Jure 188 192 agrees in his evaluation with 
the application of this principle in casu; Van der Westhuizen v Arnold 2002 6 SA 453 (SCA) 465, 
on the permissible use of the background and surrounding circumstances regarding the 
interpretation of a contractual provision in South Africa; and Charter Reinsurance Company Ltd v 
Fagan [1997] AC 313 384 that ‘it must be set in the landscape of the instrument as a whole’. See 
also Reinecke et al par 222 as well as Merkin 64 par 3-11 who state that all terms of the contract 
must be read in conjunction. 
212 Stempel 7 quoting with approval from Farnsworth Contracts (1990). 
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6.5.5.1.5 The contra preferentem rule 
 
Although various secondary rules of interpretation exist,213 the courts often apply 
the contra preferentem-rule. Where none of the other rules assist or provide a 
solution, the word or phrase must be construed against the person who drafted it, 
who typically is the insurer.214 The general notion of fairness also requires 
policies to be interpreted to serve their basic purpose of providing indemnity.215 
The rule will not apply where statutory provisions require the term to be drafted in 
a specific way. This rule is important as it specifically refers to the interpretation 
of exclusion clauses discussed below. 
 
6.5.6 Interpretation of Specific Elements of Pollution Exclusion Clauses  
 
6.5.6.1 General 
 
Where the insurer relies on a pollution exclusion cause to deny coverage, it has 
asserted an affirmative defence and bears the burden of proving such a 
defence.216 Practice, both nationally,217 and internationally,218 requires these 
                                                 
213 See Reinecke et al pars 227–234 for a discussion of the application of secondary rules of 
interpretation in the construction of insurance documents; for an extensive discussion of all the 
rules of interpretation of contracts in South African law, see also Cornelius SJ Principles of the 
Interpretation of Contracts in South Africa (2002) (hereinafter ‘Cornelius’). 
214 Although this is seldom te case, ons must note that where an insured drafted a contract or a 
specific portion of it, the contra preferentem rule should also be used against him; see Wansink 
JH “Verzekering, een Juridisch Product in een Kritische Buitenwereld – Een Impressie uit 
Nederland” 1999 (4) TSAR 706 711 that the contra preferentem rule applies as a general rule in 
the EU, that serves as a consumer protection rule, and provides legal certainty; see also 
Fogleman 1525; 476; also 474 on the merits of the reasonable expectations doctrine specifically 
in the USA, that the insured may expect that the policy wording conforms to public expectations 
and commercially reasonable standards. Courts may override provisions that are contrary to the 
insured’s reasonable expectations and to interpret the policy wording in favour of the insured. 
215 Saylor RN and Cole AM “The Mother of All Battles: The Dispute over Insurance Coverage for 
Environmental Contamination in the United States” 1993 Environmental Liability 29 30 confirm 
the general principle that the interpretation favourable to the insured will be adopted as in most 
cases the insurers draft the standard policy documents, and as drafters they had the ability to 
draft the terms as they saw fit.  
216 See also par 6.1.6.1 above on the burden of proof of the insured and of the insurer; also 
Mount Lebanon v Reliance Insurance Co (2001) PA Super 177. 
 312 
exclusion, exemption and limitation clauses to be interpreted restrictively or 
contra preferentem in the event of an uncertainty or ambiguity: ‘If the language 
of the disclaimer or exemption clause is such that it exempts the proferens from 
liability in express and unambiguous terms, effect must be given to that 
meaning. If there is ambiguity, the language must be construed against the 
proferens. But the alternative meaning upon which reliance is placed to 
demonstrate the ambiguity must be one to which the language is fairly 
susceptible; it must not be ‘fanciful’ or ‘remote’.’219 
 
It should, however, always be applied with caution as it remains an arbitrary 
method of deciding which interpretation should prevail.220 
 
A more detailed discussion on the interpretation of the various elements of the 
pollution exclusion clauses as found in the international insurance industry 
follows under separate headings below. It is important to note that issues relating 
to the interpretation of insurance policy wordings still require a case-by-case 
interpretation of the individual wordings used, as no statutory guidance exists as 
to the exact meaning and extent of the scope of wording used.221 It is proposed 
 
217 Cornelius 181; Drifters Adventure Tours CC v Hircock 88; Allianz Insurance Ltd v RHI 
Refractories Africa (Pty) Ltd 2008 3 SA 425 (SCA) pars 8, 11; Truck and General Insurance Co 
Ltd v Verulam Fuel Distributors CC and another par 23; Johannesburg Country Club v Stott  516; 
Afrox Healthcare v Strydom 34; First National Bank of SA Ltd v Rosenblum 2001 4 SA 189 (SCA) 
195; specifically on the general principle of the law of contract see Van der Merwe et al 299, 307, 
Christie 188. 
218 Kalis et al Part 3 par 11.03; Mitchell 129 provides a variety of international examples. 
219 Durban’s Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha 989; Drifters Adventure Tours CC v Hircock 
pars 8–10; Cape Group Construction (Pty) Ltd t/a Forbes Waterproofing v Government of the 
United Kingdom 2003 5 SA 180 (SCA) 186; Van der Westhuizen v Arnold 469. 
220 See Cornelius 182; Stempel 44 supports the application of what he calls the ‘common sense’ 
comprehensive contract theory when interpreting the pollution exclusion clause; Ellison et al 61 
evaluate the ethical behaviour of insurers in that they promised regulators that they would not be 
overzealous in applying the exclusions when they secured approval for both the absolute and 
total pollution exclusions, but that they are not keeping their promises. They are also at 67 of the 
opinion that the courts are, in interpreting these terms, attempting to keep the insurers to their 
promises. This can be supported. 
221 Some insurers feel that interpretation has strayed from ordinary principles of contract law and 
benefits the insured without merit. Some judgments have been described as ‘the product of 
“deconstruction”, invoking the vocabulary of leftist intellectuals (alleged at time to be nihilists) in 
an attempt to convince the reader that interpretation of the pollution exclusion at odds with that of 
Footnote continues on the next page. 
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that, as a potential solution to the problems relating to the interpretation and 
subsequent effect on cover of these clauses, stricter statutory control and 
regulation of wording allowed in insurance policies should be introduced.222 
 
6.5.6.2 Meaning of ‘occurrence’, ‘incident’ or ‘event’ 
 
The term ‘occurrence’ is interpreted according to its normal everyday meaning as 
a synonym for a ‘happening’ or event’, unless the policy clearly indicates a 
different meaning.223 In the 1973 version it was defined as ‘an accident, including 
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or 
property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the 
insured.’224 The 1986 version of the CGL policy extended the definition to also 
include ‘events that take place over an extended period of time’.225 The 
‘occurrence’ also has to take place during the policy period.226 Also see the 
discussion above on the interpretation of limitations specifically for each ‘insured 
event’ or ‘occurrence’.227 
 
In NEMA,228 in the section on the control of emergency incidents and the steps 
that need to be taken, an ‘incident’ is referred to as ‘an unexpected sudden 
occurrence, including a major emission, fire or explosion leading to a serious 
danger to the public or potentially serious pollution of or detriment to the 
 
the insurance industry must be the doctrinal equivalent of the Red Menace.’ as quoted by 
Stempel 4. 
222 See the conclusion in par 6.8 below. 
223 Mann v Lexington Insurance Company [2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 28; see also Fogleman 1535. 
224 See in this regard Whitney RA “Environmental Contamination and the Application of the 
Owned Property Exclusion to Insurance Coverage Claims: Can the threat of harm to the property 
of others ever get real?” 2000 (3) Northern Kentucky Law Review 505. 
225 Fogleman 503 provides the full 1966-version of the definition. 
226 Howard & Mackowsky 901 explain the situation that an uninterrupted continuous polluting 
incident can be seen as a ‘single occurrence’, but that an ‘insured event’ can also be caused by 
multiple causes; see Fogleman 508 et seq for the wording of the various versions of the standard 
CGL policy wording specifically for the period for which cover is provided. 
227 See par 6.5.4 above. 
228 S 30. 
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environment whether immediate or delayed’.229 The ECA also defines an 
‘incident’ as ‘an unexpected sudden occurrence leading to serious danger to the 
public or potentially serious pollution of or detriment to the environment, whether 
immediate or delayed’.230  
 
Although the use of the word ‘incident’ is not common in public liability insurance 
policies, Fogleman argues that its inclusion might follow the use of this specific 
word in the same context as the European Commission in the proposed Article 
2(2)(b) of the Environmental Liability Directive uses it.231  Cover under most 
liability insurance policies is ‘event’ or ‘occurrence-based’ and the interpretation 
of this wording is therefore crucial to prove the trigger and extent of the cover 
provided.232 
 
Cover is also often excluded for damage caused by ‘pollution conditions’, which 
is then defined by referring to the incident that causes the damage. The following 
serves as an example: ‘Pollution Conditions means the discharge, dispersal, 
release or escape of any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, 
including smoke, vapours, fumes, alkalis, toxic chemicals, medical waste or 
waste products into or on land, or any structure on land, the atmosphere or any 
watercourse or body of water, including groundwater, provided such conditions 
are not naturally present in the environment.’233 
 
                                                 
229 S 30(1)(a); for an evaluation of the operation and effect of s 30 see Truck and General 
Insurance Co Ltd v Verulam Fuel Distributors CC and another  par 12. 
230 S 30; see also the discussion of this specific section in Truck and General Insurance Co Ltd v 
Verulam Fuel Distributors CC and another par 13 et seq. 
231 See the comprehensive discussion of the Directive in chap 7 par 7.2 below. 
232 The effect of this type of trigger is also discussed comprehensively the examination of long-tail 
liability in par 6.3.2 above. 
233 This is a combination of the various alternatives provided by Fogleman 559. 
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6.5.6.3 Meaning of ‘accident’ and ‘sudden and accidental’ 
 
Environmental damage can be accidental, gradual or caused by old burdens of 
historic causation.234 Cover for bodily injury or property damage is often only 
provided under a policy where the damage was caused by an ‘occurrence’ that 
was ‘accidental’.235 In simple terms, an occurrence is accidental if it was not done 
deliberately.236 Where the term is not defined under the policy, its interpretation 
becomes problematic. Faure & Skogh describe an ‘accident’ as ‘a hazard that 
hits humanity as an unexpected event’.237 Fogleman also examines various 
judgments and reaches the conclusion that courts have generally interpreted the 
word ‘accident’ to mean ‘an unexpected event’ and also ‘an unexpected 
happening or consequence from either a known or an unknown cause’.238 Clarke 
holds a similar view that ‘accidental’ means ‘unexpected and unintended’ in 
context of what the insured knew or reasonably should have known, and must 
not be a result of willful misconduct by the insured.239 
 
In order to prevent future uncertainties, public liability policies have evolved to 
include a definition of the word ‘accidental’ as meaning ‘unintended’, ‘sudden, 
unforeseen, fortuitous and identifiable’, or as ‘a sudden occurrence, which is 
unintentional and unexpected for the policy holder’.240 The growth of toxic mould 
                                                 
234 Larsson 573 identifies these as the three basic types of environmental damages, although the 
delimitations do not always appear to be clear. 
235 See Wansink JH “Hoe plotseling en onzeker is de verzekeringsdekking voor 
milieuaansprakelijkheidsrisico’s?” in Ten Kate J,  Kottenhagen RJP, Van Mierlo AIM, Wansink JH 
(eds) Miscellanea Jurisconsulto vero dedicata, Essays offered to Prof. Mr. J.M. van Dunne (1997) 
451–460; see also the description of ‘occurrence’ in par 6.5.6.2 above. 
236 IFP&C Insurance Ltd v Silversea Cruises Ltd [2004] Lloyd’s Rep IR 217; see Fogleman 1529– 
1535 for a variety of judicial interpretations in the UK courts of the words ‘accident’ and 
‘accidental’ under public liability, motor vehicle, travel policies and under legislation; also 537– 
548 for extensive USA case law on the interpretation of the terminology ‘sudden and accidental’; 
see also McGee 248. 
237 Faure & Skogh 241. 
238 See also Fogleman 501–502 for a general discussion of USA case law on this point. 
239 Clarke 553 confirms that the knowledge that there was a substantial probability of the 
occurrence must be the knowledge of the insured that must be determined according to an 
objective test. 
240 See Wansink JH “Het nieuwe schadeverzekeringsrecht en Oude olielampjes en dwaallichtjes” 
Oratie van 28 maart 2006 bij de aanvaarding van het ambt van bijzonder hoogleraar op het 
Footnote continues on the next page. 
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has, for example, been found to be ‘sudden and accidental’ even though it grows 
over a longer time, as it is clearly ‘unexpected and unintended’.241 
 
On the other hand, the court in the South African Allianz case held that the words 
‘unintentional’ do not indicate something akin to ‘unforeseen’ or ‘unexpected’.242 
Whether it is ‘accidental’ or not should be viewed from the insured’s perspective, 
rather from the perspective of the prejudiced party towards whom liability is 
incurred. The incident that causes the damage must be ‘sudden’, which has been 
interpreted as meaning ‘abrupt’.243 It is important to note that this temporal 
element can only refer to the incident or event and not to the ensuing 
environmental damage. Determining the timing of the discharge, dispersal, 
release or escape of pollutants is crucial where the claim is based on the release 
of a polluting substance from a containment area, for example, and not its 
eventual entry or migration into subsoil or air.244 
 
In the USA the courts have in many cases held that where cover is limited to 
‘sudden and accidental’ incidents, it covers gradual as well as abrupt polluting 
incidents.245 This required the inclusion of an express provision or definition that 
the word ‘accident’ specifically excludes ‘gradual pollution’ that occurs, for 
example, by the slow seepage of polluting or toxic substances into soil or water.  
The word ‘sudden’ can refer to two possible scenarios, namely that the 
 
gebied van het verzekeringsrecht aan de Universiteit van Leiden 2 that the uncertainty of the 
occurrence must be an uncertainty in the minds of the parties at the time of conclusion of the 
insurance contract, and not at the time of the loss; for the position in the UK, see Hawley v 
Luminar Leisure plc [2005] Lloyds Rep IR 275; see also Fogleman 1566 for a discussion of the 
definition that was in dispute in the case of Jan de Nul (UK) Ltd v NV Royale Belge [2000] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 700; see also Fogleman 547 on USA case law in this regard. 
241 In the words of Goodman 256. 
242 Allianz Insurance Ltd v RHI Refractories Africa (Pty) Ltd  par 11. 
243 Cagande LF “The ‘Sudden’ Interpretation: Northville Industries Corp. v. National Union Fire 
Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh” 1999 (16) Pace Environmental Law Review 285 294. 
244 Cagande 296; as reiterated by Fogleman 541 et seq. 
245 Stempel 28 alleges that insurers did not intend the exclusion to be read literally, but rather that 
the way in which it is drafted suggests that they knowingly drafted a provision so broad as to 
make literal reading inappropriate; see also Cagande 306 and Fogleman 538 et seq on this 
‘conspiracy theory’ that insurance regulators conspired to fraudulently misrepresent their 
intentions with coverage; New Castle County v Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company 933 F 
2d 1192 (3d Cir 1991) 1193. 
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commencement of the pollution must have been ‘sudden’, which is usually the 
intention of the parties, but also that the duration of the pollution must have been 
‘sudden’, meaning ‘brief or momentary’.246  
 
The facts and circumstances of each case, as well as the nature of the insured’s 
activities and the source, characteristics and effects of a polluting substance will 
all have to be taken into account to determine the meaning of the words and 
terms in context. In a Belgian case concerning a polluting incident that lasted 
over a period of weeks, the incident was interpreted not to be a ‘sudden’ 
occurrence.247 On the other hand, in a case in the USA high winds and slope 
failures caused toxic tailings of copper, lead and zinc ore at a mine to disperse 
over a period of 60 to 70 years. The court found that the events, in isolation, 
could be considered to be ‘sudden’, even though they occurred continuously over 
a very long period of time.248 The difference between these two decisions clearly 
illustrates the challenges that confront the courts in these situations. It appears 
from extensive case law that the primary dispute between policyholders and 
insurers in most cases centers on the single word ‘sudden’. Ellison et al examine 
various judgments and conclude that the meaning afforded to the term ‘sudden’ 
should be limited to the following possibilities  ‘unprepared for, unintended and 
unexpected’ or ‘abrupt, immediate or of short duration’.249 
 
 
                                                 
246 Clarke 556 is, however, of the opinion that the interpretation in terms of the second scenario 
carries conviction in context of its use in the CGL policies, but for other policies than the CGL the 
first scenario appears to be preferred, but that in conjunction with the word ‘accidental’, 
irrespective of its interpretation, it clearly has the effect of excluding any gradual pollution claims 
from cover. 
247 Jan de Nul (UK) Ltd v NV Royale Belge above.  
248 Steel v Aetna Casualty & Surety Company 931 P 2d 127 (Utah 1997).  
249 Ellison JN, Lewis RP & Valery BT “Recent Developments in the Law Regarding the ‘Absolute’ 
and ‘Total’ Pollution Exclusions” 2001 (13) Environmental Claims Journal 55 (hereinafter ‘Ellison 
et al’)  58. 
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6.5.6.4 Meaning of ‘immediate consequences’ 
 
Although it could be interpreted to mean that essentially no lapse in time between 
damage and the occurrence of loss should occur, a preferred alternative is to 
interpret the term ‘immediate’ as meaning that no intervening cause is present.250 
 
Regarding the control of emergency incidents in terms of the definition in NEMA 
of an ‘incident’, the ‘incident’ is referred to as ‘an unexpected sudden occurrence, 
including a major emission, fire or explosion leading to a serious danger to the 
public or potentially serious pollution of or detriment to the environment whether 
immediate or delayed’.251 In terms of this description even delayed 
consequences fall within the scope of the specific legislative measure. 
 
6.5.6.5 Meaning of ‘claim’ and ‘single claim’ 
 
A distinction must also be drawn between the claim brought against the insured 
by the prejudiced party, and the subsequent claim by the insured against his 
insurer under a liability insurance policy. The former has correctly been described 
as the occurrence or event of a state of affairs, which justifies a claim on an 
insurer.252 This ‘claim’ is the demand for payment by the insured following the 
loss.253 
 
As far as a liability policy is concerned, notice of the circumstances that could 
give rise to a potential claim by the prejudiced party against the insured is usually 
required. This is followed by the actual claim against the insured. Where 
judgment or another form of award is given in the prejudiced party’s favour, or a 
                                                 
250 This interpretation is preferred by McGee 248; see also Merchants Marine Insurance Co v 
Liverpool Marine and General Insurance Co Ltd (1928) 3 Ll L Rep 45. 
251 S 30(1)(a); own emphasis. 
252 Own emphasis; Fogleman 1553 quoting from the judgment in Australia and New Zealand 
Bank v Colonial Warehouses [1960] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.241 (QBD). 
253 Merkin 311; see also Coetzee v Attorney’s Indemnity Fund. 
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settlement agreement is reached, the insurer incurs liability to meet the 
prejudiced party’s claim once the quantum has been finalised.254 
 
It is possible for the policy to set a maximum limit payable for a single claim. This 
often limits the claims for environmental loss extensively.255 The aggregate of all 
the claims brought under a single policy can also be limited contractually. It 
should be kept in mind that various policies can be triggered by a single 
occurrence and that there can then be a single claim under each policy, or that 
single claims under one policy can be triggered by numerous accidents, 
occurrences, events or losses. The specific facts and policy limitations in each 
situation will determine the extent of these limitations. 
 
Care must be taken to determine the trigger for every specific claim under a 
policy, and after that to determine whether the specific loss is in fact covered 
under that policy. Factors that can be taken into account include the unity of 
cause, place and time and the intentions of the parties where there is human 
intervention.256 
 
A contractual claim in terms of a contractual environmental indemnity clause for 
the reimbursement by the previous owner of property of the remediation costs 
incurred by his successor on the property for pollution damage, is seen as 
sufficient to serve as a ‘claim’ under an indemnity policy as it falls under the 
definition of a ‘pollution claim’.257 
                                                 
254 As confirmed by K/S Merc Skandia XXXXII v Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters [2001] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 802. 
255 It should be kept in mind that insurance in the form of excess of loss insurance can be taken 
out to provide indemnity for the losses not covered by the primary insurance policy, due to the 
inclusion of these limitations. 
256 Fogleman 1551 by referring to the remark by Kerr LJ in the 1972 arbitration award made in 
Dawson Field that ‘[w]hether or not something which produces a plurality of loss or damage can 
properly be described as one occurrence therefore depends on the position and viewpoint of the 
observer and involves the degree of unity in relation to cause, locality, time and, if initiated by 
human action, the circumstances and purposes of the persons responsible’. 
257 Cambridge Water Company Ltd v Eastern Countries Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264; as 
confirmed by Fogleman 1557. 
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Claims settled by an insured are only covered under a policy where this was the 
express intention of the parties to include these claims in the cover. 
 
6.5.6.6 Meaning of ‘legally liable’ 
 
In indemnity insurance, the insurer is obliged to indemnify the insured against 
legal liability for losses covered by the policy. This duty only arises once the 
insured is in fact ‘legally liable’, which again emphasises the importance of 
determining liability for environmental damage as discussed in preceding 
chapters.258 
 
‘Liability at law’ includes statutory liability, tort liability, whether fault-based or 
strict liability, as well as liability for breach of contract, provided that the latter was 
included under the cover provided.259 The insured has to prove that he was 
‘legally liable’ to pay sums to third-party claimants as damages or compensation 
in respect of damages or loss suffered by the third party.  The existence and 
amount of liability to a third party must have been established and quantified by 
an agreement such as a contract or a settlement, or by a judicial process such as 
an arbitration award or a court order.260   
 
It is difficult to determine exactly when a person becomes liable in a situation 
where a remediation notice is served upon him in terms of a statutory measure. It 
appears that he can only become ‘legally liable’ for the remediation costs once 
the notice has been served, and not from the date of his polluting conduct. The 
Environment Act in the UK, for example, establishes a strict retrospective pure 
statutory liability regime for soil pollution or land contamination,261 and 
                                                 
258 See chap 3 and 4 for the South African position, and chap 7 for the position in other countries. 
259 See Van Niekerk (2006 JILB) 202; see also Merkin 687. 
260 Clarke 547 explains that what is required is simply liability in terms of any action, arbitration or 
agreement; see also the effect of these agreements and processes regarding the triggers of 
liability insurance cover in chap 5 par 5.3.4.2.2 as well as the suspension of the prescription of 
insurance claims in par 5.3.6. 
261 S 57 of the Environment Act 1995; see also in this regard Faure (ed) 87–89. 
 321 
acknowledges the duty of an ‘appropriate person’ to clean up affected sites once 
a remediation notice has been served.262 He has no insurance claim for legal 
liability where he incurs the remediation costs in anticipation of the serving of the 
notice, for example, where payment is based purely on a commercial decision to 
incur these costs. It has also been held that the costs of remedial works incurred 
to prevent further damage to third-party property did not constitute a valid claim 
as the insured had not yet become ‘legally liable’ to pay these costs.263 One may, 
however, reason that in failing to incur preventative costs for an impending loss 
could lead to civil liability for an omission, which then does qualify as a ‘legal 
liability’ and a claim would only then become viable. 
 
6.5.6.7 Meaning of ‘pollutants’, ‘contaminants’, ’irritants’ and other waste 
materials’ 
 
These terms are seldom defined, unless cover is provided for a very specific 
named peril. Any material or substance that is potentially harmful to human 
health or the environment is invariably ‘hazardous’.264 Some exclusion clauses 
limit claims to known pollutants. It should be noted that the term ‘known 
pollutants’ does not refer to the knowledge that the insured has at the time that 
the substance was a pollutant, but refers to the fact that a specific type of 
pollutant was generally seen and identifiable as a pollutant that has a hazardous 
effect on the environment.265 
 
                                                 
262 Fogleman 1560 considers whether this duty can be accepted as a ‘legal liability’ for purpose of 
a liability insurance claim, before a remediation notice has been served upon such a person. It is 
submitted that, in view of the wording used, the liability is only certain once the notice has been 
served. 
263 Yorkshire Water Services Ltd v Sun Alliance & London Insurance plc [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 21; 
see also the discussion by Fogleman 1559. 
264 Fogleman 553 discusses the extensive body of case law that confirms that oil, asbestos fibres, 
insecticides, fumes from paint and even hog manure have been found to be pollutants, yet 
excessive noise and the lead paint itself in a dwelling have been found not to be ‘pollutants’ for 
purposes of a pollution insurance claim. 
265 Clarke 552 confirms that the substance must have at least a ‘realistic potential’ to cause 
environmental damage. 
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Another example of an exclusion clause that includes a description of specific 
pollutants in the main body of the clause reads as follows: ‘This insurance does 
not apply to bodily injury or property damage which would not have occurred in 
whole or in part but for an actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, 
seepage, migration, release or escape of pollutants at any time. Pollutants 
means any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including 
smoke, vapour, soot, fume, acids, alkalis, chemicals or waste material.’266 
 
Descriptions like these have been criticised severely and labelled as being 
arcane, ambiguous and convoluted. It is submitted that insurers clearly shows a 
lack of good faith in their drafting practices in this regard. The verbosity, and the 
broad nature and description of the excluded risks have been the cause of 
countless disputes regarding the interpretation of the wording and scope of 
various pollution exclusion clauses. 
An excellent example can be found in the continuing debate on whether 
‘harm’267 that is caused by sick building syndrome or ‘SBS’ is included or 
excluded from the traditional meaning afforded to the term ‘pollution 
conditions’.268 SBS is mostly caused by inhaling air of poor quality, which is due 
to contamination by organic and synthetic compounds such as emissions from 
paints and glues, as well as bacteria, carbon monoxide, microbial organisms and 
                                                 
266 This specific clause was at issue in the case of Mount Lebanon v Reliance Insurance Co 9. 
267 The World Health Organisation has classified the following symptoms under the category of 
SBS: mucus membrane irritation, toxic symptoms (headaches, nausea, fatigue and irritability), 
asthma and respiratory infections, skin and mucous membrane dryness, and gastrointestinal 
complaints. See WHO Regional Office for Europe World Health Organisation: Indoor air quality 
research: Report on WHO meeting, Stockholm 27–31 August 1984 (1986) 64; see also Lucey MT 
“Sick Building Syndrome: Airing insurance coverage issues arising from this new wave of toxic 
tort litigation”1999 (Spring) Federation of Insurance and Corporate Counsel Quarterly 333. 
268 See Mitchell 124; see also Wollner KS “Sick Building Syndrome and a Definition of ‘Polluting 
Conditions’” 2001 (June) International Risk Management Institute Journal 1 
http://www.irmi.com/Expert/Articles/2001 (last accessed on 15 March 2008); see, for example,  
Meridian Mutual Insurance Company v Kellman 197 F 3d 1178 (6th cir 1999) where a sealant on 
the floors of a room situated above those of the claimant caused severe respiratory difficulties; 
also Stempel 54 on whether poor indoor air quality and SBS are excluded from the absolute 
pollution exclusion clause.    
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toxic mould269 that contaminate air vents in buildings. It has the potential to 
cause both bodily injury and property damage. The identity of the person who is 
to be held liable in these circumstances for the harm caused is mostly uncertain. 
It is also not clear whether this type of risk is excluded from insurance cover by 
the operation of general pollution exclusion clauses. The construction and 
interpretation of the various components of the pollution exclusion clauses are 
discussed in this chapter above.270 
 
At the moment harmful bacteria, carbon monoxide and toxic mould are not seen 
as ‘known pollutants’ or ‘waste’ in terms of USA law.271 At the moment no case 
law on any of these issues exists in South African law. 
‘Waste’ has been described in the absolute exemption pollution clauses simply 
as ‘including materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed’.272 
Policyholders clearly have an objectively reasonable expectation that any 
pollution coverage provided to them for purpose of a specific industry includes 
potential pollution caused by business byproducts. 
 
6.5.6.8 ‘Damages’, ‘compensation’, ‘remedial works’, ‘clean-up’ and 
‘restoration costs’ 
 
The valuation and assessment of the various forms of damage or loss that apply 
in pollution insurance, link closely to issues on the interpretation of these 
                                                 
269 Referred to as mould, mildew, or ‘that confounding fungus’; 
http://www2.jsonline.com/homes/build/ jul01/mold (last accessed on 18 February 2008). It is 
estimated that more than 300 000 law suits have already been filed in the USA for claims based 
on liability for toxic mould http://www.environmentalinsurance.com/ss04.html (last accessed on 21 
February 2008); Goodman 241; also Waldron JT & Palmer TP “Insurance coverage for mold and 
fungi claims: the next battleground?” 2002 (38) Tort Trial and Insurance Practice Law Journal 49. 
270 See chap 6 par 6.5.5 above. 
271 Ellison et al 70 discuss case law where the term ‘waste’ was for example held to mean 
‘industrial byproducts’ and that it did not include bacteria, whereas ‘contaminant’ was found to 
include bacteria; Stempel 47 provides case law that supports the views that as carbon monoxide 
is not a traditional sort of waste discharge, it is not covered by the absolute pollution exclusion. 
272 As quoted by Fogleman 573. 
 324 
concepts and terms. It therefore deserves a more coherent examination that 
follows in a separate comprehensive discussion below.273 
 
6.5.6.9 ‘Owned property’ exclusions 
 
Public liability policies also evolved by the addition of an ‘owned property 
exclusion’, which bars the policyholder from claiming for damage caused to his 
own property under the liability policy.274 The purpose is clearly to force the 
prejudiced party to claim under his first-party property insurance policy.275 
 
When pollution has migrated from owned property to a third party’s property, the 
costs incurred for the clean-up of the owned property to prevent further loss to 
the third-party property, has been held not to be barred from cover under the 
‘owned property’ exclusion in the pollution exclusion clauses.276 The exclusion 
can even be extended to bar claims for property that is owned, or under the 
control or custody of the insured. It is also interesting to note that property 
alienated by the insured, that at a later stage requires clean-up, has been held 
not to fall under the ‘owned property’ bar and does enjoy cover.277 
 
 
                                                 
273 See par 6.6.2 below. 
274 Whitney 507 confirms that the purpose of this exclusion is to limit claims brought under liability 
policies for legal liabilities towards third parties for their property damage, and to force the insured 
to claim from his first-party property insurance cover. 
275 Fogleman 590 on the position in the USA, and 1569 on the position in the UK foresees the 
possibility that the remediation of groundwater or soil under one’s own land to prevent a 
continued pollution might not fall within the scope of this exclusion clause, as one technically 
does not own the water or soil that lies beneath the surface. This can be supported. 
276 Whitney 508 et seq reviews the judgment in much-quoted case of Broadwell Realty Services v 
Fidelity & Casualty Co 528 A 2d at 76 78  (NJ Super Ct. App Div 1987). 
277 See Snyder General Corporation v. Century Indemnity Company 113 F 3d 536 (5th Cir 1997) 
on both these issues.  
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6.6 NATURE AND QUANTIFICATION OF ‘DAMAGES’ AND 
‘COMPENSATION’ 
 
6.6.1 General 
 
As a general rule, the terms ‘damages’ and ‘compensation’ are not defined.278 
The simplest description of the extent of the damage or loss dealt with in this 
thesis includes damage to the environment in general, as well as damage 
created via the polluted environment.279  The former then covers damage to non-
individual parts of the environment, and damage to public property such as res 
communes and res nullius.280 This only provides a general framework for the 
discussion that follows, and does not attempt to address or propose a solution for 
the multitude of problems found in the industry regarding the interpretation and 
quantification of ‘damages’ and related concepts. 
 
Although it is easy to determine that damage in fact occurred, it is not always 
possible to individualise the exact components that were damaged, and very 
difficult to determine the economic value and quantify the damage caused to 
each component.281 It also remains a challenge to determine the origin or cause 
of each specific component of damage.282 
                                                 
278 See the early case of Hall Brothers Steamship Company Ltd v Young [1939] 1 KB 748 (CA) 
751 where ‘damages’ was defined as ‘sums which fall to be paid by reason of some breach of 
duty or obligation, whether that duty or obligation is imposed by contract, by the general law, or 
legislation.’; also on the atypical case Vandenberg v Superior Court of Sacramento County 21 Cal 
4th 815 88 Cal Rptr 2d 366, 982 P 2d 229 (1999) where liability insurance cover against 
‘damages’ was construed as including contractual damages where a breach of contract by a the 
insured lessee caused the lessor to incur liability to pay clean-up costs. 
279 As held in the conclusion to chap 2 of this thesis; this view is also supported by De Ketelaere 
1353. 
280 See specifically Faure & Skogh 61, and see also 319 for their description of the distinction 
between public goods such as endangered species, and private goods. 
281 For a fully detailed discussion of the economic valuation of damage that is caused by or 
relates to environmental pollution, see Bowman M & Boyle A Environmental Damage in 
International and Comparative Law (2005) (hereinafter ‘Bowman & Boyle’) chap 3; Carrette A 
Herstel van en vergoeding voor aantasting van nie-toegeeinde milieubestanddelen (1997) for the 
valuation of damage to the public environment or natural resource assets; Lin AC “Beyond tort: 
Compensating victims of environmental toxic injury” 2005 (78) Cal L Rev 1439 on the difficulties 
in proving the toxicity of substances and gathering sufficient evidence to support a toxic tort claim; 
Footnote continues on the next page. 
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Honoré refers specifically to pollution damage when dealing with the divisibility of 
damage as follows: ‘There are a large number of cases, moreover, apart from the 
destruction of objects which can be counted, weighed and measured, in which 
the harm can be regarded as divisible. For example, it may have extensive 
magnitude without being divided into separate items. The collapse of a wall is an 
instance. It may be that without the tortfeaser’s contribution only part of the wall 
would have collapsed. Other instances are the pollution of a river, and the 
emission of noise, smoke and stench. In these instances the separate items of 
harm, if they exist, certainly cannot be counted, yet the notion of more or less 
harm makes perfectly good sense. Even if the magnitude is intensive (pain, 
suffering, loss of amenities, discomfort and inconvenience), it is possible in 
certain cases to say that less pain etc. would have befallen the injured party in 
the absence of the tortfeaser’s conduct. The only problem is that of quantifying 
the difference in monetary terms.’283 
 
6.6.2 Methods of Assessment and Valuation 
 
6.6.2.1 General 
 
Tort compensation is seldom accurate, as can be seen from the discussion on 
damages in a preceding chapter.284 As the exact economic valuation or 
quantification of specifically environmental damages for purpose of a civil claim is 
not always possible, a prejudiced party should not be faulted for his inability to 
quantify his damages accurately. Determining the exact damage that was caused 
to property or the natural environment is also difficult. The courts in this type of 
 
see also in general Reinecke et al par 11.1.3 the quantification of loss or damage for insurance 
claim purposes in South African law. 
282 This is dealt with in the discussions of general causation, and more specifically on aspects of 
multiple or cumulative causation in chap 4 par 4.2.5 and par 6.4 above. 
283 Honoré AM “Causation and Remoteness of Damage” in Tinc A (ed) International Encyclopedia 
of Comparative Law  Part 1 Vol 7 (1983) pars 7–113. 
284 See chap 4 par 4.2.6 above. 
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situation have no choice but to set an amount based on no more than an 
informed guess.285 Absolutely exact valuation may, for example, depend on 
uncertain future events. Focus in an insurance context should always remain on 
the principle of indemnity, especially in the event of a claim under an unvalued 
policy.286 
 
It is trite law that questions regarding quantification are not decided on a balance 
of probability, but rather on the court’s assessment based on the facts of a 
particular case.287 A best estimate on the available evidential material is thus all 
that is required.288 According to Van Niekerk ‘[n]o hard or fast rules can be laid 
down as to the method of calculating value and assessing the amount of loss for 
insurance purposes. The aim is, and should always be, to provide the insured 
with as near an adequate indemnity as possible so as to enable him to be 
restored financially to the position he occupied before the loss’.289 Exact 
assessment and valuation or quantification is discussed in greater detail under 
the various headings below. 
 
Where more than one party contributed to the loss or damage, it is sometimes 
impossible to identify precisely which part or element of the damage each one 
caused, and a pragmatic approach must then be followed where divisibility 
cannot be formulated on the grounds of logic or reason. This then requires the 
court to make a reasonable guess or estimate.290 
                                                 
285 SDR Investment Holdings Co (Pty) Ltd, Springgrove Cellar (Pty) Ltd, Zorgvliet Farms & 
Estates (Pty) Ltd v Nedcor Bank Ltd, Honey & Partners 2007 4 SA 190 (C) pars 51, 58; see also 
the discussion of the South African position on quantification of losses in chap 4 par 4.2.6.4. 
286 As stated by Merkin 333 et seq. 
287 De Klerk v ABSA and others 2003 4 SA 315 (SCA) pars 28, 37, 38. 
288 See in this regard SDR Investment Holdings Co (Pty) Ltd, Springgrove Cellar (Pty) Ltd, 
Zorgvliet Farms & Estates (Pty) Ltd v Nedcor Bank Ltd, Honey & Partners par 58; De Klerk v 
ABSA and others par 29; see also Reinecke et al par 300. 
289 Van Niekerk JP “Under-insurance and average” 1981 (3) MB (hereinafter ‘Van Niekerk 
(1981)’) 125. 
290 See Van Dunne JM (ed) Transboundary Pollution and Liability: The Case of the River Rhine 
(Conference Proceedings of the International Conference held at Rotterdam on 19 October 1990) 
Instituut Milieuschade Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam (1991); as confirmed by the judgment in 
Footnote continues on the next page. 
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As the quantification of an insurance claim, whether under first-party or third-
party insurance, is problematic, an express reinstatement clause or a valued 
policy may offer some relief.291 The reinstatement clause will offer a great benefit 
to the insured or the third party where the reinstatement refers to the remediation 
or clean-up of the environment. Cover must then be provided for the actual 
clean-up or remediation costs incurred. A valued policy will, on the other hand, 
benefit the insurer in that he is liable for a specific value irrespective of the 
extensive remediation costs incurred.292 
 
6.6.2.2 Extent of ‘compensable damage’ 
 
Compensable damage entails damages that are (a) certain and specific, (b) 
proven, and (c) quantifiable. Four steps are required to assess compensable 
damage. In the first place, the polluting source must be established. This must be 
followed by the identification of the direct environmental damage caused. 
Thereafter consequential or future losses and indirect damages must be 
identified and estimated, provided that they are included in the cover, and in the 
last instance the total damage must be valued or quantified.293 
 
Reinecke formulates the following general principles for the quantification of loss 
or damage. A comparison between the actual or real monetary value of the 
affected asset or interest before and immediately after the insured event must be 
made, at the time and place the loss occurred.294 As a general principle no 
 
Wright v Mediclinic 2007 4 SA 327 (C) 371, discussed in chap 4 par 4.2.6.4 on problems in the 
assessment and quantification of damages is South African delictual liability claims. 
291 See Reinecke et al par 300 on the general principles of quantification of a claim and the value 
of these clauses; specifically pars 35, 307 and 571 on valued policies, and par 36 for policies for 
new value. 
292 Merkin 337 et seq provides an examination on the operation of the different measures of 
indemnity in valued and unvalued policies. 
293 Larsson 534 et seq. 
294 See chap 4 par 4.2.6.4.4 above; also Reinecke et al par 306 on the application of 
quantification methods to determine the value of the loss of an expectation or so-called 
expectancy. 
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allowance should be made for sentimental value, prospective profits or 
expectancies or other consequential losses.295 It is, however, possible to 
expressly include these aspects under the cover provided. The chances of 
succeeding with claims for prospective losses and stigma damages in South 
African law are slim, as discussed in chapter 4 above. 
 
Depreciation in market value generally serves as the primary instrument of 
measurement, and restoration, repair or remediation costs serves as a 
secondary measurement.296 The latter is of great importance for this study as it is 
a popular method, and in an environmental context a very appropriate one, to 
lead evidence of the necessary and reasonable costs of restoring the damaged 
property to its original position. An insurer can rebut the presumption that these 
costs reflect the actual depreciation of the value of the property, and therefore 
the loss, if he can prove the latter. This is discussed as far as clean-up costs and 
natural resource damages are concerned, in the paragraphs that follow.297 
Even when damage occurs on private property, the evaluation of environmental 
damages remains time-consuming and an inexact science and this is especially 
the case where consequential losses, natural resource damages and the like are 
concerned.298  In the words of Reinecke ‘the quantification of loss is sometimes 
clouded by fine points of fact and of law, so that the position of the claimant may 
                                                 
295 See in this regard Raubenheimer NO v Trustees, Johannes Bredenkamp Trust and Others 
2006 1 SA 124 (C) where the court rejected the claim that the defendant’s conduct that affected a 
sentimental and emotional attachment to the plaintiff’s property was actionable.  
296 ISEP Structural Engineering & Plating (Pty) Ltd v Inland Exploration Co (Pty) Ltd 1981 4 SA 1 
(A); Joubert v Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1978 3 SA 328 (T) 332; Nafte v Atlas 
Assurance Co Ltd 1924 WLD 239 246; Merkin 339 evaluates reinstatement as a quantification 
method. 
297 See par 6.6.2.3.3, par 6.6.2.5 below. 
298 Many similar measures apply in other countries. For an interesting statutory method of 
assessment and limit of quantification see the German Environmental Liability Act 1990 that 
provides for a mechanism in the form of proportionality test for valuation, irrespective of the actual 
restoration costs. In terms of s 251.2 of German Civil Code ‘an owner can ask for restoration of 
contaminated natural resources only if restoration costs are not disproportionate compared to the 
value of the property’; On the other hand, see the Norwegian Pollution Control Act 1981 par 58 
that no value is placed on individual property interests, but public authorities can claim the refund 
of ‘reasonable costs’ incurred to cover existing or future restoration. 
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be rather invidious.’299 An investigation of the universal issues relating to the 
nature and the assessment of the different forms of damages for purpose of an 
insurance claim in an environmental context follows below. 
 
6.6.2.3 Property damage 
 
6.6.2.3.1 General description 
 
“Damage’ in the context of pollution property damage can simply be described as 
a ‘changed physical state’ of the property that does not include normal wear and 
tear, or damage due to a ‘mischief done to property.300 An owner of property has 
the right to enjoy the use of his property and the profits generated by it, yet also 
has to bear economic responsibility for that property. Although it is often disputed 
whether direct physical loss to property includes consequential or intangible loss 
such as pure economic loss, the scope of damage can in principle be 
extensive.301 Consequential loss is usually expressly excluded from cover. 
 
‘Property damage’ in CGL policies has been defined as ‘physical injury to or 
destruction of tangible property, including all loss of use of that property at any 
time resulting there from; or loss of use of tangible property that is not physically 
injured’.302 Environmental property damage usually consists of soil or 
groundwater contamination, although it is not limited to these two forms of 
damage. Damage can also be caused by the reduction in the air quality 
surrounding the property, as well as to objects such as structures, plants and 
animals on the property.303 Water damage, also known as ‘water losses’ is 
                                                 
299 Reinecke et al 221. 
300 Clarke 551 states that the term ‘mischief’ indicates that it does not include normal wear and 
tear. 
301 Howard & Mackowsky 888 discuss case law where it was held that ‘non-physical loss’ is 
excluded from cover. 
302 See Whitney 506; Fogleman 496 compares the wording of the earlier 1973 version with this 
subsequent wording in the 1986 version.  
303 Howard & Mackowsky 883.  
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usually expressly excluded from cover.304 Water is also often seen as a shared 
public resource to which no individual rights can attach, and damage to this type 
of public resource and the duty to remedy does not fall under the ‘owned 
property’ exclusion.305 
 
6.6.2.3.2 Scope of damages 
 
Property damage can include the costs of repair or replacement, depreciation of 
the value of property, compensation for the loss of use306 or discomfort caused 
by the harm, and also stigma damages. Stigma damages are caused by the 
perception of damage, for example, where a depreciation in market value occurs 
because of the public’s perception of the reduced value due to the proximity of 
the land to the contamination. This will also occur where land was physically 
damaged yet cleaned up, but a reduction in market value occurs due to the 
stigma of residual contamination or the knowledge that the land was 
contaminated.307  
 
Building owners, architects, and building contractors can, for example, also be 
held liable for property damage and bodily injury caused by ‘sick building 
syndrome’.308  
 
                                                 
304 See chap 5 par 5.3.2.3.7 for this specific type of exclusion in property policies; see also 
Chesler & Schulman 250; and 256 that no distinction is made in this regard between flooding and 
slower gradual water infiltration. 
305 See in this regard Whitney 526 et seq on relevant case law on this point. 
306 See for example the Finnish Environmental Damage and Compensation Act 1994 that 
provides that a ‘reasonable’ compensation may be provided for a prejudiced party for non-
pecuniary loss linked to the reduced use of his property. The term ‘reasonable’ is to be defined in 
terms of duration of the nuisance and the degree to which the prejudiced party could have 
reduced or prevented it. This also incorporates the type of damage claimed in accordance with 
‘lost trees’-awards. 
307 Fogleman 394; Van Daele 18 describes the situation where a value for ‘onzekerheid en angst’ 
relating to one’s environment, or the unpleasant side-effect of a bad smell caused by pollution are 
immeasurable; see also the discussion of ‘pure economic losses’ in chap 4 par 4.2.6.2.5 above, 
and par 6.6.2.6 below. 
308 See Mitchell 127. 
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6.6.2.3.3 Clean-up or reinstatement costs as ‘property damage’ 
 
In recent South African case law on the interpretation of a statutory description of 
‘property damage’, the interpretation of the term was found to include cover for 
the insured’s liability to pay clean-up costs for ecological damage caused.309 It 
was held that where the insurer wished to exclude ‘ecological damage’ from any 
other kind of ‘property damage’, it should have done so expressly.310 Where the 
wording states that ‘remediation costs must be incurred because of property 
damage’, a case can be made that the insured does not have to limit the claim 
against his liability insurer to the exact property damage, but only to the damages 
and compensation incurred because of damage to property.311 Although the 
wording of the policy must be interpreted in the context of the policy, it often does 
not offer clear solutions to address these problems. 
 
The word ‘reinstate’ usually refers to the repair of damage where there is a partial 
loss, whereas ‘replace’ refers to a replacement where there is total loss. 
‘Restoration’ includes both these scenarios. Some policies contain a 
reinstatement clause, which allows the insurer to elect to reinstate rather than to 
pay out the value of the loss or damage under the policy. 312 
 
6.6.2.3.4  ‘Owned property’ exclusion  
 
Reference must again be made to this specific exclusion that refers to ‘property’. 
Public liability policies also include a standard ‘owned property exclusion’ clause, 
which bars the insured from claiming for damage caused to his own property 
under the liability policy and forces him to claim under his first-party property 
                                                 
309 See Truck and General Insurance Co Ltd v Verulam Fuel Distributors CC and another 33. 
310 Par 23 of the judgment. 
311 See Fogleman 1541 for various arguments and counter-arguments on this point. 
312 Merkin 358 et seq on the benefits of a reinstatement clause and the time limit to exercise the 
option to reinstate. 
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insurance cover.313 Where pollution has migrated from owned property to a third 
party’s property, the costs incurred for the clean-up of the owned property to 
prevent further loss to the third-party property are often interpreted not to fall 
within the scope of this specific exclusion, and therefore included under the cover 
provided.314 Courts have even held that where a third party’s property is merely 
threatened by the possibility of pollutants migrating to it and causing harm, it is 
sufficient to find that clean-up costs of the primary site or ‘owned property’ fall 
beyond the scope of an ‘owned property’ exclusion, and does enjoy cover.315 
Whitney is correct in concluding that this is contrary to the intention of providing 
remediation cover and that cover should be excluded until the damage to third-
party property due to the migration becomes ‘real’.316 Remediation costs cannot 
per se include all prevention costs. It should only include prevention costs in the 
situation where loss to third-party property has already been caused, and where 
remediation is required to prevent an increase in further losses. 
 
The position regarding the coverage of loss relating to ‘after acquired property’ 
remains uncertain. Few courts have considered whether an insured enjoys cover 
under a policy that was acquired after a policy period had expired, but where the 
damage to the property occurred during the policy period.317 It is submitted that 
as insurers could not have contemplated these losses prior to the insured 
acquiring the property, they are not liable unless they unambiguously provide for 
this type of cover. 
 
                                                 
313 Whitney 507 confirms that the purpose of this exclusion is to limit claims brought under liability 
policies for legal liabilities towards third parties for their property damage, and to force the insured 
to claim from his first-party property insurance cover. 
314 See Whitney 508 on the judgment in much-quoted case of Broadwell Realty Services v 
Fidelity & Casualty Co; also 509 et seq for more case law on this point; see also Fogleman 592 
for more case law in the USA on this point. 
315 See in this regard Whitney 540 et seq on recent developments in the USA with specific 
reference to relevant case law. 
316 As stated by Whitney 548 in his conclusion. 
317 Fogleman 518 on the position in the USA courts on this issue. 
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6.6.2.4 Clean-up and restoration costs 
 
There is little room for misinterpretation where the words ‘clean-up costs’ or 
‘restoration costs’ are used.  Although ‘reparation’ requires full compensation, it 
has no single, logically determined, fixed meaning in law.318 One must ask 
whether the general term ‘damages’ also includes these clean-up and salvage 
costs that are incurred during remedial works, by examining the wording and 
intention of the entire policy.319 As reinstatement is a secondary measurement of 
damage or loss in South African law, this measurement will be appropriate to 
quantify clean-up costs.320 
 
Whereas only one judgment has been given in South African law, diverse 
judgments have been given on these issues in the UK.321 The term ‘damages’ 
has been interpreted to mean ‘sums which fall to be paid by reason of some 
breach of duty or obligation, whether that duty or obligation is imposed by 
contract, the general law or by legislation’.322 On the other hand it has also been 
held that the principal purpose of interference-with-property cover was to provide 
protection against claims based on tort, but not also against statutory claims.323 
 
In the USA ‘clean-up costs’ were only accepted as a form of claimable ‘damages’ 
from about the 1990s. The 1998 ISO pollution exclusion clause, for example, 
expressly bars cover for ‘any loss, or expense arising out of any request, 
demand, order or statutory or regulatory requirement that any insured or others 
test for, monitor, clean-up, remove, contain, treat, detoxify or neutralize, or in any 
                                                 
318 Bowman & Boyle 17. 
319 For an extensive discussion of this point, see the Report by the Comit’e Europ’een des 
Assurances (‘CEA’) Study on first-party legal obligations for clean-ups and corresponding 
insurance covers in European Countries Paris CEA (21 October 1998). 
320 See the discussion of this measurement in par 6.6.2.2 above.  
321 In Bartoline Limited v Royal & Sun Alliance Plc and another [2007] 1 All ER (Comm) 1043 the 
court rejected a wide interpretation of the word ‘damages’ and denied a claim under a public 
liability policy for statutory clean-up costs; see also King v Brandywine Reinsurance Company 
(UK) Ltd [2004] 2 All ER (Comm) 443; see Fogleman 1537 for additional case law in point. 
322 As per J Greene in Hall Brothers Steamship Company Ltd v Young 748. 
323 Bartoline Limited v Royal & Sun Alliance Plc and another 1043. 
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way respond to or assess the effects of “pollutants”; or claim or suit by or on 
behalf of a governmental authority for damages because of these activities’.324 
The general term ‘damages’ has generally been held to be ambiguous and has 
often been construed in favour of the insured, therefore including all financial 
losses that the insured reasonably would have accepted the term ‘damages’ to 
cover.325 
 
In Belgium the state remains liable for the process of restoring the environment, 
and can institute a claim for both ‘environmental damage’326 and ‘environmental 
impairment’ costs.327 The latter includes all collective interests as well as all 
negative consequences caused by pollution. 328 
 
As mentioned above, South African courts have held that statutory clean-up 
costs for ecological damage fall within the broad description of ‘property damage’ 
under a liability insurance policy.329 
The term ‘compensation’ cannot be interpreted as a mere synonym for 
‘damages’, and it also remains open for interpretation whether it includes clean-
up costs and expenses. This will be the case provided that it can be read as such 
in the context of the entire policy.330 
 
Currently, policyholders in South Africa as well as in other countries are warned 
to include cover eo nomine for clean-up costs to avoid lack of cover.331 Again it is 
suggested that specific reference must be made in the contract on whether 
                                                 
324 As examined by Fogleman 436. 
325 See Fogleman 492–494 for an extensive list of USA case law on this point; it was held by 
some courts that as CERCLA makes a distinction between ‘clean-up costs’ and ‘natural resource 
damages’, the former should not be included in the general term ‘damages’. 
326 Art 2,7 as ‘any loss or disadvantage suffered by an individual or by a legal entity as a result of 
marine pollution of the marine environment, whatever the cause may be,’ 
327 Art 2,7 describes this term as ’any negative influence on the marine environment for as long 
as it does not constitute damages’. 
328 Belgian Act 12 March 1999 art 2,6; art 3; art 37. 
329 Truck and General Insurance Co Ltd v Verulam Fuel Distributors CC and another par 13. 
330 In the opinion of Fogleman 1540. 
331 See Truck and General Insurance Co Ltd v Verulam Fuel Distributors CC and another par 23; 
Fogleman (2007) 825 in reaction to the judgement given in the Bartoline case. 
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clean-up costs are included or excluded, as is the case in the ISO policy 
exclusions and the South African PLIP policies.332 The extent of these costs and 
whether it is possible to clean up or restore to exactly the original condition of the 
environment is dealt with in the evaluation of natural resource damages below.333 
  
6.6.2.5 Natural resource damages 
 
6.6.2.5.1 Descriptions 
 
Natural resource damages334 are those caused to the environment per se, for 
example, damage to biodiversity and to the landscape.335 The term ‘natural 
resources’ is, for example, defined in the Conservation of Agricultural Resources 
Act336 as ‘the soil, the water sources and the vegetation, excluding weeds and 
invader plants,’ yet this applies only for purpose of this Act.337 The market value 
of property does not always reflect the true intrinsic value of the property to the 
insured. In some cases the asset, although intrinsically valuable, will technically 
have no market value at all.338 This makes the secondary measure of loss 
namely reinstatement to the previous condition a suitable one. See the 
evaluation of this point under the examination of quantification of damages that 
follows below.  
 
                                                 
332 Special Risks Underwriters Yesterday’s Policies won’t meet tomorrow’s needs: The PLIP 
policies (1992) 3.  
333 See par 6.6.4 below. 
334 Also known as ‘NRD’ claims, which have significantly increased over the past decade. See 
Donnellon T, Rusk G “Natural Resource Damage: Risk Management Implications Associated with 
Natural Resource Damage Claims” 2005 Environmental Claims Journal 249 for a discussion of 
risk management by insurers and reinsurers and the impact of the increase of these claims on 
their environmental loss reserves. 
335 As stated by Faure (ed) 138. 
336 Act 43 of 1983. 
337 S 1 item 18. 
338 See Reinecke et al par 303 on these shortcomings of market value as the primary method of 
quantifying damage or loss. 
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CERCLA considers a ‘natural resources‘339 to be damaged where there has been 
‘a measurable adverse change, either long- or short-term, in the chemical or 
physical quality or the viability of a natural resource resulting either directly or 
indirectly from exposure to a discharge of oil or release of a hazardous 
substances or exposure to a product of reactions resulting from the discharge of 
oil or release of a hazardous substance’.340 It then establishes the liability of a 
potentially responsible person for ‘damage for injury to, destruction of, or loss of 
natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, 
destruction, or loss resulting from such a release’.341 This description can be 
endorsed as it is comprehensive, and the wording used is quite certain and clear. 
 
Belgian law distinguishes ‘environmental damage’ from ‘environmental 
impairment’. The former is defined as ‘any loss or disadvantage suffered by an 
individual or by a legal entity as a result of marine pollution of the marine 
environment, whatever the cause may be.’342 Whereas ‘environmental 
impairment’ is defined as ’any negative influence on the marine environment for 
as long as it does not constitute damages.’343 The latter includes all collective 
interests as well as all the detrimental consequences caused. The Belgian State 
is entitled to institute a claim for these damages or impairments, as restoration of 
the environment remains the primary goal of the State.344 
 
The interpretation and extent of a claim for ‘harm’ or ‘loss’ as a form of damages 
is also not clear. One of the best examples that can be used to illustrate this 
issue is whether ‘harm’ caused by sick-building syndrome is seen as 
                                                 
339 See chap 2 par 2.2.3.6 for the definition of ‘natural resources’; also the discussion of a claim 
brought in terms of CERCLA in chap 7 par 7.6.2.2 below. 
340 See the evaluation of this definition provided by Fogleman 305. 
341 § 9607(a)(4)(C). 
342 Belgian legislation Wet van 12 Maart 1999 art 2,6. 
343 Above art 2,7. 
344 Above art 37 and art 3. 
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environmental or pollution damage.345 SBS is discussed above.346 It causes both 
bodily injury as well as property damage. The identity of the person responsible 
for the harm caused remains uncertain in most SBS cases. Uncertainty also 
reigns as to whether the claim falls within the scope of a general pollution 
exclusion clause and is thus excluded from insurance cover. 
 
6.6.2.5.2 Valuation and quantification methods 
 
Restoration costs must serve as the basic measure of damages where any other 
quantification or value is absent, although the costs of restoration might be 
grossly disproportionate to the marginal ecological benefit gained from such 
restorative actions.347 It is difficult to put a price tag on public air, water, wildlife 
and scenery as the market value cannot always reflect the true intrinsic value.348 
Once again, this confirms that the secondary measure of loss, namely 
reinstatement, is suitable for this kind of situation. 
 
Existence value or use value is clearly to the benefit of individuals, and a claim 
for its loss is analogous to a civil damages claim for ‘pain and suffering’. Animals 
and plants could be driven to extinction, coral reefs destroyed and air quality 
reduced, resulting in the destruction of entire ecosystems.349 This situation does 
not easily fit into the classic compensation system. This should be made possible 
especially where the health and well-being of the community is affected.350 
 
                                                 
345 See also Mitchell 124, as well as Wollner 1 et seq; Meridian Mutual Insurance Company v 
Kellman where a sealant on the floors of a room situated above those of the claimant caused 
severe respiratory difficulties.   
346 See par 6.5.6.7 above. 
347 State of Ohio v Department of the Interior 880 F 2d 432  (DC Cir 1989). 
348 Larsson 545 considers the values placed on ‘services provided by natural environments’, such 
as non-consumable recreational activities on 546; see also Sclafane S “Fish gotta swim, birds 
gotta fly: NRD Claims Muddy Insurance Waters” 2005 (April) National Underwriter Property 
&Casualty 24 that there is no general standard based on what the ‘average person’ expects to 
see in nature that can be applied to assess these damages, and the merit of the formula applied 
by the state of New Jersey to develop a ‘settlement number’ to force insurers to settle claims.  
349 These all serve as examples of public international goods.  
350 Own translation of the situation where ‘volksgezondheid in gedrang kom’. 
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The valuation of these claims for the spoiling of a natural resource is commonly 
known as a ‘non-use contingent valuation’.351 ‘Indirect’ compensation can be 
awarded for damage to natural resources by the enforcement of restoration or 
reinstatement measures.352 
 
Even when on private property, the valuation of natural resource damage based 
on a depreciation in property value does not offer an exact valuation of the 
damage.353 A change in environmental quality will, however, certainly affect most 
of the economic values that relate to that property.354 It should stand to reason 
that an individual owner can ask for complete restoration of contaminated natural 
resources only if the restoration costs are not completely disproportionate 
compared to the value of property.355 
 
An issue that affects the extent of the damages is the question as to what degree 
or condition the resource must be restored. The Water Resources Act356 in the 
UK, for example, provides that a person who must remedy or prevent pollution 
must ‘as far as is reasonable practicable to do so [to restore] the waters, 
including any flora and fauna dependent on the aquatic environment of the 
waters, to their state immediately before the matter became present in the 
waters.’357 It stands to reason that it is not always possible to restore or clean-up 
to the original state of the environment.358 
 
                                                 
351 De Ketelaere 27. 
352 See De Ketelaere 29–39 for a comprehensive examination of valuation methods for environ-
mental damage. 
353 In the opinion of Larsson 545. 
354 As reiterated by De Ketelaere 39. 
355 This is also the position in German law in s 251.2 of the German Civil Code. 
356 Act of 1991; see also the discussion in chap 7 par 7.3 below on this position in the UK. 
357 S 16; see also Fogleman V “The Widening Gap in Cover for Environmental Liabilities in Public 
Liability policies” 2007 (June) Journal of Planning and Environmental Law 816 819. 
358  See the Finnish Environmental Act s 6; Norwegian Pollution Control Act 1981 par 58; Larsson 
541 suggests the development of something called ‘ambition norms’ for purpose of clean-up and 
restoration. 
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6.6.2.6 Consequential, prospective and pure economic losses 
 
Consequential loss and prospective loss can take many forms, but loss of profit 
is the most commonly found form.359 Under valued policies, it is permissible for 
the insured to include consequential or prospective loss such as lost profits under 
his claim, provided that the insurer agreed that the valuation is prima facie 
conclusive and that it is recoverable. Under unvalued policies consequential 
losses can only be claimed where they were expressly included under the cover 
provided.360 
 
The correct formula to calculate the quantum of prospective damage must be 
found under the sum-formula approach and the concrete concept of damages, 
which focuses on the withdrawal or deterioration of a particular part or element of 
a person’s patrimony.361 The hypothetical element of the sum-formula approach, 
however, renders it more suitable for the assessment and quantification of 
prospective losses. The hypothetical position that existed before the damage-
causing event that has become unreal, and the hypothetical position after the 
damage-causing event that has become real must be compared and the 
difference seen as the quantum of the damage suffered.362 The court must 
furthermore discount or capitalise the amount as the plaintiff receives the amount 
in advance.363 
 
                                                 
359 See Visser PJ, Potgieter JM, Steynberg l & Floyd TB The Law of Damages 2nd ed (2003) 
(hereinafter ‘Visser et al’) 121 et seq for forms of prospective loss, which include future expenses, 
loss of future income, loss of business, professional or contractual profit, loss of prospective 
support and loss of chance; Merkin 345 provides as examples future loss of business, damage to 
goodwill, loss of prospective lucrative business opportunities and loss of future income. 
360 See the discussion on the inclusion of consequential loss under the cover provided by Merkin 
344–347. 
361 Visser et al 71; Reinecke MFB ”Nabetragting oor die Skadeleer en Voordeeltoerekening” 1988 
De Jure 221 (hereinafter ‘Reinecke (1988)’) 226 supports the idea that the concrete approach 
offers advantages above the abstract approach. 
362 Visser et al 119. 
363 SA Eagle Insurance Co Ltd v Hartley 1990 4 SA 833 (A) 839. 
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Where the damage is caused before the accrual of the cause of action or at the 
time of commencement of the action until the moment of judgment, the 
calculation of the existence and quantum of the prospective losses are not that 
complex, as the court has factual evidence at the time of judgment although it 
was not necessarily available at the time of summons. This must affect the 
amount of compensable damages ordered. 
 
Pure economic losses are losses that do not directly refer to personal or property 
injury, for example, the loss of revenue and affected reputation. The question 
under this discussion of exclusion clauses remains whether the general term 
‘damages’ includes ‘pure economic loss’.364 Again it can be emphasized that best 
practice requires that the contract or policy document must specifically include or 
exclude pure economic loss in the wording used to describe the damages or 
extent of cover, as is the case in the PLIP policies.365  
 
As stated previously, because courts are universally reluctant to allow claims for 
pure financial losses,366 some countries introduced express legislative provisions 
to allow insurance claims for these losses.367 The exception is found in marine 
                                                 
364 See chap 4 par 4.2.6.2.5. 
365 Special Risks Underwriters Yesterday’s Policies won’t meet tomorrow’s needs: PLIP policies 
3; see also Fogleman (2007) 821 on the importance of the policy wording, especially in public 
liability policies are they are as a general rule not standardised. 
366 See the discussion of claims for pure economic losses in South African law in chap 4 par 
4.2.6.2.5; Bussani M, Palmer VV & Parisi F “Liability for Pure Economic Loss in Europe: an 
Economic Restatement” 2003  51) The American Journal of Comparative Law 113 that the notion 
of ‘pure economic loss’ and liability for this type of loss varies considerably and that Western 
countries are divided over these issues; see the discussion of this principle, also known as the 
‘bright-line rule’ in Larsson 395; Faure (ed) 136; claims in the USA were disallowed in Robins Dry 
Dock & Repair Co v Flint US Supreme Court 275 US 303 (1927); General Public Utilities v Glass 
Kitchens of Lancaster Inc 374 PaSuper 203 542A 2d 567 (1988); Adkins v Thomas Solvent 
Company 440 Mich 293 487 NW 2d 715 (1992); Chance v BP Chemicals Inc 77 Ohio st 3d 17 
670 NE 2d 985 (1996); yet claims were allowed in Local Joint Executive Bd. & Culinary Workers 
Union, Local No. 226 v Stern 98 Nev 409 651 P 2d 637 (1982); Burgess v M/V Tamano 370 Supp 
247 (DMe1973); Brown v Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (In re Paoli 
Railroad Yard PCB Litigation) 35 F 3d 717(3d Cir 1994); Terra-Products Inc v Kraft General 
Foods Inc 653 NE 2d 89 (Ind Ct App.1995). 
367 See for example the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 43 USCA δ1811; Fisherman’s 
Contingency Fund 43 USCA δδ1841-1846 in the USA; the 1994 Finnish Environmental Act; see 
specifically also the South African Consumer Protection Bill s 61(5) which provides that ‘harm’ 
Footnote continues on the next page. 
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pollution claims, where the loss or reduction of professional use of natural 
resources due to pollution lead to financial losses for fishermen and beach-front 
tourism operators and are automatically seen to fall under the concept of 
‘damages’.368 The position in South African law on whether compensable claims 
for pure economic loss can be brought is discussed in chapter 4 above.369 
 
Assessing pure economic loss, especially where future economic losses are 
concerned, proves to be difficult. In the words of the court in the Lim Poh Choo 
case, ‘[t]here is really only one certainty; the future will prove the award to be 
either too high or too low.’ 370  
 
6.7 Locus Standi and Conflict of Laws 
 
Insurance issues are usually of a contractual nature, and the contract in most 
instances contains clauses on the choice of law, court jurisdiction and 
enforcement.371 In international disputes jurisdiction is established where the 
defendant is domiciled under the Brussels Regulation for EU members,372 and 
under the Lugano Convention373 for non-EU members who are members of the 
Economic Free Trade Association and also party to the European Economic 
Area Agreement within the EU.374 Where a defendant is domiciled in another 
country the common law of that country prevails.375 Jurisdiction is not determined 
 
includes death, injury, illness, loss of or physical damage to property, and any economic loss 
(own emphasis). 
368 Larsson 537 describes pure financial loss in such a situation as including ‘certain loss of profit 
(possibly identifiable as a form of lucrum cessans), business interruptions, professional loss of 
use of natural resources, but not a failure to make a potential future profit’; see also Commité 
Maritime International CMI Yearbook:Admissibility and Assessment of Claims for Pollution 
Damage Part II (1993) 95. 
369 Chap 4 pars 4.2.6.2.7, 4.2.6.4.4. 
370 Lim Poh Choo v Camden and Islington AHA [1980] AC 174; also Harpwood 410–413 on the 
fairness and efficiency of tort compensation. 
371 McGee 647. 
372 European Council Regulation 44/2001 OJL 12 articles 2,3 and 4 which came in force on 1 
March 2002. 
373 Lugano Convention of 1989. 
374 See the explanation by Merkin 37 par 2-01. 
375 Regulation 44/2001 2001 OJ L 12. 
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by domicile alone, but in matters relating to contract it can also be determined by 
the place where performance of the obligation has to take place.376 
 
Specifically regarding insurance, the insurer may be sued where the insurer or 
his branch, agency or other establishment, or where the insured is domiciled.377 
In respect of liability insurance or insurance of immovable property, the insurer 
may be sued where the harmful event occurred.378 This also applies where both 
movable and immovable property are covered under the same policy and are 
adversely affected by the same harmful event.379 Articles 13 and 14 provide for 
situations in which it is possible to derogate from the insurance rules.380 In non-
European cases, the court of a member-state has jurisdiction where the 
applicant, plaintiff or prejudiced party has some form of presence within the 
jurisdiction.381 
 
Insurance policies often also contain an arbitration provision that requires 
disputes to be heard by an arbitration process in order to avoid costly litigation.382 
Many varying forms of and options for alternative dispute resolution procedures   
can be found in insurance policies.383 
 
Where these provisions require the policyholder to litigate in a foreign jurisdiction 
the costs can be excessive.384 Vertical and horizontal fragmentation of pollution 
                                                 
376 Above article 5. 
377 Above article 9. 
378 Above article 10; see also McGee 650. 
379 Above 
380 For example, for claims relating to ships, sea installations, aircraft and contracts of carriage 
and goods in transit, or claims covering large commercial risks; see also Merkin 46 par 2-09 for a 
comprehensive list of the categories of acceptable exclusive jurisdiction agreements. 
381 As stated by McGee 656. 
382 See especially Reinecke et al pars 300 who state that matters of quantification are often 
referred to arbitration; see also 239 par 318 on the agreement between the parties that arbitration 
is the suitable forum for dispute resolution; see also Merkin 37 par 2-01 on the similar position in 
the UK which is regulated in terms of s 9 of the Arbitration Act 1996. 
383 See in general Masters 72 for an explanation and examples of typical arbitration provisions 
specifically in the USA. 
384 In the words of Masters 72 that such a ‘traveling road show may increase many fold the cost 
of an already potentially expensive proposition’. 
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regulation regimes and the lack of integration of pollution legislation nationally as 
well as internationally also contribute to this problem, but these issues deserve a 
study on their own cannot be addressed or examined in greater detail in this 
thesis.385  
 
6.8 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
It clearly appears from this chapter that although the issues that complicate 
effective insurance for environmental damage are universal, the solutions or 
attempts to find them are not. In order to propose effective solutions to and 
improvements regarding the problems encountered in the South African law, the 
following issues should be addressed. 
 
Lack of information affects the predictability of environmental risks that the 
insurer requires for effective risk differentiation. It also affects the prejudiced 
party’s claim against the polluter for damages, as well as the insurance claims 
under first-party and third-party insurance. This is especially the case where 
environmental damage is caused by the ‘new risks’ as addressed in the 
preceding chapters. It is submitted that the right of access to information as 
examined in chapter 3 above, will facilitate the risk-differentiation process as well 
as the abovementioned claims. It is also proposed that mandatory 
comprehensive public registers must be kept within specified industries and that 
monitoring via policy and licensing conditions must be increased. Information can 
also be made available to the public by allowing access to detailed environmental 
impact assessments and by reports of regular ecological audits by the relevant 
authorities. 
                                                 
385 See in this regard the following opinions of South African writers: Glazewski J Environmental 
Law in South Africa 2nd ed (2005) 550–557; Kidd M “Integrated Pollution Control in South Africa: 
How Easy a Task?” 1995 (2) SAJELP 37–54; Kotzé L “Improving Unsustainable Environmental 
Governance in South Africa: the Case for Holistic Governance” 2006 Potchefstroom Electronic 
Law Journal 1-44; Nel J & Du Plessis W “Unpacking Integrated Environmental Management – a 
Step Closer to Effective Co-operative Governance?” 2004 SA Public Law 181; Bray E 
“Fragmentation of the Environment: Another Opportunity Lost for a Nationally Coordinated 
Approach?” 1995 (10) SA Public Law 173. 
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The insurer only incurs liability towards his insured or a third party once the claim 
against him vests. The time when the claim vests depends on the relevant trigger 
theory that applies to that specific policy. Problems occur where there is a delay 
between the polluting occurrence, the impact of the pollutants, the manifestation 
of the loss and the institution of the insurance claim. The basic trigger theories 
relate to these time periods. 
 
The first type of policy is based on the ‘acts committed’ or ‘occurrence based’ 
trigger. The insurance policy in force at that time provides the cover. The 
disadvantage with this type of trigger is that the insurer is exposed to an 
unlimited extensive prospective cover, called ‘long-tail’ liability. Due to the delay 
between the polluting conduct or occurrence, the eventual manifestation of loss 
and the subsequent claim, complications arise. Evidence and information may be 
lost, the insurer or the original insured may not exist anymore, and the cover may 
prove to have been insufficient to cover these prospective losses. It is also 
notoriously difficult to determine the exact time at which the polluting occurrence 
or conduct occurred. Due to these complications it has become general 
insurance practice to move away from these types of policies. 
 
The second type of policy is the ‘manifestation’ or ‘loss-occurrence’ policy. The 
policy in force at the time of manifestation of loss provides cover irrespective of 
when the polluting occurrence occurred. Most public liability policies are triggered 
by the ‘occurrence’ or ‘event’ that caused the insured’s liability. The insurer who 
is liable to provide cover was unaware of the risks posed in the past by the actual 
polluter when he determined the risks and agreed to provide cover. 
 
The third type of policy is issued on a ‘claims-made’ basis. Although it has been 
criticised, insurers see it as the most acceptable of the triggers.   Because of the 
danger that the insurer under such a policy could incur an infinite retroactive 
liability for all past sins, these policies are linked to fixed retroactive dates. It 
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offers the insurer a finite time of cover, a more predictable risk and no danger of 
potential future claims in terms of a long-tail liability. These benefits offer the 
insured the advantage that the premiums are generally lower than those of other 
policies. He also enjoys the benefit of retroactive cover. He must, however, 
disclose all knowledge that he has or should have had of any polluting 
occurrence preceding the inception of the policy. To avoid long-tail liability, the 
viability of introducing the claims-made trigger for the vesting of claims in specific 
industries should be considered. As addressed in chapter 4 above, issues of 
causation and the allocation of liability in multiple and cumulative causation 
situations deserve urgent attention, and the introduction of the ‘claims-made’ 
trigger could address some of these issues.  
 
In some cases the policy is issued on a ‘claims-made and reported’ basis. The 
notification of the discovery of loss prior to the claim, as well as the claim itself, 
must be made within the stipulated time period. Where the policy contains a duty 
to notify the insurer of the claim, the clause may constitute either a contractual 
duty or a suspensive condition. Where it is the former, failure to give proper 
notice when it is due will constitute breach of contract. In most instances, the 
policy contains a clause that the insured forfeits his right to claim under the policy 
where he does not give proper notice within a set time limit. In case of the latter, 
the insured’s right to claim from the insurer is suspended until he meets the 
condition. In both situations the insured is precluded from claiming. In order to 
prevent uncertainties it is proposed that vague wording in these clauses that 
notice must be given ‘as soon as possible’, ‘immediately’ or ‘within a reasonable 
time’ should be prohibited. A specific, realistic time limit should be included. This 
can also be justified by the saga of Barkhuizen v Napier that came before South 
African courts recently as addressed throughout this chapter. 
 
Where more than one insurer is liable for a loss, they must all respond and the 
claim must be allocated between them. Sometimes, the insured does not procure 
insurance cover for a specific period, in which case he must also, as a self-
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insurer, be subjected to a specific method of allocation of liability. One method of 
allocation is a joint and several liability up to the policy limits. An example in 
South African statutory law of such a joint and several allocation method can be 
found in the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act. Joint and 
several liability is also proposed for product liability in the Consumer Credit Bill, 
and it is submitted that the latter could serve as an example of the 
implementation of such a liability regime for environmental pollution damage. 
This allocation method is more to the advantage of the insured as he can decide 
which one of the various insurers he wants to claim from, leaving the insurers to 
identify their respective shares in the liability and to claim contribution from each 
other.  
 
The other method of allocation would be a purely proportionate allocation 
according to the values of the various policies. Although the calculations are 
complicated where primary and excess policies apply, this form of allocation 
could provide a simple solution in that insurers would not be exposed to the 
whole claim as would be the case where there is a joint and several allocation of 
liability.  
 
Some of the more problematic issues relate to causation. In some cases it is 
impossible to prove the identity of the polluter who is responsible for the pollution 
damage. The USA avoids the issue by attributing the pollution damage to 
‘potentially responsible parties’ or PRP’s. This solution is based on the proximate 
cause test. A similar approach can be found in the South African Consumer 
Protection Bill on the proposed product liability regime. It is proposed that this 
could offer a solution to a very relevant issue that has the potential to frustrate 
many environmental damage claims.  In a situation of multiple causation more 
than one polluter contributes to a single cause of pollution, or a synergy of 
various pollutants could cause or increase pollution damage. The proximate 
cause test can also be applied to allocate liability. In the UK liability is allocated 
according to the materiality of the contribution by each polluter to the risk. In the 
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USA and in the Netherlands the problem is addressed by the allocation in 
accordance with a market-share liability. Whether a peril is included or excluded 
under each of the policies in question must also be considered. 
 
Most insurance policies contain exclusion, exemption and limitation clauses. 
These clauses may not be contrary to public policy. Where these clauses affect a 
person’s constitutional rights, the norm of public policy must be interpreted in 
accordance with the values of the Constitution to determine whether the clause in 
question is unconstitutional and therefore unenforceable or invalid. A time bar 
clause that denies the insured the right to institute an insurance claim against his 
insurer is such a clause and could prove to be contrary to the constitutional right 
of access to the courts. 
 
Exclusion and limitation clauses are not regulated by statute in South African law. 
In view of the latest case law on the nature of clean-up costs in relation to 
property damage, and the interpretation of various terms in these exclusion 
clauses, solutions must be considered. It is proposed that, as a potential solution 
to the problems relating to the interpretation and subsequent effect on cover of 
these clauses, stricter statutory control and regulation of the wording of clauses 
that affect the rights of the insured in insurance policies must be introduced. 
Standard definitions or descriptions, whether statutory or created by judgments 
that serve as legal precedent in South African law for terms such as ‘occurrence’, 
‘incident’, ‘event’, gradual’, ‘sudden and accidental’, ‘pollutant’ or ‘contaminant’, 
‘property’ and ‘natural resources’ are urgently required. Terminology such as ‘all 
risk cover’, ‘absolute’ or ‘total’ pollution exclusions, and ‘comprehensive’ liability 
cover often creates a misconception in the mind of the insured on the extent of 
the cover which he procures and should be avoided. The use of these vague and 
misleading terms should be prevented. The wording used for the provisions in 
insurance policies have been labelled as being arcane, ambiguous and 
convoluted, and an attempt should be made to simplify the wording to serve the 
general man-on-the-street or average consumer with an average education 
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within his specific environment. Whether the insurance industry will allow the 
restrictive effect of this type of statutory or regulatory intervention will depend on 
whether the statutory description will be effective from the viewpoint of both the 
insured and the insurer. For the insurer, the benefit lies therein that the risk is 
better defined and that unnecessary and costly disputes can be avoided. For the 
insured, the benefit lies in the fact that ‘what he sees is what he gets’, in that the 
wording that appears in his policy documents has a predetermined meaning and 
scope. 
 
As the rules of interpretation of contracts do not always offer a comprehensive 
and generic solution to disputes regarding the wording of policies, basic pro 
forma or model clauses for the specific industries could offer more legal certainty. 
As the model clauses as discussed in this chapter serve as mere examples and 
are directive and regulatory rather than peremptory, a stricter proposal of model 
policy wording may be required to standardise the industry. 
 
The last issue relates to the nature and the quantification of ‘damages’ and 
‘compensation’ in an environmental context. The assessment and valuation of 
environmental damage will never be an exact science and will always depend on 
a court’s best reasonable estimate or guess based on the facts and 
circumstances of each situation. For property loss, a depreciation of market value 
serves as the most reliable measure. For natural resource damage, the clean-up 
and restoration costs serve as the best measure. As it is difficult to claim for other 
losses such as pure economic loss, lost profits, stigma damages, prospective 
loss and sentimental loss, statutory intervention allowing these claims is required. 
The proposal in the South African Consumer Credit Bill that allows a claim for 
‘economic losses’ serves as an example. The goal should remain the effective 
indemnification of the loss and damage caused by pollution, yet not at the cost of 
a viable and profitable insurance market. 
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The position in South African law and the universal issues and complications 
relating to environmental insurance are addressed in this chapter and in the 
preceding chapters of this study. The next chapter includes a background study 
of the liability systems and the availability of environmental damage insurance 
and environmental liability insurance cover in other countries. The position in the 
EU, specifically the Netherlands, Belgium and the UK, as well as the position in 
the USA are examined.386 As the topic is extensive, a true comparative study is 
not possible and only an excursus into the law of each country is provided in the 
following chapter.  
                                                 
386 See chap 1 of this study for the reasons why these countries have been chosen. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
EXCURSUS: THE POSITION 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND IN THE USA 
 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Due to the generic nature of insurance and the universal right to an unpolluted 
environment, many of the issues discussed in the previous chapters come 
into play in most other countries with similar effect. This requires a brief 
discussion of the position in other countries that will enable one to avoid the 
many pitfalls by learning from the past experiences of others. In order to run 
parallel to the discussion of the position in South African law, statutory and 
civil liability regimes for pollution damage in a specific country are discussed 
first, followed by an investigation into the availability of insurance against 
pollution damage. The two basic liability regimes include the liability of states 
or other international persons under international law,1 and the liability of 
individual polluters, which could include a state under rules of national law. 
This study covers only the statutory and civil liability of individuals, and the 
insurability of the risk of environmental damage and of liability for causing 
such damage under the various foreign law regimes. 
 
The issues surrounding liability for pollution damage and its insurability 
currently receive their fair share of attention worldwide. This appears clearly 
from the implementation of more extensive legislative measures and by an 
increase in case law on issues relating to liability and the scope and 
interpretation of insurance policies.2 As all the aspects of a specific country’s 
                                            
1 See chap 3 pars 3.3.3 above on international statutory liability. 
2 See Rodler DN ‘Carbon Monoxide Ruled to be a Pollutant’ 2003 (January 27) The Legal 
Intelligencer 1 for a discussion of the case of Matcon Diamond Inc v Penn National Insurance 
Co No 186 WDA 2002 (Pa Super Jan 2003), where carbon monoxide was found to be a 
pollutant that therefore fell within the ambit of the pollution exclusion clause in an insurance 
policy, as per the definition of a ‘contaminant’ being something that ‘renders another thing 
impure and unsuitable for breathing’. See also Mount Lebanon v Reliance Insurance Co 2001 
Footnote continues on the next page. 
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statutory position on environmental matters and the particularities of its liability 
and insurance law are extensive, a true comprehensive comparative study 
within the scope of the topic of this study is difficult. Only the primary 
environmental statutes and the rudimentary features of the principles of 
liability and insurance of the United Kingdom,3 Belgium, the Netherlands and 
the United States of America4 are addressed in this chapter to serve as a 
background study to this thesis. As these countries, except for the USA, are 
members of the European Union,5 the effect of the recent EU Environmental 
Liability Directive is addressed briefly below. 
 
 
7.2 THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
7.2.1 General  
 
Due to various polluting incidents in Europe during the 1970s and 1980s, calls 
increased for the European Commission to propose a liability system for the 
remediation of environmental damage.6 In June 1990 the Community Heads 
of State and Government adopted a ‘Declaration on the Environment’.7 It 
proclaims a ‘right to a healthy and clean environment, specifically regarding 
the quality of air, rivers, lakes, coastal and marine waters, the quality of food 
and drinking water, protection against noise, protection against contamination 
of soil, soil erosion and desertification, preservation of habits, flora and fauna, 
 
PA Super 177 9–11 on liability for chemical emissions and the implication of the specific 
exemption clause on liability for air pollution. 
3 Hereinafter the ‘UK’. 
4 Hereinafter the ‘USA’. 
5 Hereinafter the ‘EU’. 
6 Incidents included the wide-spread pollution of the Rhine. For a comprehensive discussion 
of this specific problem see Van Dunne JM (ed) Transboundary Pollution and Liability: The 
Case of the River Rhine (Conference Proceedings of the International Conference held at 
Rotterdam on 19 October 1990)  Instituut Milieuschade Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam 1991 
also referred to in chap 3, 4 and 6 above. 
7 European Council Resolution of June 15, 1990 Bulletin of the European Communities par 
1.36. 
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landscape and other elements of natural heritage, the amenity and quality of 
residential areas’.8 
 
Although the positions in the UK, in the Netherlands and in Belgium are 
discussed extensively below, it may be necessary to comment in passing that 
mandatory environmental damage insurance, which is complimentary to a 
liability system, is required in some other EU countries such as Finland and 
Sweden, as well as for specific industries in Germany.9 The positions in these 
countries are not addressed in greater detail below. 
 
7.2.2 The EU Directive 
 
7.2.2.1 Brief history 
 
After a lengthy process and deliberations, the final proposal for the 
Environmental Liability Directive or ‘ELD’ on environmental liability regarding 
the prevention and remediation of environmental damage was eventually 
adopted in 2004. It only became effective on 30 April 2007 and is currently 
being implemented as a pan-EU framework for environmental liability.10 
 
                                            
8 For a general discussion of the Declaration, see Kramer L EC Environmental Law (2007) 2; 
see also De Ketelaere K (ed) et al Handboek Milieu- en Energierecht (2006) (hereinafter ‘De 
Ketelaere’) Part III 207 et seq. 
9 The position in these countries is addressed in the studies by Wetterstein P “The Finnish 
Environmental Compensation Act” 1998 (May) The Bulletin: Pollution, products and new 
technologies (AIDA) 19; Oldertz C “Environmental Liability in Sweden” 1989 (3) Tijdschrift 
voor Milieuaansprakelijkheid 80; Pfennigstorf W “The state of pollution liability insurance in 
the Federal Republic of Germany” 1989 (3) Tijdschrift voor Milieuaansprakelijkheid 73; 
Hoffman WC “Environmental liability and its insurance in Germany” 1993 (2) (Winter) 
Federation of Insurance and Corporate Council Quarterly 147; Ladeur K “Der 
‘Umweltshaftungsfonds – ein Irrweg der Flexibilisierung des Umweltrechts?” 1993 
Versicherungsrecht 257. 
10 Directive 2004/35 CE [2004] O.J. L143/56; see Bratt P Polluter Pays. A short guide to the 
Environmental Liability Directive (2008) (hereinafter ‘Bratt’) 2 who confirms that the UK, as 
well as many other countries, to date failed to implement the proposed legislation. See also 
Fogleman V “The Environmental Liability Directive and its Impacts on English Environmental 
Law” 2006 (October) JPL 1443 for an extensive discussion of the impact on the position once 
the UK implements the Directive, which it has to date not done; Winter G, Jans JH, Macrory R 
& Kramer L “Weighing up the EC Environmental Liability Directive” 2008 (June) Journal of 
Environmental Law 163 (hereinafter ‘Winter et al’) 175–6 confirms that a draft Bill in the 
Netherlands is currently serving before Parliament; they discuss the positions in Germany, 
Poland, and Spain who have implemented the required legislation. 
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7.2.2.2 Basic scope of the ELD 
 
The benefit of the ELD lies in its focus on liability for natural resource 
damages or ‘NRD’s’, as these claims fare badly under traditional civil liability 
regimes. It introduces a strict liability regime, but has no retroactive operation 
as it covers environmental damage caused only by designated activities from 
date of its implementation.11 It also does not apply to cases of personal injury, 
damage to private property or to any economic loss, and does not affect any 
right to claim for these traditional forms of damage. Liability under the 
Directive qualifies as a ‘legal liability’ for purposes of an indemnity insurance 
claim.12 Aspects dealt with under international treaties, for example, on marine 
oil spill and nuclear liability, are expressly excluded from the Directive’s 
application.13 
 
7.2.2.3 Designated activities 
 
A strict liability regime exists for the liability of operators or controllers of 
certain designated activities for the environmental damage that they cause. 
Designated activities include (a) the operation of an installation subject to an 
environmental permit; (b) waste management operations; (c) discharges into 
surface and groundwater that require prior authorisation; (d) water extraction 
and impoundment subject to prior authorisation; (e) manufacture, use or a 
variety of other actions such as processing or transport of dangerous 
substances or preparations, plant protection products and biocidal products;14 
(f) transport of dangerous or polluting goods; (g) operation of installations that 
                                            
11 Bratt 2 is, however, of the opinion that ongoing impacts due to incidents that occurred prior 
to the ELD may in fact be covered, but that the Regulations will not apply to damage caused 
by an incident that took place 30 years or longer before the damage manifests. 
12 Fogleman V Environmental Liabilities and Insurance in England and the United States 
(2005) (hereinafter ‘Fogleman’) 1559 holds a similar viewpoint that liability under the Directive 
should  be sufficient to serve as a ‘legal liability’ to trigger insurance cover; see also the 
discussion in chap 6 par 6.5.6.6 above on these triggers. 
13 See Winter et al 173 et seq for a consideration of the interaction of the Directive with other 
liability systems such as the nuclear and marine oil pollution regimes. 
14 Wilson G “The Biocidal Products Directive” 1998 (July) European Environmental Law 
Review 204 provides the following examples of biocidal products: ‘wood preservatives, 
insecticides, pesticides and various anti-foulants and sanitizers.’ 
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combat air pollution caused by industrial plants; and (h) any contained use, 
transport or placing on the market of GMOs.15  
 
7.2.2.4 Description of ‘environmental damage’ 
 
‘Environmental damage’ in the proposed regulations includes (a) damage to 
protected species, natural habitat or sites of scientific interest caused by a 
‘designated activity’; (b) damage to surface water and groundwater; and (c) 
contamination of land by substances, preparations, organisms or micro 
organisms.16  These must pose a significant risk of an adverse effect on 
human health.17 
 
7.2.2.5 Remediation orders 
 
The operator has a primary duty to act in accordance with the Directive, and a 
secondary duty to carry any costs incurred. Strict notice procedures apply 
once there is a threat of environmental damage, or where damage has 
already been caused. Responsible persons can then be ordered by the 
relevant authority to take the necessary remediation measures that include (a) 
primary remediation or clean-up; (b) complementary remediation if resources 
cannot be returned to their original state; and (c) compensatory remediation 
that consists of stop-gap measures to compensate for shortage or resources 
                                            
15 As found in the Regulations to Sched 2. 
16 Bell S & McGillivray D Environmental Law 6th ed (2006) (hereinafter ‘Bell & McGillivray’) 
393 are of the opinion that the narrow scope of the description of ‘environmental damage’ 
under the Directive is problematic. Once again, the exact meaning of ‘remediation of the 
environment’ remains uncertain and although criteria are given, there is still, in their words, 
‘an inevitable vagueness about them’. See also 395 for their criticism that the Directive is in 
essence not environmental and does not provide for civil liability, but that it does offer the 
benefit of providing improved protection for the ‘unowned environment’; see also Winter et al 
172 for the drawbacks of the Directive because it does not offer any solution where the 
person responsible for the environmental ‘orphan damage’ remains unidentified. 
17 Art 2(1) describes ‘environmental damage’ as including (a) damage to protected species; 
(b) water damage; and (c) land damage; ‘damage’ is in general is defined as ‘a measurable 
adverse change in the natural resource or measurable impairment of a natural resource 
service which may occur directly or indirectly’. 
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or services until primary and complementary remediation have been 
completed.18 
 
The focus of the Directive is on statutory pollution prevention and clean-up or 
reparation rather than on the rights of prejudiced parties to claim 
compensation. Rights are given to affected individuals or bodies to press the 
regulatory authorities to take action, yet the emphasis remains that it is 
intended to force the regulator to act and impose clean-up liabilities for 
purposes of environmental remediation. Where an authority does the actual 
remediation, the operator remains liable for the costs in terms of his 
secondary duty. Damages are therefore to be used only for remediation of the 
environment and not to compensate parties prejudiced by the pollution. 
 
7.2.2.6 Defences 
 
Defences include the following: (a) where the damage was authorised under 
permits issued; or (b) where the damage was not thought to be likely at the 
time of the damaging act. Where the polluter has acted intentionally or 
negligently in his operational activities, he could incur liability for any ensuing 
environmental damage.19 
 
7.2.3 Mandatory Insurance Cover 
 
Very few mandatory insurance schemes exist for EU countries, except for 
those in the nuclear industry and the insurance that is required where there is 
a risk of marine oil pollution.20 The liabilities arising from the nuclear and oil 
pollution sectors are excluded from the Directive. Provisions requiring 
                                            
18 See the statement by Winter et al 168 that the establishment of the Directive is purely in the 
public interest, and does not address private interests; see also Bratt 3 on this point. 
19 Winter et al 169 identifies the various provisions and circumstances in which an operator is 
freed from his primary duties in this regard. 
20 See the brief discussion of the liability regimes and the position of insurance within these 
industries in chap 3 par 3.3.4.4.2 and par 3.3.4.3.3 above. 
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mandatory insurance cover for environmental damage were not included in 
the Directive, yet are to be revisited in a few years.21 
 
 
7.3 THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
7.3.1 General Introduction 
 
The position in the UK is of great relevance to South Africa as the impact of 
the UK law on the development of our insurance law over many decades 
remains undeniable. 
 
Liability for environmental damage has a long history in the UK.22 In 
accordance with the Human Rights Act of 1998 on the protection of property, 
everyone is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions, unless it is 
in the public interest to be deprived of his possessions.23 Everyone also has 
the right to respect for private and family life. Interference is only justified 
where it is in the interest of public safety or the economic wellbeing of the 
country, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.24  This will 
form the basis for the right not to have one’s property damaged or one’s life 
interfered with by another’s polluting actions. The main environmental statutes 
and relevant principles of civil liability are discussed below.25  
 
 
 
                                            
21 This is confirmed by Bell & McGillivray 395. 
22 See in this regard early cases such as Bliss v Hall [1838] 4 Bing NC 183 and the well-
known case of Rylands v Fletcher [1868] LR 3 HL 330; as well as older legislation such as 
The Rivers Pollution Prevention Act 1876. 
23 Chap 42 Sched 1 ‘The Articles’ Part II First Protocol Article 1. It was, however, held in 
McKenna and Others v British Aluminium Ltd [2002] Env LR 30 that it was arguable that 
pollution damage caused by a factory would enable prejudiced parties who did not have a 
proprietary interest in the affected land, to claim compensation in accordance with the 
provisions of art 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
24 Part I art 8. 
25 Harpwood V Modern Tort Law 6th ed (2005) (hereinafter ‘Harpwood’) can be recommended 
for a comprehensive discussion of relevant case law, as only limited references of the 
extensive body of case law that exists on this point can be included in this thesis.  
 358
7.3.2 Statutory Liability 
 
7.3.2.1 General features of environmental legislation 
 
The common features of UK environmental legislation that apply prior to the 
polluting occurrence are: (a) the compulsory application for permits and 
authorisations for which potential polluters must pay fees to support the 
authority’s supervisory work;26 (b) ‘best available techniques not entailing 
excessive cost’ to avoid pollution;27 and (c) imposing criminal sanctions to act 
as a deterrent.28 
 
Once pollution has occurred, features of legislation include the following: (a) 
authorities have the power to force the polluter to take steps to abate the 
harm caused to the environment; (b) criminal sanctions take effect, which are 
usually of a strict character for which no proof of mens rea is required; and (c) 
statutory remedies such as injunctions become available; and (d) a statutory 
civil liability is created.29 
 
7.3.2.2 Environmental Protection Act30  
 
The primary legislation for the regulation of environmental matters in the UK is 
the Environmental Protection Act, complemented by the Environment Act31 as 
well as by various codes of practice.32 It deals with the environment as such, 
and not with separate environmental media such as air, water and land. Its 
purpose is to provide an effective administrative system for pollution control 
                                            
26 This is in accordance with the polluter-pays principle; see also par 3.3.2.2 above for a 
general discussion of this principle. 
27 See in this regard a discussion of ‘BATNEEC’ by Faure M & Skogh G The Economic 
Analysis of Environmental Law and Policy (2003) (hereinafter ‘Faure & Skogh’) 188. 
28 As summarised by Larsson M The Law of Environmental Damage: Liability and Reparation 
(1999) (hereinafter ‘Larsson’) 356 et seq. 
29 See in this regard Burnett-Hall RH “Emerging Trends in Environmental Law: Non-fault 
liability: The United Kingdom” 1991 IBA: Section on Business Law, International 
Environmental law 149; also at 153; see also the judgment in Alphacell Ltd v Woodward 
(1972) AC 824. 
30 Act of 1990. 
31 Act of 1995. 
32 For a detailed discussion and commentary on these Acts see Bell & McGillivray 26. 
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and to impose criminal sanctions in order to promote the enforcement of the 
Act, and to supplement other statutes that deal with environmental 
protection.33 
 
The Environmental Protection Act also creates a pure statutory nuisance 
regime that includes liability for the emission of smoke, fumes, gases, dust, 
smell or other effluvia from industrial or business premises, which are 
prejudicial to health or which create a nuisance.34 This Act has the effect that 
insurers must provide cover for potential liabilities that they did not 
contemplate when they issued the policy initially, prior to the enactment of the 
Act. 
 
The Act also establishes a strict retrospective statutory liability regime for soil 
pollution or land contamination,35 and acknowledges a retrospective duty of 
an ‘appropriate person’ to clean up affected sites once a remediation notice 
has been served.36  
 
Local authorities have extensive powers to inspect areas, identify 
contaminated lands, to include them in public registers, to determine the 
identity of potential liable parties, to determine the extent of liability, and to 
ensure that effective remediation by parties takes place.37 It does not, 
however, create any right for a third party to lodge a civil suit for the polluting 
conduct or for a failure to adhere to any remediation notice.38 Where persons 
                                            
33 The Water Act 1989 and the Clean Air Act 1968. 
34 S 79–82 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990. 
35 S 57 of the Environment Act 1995; see also Faure M (ed) Tort and Insurance Law Vol 5: 
Deterrence, Insurability and Compensation in Environmental Liability: Future Developments in 
the European Union (2003) (hereinafter ‘Faure (ed)’) 87– 89. 
36 In s 78A(2) ’contaminated land’ is described in terms of the ‘harm and risk approach’ as ‘a 
site designated by local authority where there is significant harm that is being caused, or a 
significant possibility of such harm being caused’; in s 78A(9) ‘controlled waters’ are waters 
‘where pollution is caused or is likely to be caused where there is entry into or potential entry 
into controlled water of any poisonous, noxious or polluting matter or any solid waste matter’; 
s 78F recognises different standards for different classes of persons; see in this regard also 
the discussion by Faure (ed) 87; Fogleman 1560 questions whether this duty can be accepted 
as a ‘legal liability’ for purpose of a liability insurance claim before a remediation notice has 
been served. It is submitted that the liability is only a certainty once the notice has in fact been 
served. 
37 S 78B. 
38 As stated by Fogleman 1144 et seq; see also1312 in this regard. 
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who are liable for payment of remediation costs have been identified, the 
damages may be apportioned among them according to their share in the 
polluting circumstances.39 Where this is not possible, damages are to be 
divided equally.40 The only defence available is that another recipient has not 
complied with a remediation notice.41 
 
In addition to these pure statutory liabilities, the Environmental Protection Act 
also creates a statutory civil liability in specific circumstances. It is trite law 
that the existence of a statutory civil liability claim depends on an express 
statutory provision that a duty was owed by a particular defendant to a 
particular claimant. An example of such a duty of care is the duty to control 
waste from the cradle to the grave that rests upon all persons who produce or 
are in control of waste.42  This section also creates a civil liability for payment 
of damages in addition to the liability to pay clean-up costs and pay criminal 
penalties. As statutory damages cannot be claimed unless a statute 
specifically authorises such a claim and unless the damage suffered was the 
type contemplated in the statute, the Act in this case clearly allows such a 
claim. 
 
7.3.2.3 The Water Act43 
 
This Act creates a strict criminal liability, yet for a civil liability claim the only 
possibility lies a claim based on the torts of negligence, nuisance or trespass 
as discussed below.44  
  
 
 
                                            
39 Faure (ed) 89 emphasises that it is important to note that this is a proportional and not a 
joint and several liability. 
40 S 57 Environmental Protection Act.  
41 See also Faure (ed) 89. 
42 See s 34 on the duty of care required; see s 73(6) on civil liability that states that ’any 
person who unlawfully deposits, or knowingly causes or permits the deposit of waste which 
causes damage, is liable for that damage unless it: (i) was wholly due to the fault of the 
person who suffered it; or (ii) was suffered by a person who voluntarily accepted the risk’. 
43 Water Act 1989. 
44 S 107. 
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7.3.2.4 The Merchant Shipping Act45 
 
This Act contains extensive provisions regarding statutory civil liability for the 
illegal dumping of waste by ships.46 
 
7.3.2.5 The Water Industry Act47 
 
Where a property owner allows water to escape from his property that harms 
the environment, he incurs statutory civil liability in accordance with the 
provisions of this Act.48 
 
In addition to these most important statutes, various other minor statutes 
contain provisions that create statutory liability that are not examined in great 
detail.49 
 
7.3.2.6  Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act50 
 
Reference must also be made to this specific piece of legislation that confers 
upon third parties rights for a direct claim against the insurer of third-party 
risks where the policyholder becomes insolvent or in specified other events, 
as a form of statutory subrogation.51 The requirements are that (a) the 
contract must provide that third parties can enforce it or that it is to their 
benefit; (b) the third party must be identified by name or class or fall within a 
                                            
45 Merchant Shipping Act 1995. 
46 A detailed examination of marine pollution, oil pollution and control of the waste industry is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
47 Water Industry Act 1991. 
48 Part VIII s 209. 
49 See, for example, the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981; for a comprehensive list and a 
detailed discussion of other environmental statutes in the UK see Fogleman Part B. 
50 Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 1930. 
51 S 1(1), s 1(4), s 2 state that information that allows a prejudiced party who has a liability 
claim to discover whether the insolvent wrongdoer has any insurance coverage, must be 
provided by the liquidator upon demand. This duty to disclose information only arises once 
liability has been established by an action, arbitration proceeding or agreement. 
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described or designated group of persons; and (c) the third party must have 
the capacity and be capable of enforcing the claim under common-law rules.52 
 
In the context of the scope of this thesis it should be noted that The Merchant 
Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act53 is specifically excluded from the scope of the 
Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act, and the rights of third parties in 
that specific industry are therefore regulated by the former.54 
 
7.3.2.7 The Environmental Liability Directive 
 
Cognisance must also be taken of the effect of relevant EU Directives as they 
serve the purpose of supra-national law for the UK as well. The Directive has 
been examined more extensively above.55  
 
7.3.3 Civil liability 
 
7.3.3.1 General 
 
In addition to statutory liability, another remedy available to the prejudiced 
party is a claim based on tort liability. Causes of action include negligence,56 
nuisance,57 strict liability under the Rylands v Fletcher rule,58 and general 
trespass.59 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
52 See Merkin RM Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance 8th ed (2006) (hereinafter ‘Merkin’) 325 et seq 
for a detailed discussion of the application of this Act. 
53 The Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971. 
54 S 12(5). 
55 See par 7.2 above. 
56 See par 7.3.3.2 below. 
57 See par 7.3.3.3 below. 
58 See the discussion in par 7.3.3.4 below. 
59 As discussed in par 7.3.3.4 below. 
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7.3.3.2 Negligence 
 
7.3.3.2.1 Requirements 
 
Tort liability cases require that (a) the wrongdoer must be under a duty of 
care, and he must be in breach of the standard of care as imposed under the 
duty of care; (b) damages that are reasonable and foreseeable must factually 
have been caused by the breach of duty;60 (c) the plaintiff as the prejudiced 
party must demonstrate the tortfeasor’s fault;61 and (d) actual damage to 
property or physical injury must be suffered.62 Possible defences include the 
plaintiff’s contributory negligence and inevitable accident or force majeure.63  
 
The last few years have seen the development of the toxic or environmental 
tort, of which the following are the key issues. 
 
7.3.3.2.2 Breach of a duty of care 
 
The duty of care required is the standard of care appropriate to the 
circumstances. Three tests can be applied to determine whether a duty of 
care exists, namely the test of reasonable foresight by the wrongdoer, the test 
of proximity of harm, and whether considerations of justice and 
reasonableness impose such a duty.64 A case-by-case approach is required. 
Where a hazard is caused by a natural nuisance without any human 
intervention, a ‘measured duty of care’ is still imposed upon a person who 
                                            
60 In Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock and Engineering Co Ltd [1961] 1 All ER 404 
(PC) 415A the court held that tortuous liability is founded not on the act that causes the 
damage, but on the consequences that damage has been done; see also the finding in 
Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Countries Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264 that merely foreseeing 
general ‘pollution’ is insufficient as it is too wide; the views of Bell & McGillivray 371 and their 
arguments that the nature and extent of the pollution must at least have been foreseen, can 
be supported. 
61 Tutton v AD Walker Ltd [1986] QB 61. 
62 Negligence as an individual tort dates from the case of Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 
562. 
63 See in this regard Faure (ed) 53 et seq. 
64 See the consideration of these three tests in Donoghue v Stevenson  575, 580 et seq. 
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knew of the hazard to prevent harm or loss within a reasonable time.65 In 
cases where a remedy is available under another compensation system such 
as a claim against a compensation fund, no duty of care is owed.66 
 
The objective ‘reasonable man’ test is applied to determine whether there was 
a breach of duty of care in the specific circumstances on a case-by-case 
approach, as far as the specific activity is concerned.67 It cannot be expected 
that it would be reasonable to anticipate unknown risks. Where realistic 
precautions could have been taken, yet were not, the duty of care has not 
been met.68 In some cases, criminal liability can be accepted of proof of 
breach of duty.69 The criteria are that (a) the accident must not be easily 
explained; (b) its cause must be unknown; (c) the incident would not have 
happened had it not been for lack of proper care; and (d) the defendant must 
have been in control of the situation.70 
 
7.3.3.2.3 Causation and remoteness of damage 
 
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the tortfeasor’s conduct made a 
material contribution to the loss suffered. In relevant case law, a victim’s 
asbestosis was caused over a long period of time while he worked for various 
                                            
65 See also the Occupiers Liability Act 1957 (for visitors to premises), and the Occupiers 
Liability Act 1984 (for non-visitors to premises) that place a statutory duty of care upon a 
person who knows or should have known about a danger on the property that he occupies, 
that causes harm to another who has access to the premises. Damage or harm can be 
caused by pollution factors, such as by exposure to poisonous gases or toxic liquids; see also 
Harpwood chap 10 for a detailed discussion. 
66 In Matthews v Minister of Defence [2003] UKHL 4, the victim’s exposure to asbestos in his 
work environment caused serious illness, but as a statutory fund was available for his claim 
for compensation, the court held that the Crown as his employer did not to owe him a civil 
duty of care.  
67 See Harpwood 127 et seq for other examples of the application of the test of the 
reasonable man. 
68 This is generally known as the ‘state of the art defence’; in Roe v Minister of Health [1954] 2 
OB 66 the court held that it was not common knowledge that a chemical seepage would occur 
where specific chemicals were stored in canisters unsuitable for that purpose; see the 
discussion by Harpwood 318 specifically on the standard duty of care of an employer to 
provide safe working conditions to his employees; see also in this regard the discussion of 
statutory mandatory insurance for employer’s liability in par 7.3.3.4.2 below. 
69 This situation is analogous to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, that where a wrongdoer is 
held criminally liable for pollution damage, the court may draw an inference that negligence in 
a civil sense was present; see in this regard s 11 of the Civil Evidence Act 1968. 
70 Scott v London and St Katherine’s Docks [1865] 2 H&C 596; see Harpwood 152–154 for a 
summary and detailed discussed on the application of these criteria. 
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employers, yet only half of the employment period was in the respondent’s 
employ. The court held that the respondent was liable for 75% of the loss, 
even though the exact share of his contribution in causing the loss was not 
proven. The prejudiced party has to prove that the tortfeasor was responsible 
for the whole or at least a quantifiable part of the loss suffered. As exact 
quantification is difficult, the court only has to do the best it can by using 
common sense.71 
  
The ‘but for’ test is applied to determine a factual chain of causation, although 
the court may deviate from applying the test where it appears not to be 
appropriate.72 Where there is concurrent causation, the wrongful conduct of 
concurrent tortfeasors could cause a single indivisible injury or the same loss. 
In this situation a single tortfeasor can be held liable in full to compensate the 
prejudiced party in full for all the damage suffered in terms of the Civil Liability 
(Contribution) Act.73 It is, however, often difficult to prove the requirements of 
‘single indivisible injury’ and ‘same damage’. Another scenario is where each 
tortfeasor caused part of the damage, yet neither caused the whole. Had a 
single act of tort been proven, liability would have been incurred, yet on the 
evidence it is impossible to identify with precision what part of the loss was 
caused by each tortfeasor. This is not a form of true concurrent tort, as it 
would be unjust to proceed that a tortfeasor be held liable for the whole of the 
damage, where demonstrably he is not. Even though it is impossible to 
succeed in making a precise apportionment, the court should make the best 
estimate it can on the available evidence, making the fullest allowance in 
favour of the prejudiced party for any uncertainties known to be involved in the 
apportionment.74 
 
                                            
71 Holtby v Brigham & Cowan (Hull) Ltd [2000] 3 All ER 421 (CA) par 20. 
72 See Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41 pars 8–14, where it was held that the doctrine of 
informed consent enjoys priority over the unyielding application of the ‘but for’ test. 
73 Act 1978 s 1(1); Rahman v Arearose Ltd and Another [2001] QB 351 (CA); see also the 
discussion by Harpwood 165 et seq. 
74 Rahman v Arearose Ltd and Another pars 19–22; see also Allen and Others v British Rail 
Engineering Ltd and Another [2001] EWCA Civ 242 par 20. 
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In addition to factual causation, a second requirement is that the damages 
must not be ‘too remote’. This forms the requirements of legal causation.75 
The damages must be a direct consequence of the conduct, and the way in 
which the wrongdoing occurs as well as the category of harm, must have 
been foreseeable.76 
 
7.3.3.2.4 Fault 
 
The reasonableness of the tortfeasor’s conduct has to be evaluated.77 In view 
of recent developments in product liability cases, it appears as if the current 
trend is towards presumptive liability where the tortfeasor has to prove the 
absence of negligence.78 This would definitely improve a prejudiced party’s 
chances to succeed with a civil liability claim for pollution damage or loss 
suffered based on tort. It also assists the prejudiced party by creating 
presumptions of knowledge for a purchaser of land. Where an owner of land’s 
occupation ceases, his liability also ceases except in the case of positive 
misfeasance. Liability based on the conduct causing the nuisance remains 
with the seller who caused the nuisance during his ownership even after the 
property is sold to another. 
 
7.3.3.2.5 Remedies 
 
Remedies include preventative remedies such as injunctions and 
compensatory remedies such as damages. Only the latter falls within the 
scope of this study.  
 
                                            
75 See the similar requirements in South African law as evaluated in chap 4 par 4.2.5.3 above; 
see also par 7.5.3.3 for the position in the Netherlands and par 7.4.3.4 for the position in 
Belgium.  
76 See Margereson v JW Roberts Ltd, Hancock v Same [1996] PIQR P358 for case law on 
asbestos pollution, where the court found that tortfeasors should have foreseen the risk that 
the asbestos dust that generated from their factory could cause asbestosis. 
77 See Bell & McGillivray 372; see also Faure (ed) 83 for an evaluation of this criterion in that 
the tortfeasor’s conduct must have been below a reasonable standard. 
78 For product liability in general, see also Harpwood chap 15; for a South African perspective 
see Neethling J, Potgieter JM & Visser PJ Law of Delict 5th ed (2006) (hereinafter ‘Neethling 
et al’) 293, as well as the provisions of the Consumer Protection Bill as considered in chap 4 
par 4.2.4.5.2 above. 
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The purpose of damages is to relieve the prejudiced party rather than to 
punish the tortfeasor, and is designed to provide indemnity.  For damage to 
property, damages may be claimed for the cost of repair or replacement, 
depreciation of property value, compensation for the loss of use, and for the 
discomfort caused by the harm.79 Even though replacement or restitution 
costs could offer a solution, the realistic position is that it does not always 
completely compensate for the loss. This can be illustrated by the recent ‘lost 
trees’ awards. A claim for damages to cover the replacement of the loss of 
200-year old trees by planting saplings of the same cultivar does not 
compensate for the loss of the ecological value of the older trees.80 
 
Although courts in the UK are also reluctant to allow claims for pure economic 
loss, they also make the exception in case of marine pollution claims for the 
loss of the professional use of natural resources due to a polluting incident.81 
 
For personal injury, compensation for bodily harm, disability, pain and 
suffering, emotional distress, loss of quality of life, loss or impairment of 
wages, loss of present and future earning capacity, reimbursement of medical 
and other expenses can obviously be claimed.  
 
Where a claim is based on lost opportunity, the court must do the best it can 
on the basis of available evidential material, even where it makes no more 
than an informed guess, as no better system has yet been devised to assess 
the exact loss based on lost opportunity.82 
 
Private law claims for pollution damages remain time-consuming, costly, and 
difficult to institute due to lack of information.83 Bell & McGillivray also interpret 
                                            
79 Commité Maritime International CMI Yearbook Admissibility and Assessment of Claims for 
Pollution Damage Part II (1993) 95. 
80 See Bell & McGillivray 381 for a discussion on these ‘lost trees’ awards. 
81 Harpwood 88 examines the viability of a claim for pure economic loss resulting from 
environmental pollution that was caused by a polluter’s negligent conduct. 
82 Allied Maples Group Ltd v Simmons & Simmons [1995] 1 WLR 1602 (CA). 
83 The access to essential information is addressed by s 20 of the Environmental Protection 
Act 1990 which creates the duty to maintain public registers of environmental information 
based on mandatory environmental audits. 
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the latest judgements as indicative of a reluctance to develop the common law 
as a mechanism for environmental protection, in anticipation of the 
development of statutory protection measures.84 This appears to be a 
universal tendency. 
 
7.3.3.3 Nuisance 
 
7.3.3.3.1 General 
 
Nuisance is concerned with the unlawful interference with a person’s use or 
enjoyment of land or of some right over or in connection with it, and can be 
classified as a statutory, a private or a public nuisance.85 
 
7.3.3.3.2 Private nuisance 
 
A private nuisance is caused when there is a continuous unlawful and indirect 
interference,86 with the use and enjoyment of land or some right over or in   
connection with it.87 The basis of a claim for private nuisance is founded on 
the balance between the reasonableness of the tortfeasor’s activity and the 
impact on the prejudiced party’s rights.88 Balancing factors include (a) the 
application of the locality doctrine;89 (b) the nature, duration and intensity of 
                                            
84 In the opinion of Bell & McGillivray 386; this deduction is based on the judgements in the 
Cambridge Water Co case and Transco v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2003] 
UKHL 61 as considered below. 
85 Cambridge Water Company v East Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 AC 264; see Purdue M 
“The Merits of Statutory Nuisance as Means of Cleaning Up Beaches” 1997 (9) JEL 103 for a 
detailed discussion of the topic. Courts have, however, been inclined to combine the torts of 
negligence and nuisance under a single tort called fault-based liability. This is also the 
position in the South African law of delict regarding nuisance or the abuse of rights discussed 
in chap 4 par 4.2.3.4.1. 
86 It is required that nuisance must be of an ‘indirect’ nature, which is the element that 
distinguishes nuisance from trespass. 
87 See also Harpwood 246–256 for a comprehensive examination of the various elements 
contained in this description. 
88 In Sanders Clark v Grosvenor Mansions Co Ltd [1900] 2 Ch 373 the court held that ‘[i]f a 
person is acting reasonably when using his property the way he wishes to, there is nothing 
which at law can be considered a nuisance’. 
89 In terms of this doctrine, the location and the boundaries of the locality and the intensity of 
the activities have to be taken into account; see, for example, St Helen’s Smelting Co v 
Tipping [1865] 11 HL Cas 642 where copper fumes caused damage to the trees on an 
adjoining property. 
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the nuisance;90 (c) the prejudiced party’s use and state of his land and his 
sensitivity;91 (d) fault;92 and (e) public benefit.93  
 
Not every form of nuisance is actionable, as the unreasonable conduct must 
cause some ‘appreciable harm’ although proof of damages is unnecessary. 
The tortfeasor can be anyone who uses or occupies the land, anyone who 
continues with or adopts the nuisance, or even contributes to it.94 It must 
affect a person according to the test known as the ‘victim test’, which makes a 
claim for the protection of general ecological interests difficult.95 Defences 
include (a) prescription, and (b) statutory authority.96 It is, however, not a 
proper defence to aver that the prejudiced party freely came to the nuisance.97  
 
Remedies include injunctions, the self-help remedy of abatement and 
damages to cover for damage to land, personal injuries or substantial 
inconvenience caused, which is more extensive than a damages claim for 
public nuisance.98 
                                            
90 More than a temporary or once-off occurrence is required, unless it becomes a regular 
occurrence of isolated incidents; Bell & McGillivray 362 propose that these factors will also 
prove to be valuable in order to determine which remedy is the most suitable in a specific 
situation. 
91 Not only must the tortfeasor’s land that causes the nuisance be used reasonably, but the 
prejudiced party’s use of his land that is affected by the nuisance must also be reasonable.  
92 It would be unjust if liability depended on whether the occurrence of the specific type of 
damage was foreseeable, as liability claims based on nuisance would then be stricter than 
claims brought under negligence.  
93 Conduct that is to the public benefit is less likely to be seen as an actionable nuisance; see 
in this regard Dennis v Ministry of Defence [2003] Env LR 34; Bell & McGillivray 365 deduce 
from case law that ‘the courts have been reluctant to allow private interests to be trumped by 
public interest’. 
94 One may acquire an ‘easement’, known in South African law as a limited real right or 
servitude over another’s property, by acquisitive prescription for the right to continue with 
polluting activities after 20 years of continuous, open and lawful polluting use. 
95 See Bell & McGillivray 361 et seq on the position taken by the European Commission of 
Human Rights in cases relating to the ‘right to nature’ brought before it. 
96 Bell & McGillivray 368 state that this defence hails from the days of strict liability. It is their 
opinion that the possibility of taking public interest into account may have knock-on 
consequences in that the approach of the courts to allow this defence will be less favourable. 
97 This would, for example, be the case where a person who buys a property, knowing that it 
is located in the vicinity of a noisy airport, is precluded from claiming that the noise creates a 
nuisance; see also the statement in Bliss v Hall 1 that ‘[w]hat the Defendant says in answer, is 
that he carried on the business for three years before the Plaintiff became possessed of the 
messuage (houses) he inhabits. That is no answer to the complainant in the declaration; for 
the Plaintiff came to the house he occupies with all the rights which the common law affords, 
and one of them is a right to wholesome air’. 
98 See the discussion in par 7.3.3.3.3 below. 
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7.3.3.3.3 Public nuisance 
 
Public nuisance is a nuisance that materially affects the reasonable comfort 
and convenience of life of a class of the general public.99 ‘I prefer to look to 
the reason of the thing and to say that a public nuisance is a nuisance which 
is so widespread in its range and so indiscriminate in its effect that it would 
not be reasonable to expect one person to take proceedings… to put a stop to 
it, but that it should be taken on the responsibility of the community at 
large.’100 The value of this potential claim definitely lies therein that it can 
protect interests other than land rights, which makes it highly suitable as a 
vehicle for environmental damage claims, and could include any nuisance 
caused by land, air or water polluting activities. In addition to the normal 
defences available in tort, statutory authority has proven to be a useful and 
successful defence.101 
 
For public nuisances, the State as the ‘guardian of the environment’ can act in 
the public interest against the tortfeasor. Remedies include injunctions and a 
claim for damages that is of a compensatory nature.  
 
7.3.3.4 The ‘rule in Rylands v Fletcher’ 
 
7.3.3.4.1 Scope of rule 
 
The well-known rule created in the case of Rylands v Fletcher102 imposes a 
form of strict liability for things and substances accumulated on land by a 
                                            
99 Bell & McGillivray 369 describe public nuisance as ‘a crime involving nuisance, affecting a 
section of the general public, although anyone suffering “special damage” beyond that 
suffered by the public generally has a claim in tort’; according to Harpwood 238, where all 
persons suffer equally, there appears to be no claim based on public nuisance. 
100 As stated in the judgment in Attorney-General v PYA Quarries Ltd [1957] 2 QB 169 191. 
101 See in this regard Allen v Gulf Oil Refining Ltd [1981] 1 AC 1001; see also Harpwood 242 
et seq for the merits of the various defences available. 
102 [1868] LR 3 (AC) 330 (HL) 330; see also Harpwood 264–269 for a comprehensive 
examination of the rule and its subsequent application in case law. 
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person for his own purposes that escape and subsequently cause damage on 
another’s land as a natural consequence of its escape.103  
 
7.3.3.4.2 Strict liability 
 
The rule does not create a general theory of strict liability and only applies in 
specific circumstances.104 To limit extensive liability, this action requires a 
‘non-natural’ use of the defendant’s land.105 ‘Natural use’ includes anything 
that is for the general public’s benefit. Due to cases dealing with 
environmental catastrophes, the courts have found it just to impose liability in 
these situations in the absence of fault.106 
 
7.3.3.4.3 Remedies 
 
The claim cannot be used to claim for property damage not relating to the 
land, or for personal injury,107 and the damage suffered had to be 
predictable.108 Defences include statutory authority, acts of God or third 
parties, and remoteness of damages. Liability does also not ensue where the 
plaintiff was wholly at fault. It remains part of tort law even though it has its 
complications and has been subject to criticism.109 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
103 Bell & McGillivray 376 et seq provide examples of cases where this rule has been applied 
in situations where oil, chemicals, colliery spoil, gases, fire and water escaped from property. 
104 Faure (ed) 22 et seq identifies the justifications for the introduction of a strict liability rule as 
the following: (a) it acts as an effective deterrent for potential polluters; (b) it benefits the 
plaintiff in easing the burden of proving the claim; and (c) it contributes to effective 
redistribution of losses. 
105 Bell & McGillivray 375 refer to these incidents as ‘unnatural nuisances’; in Transco v 
Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council par 36 the court held that the extraordinary use of 
land must also give rise to an extraordinary degree of risk. 
106 Transco v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council par 6. 
107 See also Transco v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council pars 35, 39. 
108 Regarding the notorious unpredictability of risk, see Faure (ed) 86 with reference to the 
unreported case of Empress Car Ltd (Abertillery) v National Rivers Authority (HL) 05/02/1998. 
109 Transco v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council par 30 et seq. 
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7.3.3.5 Trespass 
 
Trespass can be described simply as the direct interference with personal or 
proprietary rights without a lawful excuse.110 Trespass takes place where 
there is a direct interference in the possession of land. This includes trespass 
by human conduct and by the presence of animals or substances found on or 
that migrate onto the land. It is also relevant to note that one could trespass to 
the ground beneath the surface, and that sub soil pollution could amount to a 
form of trespass.111 Placing substances such as waste on another’s land is 
also seen as a form of trespass.112  
 
It is actionable per se as it does not require proof of damage.113 There must 
be proof of some form of ‘direct interference’, which means that the action of 
trespassing must be the direct cause of the loss. Loss must not be created via 
an indirect cause or by an external factor. As it requires intentional or 
negligent conduct, it is thus a fault-based tort. 
 
Remedies include obtaining an injunction, a claim for the recovery of land or 
for re-entry and defence of property, a claim for lost profits, for the financial 
losses caused by the deterioration of the property and the costs of recovering 
these losses.114 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
110 See especially the judgment in Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Countries Leather plc 53; 
see also Fogleman 1400 et seq for a more extensive examination of the nature and effect of 
trespass. 
111 This viewpoint is reiterated by Bell & McGillivray 369. 
112 See the judgment in Department for the Environment, Food & Rural Affairs v Feakins 
[2004] EWHC 2785 (Ch) where the placing of animal remains on land that caused 
environmental damage was held to be a form of trespass.  
113 League against Cruel Sports v Scott [1985] 2 All ER 489. 
114 For a consideration of these remedies, see Harpwood 236 et seq. 
 373
 
7.3.4 Environmental Insurance Cover in the UK 
 
7.3.4.1 General 
 
Pollution insurance cover was traditionally provided under private insurance 
for the restitution of first-party interests, such as that found in property and 
private liability policies. With the growing threat of pollution damage and the 
reality of extensive insurance claims, insurers reacted by limiting or even 
excluding cover contractually for specific risks.115 A contractual exclusion of 
liability for any other loss or damage is allowed, yet must be fair in order to be 
enforceable. Although insurance contracts in general are not subject to the 
provisions of the Unfair Contract Terms Act,116 contractual exclusions and 
limitations in insurance contracts are. Contracts are furthermore subject to the 
‘fairness requirements’ under the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1999.117 
 
7.3.4.2 Pollution exclusion clauses in the UK 
 
Lloyd’s Underwriters Non-Marine Association (hereinafter the ‘NMA’) drafted 
the first pollution exclusion clauses as early as 1959.118 The London market 
started to offer specific environmental insurance products in the 1970s. In 
1989 a Department of Environment Working Group on Insurance was 
established to investigate the possibility that pressure for environmental 
policies would increase due to a greater statutory duty of care expected from 
participants in the waste disposal industry, and to examine the insurability of 
                                            
115 S 2(1), s 3(1); see also Sched 2 for the relevant guidelines for insurance practice. 
116 Act of 1977; s 2(2) bars any contractual exclusion contained in standard business terms,  
regarding liability for the death or personal injury of a consumer due to negligent conduct of 
another;  see also s 11 on the test of ‘reasonableness’ that must be applied in terms of the 
Act. In the case of Regus (UK) Ltd v Epcot Solutions Ltd [2008] EWHC Civ 361 the Appeal 
Court confirmed the generally permissive approach of English courts towards exclusion and 
limitation clauses. The criterion of ‘reasonableness’ must be applied in view of the facts and 
circumstances before the court when the enforceability of a contractual exclusion clause is in 
issue. 
117 See Merkin 69 pars 3–19 on the operation and effect of these Regulations on the UK 
insurance industry. 
118 Lloyd’s Underwriters Non-Marine Association Pollution Exclusions version NMA 1333. 
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environmental risks in general.119 In 1995 the recommendation was made that 
the solution would lie in the introduction of a standard comprehensive 
pollution exclusion clause into public and general liability policies, and to 
attempt to introduce a Comprehensive Environmental Impairment Liability 
insurance product into the insurance market.120 A Joint Pollution Working 
Group was subsequently created to study the viability of the proposal, which 
resulted in their ‘Report on the Assessment of Pollution Risks’ that was 
published in 1997. The report was followed by the publication of guidelines for 
the industry in 1998 to enable the industry to implement the proposals.121 The 
introduction into the market proved to be unsuccessful, as the proposals were 
not widely implemented. Various endorsements for extended exclusions as 
discussed in chapter 6 above followed over the years.122 
 
7.3.4.3 Environmental pollution insurance products 
 
As it is the case in most countries, obtaining comprehensive environmental 
damage and liability cover in the UK remains difficult and expensive. Specific 
insurance products are available in the international insurance market as 
examined in chapter 5 above.123 
 
7.3.4.4 Statutory mandatory insurance cover 
 
Currently, there are no statutory requirements or other measures that require 
mandatory insurance cover for general environmental liabilities in the UK, 
except for the cover that nuclear installations and merchant ships carrying oil 
must obtain.124 A form of insurance that is relevant to the topic is the 
compulsory liability insurance cover that employers must take out to provide 
cover for their employees. This is not required from employers who are large 
                                            
119 House of Commons Select Committee on the Environment (1989). 
120 Hereinafter referred to as ‘EIL’; see also Zeller W “How to get off the ‘Sudden and 
Accidental’ Time Bomb?” 1995 (4) NFT 307. 
121 See Fogleman 1514 for a discussion of the history and extent of the study. 
122 See chap 6 par 6.5.3 above. 
123 See chap 5 par 5.4.4 above. 
124 This is also confirmed by Fogleman 1577, and by Merkin 684. 
 375
enough to qualify as their own insurers in terms of specific legislative 
provisions.125 This type of insurance will also provide cover for loss or damage 
caused to employees by polluting factors such as exposure to asbestos and 
other harmful substances that cause occupational hazards. 
 
Statutes on environmental liabilities in the UK do not specifically mention 
insurance or the duty to obtain insurance cover, except for the Environmental 
Protection Act126 that states only that the existence of insurance cover is 
irrelevant when applying the exclusion tests and apportionment procedures 
required for environmental liabilities.127 
 
The international position in respect of specific problems and key issues 
relating to environmental insurance cover also includes those in the UK 
insurance industry and was dealt with extensively in chapter 6 above. These 
include the interpretation of words and phrases such as ‘sudden and 
accidental’, ‘accident’, ‘property damage’, ‘natural resource damage’ and 
‘legally liable’,128 issues in respect of the trigger of coverage,129 and the effect 
of various policy exclusions and limitations.130 
 
 
7.4. BELGIUM 
 
7.4.1 General Introduction 
 
Due to extensive studies undertaken by authoritative authors in Belgium and 
the Netherlands on environmental insurance, these two countries have 
become leaders in the field of environmental pollution liability and 
                                            
125 Employer’s Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969; see s 9 for the exemption of certain 
employers; s 2(1)(b) and s 2(1)(c) expressly prohibit provisions in policies that exclude cover 
for damage caused by the employer’s failure to adhere to his statutory or common law duty of 
care. 
126 See also the more extensive discussion in par 7.2.2 above. 
127 Part IIA D.35(b). 
128 See specifically chap 6 par 6.5.6 above. 
129 See in this regard chap 6 par 6.3 above. 
130 See also par 6.5 in general above. 
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insurance.131 Practical problems and difficulties lead to demands for a 
separate regime for environmental damage liability, which resulted in 
substantial law reform by these governments.132 Various liability regimes as 
created by international conventions and agreements have also been 
implemented, the most important being the conventions that address liability 
for marine damage caused by oil pollution and regarding liability within the 
nuclear industry.133 
 
7.4.2 Statutory Liability 
 
7.4.2.1 General 
 
The most logical approach to repair environmental damage is via civil liability 
law or ‘aansprakelijkheidsrecht’. A commission called the Interuniversitaire 
Commissie was appointed by the Belgian government to prepare a study on a 
general environmental policy called the ‘Voorontwerp Decreet Milieubeleid’.134 
It advised the government to move away from fault-based liability for 
environmental damage.135 The last few decades have seen a universal sharp 
increase in statutory strict or no-fault liability regimes in a variety of areas. The 
mere participation in risky activities within specific denominated industries 
serves as an example.136 Strict liability regimes were introduced in the 
following industries and are briefly explained below. It should be stressed at 
                                            
131 See, for example, the early publication by Bocken H Het aansprakelijkheidsrecht als 
sanctie tegen de verstoren van het leefmilieu Proefschrift ingediend tot het bekomen van de 
graad van geaggrereerde voor het hoger onderwijs aan de Rijksuniversiteit Gent (1979), and 
the extensive number of publications in specialised journals such as the Tijdschrift voor 
Milieurecht (published in Belgium) and Tijdschrift voor Milieu en Aansprakelijkheid and Milieu 
en Recht (published in the Netherlands).  
132 See Faure 69 who highlights the issues presented for this argument. 
133 See in this regard chap 3 par 3.3.3 above. 
134 See the Voorontwerp Decreet Milieubeleid published by the Office for Official Publications 
of the European Communities at http://www.europa.eu.int (accessed 2 March 2000). 
135 See the Interuniversitaire Commissie tot Herziening van het Milieurecht in het Vlaamse 
Gewest (or ‘ICHM’) chaired by Prof H Bocken; see also Bocken H, Deloddere S & Ryckbost D 
Report of the Interuniversitaire Commissie tot Herziening van het Milieurecht in het Vlaamse 
Gewest (1995); this report is also examined in greater detail in De Ketelaere 944; see also 
1347 et seq. 
136 See Van Daele G Milieurisico’s goed verzekerd  (2001) (hereinafter ‘Van Daele’) 22 for the 
denominated industries. 
 377
the beginning of the discussion that it is possible to escape statutory liability 
only where the relevant statute provides for specific defences.137 
 
7.4.2.2 Soil pollution 
 
A duty rests upon any person who exploits or participates in any activity 
relating to land for which a licence, permit or consent is required, to prevent 
soil pollution in accordance with the Bodemsaneringsdecreet van 22 februari 
1995.138 A strict liability regime applies where the authorised activity causes 
soil contamination.139 The owner or any user of the contaminated land, 
irrespective of whether he uses, participates in the use, or exploits the 
property, also incurs liability for soil contamination caused, unless he is able 
to deny liability in terms of specified statutory defences.140 
 
7.4.2.3 Waste disposal 
 
In the waste disposal industry, any owner of a waste disposal site incurs strict 
liability for any waste disposed of on the site under his control. This position 
as well as the ones below is similar to that in most other countries.141 
  
7.4.2.4 Transport or production of dangerous substances 
 
In case of the transport or production of dangerous, hazardous or poisonous 
substances, gases or waste, the person transporting or producer of the 
 
                                            
137 Examples include where the polluting incident is (a) a new polluting event known as a 
‘nieuwe verontreiniging’; (b) a historical polluting event or ‘historische bodemverontreiniging’, 
and (c) a mixture of these two known as ‘gemengde verontreiniging’, which exempt polluters 
from liability in specific situations. Another defense exists where limitations of use and 
preventative measures (own translation of ‘gebruiksbeperkingen en voorzorgsmaatregelen’) 
prevent restitution. See Van Daele 67–70 for a more detailed explanation. 
138 For an extensive examination of the provisions of the Act, see Ryckbost D “Het Decreet 
van 22 februari 1995 betreffende de bodemsanering” 1995 (Mei/Juni) Tijdschrift voor 
Milieurecht 178. 
139 Own translation of ‘bodemverontreiniging’ in terms of the Bodemsaneringsdecreet. 
140 Art 25 Bodemsaneringsdecreet; see also De Ketelaere 1340 et seq. 
141 See the Afvalstoffendecreet van 22 juli 2004. 
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substance, gas or waste incurs strict liability for loss or damage caused.142 
 
7.4.2.5 Groundwater recycling and mining activities 
 
A strict liability regime also applies where a person who is responsible for or 
involved in the recycling of groundwater causes contamination of the water.143 
Specific statutory mining concessions also introduce a strict liability regime for 
damage caused to the environment by participation in these mining 
activities.144 
 
The Burgerlijk Wetboek under article 1384 provides that ‘men aansprakelijk is 
voor de schade veroorzaakt door de daad van personen voor wie men moet 
instaan, of van zaken de men onder zijn bewaring heeft’. Deketelaere is of the 
opinion that this also covers liability for losses caused by omissions in the 
form of ‘latente verontreiniging van de bodem of het water’.145 
 
7.4.2.6 Marine pollution 
 
Any person causing damage to the marine environment is held liable unless 
he can prove that the loss was caused by war or force majeure, by the actions 
of third parties, or is caused only by the wrongful conduct of the government 
or its failure to act as required.146 
 
 
 
 
                                            
142 ‘[T]ransport van gevaarlijk of giftig afval’ in terms of art 7 of wet van 22 juli 1974; art 13 wet 
12 april 1965 on the ‘vervoer van gasachtige stoffen’; art 13 wet 18 juli 1975 on the 
‘exploiteren van ondergrondse bergruimten bestemd voor opslaan van gas’, on the transport 
of gases and the use of underground gas storage facilities. 
143 Recycling of groundwater in accordance with the Grondwaterherwinning wet 10 januari 
1977 arts 1–5. 
144 Mine concessions in accordance with art 5. K.B. van  Mijnconcessies 13 september 1919. 
145 See De Ketelaere 1337. 
146 Art 37(1) of the Marine wet van 20 januari 1999; see in general Huybrechts MA & Van 
Dunne KN in Faure MG & Hu J (eds) Prevention and Compensation for Marine Pollution 
Damage (2006) 123 et seq. 
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7.4.3 Civil Liability 
 
7.4.3.1 General 
 
As stated by the Interuniversitaire Commissie147 the most logical starting point 
for the repair of environmental damage known as ‘milieu schade’ is by a claim 
brought under civil liability law. This type of claim, as is the case in most other 
countries, poses its own set of unique challenges. As to the requirement of 
causation, for example, the prejudiced party often cannot prove the nature or 
source of the pollution,148 especially where there is a migration of a pollutant, 
multiple pollutants or a synergy between various pollutants. The determination 
of the cause and the extent of the pollution as well as the quantum of 
damages is a time-consuming, specialised and costly procedure. Once 
conduct, causation and loss are all proven, possible defences and exemptions 
could frustrate the claim, or the claim could have become prescribed. 
 
7.4.3.2 General principles of liability 
 
Belgian tort liability is governed by the notion of fault. Article 1382 of the 
Belgian Burgerlijk Wetboek provides that ‘any act by which a person causes 
damage to another compels the person through whose fault the damage 
occurred to repair or pay compensation for such damage’. Article 1383 states 
that a person is liable not only for the damage caused by his positive actions, 
but also for his lack of care in failing to prevent damage.149 As it became clear 
that the basic notion of fault liability was insufficient and failed to provide a 
comprehensive solution for environmental pollution claims the demands for a 
separate liability regime increased.150  
 
                                            
147 See the reference to the Report of the Interuniversitaire Commissie in par 7.4.2.1 above 
which eventually led to the enactment of the Bodemsaneringsdecreet as discussed in par 
7.4.2.2 above. 
148 Own translation of ‘die aard van de verontreiniging’. 
149 Own translations from the discussion in De Ketelaere 1330 . 
150 The study by Bocken (1979) was one of the initial works on this topic, followed by 
extensive studies and various publications in this field, as referred to in this study. 
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7.4.3.3 Blameworthy conduct and fault 
 
7.4.3.3.1 Fault 
 
Belgian law requires the notion of blameworthiness or ‘toerekenbare fout’ 
namely, that a wrongdoer will be held liable if faulty conduct is imputable to 
him. The presence of fault is determined in accordance with express 
legislative provisions or in terms of the general principles of civil liability law 
where the wrongdoer falls short of the acceptable degree of caretaking.151 
 
7.4.3.3.2 Strict liability 
 
Strict liability regimes can apply in the following situations. As is the case in 
most liability regimes, for example, in the UK, the USA and South Africa, 
neighbours or persons in close proximity of each other incur strict liability 
based on nuisance. Liability is based on the unacceptable infringement upon 
another person’s property rights.152 The well-known strict liability regime for 
product liability known as the ‘aansprakelijkheid voor gebrekkige zaken’ also 
applies in Belgium, yet is not discussed in greater detail here. Again it must be 
noted that the use of products could lead to environmental or pollution 
damage and is therefore relevant. The ordinary principles of vicarious liability, 
for example, the liability of employers for the conduct of their employees and 
the liability of a principal for the conduct of his agent, apply. Strict liability can 
also be incurred for damage caused by goods under one’s control.153 
 
 
 
 
                                            
151 For legislative provisions see, for example, the Milieuvergunningsdecreet art 22; and the 
Afvalstoffendecreet art 13; in accordance with civil law principles conduct is tested against a 
general duty of care or ‘algemene zorgvuldigheidsnorm’ as described in De Ketelaere 1331. 
152 Also called ‘burenhinder’ which falls under art 544 of the Belgian Burgerlijk Wetboek. 
153 The Burgerlijk Wetboek art 1384 provides that ‘men aansprakelijk is voor de schade 
veroorzaakt door de daad van personen voor wie men moet instaan, of van zaken de men 
onder zijn bewaring heeft’. 
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7.4.3.3.3 Defences 
 
A force majeure event can serve as a defence, yet it is not absolute. Where 
the wrongdoer knew or should have known about the impending event and 
failed to take precautionary measures, the eventual force majeure occurrence 
does not serve as a defence.154  
 
In Faure’s opinion contributory or comparative negligence by the plaintiff 
should also serve as a defence, even though it is a partial and not an absolute 
defence and should lead to a proportionate reduction in liability.155  
 
The ‘first use’ defence can also not be considered an absolute defence, as 
‘first in time’ is not in this context necessarily strongest in right. This defence 
becomes relevant in the situation where a factory was located in an 
uninhabited area, and a person who, knowing of the existing risk of pollution 
by the factory, assumes the risk by settling on property adjacent to the factory. 
The ‘newcomer’ is then precluded from acting once the risk realises and the 
polluting event occurs. The determination of liability requires the investigation 
of the possibility of reducing or preventing harm to the newcomer, the 
foreseeability of the harm and the possible expansion of the harm after the 
newcomer has settled.156  The possession of a licence issued by an authority 
to allow polluting activities has, however, been rejected as a defence.157 
 
7.4.3.4 Causation 
 
Countries such as South Africa, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Austria 
and Switzerland all take a two-pronged approach to test for causation, where 
                                            
154 Faure (ed) 54 uses the following example as an analogy: A sudden unexpected fog is 
seen as a force majeure event, but not a slow creeping fog where a driver of a motor vehicle 
has time to react to evade the fog. He is of the opinion that force majeure should even remain 
a defence under a strict liability regime discussed in par 7.4.3.3.2 above. 
155 See Faure (ed) 62; contributory negligence does not only impact on the requirement of 
fault, but one should keep in mind that it also impacts on the element of causation, dealt with 
below; see par 7.4.3.4; see also the position in South African law as examined in chap 4 pars 
4.2.4.4, 4.2.5.2.2 above. 
156 As stated by Faure (ed) 63 et seq. 
157 Known as ‘the regulatory compliance defence’ as discussed by Faure (ed) 55. 
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factual causation is limited by the second test for legal causation.  In contrast, 
causation is determined in Belgium by testing only for factual causation by the 
application of the conditio sine qua non test.158 The second test consists of a 
test for legal causation in South African law,159 a test for ‘adequate causation’ 
in some European countries,160 and the test for ‘reasonable accountability’ in 
the Netherlands.161 The lack of a second test of this nature in Belgium has the 
potential for extensive or unlimited factual liability and has been widely 
criticized.162 
 
7.4.3.5 Damage or loss 
 
7.4.3.5.1 General nature of damages 
 
The conduct must have caused damage or loss that is certain and 
quantified.163 The nature of claimable environmental damages and the 
assessment and quantification once again pose problems in an environmental 
context as discussed extensively in chapter 6 above.164 Claims in general 
include damages for bodily injury suffered, for property damage and other 
damages such as for loss of profit and pure economic loss.165 
 
7.4.3.5.2 Statutory description of damages 
 
In some situations express statutory provisions determine exactly what the 
extent of the claim is. For marine pollution in terms of the Belgian wet van 20 
januari 1999, ‘damage’ in the context of the Belgian marine environment is 
                                            
158 See Boone I “Conditio sine qua non, of mag het iets meer zijn?” in Balthazar T (ed) 
Aansprakelijkheidsrecht (2004) 53; see also De Ketelaere 1330 regarding the test for a 
‘oorzakelijke fout’. 
159 See the position in South African law in chap 4 par 4.2.5.3 above. 
160 Specifically in Germany, Austria and Switzerland.  
161 The criterion of ‘toerekening naar redelijkheid’ in the Netherlands. 
162 See the criticism by Boone 54; see also in this regard Bocken H & Boone I “Causaliteit in 
het Belgische Recht” TPR 2003 1625 1627–1633; see also Faure 160 in general on causal 
uncertainty. 
163 Own translation from Van Daele 17 who describes it as ‘zeker en onbetwistbaar’. 
164 See the detailed discussion in chap 6 par 6.6. 
165 See De Ketelaere 1334–1336 for a detailed examination of the various forms of damage 
that could be actionable. 
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defined as ‘any loss or disadvantage suffered by an individual or by a legal 
entity as a result of marine pollution of the marine environment, whatever the 
cause may be’.166 
 
The statute distinguishes environmental marine damage from an 
‘environmental impairment’ which is described as ’any negative influence on 
the marine environment as long as it does not constitute damages’.167 The 
latter also includes all collective interests and all negative consequences, 
which makes the description rather extensive. This Act allows the state to 
conduct clean-up operations, and to institute a claim for monetary damages 
against the polluter to cover the clean-up costs. As the primary goal is to 
restore the environment, the money claimed from the polluter does not 
provide compensation to cover the losses of the individual who is prejudiced 
by the pollution.168 
 
7.4.3.6 Proposal to introduce a new compensation regime 
 
A study of the viability of a new compensation system for environmental 
damage was completed in December 1998 upon the instruction of the Belgian 
government.169 The recommendations included that any new dispensation 
should not provide cover for any retroactive damage. It should be based on an 
objective strict liability in that all persons in control of premises or substances 
incur liability unless they can prove their specific share in the damage caused. 
This then creates a presumptive causation.  
 
Although it was not recommended that a mandatory insurance or other 
mandatory financial security system be introduced, Bocken is of the opinion 
that liability insurance cover for specific environmental risks should be 
                                            
166 Art 2,6. 
167 Art 2,7; own translation of the relevant section. 
168 Art 37, art 3. 
169 See the study by Deketelaere M, Schuyster F & Deketelaere K Onderzoek naar de 
Opportuniteit en de Haalbaarheid van een Vernieuwd Vergoedingssysteem voor Milieuschade 
(December 1998) as undertaken by the Instituut voor Milieu- en Energierecht Faculteit der 
Rechstgeleerdheid Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.  
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compulsory.170 This is supported as a potential solution as can be seen from 
the conclusion in chapter 8 below. 
 
In accordance with the general principles of a civil liability ‘damage approach’ 
the study proposed that ‘compensable damage’ should include all forms of 
natural resource damage, as well as damage to water and soil, traditional 
property damage and damage to persons that can all be included in the 
‘dangerous activities’ approach.171 
 
7.4.4 Insurance and Schemes of Restitution in Belgium 
 
7.4.4.1 Wet op landesverzekeringsovereenkomst 172  
 
This statute deals only with insurance contract law in Belgium, and not with 
the supervision of the insurance industry.173 The Act regulates the relationship 
between insurers and policyholders in all insurance matters except maritime 
insurance, which is dealt with in separate legislation.174 Liability insurance is 
dealt with in title I and II of the legislation. The statute contains various 
provisions that apply specifically to environmental liability insurance.175  
 
Article 78 is of particular significance as it covers the insurability of long-tail 
liabilities where claims are instituted only after the insurance has lapsed for 
                                            
170 See the Report by Bocken H General Report Theme 1B “Alternative Compensation 
Systems for Environmental Liabilities presented at the AIDA XIth World Congress New York 
(2002) (hereinafter ‘Bocken (2002)’) 7. 
171 In the opinion of De Ketelaere in the Executive Summary 1. 
172 Wet van 25 juni 1992. 
173 The following examples illustrate aspects contained in the Act: art 80 deals with the duty of 
the policyholder to disclose all documentation and proof of the damage or loss-causing 
incident to the insurer; art 79, and art 89 cover the insurer’s defence against the claim; art 82 
deals with the compulsory payment of all expenditure relating to the legal process, costs of 
defence and statutory interest that exceeds the insured sum; art 34 and art 35 provide 
prescription periods for general claims and for liability insurance claims; see also Reinecke 
MFB “Interesting aspects of the new Belgian insurance act: a few comparative remarks from a 
South African point of view” 1993 (1) TSAR 91. 
174 See par 7.4.2.6 above; for criticism of the new Act and its limited application see Couzy H 
in Huybrechts (ed) Marine Insurance at the Turn of the Millenium: The European Institute of 
Maritime and Transport Law Vol 1 (1999) 379. 
175 Art 77–89. 
 385
damage that was caused during the existence of the insurance policy.176 This 
section was amended in 1994 to replace the ‘acts committed’ trigger with the 
‘loss occurrence’ trigger for insurance cover.177 Parties are entitled to agree to 
cover on a ‘claims-made’ basis, provided that the loss also occurred during 
the policy period. Once parties have agreed to the ‘claims-made’ basis, the 
insurer is legally obliged to provide for an additional 36-months subsequent 
cover following the expiry of the policy, where the risk is not taken up by 
another insurer. This obligation only exists where the policyholder made a full 
disclosure to the insurer of all relevant facts relating to potential damage-
causing events during the policy period.178 
 
Article 86 on the ‘eigenrecht van de benadeelde’ allows the prejudiced party 
to claim directly from the insurer.179 In accordance with Article 87 statutory 
and contractual exclusions, exceptions and disqualifications cannot be 
maintained against the prejudiced party, provided that they did not already 
apply prior to the damage-causing incident.180 
 
7.4.4.2 Regulation of policies and financial limits  
 
Insurance policy provisions are also regulated in terms of the Wet van 9 juli 
1975 that applies to all insurers.181 Any clause that does not comply with the 
provisions of the Act is deemed to be void. 
 
                                            
176 Called the ‘uitloop risico’. 
177 This basis applies to all insurance policies except for motor vehicle liability, family liability 
or liability in non-industrial fire insurance policies. 
178 See in this regard Rogge J “Belgian Land Insurance Contract Act” 1998 (May) The Bulletin 
on Pollution, Products and New Technologies (AIDA) 17. 
179 This section in the Act regarding the direct right of the third party or ‘eigen recht van de 
benadeelde’ creates a statutory right for the prejudiced party to claim directly from the liability 
insurer. This is also the case in the Netherlands in terms of the new insurance legislation as 
discussed in par 7.5.4.2 below; see also Reinecke MFB “Interesting aspects of the new 
Belgian insurance act: a few comparative remarks from a South African point of view” 1993 
(1) TSAR 91 (hereinafter ‘Reinecke (1993)’) 106 et seq for an evaluation of the rights of third 
parties against the insurer in Belgian law. 
180 Art 87 § (1); see also Sandrock O “German and European drafts on choice of law rules 
applicable to delictual liability: the direct claim against the insurer” 1999 (4) TSAR 734 753 
who reports that EU countries appear to be unanimous in that either the law that governs the 
delictual liability or the law that governs the insurance contract can be applied. 
181 Art 19. 
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For civil liability claims not based on contract, specific statutory minimum 
amounts can be prescribed.182 
 
7.4.4.3 Types of insurance cover available 
 
7.4.4.3.1 General availability 
 
First-party property insurance provides cover for environmental damage 
although most policies contain a standard soil pollution exclusion clause. It is 
also possible to claim under liability insurance for loss incurred due to 
liabilities incurred towards third parties, unless the claim is excluded by a 
pollution exclusion clause.  
 
7.4.4.3.2 Liability insurance cover 
 
The most common insurance cover to be found in the Belgian market is the 
‘burgerlijke aansprakelijkheid’ (hereinafter ‘BA’), ‘BA gezin’ or ‘familiale 
verzekering’, that covers any civil liability incurred in a private capacity, and 
would include cover for liabilities incurred due to damage caused to the 
environment.  For professional liability insurance cover the market offers the 
‘BA uitbating’ policy as well as the ‘beroepsaansprakelijkheidsverzekering’.183 
 
For environmental losses in particular the ‘BA na levering’ policy could provide 
cover for loss or damage caused to the environment after the delivery of 
goods or services. As can be expected, the time clause that determines the 
trigger of cover is a key provision in this type of insurance.184 This is also an 
‘all risk’ policy which covers all risks unless a risk is specifically excluded. 
These policies all exclude cover for goods referred to as ‘toevertrouwd goed’, 
                                            
182 See, for example, the minimum cover prescribed for each risk occurrence, and the 
minimum cover for property damage as prescribed by art 2 K.B. 4 juli 2004, and B.S. 22 juli 
2004. 
183 See Van Daele 25 et seq on the cover provided by this type of policy; see also De 
ketelaere 1375 et seq on the insurance cover against environmental damage provided under 
the BA uitbating policies. 
184 See the discussion of the various time clauses or triggers of cover in chap 5 par 5.3 above. 
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for which a separate BA policy exists, which are goods in the possession of 
another for treatment, maintenance, repair or on which some form of work or 
service is to be delivered. 
 
Lastly, policies for ‘brandverzekering’ also include an element of liability 
insurance that could provide cover for environmental damage in the policy 
known as ‘BA gebouw’. Statutory limits are set in the Burgerlijk Wetboek for 
the cover provided depending on the type of buildings insured.185 
 
7.4.4.3.3 Environmental damage insurance cover 
 
Over the last few years cover has been provided for environmental damage 
under a specialised policy.186 This specific cover has various limitations. It can 
only apply to accidental pollution, the prejudiced party must prove that the 
polluter was at fault, and claims relating to damages or losses incurred where 
the polluter fails to obey State regulations and procedures are excluded from 
cover.187 The two other absolute exclusions from cover in these policies are 
war risks and nuclear risks. The specialised types of cover discussed in 
chapter 5 above are also generally available in the international market.188 
 
7.4.4.4 Limitations and exclusions 
 
As discussed in chapter 6 above, other limits and exclusions that are in 
practice often found in policies are exclusions of claims due to intentional 
acts; claims relating to asbestos; liability caused by the failure to obtain 
statutory mandatory insurance cover; limitations regarding the identity or 
capacity of the insured person; damages caused by breach of contract; and 
damages to the insured’s own assets or property. As standard cover is only 
provided for ‘accidental’ pollution, claims for gradual pollution are excluded. 
                                            
185 For an examination of these limits, see Van Daele 37 et seq. 
186 Called the ‘de waarborg pollutie: dekking voor milieuverontreiniging’ policy. 
187 See Van Daele 30 et seq who highlights these limitations. 
188 See chap 5 par 5.4.4 above. 
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This last exclusion is extensive in its operation and often counters claims for 
pollution damage.189 
 
7.4.4.5 Mandatory insurance cover 
 
Mandatory or compulsory insurance must be obtained for the transportation of 
hazardous wastes, for activities by environmental specialists, and for the 
producers or ‘exploitanten’ of specific high-risk industries, for example, the 
waste disposal industry and paint and chemical manufacturers.190 Although it 
is costly and difficult to obtain, it is required due to participation in an industry 
that poses a high pollution risk. This is also the position in most other 
countries where the waste industry is, due to its high risk rating, heavily 
regulated. The mandatory policies are of a highly specialised nature and the 
provisions differ from insurer to insurer, irrespective of whether cover is 
provided by a national or by an international insurer. 
 
Two authoritative Belgian writers on this topic, namely Bocken and Faure, 
have completed various studies on alternative methods to provide funding for 
the remediation of the environment or to ensure compliance with clean-up 
duties.191  Some have been implemented with great success in the Belgian 
market. Various financial instruments such as financial securities and 
warranties are available that can serve as alternatives to the compensation 
provided by insurance cover.192 Although this thesis does not focus on an 
extensive study of alternatives to insurance, future studies will have to take 
note of the Belgian development in this context especially in view of the 
                                            
189 See the general discussion of ‘long-tail’ liability in chap 5 par 5.3 and the contractual 
exclusions from cover par 5.4 above. 
190 Own translation of ‘milieudeskundige’; see in this regard De Ketelaere 1370 for the various 
forms of mandatory insurance cover required in Belgium. 
191 Alternatives to pollution insurance do not fall within the scope of this thesis; see, however, 
Bocken H “Financial guarantees in the environmental liability directive: Next time better” 2006 
(15) European Environmental Law Review 13; see also for a more extensive exposition 
Bocken (2000) 8 who highlights the justification for the implementation of these alternatives; 
for an earlier study, see Bocken H “Alternatives to liability and liability insurance for the 
compensation of pollution damages” (Part I) 1987 (4) Tijdschrift voor Milieuaansprakelijkheid 
83; see also Faure & Skogh 284; see also 226 where they embark upon a detailed economic 
analysis of these alternative instruments; see also Fogleman chap 14 for alternatives to 
insurance for environmental pollution damage. 
192 Art 9.1.14 of the Belgian Voorontwerp. 
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extensive problems experienced in the environmental insurance industry as 
discussed in chapter 6.193 
 
The Belgian government may require operators of installations and activities 
within designated industries or categories of industries to deliver ex ante 
financial guarantees or pay deposits to cover environmental liabilities, before 
the required permits or notification certificates that authorise their operations 
are issued to the operators.194 Deposits must be paid into separate 
environmental guarantee funds. Separate guarantees have to be delivered to 
cover different types of loss, for damage caused by death or personal injury, 
and for other types of damage to or impairment of the environment.195 
Amounts may only be paid out for purposes of restoring the damage or 
impairment.196 Where a financial guarantee is mandatory, it is possible to 
obtain a second-layer guarantee from an ‘optional limit fund’ where the 
primary guarantee proves to be insufficient to cover the losses incurred.197  
 
 
7.5 THE NETHERLANDS 
 
7.5.1 General Introduction 
 
Article 21 of the Dutch Constitution198 provides the legal basis for the 
protection of the environment and the right to the environment. The Dutch 
government was one of the first governments to react to increased pollution 
damage and established a national clean-up programme for environmental 
contamination as early as 1978.199 The general duty not to cause harm, loss 
                                            
193 See in this regard Havenga P “Nuwe risiko’s in Suid-Afrika: Versekering en alternatiewe 
vergoedingsmeganismes as antwoord daarop” in Faure & Neethling (eds) 135. 
194 Art 9.1.16 of the Voorontwerp proposes a variety of financial guarantees, for example, 
guarantees from financial institutions, other forms of personal or collateral security and 
deposits paid into separate environmental guarantee accounts. 
195 Art 9.1.17 δ (1). 
196 Art 9.1.22. 
197 See Faure 227 et seq for a discussion of the implementation of ex ante guarantee funds. 
198 Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden van 24 Augustus 1815. 
199 Fogleman 27 attributes the early development to the reaction to various major incidents, 
for example, the Lekkerkerk incident where toxic waste in soil was found under a housing 
Footnote continues on the next page. 
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or damage, or to prevent it for occurring, is found throughout the provisions of 
the Burgerlijk Wetboek.200 The relevant sections as far as environmental 
damage is concerned are discussed below. 
 
7.5.2 Statutory Liability 
 
7.5.2.1 General 
 
Various statutes focus on environmental liabilities and obligations to restore or 
clean up the environment. Statutory liability is mostly a strict liability for which 
fault is not required.201 
 
7.5.2.2 Environmental Management 
 
The general statute that governs environmental issues in the Netherlands is 
the Wet milieubeheer on environmental management.202 The Act requires any 
citizen or the state to take all measures necessary to prevent environmental 
damage.203 The Act furthermore requires potential polluters to maintain 
sufficient insurance cover to secure their financial obligations in terms of 
regulations issued in terms of the Act.204 The Act is supplemented by the 
Besluit financiele zekerheid milieubeheer.205 The enforcement measures for 
failure to comply with the statutory provisions can be found in section 18 of 
the Act. The focus and extent of this legislation correspond to that of the 
South African NEMA.206 
 
 
 
estate, causing the inhabitants of the estate to fall seriously ill. This disaster was similar to the 
Love Canal disaster in New York as described in par 7.6.2.2.1 below. 
200 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘BW’; in general, the law of property is dealt with in Boek 3, 
the law of obligations is dealt with in Boek 6, and insurance contracts in the latest release of 
Boek 7 of the BW. 
201 Called ‘risico aansprakelijkheid’ as opposed to ‘skuld aansprakelijkheid’. 
202 Wet milieubeheer van 1992. 
203 Art 1.1(a), art 10.3. 
204 Art 8.15(3). 
205 Wet van 8 februari 2003. 
206 See chap 3 par 3.4.2 above. 
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7.5.2.3 Soil and water pollution 
 
The Wet bodembescherming van 1986, as supplemented by the Stortbesluit 
bodembescherming van 1993, is of primary importance for the statutory 
regulation of soil pollution.207 In terms of the former, any person who knows or 
should reasonably have known of actions that cause soil pollution should take 
all measures to prevent such damage.208 The state can also claim all costs 
and expenses from the polluter that the state incurred to remediate the 
environment.209 Financial guarantees can be required where a potential soil 
pollution incident caused by waste matter is identified.210 
 
7.5.2.4 Pollution by dangerous or hazardous substances  
 
Another statute that applies to the environment in general is the Wet 
milieugevaarlijke stoffen 1997 that creates a statutory duty upon persons to 
prevent substances that have the potential to pollute the environment, to 
detrimentally affect the environment.211 This duty to prevent harm or loss is 
also a general duty as required by the BW.212 Liability can also be incurred for 
damage caused by the transport or storage of hazardous or dangerous 
substances.213 
 
7.5.2.5 Air pollution 
 
Liability for air pollution falls in the scope of the Wet inzake de 
luchtverontreiniging of 1976,214 as supplemented by the provisions of the 
                                            
207 Art 75; see also BW art 6:176. 
208 Art 13; see in this regard Nieuwenhuis JH, Stolker CJJM & Valk WJ (eds) Vermogensrecht 
Tekst & Commentaar (1999) (hereinafter ‘Nieuwenhuis et al’) 1385; see also 1390 for the 
position on water pollution. 
209 Art 75; see also Nieuwenhuis et al 1386 et seq for a examination of the extent of the 
remediation required, and the prescribed procedure to bring such a claim. 
210 Art 2(2). 
211 Art 2 creates a general duty of care, whereas chap 4 of the Act deal with the enforcement 
of the provisions of the Act. 
212 Art 6:175–6:178 BW. 
213 Art 8:1210 BW; see also in general Wansink JH “Verzekering en milieuschade als gevolg 
van vervoer/opslag van gevaarlijke stoffen” 1999 (3) TMA 77 (hereinafter (Wansink (1999)’). 
214 Art 90. 
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Besluit luchtemissies afvalverbranding 1993 and the Wet op 
bodembescherming referred to above.215 
  
Whether these statutory liabilities are covered under a specific liability policy 
will depend on the scope of cover provided and on the intentions of the 
parties.216 It is generally accepted, especially in terms of the open basis of ‘all 
risk cover’ policies, that all losses, even statutory liabilities, are insured unless 
specifically excluded from cover.217 
 
7.5.2.6 The nuclear industry and marine pollution by oil 
 
As is the case with most other countries, the international conventions that 
regulate these liabilities have been ratified or acceded to.218 
 
7.5.3 Civil Liability 
 
7.5.3.1 General requirements 
 
The wrongful act is seen as the most common cause of action to claim 
compensation for environmental damage. Article 6:162 of the BW provides 
that a person who commits a blameworthy action or deed that can be 
attributed to him is obliged to pay compensation to another who suffers 
damage or loss due to such conduct. He is to be held accountable where the 
deed can be attributed to him in specific circumstances in law.219  The 
                                            
215 See par 7.5.2.3 above. 
216 See the judgment of the Hof Den Haag van 21 januari 1992 where loss incurred due to the 
failure to act in terms of a statutory duty was found to be covered under a liability insurance 
policy. The policy provided for cover for any financial prejudice or ‘financiele nadeel’ caused 
to the policyholder, should he incur liability for any direct or indirect damage relating to any 
activity. The policy did not distinguish between statutory or contractual liability. It also did not 
specifically exclude wrongful acts (‘onrechtmatige daden’), omissions or negative 
performance (‘negatieve wanprestatie’) or environmental liability (‘milieuaansprakelijkheid’). 
217 Wansink 13 confirms the basic principle that ‘alle aansprakelijkheden die niet zijn 
uitgesloten, zijn verzekerd’. 
218 BW Boek 3, and Boek 6; see also Nieuwenhuis et al 709 for a discussion of the relevant 
international conventions within these industries. 
219 Own translation of the relevant section from the BW Boek 6. 
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requirements that have to be met are wrongful conduct, accountability or fault, 
damage, and factual as well as legal causation.220 
 
7.5.3.2 Wrongful conduct and fault 
 
Both wrongfulness and fault are required for civil liability.221 Conduct that is 
contrary to a duty of care, contrary to a statutory duty or conduct that infringes 
upon a right is deemed to be wrongful.222 As it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
provide an exact definition of wrongfulness, one must assess the situation in 
view of the facts and circumstances of each situation. Liability for wrongful 
conduct can be avoided where there is a justification for the conduct. 
Examples of grounds of justification include force majeure occurrences, 
statutory compliance, vandalism, war and so forth.223 Where damage is 
caused by an authorised activity, for example, by the operations of a nuclear 
power station that is to the benefit of the public, the activities must be 
tolerated by the prejudiced party for the greater good of society. The injured 
party still, however, retains his right to be compensated for his loss.224 
 
Civil liability is also based on the subjective notion of fault. Where 
wrongfulness relates to or qualifies the conduct, the element of fault relates to 
the relationship between the wrongdoer’s attitude and his conduct. In specific 
situations a strict liability regime could apply where the absence of fault does 
not deny a liability claim. This will be the case where a statute or the common 
law introduces strict liability for a specific infringement. An example would be 
the strict joint and several product liability regimes that apply in most other 
                                            
220 BW art 162 lid 1; see also Nieuwenhuis et al 665 where the criterion of legal causation is 
considered. 
221 Sieburgh CH Toerekening van een onrechtmatige daad (2000) (hereinafter ‘Sieburgh’) 41 
et seq for a discussion of the distinction between the elements of wrongfulness and fault in 
the law of the Netherlands. 
222 BW art 6:162 lid 2. 
223 Art 6:162 lid 2; art 6:178. 
224 Called ‘gedoogschade’; see the statement by Wansink 19 that ‘[d]e gedrag in het 
algemeen belang, of – overeenkomstig art 6:168 BW – op grond van zwaarwegende 
maatschapelijke belangen behoort te worden geduld’. 
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countries,225 or where a high-risk activity, the use or control of a dangerous 
substances or a vicarious relationship justifies strict liability.226 The burden of 
proof rests with the wrongdoer to prove one of the available defences.227 
 
7.5.3.3 Causation 
 
Factual causation is tested in accordance with the conditio sine qua non test, 
yet is limited, as is the case in most other countries, by a second criterion 
regarding legal causation called ‘relativiteit’. What is required, is a so-called 
‘toerekening naar redelijkheid’ or legal justification.228 Where there is multiple 
causation, the Netherlands has introduced an innovative market-share 
allocation for the allocation of liability that developed from liability cases in the 
pharmaceutical industry.229 ‘This idea of alternative causation has been 
around for a long time.’230 Wansink & Spier caution that one should always 
keep in mind that although a regime of joint and several liability clearly 
benefits the injured party, it could have disastrous consequences for the liable 
parties.231 
 
7.5.3.4 Damage or loss 
 
The wrongful conduct must cause damages in the form of either patrimonial or 
non-patrimonial damages. Patrimonial losses include direct damages and lost 
                                            
225 See Wansink JH & Spier J “Joint and Several Liability of DES Manufacturers” 1993 1(6) 
International Insurance Law Review 176 (hereinafter ‘Wansink & Spier’) for a discussion of 
the principle of joint and several liability of the manufacturers of the DES drug that caused 
birth defects; for the general position on product liability, see Nieuwenhuis et al 734 Afd 3 et 
seq. 
226 BW art 6:162; art 6:178; see in this regard Nieuwenhuis et al 671, 673 et seq. 
227 BW art 6:195. 
228 BW art 6:98, BW art 6:163. 
229See Snijder E “Van market-share liability naar pollution share liability?” 1990 TMA 141; see 
also chap 7 par 7.6.3.2.1 on the position in the USA. 
230 In the words of Wansink & Spier 178 on the liability of drug manufacturers in the early DES 
cases in the Netherlands. 
231 See in general also BW Boek 6 art 99 for the joint and several allocation in civil liability 
cases; see also Wansink & Spier 180 et seq who identify the main complications as those 
arising from the right of recourse that manufacturers have against each other, for example 
where they are not all within the same jurisdiction, where some are insolvent or untraceable 
and so forth.Other complications arise regarding the different triggers of the liability insurance 
coverage of the defendants, and the contractual limitations of claims. 
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profits, prevention costs, as well as costs incurred by the prejudiced party for 
the assessment of the damages and the costs of due legal process to claim 
and collect the damages. Non-patrimonial losses can only be claimed in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 6:106 BW and where the claim is 
sound in law. 232 
 
Property damage is in general described as the objective impairment of the 
material structure of the property that, in the general public opinion, 
characterises the acceptable appearance and intrinsic value of the 
property.233 
 
7.5.4 Insurance and Schemes of Restitution in the Netherlands 
 
7.5.4.1 Title 7.17 Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek 
 
The new law of insurance as codified in title 7.17 of the BW came into effect 
on 1 January 2006.234 The new legislation attempts to provide an even stricter 
regulation of the relationship between the insured and his insurer.235 
Restrictions regarding the freedom of the parties to contract at will have been 
introduced. This relates specifically to the inclusion of provisions in favour of 
the insurer. 
 
7.5.4.2 Statutory regulation of policy conditions 
 
Although the new legislation prohibits the inclusion of certain terms and 
requires the inclusion of others, the legislator did not want to rigidly prescribe 
                                            
232 The general concept of damages under liability insurance is discussed more extensively in 
Wansink 25 et seq. 
233 Own translation; Wansink 47 describes it as ‘een objectieve aantasting van de stoffelijke 
structuur die naar verkeersopvattingen de stoffelijke gaafheid van een zaak kenmerkt’. 
234 See an earlier discussion of the proposed legislation, see Van Mierlo AIM & Wansink JH 
“Titel 7.17 NBW: l’assurance oblige” 2000 (75) Nederlandsch juristenblad 1737 (hereinafter 
‘Van Mierlo & Wansink’). The authors are of the opinion that the legislation maintains the 
important social function that insurance serves, and that it provides a greater balance 
between the interests of the insured and the insurer.  
235 For a more detailed discussion of the long-awaited amended legislation, see Drion PJM 
(ed), Kamphuisen JGC, Wansink JH, Lauwerier BKM Bundel titel 7.17 belicht (2005). 
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pro forma general policy conditions and left the content of these general 
clauses open to negotiations between the parties. This legislation requires the 
inclusion of general descriptive provisions on the nature of the insured object 
or interest, and the exact scope of the risks covered by the policy. Contractual 
exclusion, exemption and limitation clauses are also not specifically regulated 
by statute in the Netherlands and are open to negotiation.236 
 
The following statutory provisions of the new legislation apply specifically to 
liability insurance policies and are relevant as far as environmental insurance 
claims are concerned. In accordance with Article 7:954 of the BW,237 the 
prejudiced party is entitled to claim directly from the liability insurer of the 
wrongdoer.238 The injured third party has a ius agendi and not an independent 
claim as is the case with the statutory ‘eigenrecht van de benadeelde’ in 
Belgian law.239 He only has the right to institute the insured’s claim against the 
insurer. He can never claim more than the amount that the insured would 
have been entitled to claim. 
 
The rights of the third party are furthermore protected by the provisions of 
Article 7:936 BW, for example, where the insured becomes insolvent.240 
 
Article 7:942 BW241 provides for a statutory prescription period specifically for 
liability insurance claims. Prescription of the claim against the insurer does not 
begin unless a period of 6 months has passed after the date on which the 
claim covered by the liability insurance has been instituted.242 
 
                                            
236 Art 7:951 BW. 
237 Art 7.17.2.99(c) BW. 
238 In the words of Van Mierlo & Wansink 1740, the direct action of the prejudiced party 
against the insurer is the ‘piece de resistance’ of the legislation, as it will ensure that as much 
as possible of the insurance pay-out will reach the prejudiced party. 
239 See par 7.4.4.1 above. 
240 Art 7.17.1.11 BW. 
241 Art 7.17.1.15 BW. 
242 Art 7:942 lid 1 tweede zin BW; see also Wansink JH “Verzekering, een Juridisch Product 
in een Kritische Buitenwereld – Een Impressie uit Nederland” 1999 (4) TSAR 706 714 who 
states that an additional duty rests on the insurer to notify the insured of a time bar clause in 
the policy when the insurer notifies the insured that the latter’s insurance claim has been 
rejected. 
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In terms of Article 7:951 BW an insurer is not liable where the cause of the 
loss was an inherent vice of the insured property or goods. This may affect 
claims under first-party cover where the potential polluting cause is interpreted 
as such an inherent vice.243 
 
7.5.4.3 Standardisation by the industry 
 
Even though legislation leaves the cover open to negotiation, standard 
universal liability insurance policy models have in time developed in the 
industry.244 The Afdelingscommissie of the Verbond van Verzekeraars 
recommended that contractual provisions, as well as the relationship between 
the insurers in the event of double insurance, be standardised.245 Insurers 
may deviate from the recommended standard wording, but must always 
comply with the relevant provisions of competition law.246 Although the 
insurance industry provides specific policy models, in particular model AVB’96 
for general AVB or  ‘aansprakelijkheidsverzekering voor bedrijven’ policies 
and model AVP 2000 for ‘aansprakelijkheidsverzekering voor particulieren’ as 
described in greater detail below, insurers may deviate from the wording in 
these standard versions.247  
 
The magnitude of claims for new risks, for example, environmental pollution 
claims under the EDI policies discussed below,248 often exceed the financial 
capacity of insurers. As most insurers did not all have the resources for 
effective risk determination, insurers were forced to create mutual reinsurance 
pools to enable them to provide the cover required. The specific 
environmental pool, called the ‘Milieuaansprakelijkheidsverzekering 
Samenwerkingsverband’ or ‘MAS’, consisted of more than 50 reinsurers. Any 
                                            
243 Art 7.17.2.8; see also the explanation by Blom 85 et seq on the nature and effect of an 
‘inherent vice’ in the context of pollution liability. 
244 Wansink 4 confirms the principle that ‘in dit polismodel opgenomen standaardteksten zijn 
louter indicatief. Elke individuele verzekeraar kan hiervan tekstueel en/of inhoudelijk afwijken’. 
245 As reported by Wansink 213. 
246 See art 6 of the Wet op mededinging van 22 Mei 1997; also the Mededingingswet van   
1 Januarie 1998 in this regard. 
247 See par 7.5.4.7. 
248 See par 7.5.4.6. 
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individual insurer contracted directly with individuals under a MAS policy, but 
reinsured within this reinsurance pool. The basis of share in the pool 
depended on market quota. The mutual pool prescribed uniform policy 
conditions for policies specifically issued under the scheme, that were strictly 
followed within the industry yet remained illustrative in nature and were not 
peremptory. Although the pool was officially dissolved on 1 January 2008, 
leaving insurers free to reinsure with any other reinsurer, it continues to 
operate in a specialist advisory capacity that provides expertise on risk 
assessment and premium determination, and the proposed clauses serve as 
examples for insurers in the environmental insurance market.249 
 
7.5.4.4 Insurable liabilities 
 
The insurable liability for damage caused to a third party in most cases 
recognises liability for a wrongful act based on fault liability.250 In lesser cases 
liability based on breach of contract,251 and in limited circumstances liability 
based on unauthorised agency252 and on unjust enrichment can be included 
under the insurance cover.253 Liability should always be judged objectively on 
its own and should not depend on whether insurance to cover of the specific 
liability exists.254 The intentions of the parties and the policy wording are also 
crucial to determine which liabilities are covered. The latest AVB and AVP 
liability insurance policies as discussed below, also specifically provide for any 
claim for damages caused due to non-compliance with any act, statute or 
                                            
249 The current status in the market as per information provided in the opinion provided in 
person by Kremers H Verenigde Assurantiebedrijven Nederland N.V. 28 November 2008; see 
also Faure (ed) 220 et seq. 
250 Referred to as a wrongful act or ‘onrechmatige daad’. 
251 Malperformance or ‘wanprestatie’. 
252 General liability insurance principles are covered by Art 7:957 (7.17.2.18) BW. 
253 See Wansink 16 for a more detailed discussion of possible liability scenarios where liability 
based on unjust enrichment is seen as a ‘legal liability’ for purposes of liability insurance 
cover. The following serves as a simple example. Where a person buys immovable property 
for a low price due to environmental damage caused to the property, and after clean-up sells 
the property for a profit. Art 75 lid 3 provides that clean-up costs can be reclaimed by the state 
from the polluter, or from the owners or users of the property or other persons with a right to 
benefit from the property. This would be the person who is enriched by this type of   ‘bargain-
snatching’. 
254 This is emphasised by various writers in South Africa and abroad as discussed in chap 5 
above, and also by Sieburgh 227 regarding the position in the Netherlands. 
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agreement.255 This would include any general liability incurred due to the 
criterion of reasonableness and fairness in terms of BW 6:248 lid 1. The 
requirement remains throughout that loss must in fact be suffered before a 
claim is possible.256 
 
7.5.4.5 Extent of compensable damages 
 
The following are included as forms of damages caused by pollution of the 
environment, and which can be covered by liability insurance policies: (a) 
property damage, that includes damage to the soil as well as to air257 and 
groundwater,258 (b) personal damage for bodily damage and the like, (c) pure 
economic loss, (d) damage to living things, (e) contamination,259 and (f) total 
loss of goods.260 As far as property damage is concerned, it can be described 
as the objective impairment of the material structure of the property that, in 
the general public opinion, characterises the acceptable appearance and 
intrinsic value of the property.261 
  
7.5.4.6 Environmental damage insurance cover  
 
7.5.4.6.1 History and nature of cover 
 
Since January 1998 insurers in the Netherlands collectively implemented a 
specialised environmental liability insurance policy, called Environmental 
Damage Insurance or EDI.262 The justification for the implementation of this 
specific insurance policy was that as liability for pollution claims was excluded 
                                            
255 See par 7.5.4.7. 
256 As confirmed by Wansink 14 et seq. 
257 ‘Luchtverontreiniging’. 
258 ‘Waterverontreiniging’. 
259 Own translation of the term ‘vervuiling’. 
260 See Wansink par 2.4 for an examination of the terms ‘zaakschade’ and ‘zaakbeschadiging’ 
in Dutch liability insurance, more specifically regarding environmental pollution damage. 
261 Own translation of the description provided by Wansink 47 that refers to ‘een objectieve 
aantasting van de stoffelijke structuur die naar verkeersopvattinge de stoffelijke gaafheid van 
een zaak kenmerkt’. 
262 Known as ‘Milieu Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ or MAV, and ‘Milieu Schadeverzekering’ 
or ‘MSV’; Wansink JH “A new Environmental Damage Insurance Policy (EDI) in the 
Netherlands” May 1998 The Bulletin on Pollution, Products and New Technologies (AIDA) 12 
(hereinafter ‘Wansink (1998)’); see also Faure (ed) 221 et seq. 
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from most general or standard liability insurance policies, a need for a 
specialised insurance product to provide this type of cover existed. It was 
intended to become an essential commodity in the insurance portfolio of most 
industries.263 Insurance cover specifically for pollution damage can in principle 
be obtained on a first-party basis, called ‘Milieuschadeverzekering’ or 
Environmental Impairment Insurance and on a third-party basis called 
‘Milieuaansprakelijkheidsverzekering’ or by procuring Environmental Liability 
Insurance cover under the EDI policy.264 
 
In essence the EDI is insurance to the benefit of, or procured on behalf of a 
third party, with integration, differentiation and a form of direct insurance as its 
key characteristics.265 It is a direct insurance taken out by a person who could 
be held responsible for the insured site and offers comprehensive first-party 
insurance cover to the third party as the co-insured. Where the third party 
suffers a loss, he may claim from the insurer regardless of the liability of the 
policyholder for the loss. Cover is provided only on the contractual terms of 
the policy and without any influence of tort law. The third party must only 
prove a causal link between the loss and the loss-causing event as covered 
by the policy.266 
 
It covers claims relating to pollution damage to land and any secondary 
environmental damage caused due to pollution of the soil or groundwater.267 
All damages as well as clean-up costs and costs for legal defence are 
covered. The advantages and disadvantages of this type of policy are 
addressed below. 
                                            
263 As explained by Six JP “Pollution Insurance in the Netherlands” 1998 (July) The 
International Journal of Insurance Law 181 183. 
264 See the more detailed descriptions provided by Wansink (1998) 12. 
265 See the discussion of this type of first-party insurance to the benefit of a third party in  
chap 5 par 5.3.3 above; see Faure (ed) 219 for a basic examination of the main features of 
the EDI-policy; see also Six 183–185 for details of the the five different types of sub-policies 
available under the EDI umbrella policy.  
266 See the universal issues and problems relating to causation as discussed in chapter 6 par 
6.4 below. 
267 See in this regard Faure M “Milieuaansprakelijkheidsverzekering vaarwel?” 2002 (5) Milieu 
en Recht 129 (hereinafter ‘Faure (2002)’). 
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7.5.4.6.2 Advantages of the EDI policy 
 
The greatest benefit of this policy is that the prejudiced party can claim 
directly from the insurer who provides the EDI cover. What makes it more 
attractive is that a policyholder could also insure his own property against 
environmental damage under the same policy. The EDI was designed to 
provide the following benefits: (a) As it literally forces potential polluters to 
obtain this cover, it offers greater financial security to ensure the remediation 
of environmental damage, which brings it in line with the latest international 
environmental awareness and increased liability for environmental damage; 
(b) it provides integrated coverage for all environmental damage that occurs 
on or originates from the insured site as it provides first-party coverage as well 
as first-party to the benefit of a third-party coverage. The third party is also 
placed in the position of a policyholder as a co-insured; (c) the trigger for a 
claim under the EDI is only the pollution occurrence. This eliminates the 
requirement to prove civil or other liability; (d) for insurers it provides for a 
more effective risk selection and individualised risk differentiation ex ante the 
occurrence; (e) applications for insurance against ‘bad risks’ can be refused, 
deferred or rejected at a very early stage, and would not lead to disputes as to 
whether the risks are in fact covered under general liability cover; and (f) that 
direct action by the third party as policyholder leads to lower costs and eases 
the burden of proof that rests on the policyholder to prove his claim. 
 
7.5.4.6.3 Disadvantages of the EDI policy 
 
Dutch insurers collectively decided that this policy substitutes the liability 
insurance cover previously available for these claims. Where a polluter does 
not have EDI cover, he incurs personal liability to carry the loss and would not 
be able to claim under any other liability policy. He could also not be able to 
claim his legal costs, unless he obtains additional legal defence coverage.268 
This extensively limits the insurance cover in the market in an attempt to 
enforce this type of cover as a form of mandatory insurance. 
                                            
268 See Wansink (1998) 14 who highlights these difficulties. 
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The EDI also has the following disadvantages: (a) Insurance cover is limited 
only to the agreed limits of cover provided, and provides cover only against 
specified ‘goods risks’. (b) As environmental damage claims can be extensive, 
under-insurance poses a real danger. Where the cover provided for under the 
EDI is insufficient, the policyholder is precluded from claiming for his loss 
under any other policy. It is therefore a real possibility that there could be a 
shortfall of proper cover for potentially extensive damages that the insured 
may suffer.269 (c) Because these policies only provide for soil and 
groundwater pollution and as they still contain specific exclusions, the cover is 
still restricted. (d) Clean-up costs are included, yet might not be wide enough 
to cover all remediation or restoration costs.270 
 
7.5.4.6.4 Criticism against EDI policy 
 
Where all insurers together decide to require the implementation of a policy of 
this nature as standard practice, one may question whether the practice is not 
contrary to European competition policy and Dutch competition law.271 
Another question would be whether this type of practice complies with the rule 
that standardised policy conditions should be purely illustrative and remain 
negotiable. Insurers have, however, agreed not to exclude certain risks as a 
general rule, but to leave it open to each insurer to negotiate risk cover freely 
with potential policyholders. 272 
 
Various authors questioned the effectiveness of this insurance in the 
insurance market and in practice.273 As it has shown an annual market share 
                                            
269 This is a serious disadvantage in that some risks that were covered in the past could now 
be uninsured; see also the view of Wansink (1999) 81–82 in this regard.  
270 For a comprehensive evaluation of the EDI insurance see Faure (ed) 223 et seq. 
271 Mededingingswet van 1 januari 1998 and common-law principles of competition law.  
272 As stated by Faure (ed) 224. 
273 Even though he voices concerns on this type of insurance, Faure (ed) 223 mentions in his 
evaluation during 2003 that, according to information provided by the Dutch Insurance 
Association, this new product works remarkably well. He states that ‘[w]hether this new 
product is actually a success is yet more difficult to judge. There is, however, growing interest 
from the industry for this new environmental damage insurance’. This has been confirmed by 
Kremers during 2008, as stated in n 240 above. See also the evaluation and criticism by 
Footnote continues on the next page. 
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increase, its introduction does appear to have been successful. As an 
alternative for high-risk industries, recommendations were made to rather 
replace the cover with mandatory financial guarantees to enable the state to 
meet the costs of environmental clean-up or remediation or to introduce 
mandatory insurance for specific industries.274 It has been stressed that it 
should only apply in industries that could have the potential of causing serious 
damage.275 
 
7.5.4.7 Cover under other policies 
 
As stated above, two specific types of liability insurance policies are available, 
namely the AVP or ‘aansprakelijkheidsverzekering voor particulieren’ and the 
AVB or ‘aansprakelijkheidsverzekering voor bedrijven’ policies that provide 
cover for sudden risks and occupational health risks related to the 
environment.276  
 
It is possible to take out a general all risk liability insurance cover. This cover 
can also form part of another policy such as a fire insurance or motor vehicle 
insurance policy. The description of the risks covered by a policy will 
determine the extent of losses covered. All risks are included unless a specific 
risk is excluded. Pollution-related claims are usually excluded by a specific 
‘pollution exclusion’ clause. The policy can also stipulate that cover is only 
 
Niezen GJ “Nieuwe milieuschadeverzekering – geen panacee” 1998 (4) Milieu & Recht 114; 
Bocken (2002) 39 elaborates on the ‘interesting development’ of this type of cover and 
confirms that its success will have to be measured over time, although he is of the opinion 
that it is unsatisfactory as insurers can exclusively determine the conditions of the cover 
provided. 
274 In accordance with art 8.15 of the Wet Milieubeheer, financial guarantees for specific 
industries are required to cover environmental loss caused to third parties. This applies where 
there is a potential for substantial environmental losses. This solution is, however, heavily 
criticised by the insurance industry as the feeling is that it remains possible to use liability 
insurance as an effective instrument to cover risks. 
275
 As put by Faure (2002) 129, it should apply only to industries where there is a probability 
of serious damage or prejudicial consequences. In his words, where there is a possibility of 
‘ernstige schade of ernstige nadelige gevolgen’. 
276 See in this regard Wansink 1; see also Faure (ed) 219; in respect of the insurability of 
damage caused by the transport and storage of hazardous substances in the Netherlands, 
see Wansink (1999) 77–82. 
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provided for liabilities for environmental damage towards a third party or his 
property, and not for damage to the property of the policyholder.277 
 
Various other insurance policies available in the market include the property 
insurance cover provided by the CAR verzekering policy for the insurance of 
goods or property against the risk of material damage, the Nederlandse Beurs 
Goederen Polis (NBGP) 2006; Nederlandse Beurspolis voor Uitgebreide 
Gevaren (NBUG) 1998; and fire insurance under the Nederlandse Beurs 
Brandpolis (NBBP) 1990.278 The specialised types of cover available in the 
UK market279 are also generally available in the international insurance 
market and accessible for members of most other countries. 
  
7.5.4.8 Limitations and exclusions 
 
As discussed in chapter 6, insurance in the Netherlands is also subject to 
limitations on the amount of the cover provided. Examples include limits per 
occurrence; limits for a series of damages or for a complex occurrence; and 
an aggregate limit for a specific insurance coverage period. Furthermore, 
policies contain exclusion clauses that exclude specific forms of pollution or 
sources of pollution from insurance coverage as examined in chapter 6 
above. 
 
 
7.6 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
7.6.1 General Introduction 
 
The insurance law in the USA has over time also provided some persuasive 
authority in the development of the South African insurance law and could 
prove authoritative on the risks posed by new technologies and the insurability 
                                            
277 As discussed by Wansink 24. 
278 See in this regard Faure (ed) 221. 
279 See par 7.3.4.3 above. 
 405
of these risks.280 It was one of the first countries to react to the increased 
global environmental awareness due to major polluting incidents,281 leading to 
major developments in the environmental insurance field during the 1970s 
and 1980s. 
 
Individual states and territories regulate the general insurance business in the 
USA independently.282 The USA law, however, approaches the issues and 
problems posed specifically by environmental pollution insurance primarily by 
the statutory governmental regulation of liability for clean-up costs and natural 
resource damage caused by pollution. Stringent statutory liability schemes 
force polluters to prevent pollution or face the duty to carry the costs incurred 
for clean-up. These can be far more extensive than the compensation payable 
in terms of tort liability.283  
 
A discussion of only the most important federal legislation, as well as basic 
principles of tort law for claims beyond the scope of the statutory schemes, 
follows below. 
 
                                            
280 See in this regard Reinecke MFB, Van der Merwe S, Van Niekerk JP & Havenga P 
General Principles of Insurance Law (2002) par 27 for a discussion of the absorption of the 
general lex mercatoria into the legal systems of various countries;  as no South African case 
law or statutory regulation exists, for example, for SBS claims, it is proposed that the body of 
case law in the USA could serve as authoritative where such a case is brought before South 
African courts; see the study by Mitchell WJ “CGL Pollution Exclusion Provisions and the Sick 
Building Syndrome” 1999 (January) Defence Council Journal 124; see also the study by 
Wollner KS “Sick Building Syndrome and a Definition of ‘Polluting Conditions’” 2001 (June) 
International Risk Management Institute 1 http://www.irmi.com/Expert/Articles/2001 (last 
accessed on 15 March 2008); see the case of Meridian Mutual Insurance Company v Kellman 
197 F3d 1178 (6th cir 1999) where air pollution was caused by a floor sealant used in a 
building; see also Lucey MT “Sick Building Syndrome: Airing insurance coverage issues 
arising from this new wave of toxic tort litigation” 1999 (Spring) Federation of Insurance and 
Corporate Counsel Quarterly 333. Electro-smog, which is the term used to describe the 
negative effects of electro-magnetic fields, is also studied more extensively in the USA than in 
other countries and could be useful where a legal dispute on liability for damage caused 
exists. For the latest developments, see in general also Cranor CF Toxic Torts: Science, law 
and the possibility of justice (2006) 38 et seq. 
281 See chap 1 par 1.1 n 2 above for examples of polluting incidents in the USA. 
282 McCarran-Ferguson Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011 et seq; see the general discussion by 
Fogleman 466 on the jurisdiction of the state and federal courts. 
283 Stewart RB in Van Dunne JM (ed) Transboundary Pollution and Liability: The Case of the 
River Rhine (Conference proceedings of the International Conference held at Rotterdam 19 
October 1990 (hereinafter ‘Stewart’) 107. 
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7.6.2 Statutory Liability 
 
7.6.2.1 Federal legislation preceding CERCLA 
 
Various environmental Acts preceded the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980284 (hereinafter ‘CERCLA’), 
of which the Rivers and Harbours Act285 is the oldest. Other important 
environmental statutes include the Clean Air Act (hereinafter ‘CAA’) that 
regulates air pollution,286 the Clean Water Act (hereinafter ‘CWA’) that 
regulates pollution of all surface waters,287 and the Oil Pollution Act 
(hereinafter ‘OPA’) that regulates marine oil pollution.288 The National 
Environmental Policy Act289 of 1969 (hereinafter ‘NEPA’) was the first to 
recognise a general national environmental policy for the USA. It governs the 
actions of federal agencies in dealing with environmental issues, but does not 
regulate the actions of private persons.290 These Acts are all still in force. 
 
In the 1970s the Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter ‘EPA’) was 
established to administer and implement federal legislation. 291 Examples of 
the role that EPA plays in terms of other statutory provisions include the 
power to issue regulations to establish standards in industries relating to 
polluting activities in terms of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(hereinafter ‘RCRA’),292 and to prevent and monitor the manufacture and 
distribution of toxic substances in terms of the Toxic Substances Control 
                                            
284 Hereinafter referred to as ‘CERCLA’. 
285 1899; this Act creates strict liability for offences committed in terms of this Act. 
286 42 U.S.C §§ 7401 et seq; see Fogleman 15 for detail on the liabilities incurred in 
accordance with the provisions of this Act. 
287 33 U.S.C §§ 1251 et seq; see Fogleman 17, 62 for detail on the liabilities incurred in 
accordance with the provisions of this Act. 
288 33 U.S.C §§ 2701 et seq, see Fogleman 19, 94 for detail on the liabilities incurred in 
accordance with the provisions of this Act. 
289 42 U.S.C §§ 4321 et seq. 
290 Howard MH & Mackowsky MA “Defending claims for environmental damage under first-
party property insurance policies” 2002 (Spring) Tort & Insurance Law Journal 883 
(hereinafter ‘Howard & Mackowsky’) 884; Fogleman 11, 61. 
291 All these statutes are implemented by the various states under the system of co-operative 
federalism; Fogleman 36. For more on the structure and functions of the EPA see Fogleman 
32–34. 
292 42 U.S.C §§ 6901 et seq; see Fogleman 18, 64 for a more detailed examination of liability 
for hazardous waste pollution under this Act. 
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Act.293 In addition to these statutes and to CERCLA, which is discussed 
extensively below, a brief reference to a few other significant statutes also 
follows below. 
 
7.6.2.2 CERCLA 
 
7.6.2.2.1 General 
 
The 1980 Love Canal toxic waste dump disaster in the State of New York294 
finally motivated the enactment of CERCLA.295 It established a 
comprehensive clean-up programme, called the ‘Superfund program’, and 
created an accompanying liability system for pollution damage caused by the 
release of hazardous substances excluding oil. This applies to sites not 
covered specifically in other statutes such as by the RCRA.296 CERCLA does 
not automatically supersede or replace the statutes that preceded it, unless 
an express provision to that effect exists. Damage to property and bodily 
injuries do not fall within the scope of CERCLA as it only covers claims for 
clean-up costs and natural resource damage. It is of a remedial rather than 
regulatory nature.297 
 
7.6.2.2.2 Liability in terms of CERCLA 
 
Liability attaches to potentially responsible parties known as ‘PRP’s’ who 
include owners and operators of sites or facilities from which a substance is 
                                            
293 15 U.S.C §§ 2601 et seq 
294 21 000 tons of toxic waste, buried since the 1920s, were discovered under Love Canal, a 
neighbourhood in Niagara Falls in the state of New York. Developers and the local 
government continued to build housing estates and a school on the land in the 1950s, while 
they were fully aware of the toxicity of the soil. This caused a huge scandal and public uproar. 
295 Enacted on 11 December 1980; see Fogleman chap 6 for a detailed discussion of the 
structure of its administration, and statistics relating to the finances and responses of the fund 
since the 1990s; see http://en.wikipedia.org/wik/Love_Canal (last accessed 26 January 2009). 
296 42 U.S.C §§ 9601 et seq, as amended by the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorisation Act of 1986 (hereinafter ‘SARA’); see the discussion by Howard & 
Mackowsky 884 on the staggering number and size of claims brought under CERCLA up until 
Spring 2002; Fogleman 25, 81. 
297 Abraham KS “Monsanto Lecture: Cleaning up the environmental liability insurance 
mess”1993 (27) Valparaiso University Law Review 601. 
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disposed of, treated, released or from which there is a threatened release,298 
as well as transporters and disposers of substances who can also incur clean-
up liability. A person can also incur secondary liability on behalf of another, for 
example, holding companies that incur liability on behalf of their 
subsidiaries,299 directors, officers, shareholders and employees of companies, 
successors-in-title, lenders, trustees, executors, administrators, engineers and 
contractors.300 A person who renders care, assistance and advice in clean-up 
proceedings or fail to do so, is exempted from strict liability, because the 
potential to incur liability could prove to be an unnecessary deterrent that 
prevents necessary assistance.301 Persons who contribute less than specific 
volumes of pollutants are classified as ‘de micromis responsible parties’ and 
accordingly exempted from clean-up liability.302 
For a successful claim, the plaintiff has to prove (a) that a site is a ‘facility’ in 
terms of CERCLA; (b) from which there was a release or threatened release; 
(c) of a hazardous substance; (d) into the environment; (e) by a potentially 
responsible party.303 
 
CERCLA imposes a regime of mitigated joint and several and retroactive 
liability.304 Potential polluters are held jointly and severally liable unless they 
can prove that their contribution to the pollution is divisible and distinct or 
where they can show a reasonable basis for the determination of the 
contribution of each one of them.305 This is in an attempt to effectively select a 
                                            
298 § 9607(a); see Warfel WJ “Environmental Insurance Coverage Disputes: Is State 
Legislation the Solution?” 2005 (September) CPCU eJournal 1 on 2 for an examination of the 
various suits that can be filed against PRPs. 
299 See also chap 4 par 4.2.4.5 on this aspect of vicarious liability in South African law, as well 
as the case heard in the UK of Lubbe & Four Others v Cape Plc and related appeals 27-7-
2000 (House of Lords).  
300 See in this regard Fogleman 276–287 for an extensive discussion of these groups of 
persons and relevant case law. 
301 § 9607(d)(1). 
302 § 9607(o)(1). 
303 See Fogleman 258–275 for a consideration of these requirements and relevant case law. 
304 The court held in United States v Chem-Dyne Corporation 572 F Supp 802 (SD Ohio 
1983) 805 that even though CERCLA did not contain a specific provision in this regard, 
liability was intended to be determined from traditional and evolving principles of common law 
under which joint and several liability exists where harm is divisible and be quantified as such. 
This position was subsequently endorsed by the enactment of SARA. 
305 O’Neill v Picillo 883 F 2d 176 (1st Cir 1989); United States v Township of Brighton 153 F3d 
307 (6th Cir 1998); see Stewart 107, 111; see also Fogleman 258. 
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manageable group of financially viable tortfeasors who in the aggregate are 
responsible for most of the contamination, as well as to keep the Superfund 
afloat. Liability is retroactive for damage caused prior to the enactment of the 
legislation.306 
 
Liability is strict and does not depend on proof of actual harm.307 Mere release 
or threat of release of the substance into the environment is sufficient. The 
requirement of causation is also relaxed or in some cases even non-existent 
as the tortfeasor’s conduct must merely have been a contributing factor to the 
loss. The government only has to prove that the tortfeasor generated or 
transported the substance, or a similar substance as the one on the site, and 
deposited in onto the land.308 Defences include only that the damage was 
caused by a force majeure occurrence, by an act of war or by the conduct of 
unrelated third parties.309  
 
The retrospectivity does not apply to natural resource damages, and only 
applies to clean-up costs.310 See in this regard the position on a claim for 
damages to ‘natural resources’ as discussed below.311 
 
There is no time bar in respect of the period between the polluting incident 
and the proceedings brought under CERCLA for clean-up of the site by the 
fund. CERCLA, however, contains provisions that limit the time between an 
actual emergency clean-up or assessment of natural resource damages and 
the action to recover the clean-up costs or damages, or to bring an action for 
contribution after a date of judgment or settlement to a period of three 
                                            
306 Stewart 109–121. 
307 CERCLA § 107(a)(1) does not directly impose strict liability, but provides for the imposition 
of the strict liability standard imposed by the Clean Water Act § 311; Fogleman 254 confirms 
that this eliminates the burden of proving the nature and share of their contribution in causing 
the contamination. 
308 See the judgments in United States v Monsanto 853 F 2d 160 (1988); United States v 
South Carolina Recycling and Disposal Inc et al 653 F Supp 1326 (ED Pa 1983); see also 
Stewart 110. 
309 § 9607(b); Fogleman 291–302 provides examples of these defences and the categories of 
persons who qualify as unrelated third parties. 
310 United States v Olin Corporation 107 F3d 1506 (11th Cir 1997); for more case discussions 
on the effect of the retroactivity, see Fogleman 255 et seq. 
311 See par 7.6.2.2.4. 
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years.312 Although CERCLA contains statutory financial limits for natural 
resource damage liability, there is no limitation for liability to clean up 
hazardous waste contamination.313 
 
7.6.2.2.3 The CERCLA fund  
 
The ‘Superfund’ created by CERCLA funds government investigations into 
pollution occurrences, and any pollution clean-up costs incurred by the 
authority that remedied the pollution on an emergency-response basis. 
CERCLA authorises the government to recoup these costs for the cleaning-up 
of sites on land or of water that were contaminated by the release of 
hazardous substances, from the potentially responsible person. The 
government may choose rather to order the person responsible to do the 
actual clean-up at his own cost. Funds must be used only for the restoration, 
replacement or for acquiring an equivalent of the affected resource for 
nature’s sake, and not for payment to any prejudiced party as compensation 
for the damage he suffers. 
  
7.6.2.2.4 Natural resource clean-up claims 
 
CERCLA also authorises claims for the clean-up of injuries or damage to 
‘natural resources’. As clean-up requires a restoration as close as possible to 
original condition, the costs include all costs and expenses to reach this goal, 
which avoids the problematic issue of quantification of damage to the natural 
environment or some of its components.314 Under CERCLA ‘natural 
resources’ include those resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, 
appertaining to or otherwise controlled by the government or a governmental 
authority.315 
                                            
312 § 9612(d); § 9613(g). 
313 § 9607(c)(1)(D); see in this regard the evaluation by Fogleman 256 of the judgment in 
State of California v Montrose Chemical Corporation 104 F3d 1507 (9th Cir 1997). 
314 CERCLA § 9610(16) defines ‘natural resources’ as ‘land, fish, biota, air, water, 
groundwater, and drinking water’; United States v AVX Corp: In re Acushnet River & New 
Bedford Harbor 716 F Supp 676 (D. Mass 1989); see also Stewart 114. 
315 For the wording of this section see also chap 2 par 2.2.5.3 above. 
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Clean-up costs in respect of privately owned ‘natural resources’ is therefore 
excluded from CERCLA, as are claims for property damage and bodily injury. 
Individuals have to rely on a common law damages claim for natural resource 
damage caused to private property, in terms of tort law claims as discussed 
below.316 CERCLA limits these claims for natural resource damage to a 
specified amount per release or incident,317 and limits the time between the 
assessment of natural resource damage and the action to recover it to a 
period of three years.318 There is no control to ensure that damages received 
are spent on the reinstatement of the natural resource that was damaged, 
destroyed or lost.319 
 
CERCLA provides expressly that it does not prohibit any agreement to insure, 
hold harmless or indemnify a party against his liabilities in terms of the Act.320 
 
7.6.2.2.5 Statutory liability and environmental offences 
 
Three categories of offences exist, namely, civil administrative, civil judicial 
and criminal offences.321 Claims by the government are for the enforcement of 
duties and for payment of civil administrative and judicial penalty amounts to 
the state.322 Although most statutes contain citizen suit provisions that enable 
non-governmental organisations and individuals to bring an action to enforce 
legislative provisions, they do not cover any claims for damages.323   
 
                                            
316 See par 7.6.3 below; see also chap 6 par 6.6.2.5 on the description in the Federal 
regulations to CERCLA on when a natural resource is considered to be injured or damaged; 
see Fogleman 309–313 for details of the relevant DOI environmental regulations. 
317 § 9607(c)(1)(D), at the moment $50 million; see also the evaluation by Fogleman 256 of 
the judgment in State of California v Montrose Chemical Corporation referred to above. 
318 § 9612(d); § 9613(g). 
319 See the opinion of Fogleman 304 in this regard. 
320 § 9607(e)(1); see Fogleman 313 on the possible contractual transfer of liability. 
321 See in this regard Fogleman 46; United States v Overholt 307 F3d 1231 (10th Cir 2003) as 
an example of a claim brought by the USA government. 
322 Fogleman 47–56 provides a detailed discussion of whether this liability to the State can 
trigger a claim against a liability insurer for payment under pollution insurance cover. 
323 See in this regard the views of Fogleman 58, 89. 
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7.6.2.3 The Oil Pollution Act324  
 
OPA serves three functions. It establishes a program for clean-up and 
accompanying liability, and contains a regulatory component that aims to 
provide evidence of financial responsibility for potential polluting incidents. It 
also establishes and regulates the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund to cover 
specific expenditures.325 OPA imposes liability on a ‘responsible party’, such 
as an operator of a ship, for the response and clean-up costs for damage 
caused to private property or to public natural resources by the threatened or 
actual discharge of oil into navigable waters, adjoining shorelines or the 
exclusive economic zone of the USA.326 It covers damages for the injury to, 
destruction or loss of use of natural resources, real or personal property, for 
economic losses, loss of profits and earning capacity resulting from the latter, 
and also includes the reasonable costs of assessing these damages.327 The 
extent of damages is clearly wider than the damages covered by CERCLA. 
 
7.6.2.4 The Clean Water Act328 
 
This Act applies to navigable waters of the USA such as rivers and lakes, 
excluding ponds but including wetlands and territorial seas.329 It imposes a 
liability on the owner or operator of an onshore facility or vessel for costs and 
expenses incurred by the government for the clean-up of natural resources 
after the discharge of oil or hazardous substances.330 
 
7.6.2.5 Statutory pollution exclusions 
  
In some cases the inclusion of a pollution exclusion clause in an insurance 
policy was in fact required by statute, in order to force the polluter to pay in 
                                            
324 §§ 2702(b)(2)(A). 
325 For a discussion of this fund, see Fogleman 31.  
326 OPA s 1002, s 2702(a). 
327 S 2702(b). 
328 See n 275. 
329 § 1362(7). 
330 § 1321(f)(4). 
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accordance with the polluter-pays principle.331 Virtually every aspect of the 
pollution exclusions clauses, whether imposed by statutory or contractual has 
been the focus of extensive litigation, as discussed in chapter 6 above.332 
 
7.6.3 Civil Liability 
 
7.6.3.1 General 
 
As is the case in most other countries, the last few decades have also seen 
the emergence of a specialised environmental tort law in the USA.333 Tort law 
remains predominantly state law, yet variations on the general principles exist 
in the various states. The Restatement (Second) of Torts 1976 (hereinafter 
the ‘Restatement of Torts’) attempted to restate an analysis of the broad 
general principles of tort law, although it is not binding upon the various 
states.334 Fault-based liability is the most common basis of claim where 
statutory claims to recoup losses are unavailable. In addition to fault-based 
liability such as negligence and trespass, claims based on strict liability 
following the rule in Rylands v Fletcher335 as adopted from the UK law, and on 
nuisance serve as alternatives. In some states these are recognised as 
private statutory causes of action. Fault is an element of various torts, and is 
described as ‘the wrongful act or omission that breaches a legal duty’.336  As it 
would be impossible to cover the position in the law of all of the states, only 
the rudimentary features of the principles of liability are discussed below.  
                                            
331 See the reference in Mitchell 128 to the Governor’s Memorandum on Approval of Chs 765, 
766, NY Laws (June 25 1971). 
332 See chap 6 par 6.5; see also Couch GJ Couch on Insurance  3rd ed (1995) 127–132 for a 
comprehensive discussion of relevant USA case law. 
333 In the words of Fogleman 349. 
334 As published by the American Law Institute. 
335 See the UK case of Rylands v Fletcher [1868] LR 3 (AC) 330 (HL). 
336 Fogleman 350. 
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7.6.3.2 Fault-based liability 
 
7.6.3.2.1 Negligence 
 
A person who owes another a duty of care is negligent if his breach of the 
duty causes property damage or bodily injury that is a foreseeable 
consequence of the breach. Where a standard of care is determined by a 
legislative enactment, it is known as ‘negligence per se’.337 A civil claim in 
these situations is only possible if it was the intention of the legislature to 
indicate that breach of the standard of care affords a prejudiced party a 
private right of action.338 It has been held in some cases that manufacturers 
and suppliers of hazardous substances may be held liable for negligence 
provided the requirements as set out in the Restatement of Torts for product 
liability are met.339 Actions against prior owners or occupiers based on 
negligence can obviously only succeed where the defendant’s owed the 
plaintiff a direct duty of care, which is often found not to be the case.340 
 
Once again issues of causation prove as problematic in the USA as in most 
other countries. A plaintiff must first prove actual causation or ‘cause in fact’ 
by proving on a preponderance of probability that the defendant’s conduct or 
omission exposed the plaintiff to specific substances or pollutants and caused 
the plaintiff’s damages or injury. The plaintiff then has to prove proximate 
cause as an element of legal causation, that is, that the conduct was a 
material element and substantial factor in bringing about the alleged injury.341 
 
                                            
337 Restatement of Torts § 288B. 
338 Fogleman 378 is of the opinion that a breach of a statutory standard does not create a 
negligence per se, but can merely serve as evidence to determine ordinary negligence.  
339 § 402A; see the discussion by Fogleman 380 on the merits of this basis of claim. 
340 See Fogleman 381 for an examination of the application of this principle in the various 
states. 
341 Donaldson v Central Illinois Public Service Company 199 Ill 2d 63 262 Ill Dec 854 (2002); 
Fogleman 351 states that the application and interpretation of legal causation in the different 
states varies extensively. Internationally the position on legal causation differs from country to 
country. See however the position in Belgian law in par 7.4.3.4 where there is no form of legal 
causation criterion that can limit factual causation. 
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Where there are multiple tortfeasors, the indivisible-damage rule is applied in 
the USA. The Restatement of Torts provides that liabilities are several and 
damages are to be apportioned where there is a reasonable basis for 
determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm.342 Liability is joint 
and several, however, where the conduct of more than one tortfeasor causes 
a single injury or harm.343 Clearly, a subsequent tortfeasor cannot be held 
jointly and severally liable for the acts of initial tortfeasors.344 The criterion for 
the divisibility of damage must in some cases be formulated only on grounds 
of logic or reason. 
 
The difficulties in applying the classical theory of joint liability or ‘pollution 
share liability’ led to the development of an innovative theory of market share 
liability.345 Liability was initially allocated according to this theory in product 
liability cases.346 This theory shifts the burden of proving the exact degree of 
causation and apportionment of damages to the defendants in order to avoid 
liability. It is not a form of corrective justice, but rather one of distributive 
justice based purely on a statistical causation.347 It also addresses the 
situation where it is not possible to identify the actual individual polluter who 
functions within a specific polluting industry.348 
 
7.6.3.2.2 Trespass 
 
The scope of liability and the cause of action based on the intentional physical 
entry or invasion of another’s interest in land depend on specific state law. 
There is no general requirement that the trespass must cause loss or injury, 
                                            
342 Par 433A s1(b). 
343 See in this regard Fogleman 352. 
344 Ravo v Rogatnick 70 NY 2d 305. 
345 See Fleming JG The American Tort Process (1988) 255 for an evaluation of the different 
methods of liability allocation; see also Larsson M The Law of Environmental Damage: 
Liability and Reparation (1999) (hereinafter ‘Larsson’) 391 
346 Sindell v Abbott Laboratories 607 P 2d (1980) 932; see Fogleman 353 on the adoption of a 
variation of the Sindell theory in Washington, Wisconsin, Florida, Hawaii and New York case 
law, and the rejection of the theory by other states such as New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, 
Missouri and Rhodes Island mainly due to criticism that it is contrary to public policy to deviate 
from the principles of normal tort law; see the evaluations by Larsson 391; and Fleming 258. 
347 The Sindell case 938. 
348 A similar viewpoint is reiterated by Larsson 392. 
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yet a damages claim and ensuing insurance liability would obviously not 
succeed in its absence.349 It is interesting to note that trespass does not 
require the presence of a person, but that the placement or continued 
presence of an object, for example, a substance or a structure on land can 
also constitute a trespass. In this case prior owners or occupiers could incur 
liability for a continuing trespass.350 
 
7.6.3.3 Strict liability 
 
7.6.3.3.1 General 
 
Claims under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher,351 common-law claims based on 
abnormally dangerous or ultra-hazardous activities, trespass as well as 
nuisance are all strict liability torts. As nuisance enjoys a very broad 
application in the context of environmental pollution claims, it is discussed in 
great detail below.352 Only fault is excluded as an element, and all the other 
elements of tort must be proven. It must be noted that statutes also create 
strict environmental liability regimes in specific situations, such as the 
CERCLA Superfund program for clean-up costs as discussed earlier.353  
 
7.6.3.3.2 Rule in Rylands v Fletcher  
 
This form of liability as expressed in the Restatement of Torts was adopted by 
the courts from the English law in 1983.354 Strict liability is imposed upon a 
person who controls land and who allows substances that he brought or 
accumulated onto land to escape and cause loss to another. The position is 
                                            
349 See in this regard Fogleman 384; see also 388 where the possible overlap of a private 
nuisance claim and a claim based on trespass is examined. 
350 Restatement of Tort § 161. 
351 This claim is adopted from English law; see the discussion in chap 7 par 7.3.3.4 above on 
the similar position in the UK. 
352 See par 7.6.3.4 below. 
353 See par 7.6.2.2 above. 
354 §§ 519, and 520; as adopted in State Department of Environmental Protection v Ventron 
Corporation 94 NJ 473 468 A 2d 150 (1983) where contamination of a site was caused by 
production of mercury. The court held that ‘those who poison the land must pay for its cure’. 
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similar to the position in the UK as the escape must be during a ‘non natural’ 
use of land. 
 
7.7.3.3.3 Abnormally dangerous activities 
 
The principle of strict liability was also adopted in the Restatement of Torts 
and applies where participation in abnormally dangerous activities causes 
loss.355 It is important to note that a person can be held liable even though he 
has exercised the utmost care to avoid the harm. The activity must not be a 
common usage and inappropriate in the place where it is carried on, there 
must be a high degree of risk and the likelihood of harm, and the value to the 
community must be outweighed by the dangerous attributes of the activity.356 
An owner or occupier who previously occupied the property can be held liable 
under this tort for his contribution to past contamination.357 
 
7.6.3.4 Nuisance 
 
7.6.3.4.1 General 
 
Nuisance is seen to be at the core of environmental torts and is the most 
traditional common-law cause of action for pollution claims.358 Nuisance can 
be either a public nuisance where a public right359 is infringed upon, for 
example, by smoke, dust or water pollution,360 a private nuisance where one 
                                            
355 § 519. This principle was initially included in the first Restatement of Torts § 519 that 
provides that ‘one who carries on an ultra hazardous activity is liable to another whose 
person, land or chattels the wrongdoer should recognise as likely to be harmed by the 
unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting thereto from that that makes the 
activity ultra hazardous, although the utmost care is exercised in preventing harm’. 
356 See Fogleman 374 on case law that illustrates the narrow interpretation of the test by the 
courts due to the onerous nature of the potential liability. 
357 See par 7.6.3.4.2 below that a private nuisance claim against an owner or occupier who 
previously occupied the property is not possible.  
358 Madden MS & Boston GW Law of Environmental and Toxic Torts: Cases, material and 
problems 3rd ed (2005) (hereinafter ‘Madden & Boston’) 56; see also in this regard Fogleman 
356. 
359 A ‘public right’ is one common to all members of the general public’ as stated by Madden & 
Boston 59. 
360 The Restatement of Torts § 821B deals with common-law public nuisance; Madden & 
Boston 56 describe it as ‘an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general 
public’. 
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individual infringes upon the rights of another, or a statutory nuisance, where 
a legislative authority declares specific conduct to be a nuisance for which 
liability can then be incurred.361 Nuisance is in principle based on the absence 
of reasonable conduct when exercising one’s property rights. 
 
7.6.3.4.2 Private nuisance 
 
A private nuisance occurs when there is a non-trespassing yet substantial 
invasion of an individual’s interest in the use and enjoyment of his property. 
This requires intentional or negligent, reckless or abnormally dangerous 
conduct that has the potential to cause extensive damage and that justifies 
strict liability.362 The prejudiced party must have either ownership or an 
interest in possessing the property, and must suffer significant harm.363 
Reasonableness is determined by weighing the gravity of the harm against 
the utility of the defendant’s conduct.364 A nuisance claim cannot be brought 
against prior owners or occupiers of contaminated land, unless it is 
specifically authorised by statute.365 
 
7.6.3.4.3 Public nuisance 
 
The Restatement of Torts describes a public nuisance as ‘an unreasonable 
interference with a right common to the general public’.366 A public nuisance 
supports a claim where conduct is found to be ‘unreasonable’ and where (a) 
the conduct involves a significant interference with public health, safety, 
                                            
361 See chap 4 par 4.2.3.4.1 below for a discussion of the application of the doctrine of the 
abuse of rights and nuisance in South African law. 
362 In Hoery v United States 64 P 3d 214 (Colo 2003) 1267 in a case on groundwater 
contamination, the court reiterated that in the absence of intentional conduct, a nuisance 
claim requires ‘conduct so dangerous to life or property and so abnormal or out-of-place in its 
surroundings as to fall within the principles of strict liability’; Restatement of Torts § 821D; see 
Madden & Boston 80; see also Fogleman 357. 
363 Madden & Boston 82 state that it does not include ‘slight inconveniences or petty harm’. 
364 United States v Carroll Towing Co 159 F 2d 169 (2d Cir 1947). 
365 See Fogleman 360 for a discussion of case law where attempts to extend a claim based 
on nuisance to prior occupiers proved to be unsuccessful. 
366 S 821B; see West Virginia ex rel Smith v Kermit Lumber & Pressure Treating Company 
200 W Va 221 488 SE 2d 901 (1997) for another version of a description that uses more 
general wording that a public nuisance is  ‘an act or condition that unlawfully operates to hurt 
or inconvenience an indefinite number of persons’. 
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peace, comfort or the public convenience; (b) the conduct is prohibited by 
statute, ordinance or administrative regulation; or (c) the conduct is of a 
continuing nature or has produced a permanent and long-lasting effect, and, 
as the wrongdoer knows or has reason to know, has a significant effect upon 
the public right.367  
 
A state government official in the USA usually prosecutes criminal public 
nuisance claims on behalf of the public in general.  
 
A special injury is required to enable a private person to bring an actionable 
claim for monetary damages based on a public nuisance. An individual may 
only claim damages for suffering a public nuisance where his harm was 
different from that suffered by other members of the public.368 Where this is 
not the case the situation justifies a citizen’s suit or class action for 
damages.369 
  
7.6.3.4.4 Statutory nuisance 
 
This form of nuisance is also known as a nuisance per se or ‘absolute 
nuisance’. A plaintiff may only have a cause of action based on statutory 
nuisance where any federal or statutory provision was breached and the 
specific statute makes express provision for such a claim. 
 
7.6.3.4.5 Permanent or continuing nuisance 
 
A nuisance may be classified either as a permanent nuisance, for example, 
where the construction of a structure causes environmental harm, or as a 
                                            
367 Restatement of Torts § 821B(2); Madden & Boston 58 reiterate that only imputed 
knowledge is required to comply with the requirement in (c); see also 59–62 for extensive 
case law discussions on public nuisance claims.  
368 See Fogleman 363 for more case law examples on the point in question. 
369 Nashua Corporation v Norton Company 1997 WL 204904 (NDNY 1997); In re the Exxon 
Valdez; Alaska Native Class v Exxon Corp 1997 104 F3d 1196; Madden & Boston 67 
question the necessity to enforce the onerous special injury requirement for public nuisances 
as it is not required for private nuisance claims and causes an unnecessary and unfair 
discrepancy. 
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continuing nuisance, for example, where there is a gradual seepage of 
contaminants onto land. The distinction is important for the discussion of 
prescription below.370 It is not the length of time that determines the 
permanent nature of the nuisance, but whether the nuisance is capable of 
being abated or discontinued. Where recurring incidents cause a nuisance, 
but the incidents could at some stage cease, it is classified as a continuing 
nuisance. The abatement of the defendant’s wrongful conduct is usually the 
discontinuation of the nuisance, even though the ill effects might continue 
indefinitely. Where the conduct will continue or has the potential to continue 
indefinitely, it is classified as a permanent nuisance.371 
 
7.6.3.5 Remedies 
 
7.6.3.5.1 General remedies 
 
A prejudiced party may obtain injunctive relief, or claim for damages, where 
the latter is an appropriate remedy under the specific circumstances.372 
 
A damages claim may be for proprietary or patrimonial loss suffered such as 
the depreciation of property values or repair and restoration costs, and could 
also include damages for pain and suffering, emotional distress, for personal 
inconvenience, discomfort and reduced quality of life caused by the 
nuisance.373  Claims for the costs of the process of medical monitoring have 
also been allowed.374 
 
                                            
370 See par par 7.6.3.6. 
371 Fogleman 366–367. 
372 See Fogleman 371 for a discussion of obtaining an injunction, and see also 370 for 
examples of various claims for damages in this regard. 
373 See Ayers v Township of Jackson 106 NJ 557 525 A 2d 287 (1987) where waste from a 
landfill migrated onto the plaintiff’s land causing them to sue successfully for reduced quality 
of life; see also Fogleman 391, 399 for the application of the requirements for a damages 
claim. 
374 See also Ayers v Township of Jackson; Fogleman 402–412 for various aspects relating to 
the valuation of such a claim, for example, the impact of a fear of cancer that justifies medical 
monitoring and subsequent liability for costs. 
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As already examined in the discussion of South African law,375 the traditional 
principles that relate to a damages claim are difficult to apply in pollution 
damage cases. This has seen the development of a body of law in the USA 
on claims for stigma damages.376 The public’s perception of a reduced value 
of land due to the proximity of contamination, or the actual or residual 
contamination even after clean-up, are just as real as a factual reduction in 
the value of land and should be actionable in specific circumstances where an 
owner, for example, only manages to sell his property for less than an 
objective market value due to the stigma attached to his property. It remains 
within the court’s discretion to award damages for a depreciation where a 
plaintiff had prior knowledge of or should have expected potential future 
developments or a depreciation in the value of property in the area over time 
as a normal occurrence.377   
 
7.6.3.5.2 Class actions 
 
Class actions became notorious during the 1970s due to extensive asbestos 
claims, and are especially relevant where claims for pollution damage are 
concerned. A plaintiff can sue as the representative of a larger group of 
persons in a class action.378  The introduction of the principles relating to class 
actions in South African law is based on those that developed inter alia in the 
USA. 
 
Requirements are that members must all be of the same class and that the 
normal joining of plaintiffs is impractical, the claims are typical for all members 
of the class and that the representatives will act in the interests of the 
members of the class.379 The risk of disallowing a class action could include 
the risk that varying or inconsistent judgments could be given where the 
                                            
375 See chap 4 par 4.2.6 above. 
376 See chap 4 par 4.2.6.2.4 above; Fogleman 394 provides a short explanation of the scope 
of a claim for stigma damages. 
377 See Fogleman 394–399 for case law of claims for stigma damages in the various states 
within the USA. 
378 United States of America Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23. 
379 See Rule 23(a) for the requirements for the institution of a class action. 
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members sue independently from each other, and potential conflicts of 
interests between the various members which should be taken into account 
when allowing a class action.380  
 
7.6.3.6 Statute of limitations 
 
The general rule is that a claim prescribes three years from the date on which 
the injury and the identity of the wrongdoer are known. Where a tort involves a 
continuing or repeated injury, the statute of limitations begins to run on the 
date on which the actionable conduct ceases, or on the date on which the last 
injury was caused, irrespective of the continuation of the ill effects caused.381 
A continuing nuisance generates a cause of action for every day on which the 
nuisance continues.382 Where there is a permanent nuisance, the statute of 
limitations begins to run once a plaintiff knows that the nuisance may have a 
permanent nature and has the information or imputed knowledge of the 
required particulars of claim. 
 
7.6.4 Insurance and Schemes of Restitution for Environmental 
Damage  
 
7.6.4.1 General 
 
Insurance cover is only possible where cover is provided against loss caused 
by a fortuitous event. The Restatement of Contracts383 defines such an event 
for purposes of an insurance contract as ‘an event which so far as the parties 
to the contract are aware, is dependent on chance. It may be beyond the 
power of any human being to bring the event to pass; it may be within the 
control of third persons; it may even be a past event, for example, the loss of 
a vessel, provided that the fact is unknown to the parties’.384 
                                            
380 A determination under the provisions of rule 23(b) must also be made.  
381 West Virginia ex rel Smith v Kermit Lumber & Pressure Treating Company 245 reiterates 
that this is in accordance with the continuing tort doctrine. 
382 This viewpoint is reiterated by Fogleman 367. 
383 Restatement (Second) of Contracts of 1981. 
384 §§ 291. 
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7.6.4.2 Liability insurance cover 
 
In addition to the usual cover provided under first-party insurance, the USA 
insurance industry has had a long history of providing cover under 
comprehensive or commercial general liability (hereinafter ‘CGL’) or other 
liability policies. Huge claims for clean-up and transaction costs under 
CERCLA for past polluting incidents were brought against insurers, who never 
considered these claims when the policies were issued. Claims also 
increased after the creation of the EPA.385  
 
The CGL policies mostly provide for a long-tail liability. Until 1966 the trigger 
was the ‘accident’ that caused property damage or bodily injury, which 
changed after 1966 to an ‘occurrence’-based trigger which had the same 
effect.386 These policies evolved over time as liabilities increased, and were 
revised extensively. Insurance regulatory bodies in the USA must approve 
revisions.387 Excess policies are also issued that provide cover in excess to 
that provided under a primary policy. Some ‘umbrella policies’ offer both an 
excess cover and cover for new liabilities that are not covered under the 
primary policy.388 It is also possible to obtain various endorsements and buy-
back options as discussed in chapter 6.389 
 
7.6.4.3 Property policies 
 
Property policies cover loss or damage sustained directly by the policyholder 
against a risk concerning the policyholder’s property. Some property policies 
are for all risks, such as a general homeowner’s policy, whereas others are for 
named perils only, for example, a fire insurance policy. Cover is usually 
                                            
385 See par 7.7.2.1 on the EPA; see Fogleman 429 for detail on the recent immense increase 
of environmental claims. 
386 For the extensive discussion of the various triggers of insurance policies and the issue of 
long-tail liability, see chap 6 par 6.3 above. 
387 See Fogleman 463 on the process of revision in the various states. 
388 See also chap 5 par 5.3.4.6 on the cover provided under an excess policy. 
389 See par par 6.5.3.8 above. 
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obtained for the maximum potential loss that the policyholder may suffer.390 
These policies may contain clauses dealing with the option of the insurer to 
defend. Fogleman argues that due to the lack of a third-party interest that is 
the case in the context of liability insurance, policies are interpreted strictly 
against the policyholder, and apply only traditional contractual interpretation 
principles during the construction of policy provisions. Coverage disputes 
usually include issues relating to (a) the extent of the ‘insured property’; (b) 
the presence and scope of a ‘debris removal’ clause; (c) the trigger of risk; (d) 
whether the policyholder complied with the express policy provisions; and (e) 
whether the claim is excluded by any exclusion or limitation clause.391 
 
As the property is under the policyholder’s direct control, the risk of 
manufactured claims is greater. Cover is usually provided only if damage is 
discovered during the policy period.392 Time bar clauses are often included in 
the policies that preclude action to enforce a rejected claim. 
 
7.6.4.4 Pollution exclusion clauses 
 
Over time, as the number of statutes such as CERCLA that required a clean-
up of pollution damage and related insurance claims increased, insurers were 
forced to include extensive pollution exclusion clauses in policies to limit their 
liabilities. As the issues concerning these clauses are of a global nature, a 
comprehensive discussion of these exclusions and related issues can be 
found in chapter 6.393  
 
In the USA, the drafting of a pro forma exclusion clause that excluded 
pollution damage liability claims in 1969 ushered in the general practice of 
                                            
390 See Fogleman 622 for an evaluation of the distinction between property and liability 
policies based on these elements. 
391 See the discussion of these issues in Fogleman 624. 
392 See the detailed discussion in chap 6 par 6.3 on the nature and effect of the various 
triggers of risk. 
393 See chap 6 pars 6.5.5, 6.5.6 for examples and issues relating to the interpretation of 
pollution exclusion clauses. 
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excluding pollution claims under liability policies.394 Various versions of 
exclusion clauses were drafted and presented for use in the industry over the 
years.395 The availability of CGL in the market declined rapidly once courts 
started to interpret the words ‘sudden and accidental’ as meaning ‘unexpected 
and unintended’, with the result that it excluded damage caused by gradual 
pollution from cover.396 
 
Over time absolute or total pollution exclusion clauses were included in CGL 
policies that barred all pollution claims, including claims for gradual pollution, 
from cover. The name of the CGL policy was also changed from 
‘comprehensive general liability policy’ to ‘commercial general liability policy’, 
although the abbreviation used in the industry remained the same. Various 
other exclusions and subsequent endorsements that excluded cover from 
these general exclusion clauses and wrote back cover for specific risks, as 
drafted by the ISO and by other private insurers, followed. 
 
In insurance disputes, the policyholder carries the burden to prove that his 
claim falls within the cover provided by a policy. The insurer then carries the 
burden to prove that the claim is in fact excluded by a contractual exclusion 
clause. Rules of construction or interpretation of insurance policy provisions in 
the USA are different from normal rules of construction of contracts in general, 
as insurance contracts are seen as contracts of adhesion in which the 
policyholder has little bargaining power to negotiate the wording of the 
policy.397  
 
                                            
394 See in this regard clause IRB–G335 of the Insurance Rating Bureau in the USA, which 
was one of the first of its kind. 
395 See chap 6 par 6.5.3 for the wording of different versions of pollution exclusion clauses. 
396 See, for example, the judgment in Jackson Township Municipal Utilities Authority v 
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company 186 NJ Super 156 451 A 2d 990 (1982) in this 
regard. 
397 As discussed by Fogleman 473; see also 466–472 on the jurisdiction of the courts in the 
USA in insurance cases. 
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Specific rules include the application of the ‘reasonable expectations 
doctrine’;398 the contra preferentem rule;399 and the unconscionability rule;400 
refusal to enforce a term that is contrary to public policy; and the application of 
the doctrine of statutory construction.401 
 
7.6.4.5 ‘Known loss’ doctrine 
 
Liabilities that are known to the policyholder are not covered under general 
liability insurance products in the USA, as these policies only provide cover for 
liabilities for fortuitous events and risks. Some states have introduced a 
‘known loss’ doctrine, and in some it has even been implemented by 
statute.402  The insurer’s liabilities under a policy that was at risk once the 
policyholder became aware of the occurrences, cannot be triggered.403  
 
7.6.4.6 Specific environmental insurance policies 
 
Two specific insurance policies were developed in the USA. Environmental 
Impairment Liability or ‘EIL’ policies usually provide cover for third-party bodily 
injury and property damage, clean-up costs and defence costs. Although 
these policies are expensive and scarce due to their lack of profitability,404 
they indirectly offer an advantage by encouraging acceptable environmental 
risk management by policyholders. As they are more specific than general 
liability policies, they allow courts to respect the sanctity of contract during a 
dispute that requires the interpretation or construction of the contract.405 
                                            
398 See the brief discussion of this doctrine in chap 6 par 6.5.5.1.5 above; see also Fogleman 
474 for a more detailed discussion of this rule. 
399See chap 6 par 6.5.5.1.5 for a discussion of this rule. 
400 This entails that the courts may limit a specific term to avoid an unconscionable result in 
specific circumstances. 
401 See Fogleman 477 on the role of legislative history in applying this doctrine, also known as 
the doctrine of ‘regulatory estoppel’. 
402 See the discussion in Fogleman 607 et seq on the position in the various states within the 
USA. 
403 As the doctrine enjoys a narrow interpretation, claims are not defeated where there is 
uncertainty as to whether the occurrence will occur again. 
404 Italiano ML “Environmental Impairment: Dealing with the Legalities” 1990 (August) Risk 
Management 38 (hereinafter ‘Italiano’) 39 confirms this in view of the USA General 
Accounting Office Report in this regard. 
405 Italiano 40 also identifies this as one of the benefits of the EIL policies. 
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A special named peril insurance policy, namely the Environmental 
Remediation Insurance or ‘ERI’ policy, was developed in response to the 
effect that CERCLA had in the USA. It is a form of first-party insurance for 
previously undetected and pre-existing land contamination of commercial 
properties. It does not provide cover for third-party liability, yet cover can be 
extended to include off-site clean-up of a third party’s property, or enhanced 
to provide cover for contamination that occurred after the policy was taken up 
on a ‘discovered reported’ basis.406 
 
Various other instruments are available in the USA market that provide 
specific coverage for pollution or environmental damage.407 These include (a) 
site specific policies, for example, cover against asbestos liability, military 
base remediation and industry specific sites; (b) policies for professionals 
such as environmental consultants; (c) contractors policies; (d) road 
transportation policies; (e) financial assurance policies required for the 
transportation of hazardous waste, for example.408 These instruments were 
examined in greater detail in chapter 5.409  
 
7.6.4.7 Choice of law in the USA 
 
Due to its varying state laws, the choice of law in the USA becomes relevant 
where the policyholder must clean up a site that is not situated within his state 
of domicile but in another state, where different legal rules apply.410 Some 
policies contain a choice of law clause that prevents uncertainty regarding 
jurisdiction. Once this fails, the court in which the claim is brought must first 
determine whether there is an actual conflict of the state laws involved, and 
once it has affirmed the conflict, it can apply the applicable conflict of law rules 
                                            
406 See the more detailed discussion of the position in the USA in chap 7 par 7.6 below; see 
also Larsson 529 in this respect. 
407 For a comprehensive discussion of the history and structure of the USA environmental 
insurance market, see Fogleman chap 14 670–679. 
408 See Fogleman 652–668 for a detailed exposition of the scope of cover provided by the 
various instruments. 
409 See par 5.43, par 5.4.4 above. 
410 Fogleman 610. 
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that apply to these issues in general.411 In the absence of such a choice of law 
clause, a   party involved in an insurance dispute often does so-called ‘forum 
shopping’ and institutes his claim in a state where the substantive law is 
favourable to his position. Courts do not have to allow these claims brought 
before them where the jurisdiction is subject to constitutional limitations or 
where the court is of the opinion that the issue under litigation is insufficient to 
meet the requirements of due process.412 Factors that are taken into account 
to determine jurisdiction include (a) law of the place of conclusion of the 
contract;413 (b) the state with the ‘most significant relationship’, where the 
most contractual transactions between the parties took place unless another 
state has an overriding policy-based interest in the application of its own 
laws;414 and (c) where an analysis of the governmental interests indicates that 
the laws of one state should enjoy precedence above those of another.415  
 
7.6.4.8 Additional mandatory insurance schemes in the USA 
 
To date no mandatory insurance schemes or policies, other than those 
required in terms of international regimes, for example, in the nuclear industry, 
have been implemented in the USA. Various forms of specialised pollution 
insurance products in the market that were considered in chapter 5, are also 
available within the USA.416 
 
7.6.4.9 Proposals for more effective pollution insurance coverage 
 
Due to the enactment of CERCLA and the increasing liabilities of insurers, an 
increase in exclusions from cover has rendered insurance rather ineffective 
and has severely affected the insurance market. Fogleman proposes that trust 
                                            
411 Fogleman 610 warns that care must be taken when determining the nature of the claim 
brought before the courts, as different rules apply for claims in tort law than for contractual 
claims. 
412 Peterson J “CERCLA Choice-of-law: Insurer’s Attempts to Escape their own Quagmires” 
2006 (36) Environmental Law 565 for the methodologies involved; see the discussion by 
Fogleman 611 on the complications and limitations of this type of ‘forum shopping’. 
413 The lex loci contractus; see also the Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws (1943). 
414 Restatement (Second) of the Law of Conflict of Laws (1971) s 188. 
415 See in this regard Fogleman 616. 
416 See chap 5 par 5.4 above. 
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funds must be established to mitigate the effects of CERCLA and the 
Superfund and other legislative programs, and to repeal any retroactive 
liability that insurers did not contemplate when issuing insurance policies, yet 
have to cover in terms of legislation. Various proposals on law reform in this 
regard are examined and evaluated.417 She identifies the existence of both 
state and federal liability systems as the major stumbling block in the way of 
establishing alternative systems to insurance.418 
 
 
7.7 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
It is clear from this study that most issues relating to environmental insurance 
claims and related insurance matters are generic and universal. The 
reluctance of courts to develop the common law as a mechanism for 
environmental protection in anticipation of the development of statutory 
protection measures appears to be a universal tendency in view of the latest 
judgments. The South African legal system is presently still in the early stages 
of development. The experience of other legal jurisdictions in dealing with 
these matters and in finding solutions to address problems, can greatly assist 
and inform the South African judiciary, the legislature, governmental 
departments and other authorities as well as insurers who offer insurance 
products in South Africa where the law is lagging behind. It is therefore 
important to briefly consider the position in other countries that can prove 
informative in the development of the South African law.  
 
In the EU the ‘Declaration on the ‘Environment’ creates the fundamental right 
to the environment. The EU Environmental Liability Directive came into force 
recently on 30 April 2007. This Directive attempts to address liability for 
natural resource damage caused by pollution, because of the problems 
experienced in holding polluters liable in terms of civil liability regimes.  It does 
                                            
417 See the discussion in Fogleman 633–649.  
418 Fogleman 649 advocates that a repeal of retroactive liability in the USA could put an end 
to unnecessary insurance coverage disputes, which can be endorsed and recommended as a 
solution to this problem encountered in most other countries. 
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not apply to aspects that are dealt with under international treaties, 
conventions and other international instruments. The Directive provides a 
broad description of what ‘damage to the environment’ entails, by describing 
different types of damage caused to various parts or elements of the 
environment that result in a significant risk of an adverse effect on human 
health. It is not clear whether the description in the Directive or the 
Declaration as discussed above will enjoy precedence in case of an 
uncertainty in this regard. 
 
The Directive introduces a strict liability regime for persons involved in 
designated activities. Defences against liability include damage caused by 
authorised actions, or where damage was unlikely at the time of conduct. 
 
At present, the Directive does not introduce mandatory insurance cover for 
specific industries, although there is an expectation that this will be addressed 
in the near future. Liability under the Directive qualifies as a ‘legal liability’ for 
purpose of liability insurance claims. 
 
The shortcomings of the Directive include the following. It does not have any 
retroactive operation and can only provide guidance for damage caused from 
the date of its implementation.  It does not address liability for damage to 
private property, personal injury or pure economic loss caused by damage to 
the natural environment. The Directive has, to date, only been implemented 
by a minority of EU member countries. 
 
The position in the UK is similar to that in South Africa, except that there is no 
legislation that creates a fundamental human right to the environment. In 
addition to statutory liability in terms of specific environmental statutes not to 
damage the environment and to clean up the environment where required, a 
civil liability regime exists to accommodate environmental damage claims. 
 
The Environmental Protection Act serves the same purpose as the South 
African NEMA and the ECA, except for the following positive aspects. It offers 
the benefit that it creates a general strict statutory liability regime for the 
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emissions from industrial or business sites that are prejudicial to the health of 
individuals or that cause a nuisance. It also establishes a retrospective 
statutory liability regime for soil and land contamination, and introduces the 
duty of ‘appropriate persons’ to clean up affected sites. In the last instance it 
introduces a statutory civil liability to pay damages to a prejudiced party in 
addition to clean-up costs and criminal penalties. 
 
Civil liability claims include claims based on negligence, on nuisance, both 
private and public, on a form of strict liability in accordance with the rule in 
Rylands v Fletcher for things or substances accumulated on land, and on 
trespass. Due to the magnitude and irreversible nature of environmental 
catastrophes, it appears to be justified to impose liability in these situations in 
the absence of fault. 
Various environmental insurance products are available in the UK market that 
offer both first-party and third-party insurance cover. The universal issues of 
these policies were covered in detail in chapter 6. The scope and effect of 
pollution exclusion clauses are, mostly, the focus of extensive litigation as is 
the case in other countries. At the moment, there is no mandatory insurance 
cover required for specific industries in the UK, except for the waste, nuclear 
and shipping or marine industries. 
 
In Belgium, a variety of statutes address liability for damage caused to the 
environment. Statutory strict liability regimes apply to soil pollution, to 
operators within the waste disposal industries, to the carriers and producers of 
dangerous substances and to groundwater recycling and persons involved in 
mining activities. Any person who causes damage to the marine environment 
also incurs strict liability. 
 
It is also possible to claim damages in terms of a fault-based civil liability 
regime. It is interesting to note that the requirement of factual causation in 
Belgium is not limited by a requirement of legal causation as is the case in 
most other countries, including South Africa. A civil claim based on nuisance 
is also a possibility. This claim is a strict liability claim and fault is not a 
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requirement. The same liability can be incurred for damage caused by goods 
under a person’s control. 
 
The introduction of a new compensation regime has been studied for some 
time and various proposals have been made. Recommendations include that 
it should be based on objective strict liability, that a causative presumption 
must be created that persons in control of premises from which polluting 
substances emit or who are in control of polluting substances, are liable. 
These persons can only escape liability where they can prove that they only 
partially contributed to the environmental damage. 
 
Insurance schemes in Belgian law allow for claims for environmental damage 
under both first-party and third-party insurance policies. The relationship 
between the policyholder and the insurer is statutorily regulated. Any clauses 
in insurance policies that are contrary to statutory provisions are void. 
 
The ‘acts committed trigger’ was substituted by the ‘loss-occurrence’ trigger in 
terms of the Belgian Wet op landesverzekeringsovereenkomst 25 juni 1992. 
Parties may, however, agree on insurance cover on a ‘claims-made’ basis. 
The latter appears to have become the preferred position in most other 
countries. The Act also prescribes and regulates the duties of the insurer 
where the cover is provided on this basis. Statutory financial limits are also 
placed on civil liability claims for purposes of insurance cover. 
 
Belgian law offers the benefit that it allows a direct statutory claim by a 
prejudiced party against the insurer of the polluter who provides liability 
insurance cover for the latter’s liabilities in accordance with the 
abovementioned Act.  This benefit is also provided in the Netherlands. 
  
Specialised environmental damage insurance cover is available in the Belgian 
market, but it only provides cover where the pollution was accidental and not 
gradual. Claims that relate to a failure by the polluter to obey governmental 
regulations and procedures, as well as war and nuclear risks, are excluded 
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from cover. Liability insurance cover for specific environmental risks is 
mandatory. 
 
Because of the complications that exist as far as insurance claims for 
environmental pollution damage are concerned, authoritative Belgian writers 
are of the opinion that alternatives to insurance could be the answer. In view 
of similar issues in South African law, this possibility has some merit. An 
alternative that has been proposed is the delivery of mandatory financial 
guarantees or deposits that have to be made into a separate environmental 
guarantee fund where specific industries are concerned. Amounts may only 
be withdrawn from the fund to restore environmental impairment and not to 
cover loss suffered by prejudiced parties. This, however, should form the 
focus of an extensive independent study and does not fall within the scope of 
this thesis. 
In the Netherlands, article 21 of the Dutch Constitution provides for a 
constitutional right to the environment. Various environmental statutes 
address environmental issues, of which the most important is the 
Environmental Management Act of 1992. Soil, water, atmospheric pollution 
and pollution by the release of hazardous substances are also addressed in 
various specialised statutes. 
 
As is the case in most other jurisdictions, a civil liability claim based on 
wrongfulness and fault is available to a prejudiced party for damage caused 
by pollution, unless a strict liability regime applies. This would, for example, be 
the case where the polluter participates in a high-risk activity or is in control of 
a dangerous substance and his conduct or failure to act causes damage. 
Factual causation, as tested in accordance with the conditio sine qua non test, 
is also limited by a second criterion of legal causation based on 
reasonableness, as is the case in most other countries except for Belgium. 
A broad spectrum of forms of damages are actionable, which include 
patrimonial and non-patrimonial losses, loss of profits, prevention costs and 
costs of due legal process. 
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In the Netherlands, insurance policies are statutorily regulated to a greater 
extent than in South Africa by the provisions of title 7.17 BW. These 
provisions severely curtail the contractual freedom of insurers and 
policyholders. The prejudiced party is also, as is the case in Belgian law, 
entitled to claim directly from the polluter’s liability insurer. The rights of the 
third party are also statutorily protected by legislation, for example, where the 
insured becomes insolvent. A statutory prescription period for claims under a 
liability policy is prescribed. Prescription of the claim against the insurer is 
delayed for six months from the date on which the prejudiced party institutes 
his liability claim against the insured. This attempts to alleviate the problems 
experienced by prejudiced parties when claiming damages from a polluter, 
which the latter can recoup from his insurer under liability insurance cover. 
The plaintiff who has to collect the required information to present as evidence 
for his claim is not prejudiced by a relatively short prescription period.  
 
Since 1998 insurers in the Netherlands collectively implemented a specialised 
and innovative form of environmental insurance called ‘Environmental 
Damage Insurance’ or EDI. The comprehensive policy provides for both 
environmental impairment insurance on a first-party basis, and environmental 
liability insurance on a first-party to the benefit of a third party basis. Its benefit 
is that it provides the insured with integrated coverage. As it precludes claims 
for environmental pollution damage under other first-party policies, potential 
polluters are forced to obtain this type of cover. The third party is in the 
position of a policyholder as far as the liability insurance is concerned. The 
trigger for a claim is the pollution occurrence. It is not necessary to provide 
proof of civil or other liability, such as statutory liability, for the damage. It 
offers the benefit to prejudiced third parties that they do not carry the burden 
of proving claims against the insured. It also offers insurers a more effective 
risk selection and risk differentiation. This insurance instrument is one of the 
first of its kind and could offer some solutions to the problems experienced by 
most countries in the field of insurance claims for environmental damage. As it 
has shown an annual market share increase, its introduction does appear to 
have been successful.  
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The EDI, however, holds the disadvantage that, due to policy limitations and 
the extensive damage in pollution cases, cover may prove to be inadequate 
which leaves the prejudiced party without the right of recourse to claim under 
other insurance policies. Due to the cooperation of the insurers within the 
industry in this regard, this form of insurance has been criticised as being in 
conflict with competition law. Care must therefore be taken that such a 
scheme does not result in illegal collusion between insurers. 
 
As an alternative for high-risk industries, recommendations have also been 
made in the Netherlands to replace the cover with mandatory financial 
guarantees. This will enable the State to meet the costs of environmental 
clean-up or remediation or to introduce mandatory insurance for specific 
industries. 
 
The USA approaches the problem of environmental damage caused by 
pollution in a unique way through the introduction of a comprehensive 
statutory governmental regulation of liability for clean-up costs. This was 
implemented by the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation 
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) that introduced the Superfund program. 
The fund finances the clean-up of pollution, and then claims the amounts from 
the polluter. The fund can also instruct a polluter to clean up at his own 
expense. Environmental reparation is thereby guaranteed, provided of course 
that the fund remains solvent. The risk of not being able to recoup the costs 
and expenses of a particular clean-up rests with the fund. Although this 
seems to offer a very attractive solution, one should, in view of the solvency 
issues of the South African Road Accidents Fund that has similar goals of 
ensuring compensation in mind, question whether this would provide a 
solution in the South African context. 
 
As CERCLA focuses on the restoration and clean-up of the environment, it 
does not cover claims for damage to property and bodily injuries or for liability 
claims by third parties to compensate them for these losses. Natural resource 
damage or ‘NRD’ that goes beyond a claim for clean-up to the original 
 436
position is also not compensated by the fund. This avoids the complications of 
proving the extent and value of NRD’s.  
 
In terms of CERCLA, liability attaches to potentially responsible parties for the 
release of hazardous pollutants from specified sites into the public 
environment. Claims may not be brought against the fund for damage caused 
to privately owned ‘natural resources’. Liability is incurred merely by the 
release into the environment, and does not require proof of the exact harm or 
damage caused. Liability is for restoration and clean-up only, and is a strict 
retroactive joint and several liability. A responsible party can avoid liability only 
where he can prove that the cause of the pollution was divisible, and where 
he can show a reasonable basis for the determination of his contribution to 
the damage. Defences include only that the damage was caused by a force 
majeure occurrence, by an act of war or by the conduct of unrelated third 
parties who are not potential responsible parties.  
There is no time bar in respect of the polluting incident and the proceedings 
brought under CERCLA against the fund for the restoration of the polluted 
environment. There is, however, a time bar period of three years between the 
emergency clean-up by the fund and the fund’s right to claim the clean-up 
costs from the polluter. 
 
It remains possible to procure insurance to provide cover for one’s liabilities 
under the scheme. The same issues, as discussed in chapter 6 above, then 
occur in that most insurance policies contain clauses that exclude pollution-
related claims from cover or that limit the amounts of claims. The fund does 
not provide a solution in this regard, yet does avoid the issues relating to a 
claim for natural resource damage as discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
Various other statutes create and regulate statutory liabilities, such as the 
Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Oil Pollution Act and the Toxic 
Substances Control Act.   
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CERCLA also limits civil claims against polluters, by prescribing maximum 
amounts and a time bar period of three years. The compensation awarded 
does not have to be spent on the restoration of the environmental damage.   
 
Civil liability claims are based on fault-based liability for negligence and 
trespass, being the most common basis for a liability claim. Strict liability in 
terms of the rule in Rylands v Fletcher which was adopted from the UK law, 
nuisance, participation in abnormally dangerous activities and statutory strict 
liability claims serve as alternative causes of action. The Restatement of Torts 
also provides that where more than one tortfeasor causes harm, the 
tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the damage. In an attempt to 
avoid problems in the implementation of this ‘pollution share liability’, the USA 
developed an innovative market-share liability for environmental damage that 
was initially applied in product liability cases. It is based purely on a form of 
statistical causation. Defendants carry the burden of proving the exact degree 
of causation and apportionment of damages in order to avoid liability. This 
approach can be investigated for implementation in specific industries in other 
countries as well. 
 
Claims for stigma damages caused to a property because of its proximity to 
pollution, or due to its previous polluted state have been allowed in the USA. 
From relevant case law it has become clear that the extent of the award for a 
depreciation in the value of the property remains within the court’s discretion, 
depending on the facts and circumstances in each situation. 
 
The USA legal system has seen the institution of many successful class 
actions, notably for claims brought due to asbestosis. The success of class 
actions can offer guidance for class actions that are to be instituted in other 
countries that do not possess legal precedent for these actions. 
 
The body of case law in the USA on the interpretation of exclusion clauses in 
insurance contracts is extensive. The effect of these clauses internationally, 
has been addressed in the previous chapter. As no South African case law or 
statutory regulation exists, for example, for SBS claims, it is proposed that 
 438
case law in the USA could serve as authoritative where such a case is 
brought before a South African court. 
 
Due to the increase in transboundary pollution, and the different positions on 
civil liability and insurance law under state law, it is important to include a 
choice of law clause in insurance policies, in order to prevent parties from 
‘forum shopping’. This applies not only to the USA, but also to most other 
countries that are exposed to the possibility of transboundary pollution, of 
which South Africa is definitely one. 
 
It is clear that most international jurisdictions also do not address the 
complications of claims for damages, as the focus is currently more on 
protection, on creating deterrents and on measures for environmental 
restitution, and not on structured civil compensation mechanisms. There is an 
urgent need for an increase in statutory civil liability and compensation 
mechanisms to cover claims for environmental damage, or for the introduction 
of alternatives to insurance. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
8.1 GENERAL  
 
The risks that arise as a result of environmental pollution damage create 
universal problems when insurance cover is sought. Environmental damage 
insurance can be procured under a first-party insurance policy, for example, 
property insurance, or under a third-party insurance or liability insurance 
policy. For the latter, the polluter must incur statutory or civil liability towards 
the party prejudiced by the pollution damage. The determination of liability, 
especially regarding the polluter’s delictual or civil liability remains fraught with 
complications. 
 
Due to the uncertainty and potential magnitude of pollution-related claims, 
insurers have attempted to avoid or limit these risks by including special 
pollution exclusion and limitation clauses in policies. The limitations or 
exclusions from cover place the insured in a vulnerable position. Various other 
issues such as the coverage of gradual pollution, the effect of the various 
triggers of coverage and the potential long-tail liability of insurer, the lack of 
information and the unpredictability of the risk cause further complications for 
both the insured and the insurer. 
  
Currently, the focus in South Africa and internationally appears to be more on 
protection, creating deterrents and providing measures for environmental 
restitution, rather than on structured civil compensation mechanisms for 
damage caused to the environment by pollution. There is an urgent need for 
the expansion and development of statutory civil liability and compensation 
mechanisms to cover environmental damage suffered. The following 
conclusions can be drawn from this study and the corresponding 
recommendations made. 
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8.2 THE RIGHT TO THE ENVIRONMENT 
 
The exact scope of what ‘environmental damage’ entails clearly depends on 
the individual facts and circumstances and the statutes that apply in each 
instance. The definitions provided in applicable specialised legislation will 
enjoy precedence. Where there are none, the definitions provided in NEMA 
and ECTA will serve as default definitions if applicable. Where there is no 
statutory definition in a specific instance, one can but hope that the judiciary, 
when interpreting the terms ‘environment’, ‘damage’, ‘pollution’ and related 
concepts, will provide the broadest possible interpretation to give force and 
effect to section 24 of the Constitution. Justification for this approach can be 
found in the fact that the environment should be seen as public goods that 
deserves protection and restitution for the sake of present and future 
generations.  
 
The use of the term ‘well-being’ in section 24 of the Constitution militates 
against the traditional view that aesthetic nuisance is not actionable, and in 
view of the tremendous value that the natural environment holds for our 
country, claims for damage that relate to aesthetic elements should be 
recognised and encouraged. 
 
 
8.3 STATUTORY LIABILITY 
 
The Constitution1 has established a solid foundation for an effective liability 
regime where the environment is damaged by pollution. The constitutional 
right to the environment requires citizens to protect the environment, and a 
failure to comply with this statutory duty causes an actionable omission for 
purposes of a civil liability claim. Section 24 furthermore informs the open-
ended criterion of public policy that is required for the determination of 
wrongfulness, and also the criterion of legal causation that serves to limit 
potentially endless factual causation. 
                                            
1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
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Where there is a conflict between the fundamental right to the environment 
and other fundamental rights, or where there is a limitation of the right to the 
environment, the issue must be dealt with in accordance with section 36 of the 
Constitution. 
 
In terms of section 38 ‘appropriate relief’ may be granted for the infringement 
of a constitutional right. Remedies include a declaration of rights that can 
assist in the interpretation of a statutory provision or a contract, and 
preventative or mandatory injunctive relief to prevent environmental damage, 
or to ensure compliance with measures designed to protect and restore the 
environment. A court may also award constitutional damages for the 
infringement of the right to the environment. The purpose of an award should 
not be to address or to substitute civil damages, but should be limited to the 
clean-up and remediation costs expended in the restoration of the polluted 
environment. 
 
Section 38 of the Constitution and section 32 of NEMA introduce the 
possibility of class actions for claims relating to environmental interests. It is 
submitted that this will prove to be invaluable where a polluter causes damage 
to the environment that causes harm or loss to a specific group or to a large 
number of members of a community. 
 
Access to detailed information is crucial in order to succeed with legal 
proceedings in environmental matters. The right of access to information in 
terms of section 32 of the Constitution and the provisions of the Promotion of 
Access to Information Act2 provide claimants with the necessary rights and 
procedures to ensure access to information, provided that the disclosure is in 
the public interest. As ‘imminent and serious environmental risk’ is a statutory 
factor that informs the public interest, disclosure of information is justified 
where claims relating to environmental damage are concerned. Information 
has become more readily available since the implementation of environmental 
                                            
2 Act 2 of 2000. 
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legislation that requires mandatory environmental impact assessments for 
designated activities.   
 
South African legislative, judicial and administrative processes should at all 
times be governed by the distinctive principles of international environmental 
law, specifically the polluter-pays principle, the preventative principle, the 
principle of strict liability, the principle of sustainable development and the 
principle of restitutio in integrum. 
 
It is necessary to expand general statutory duties to clean up, with specific 
focus on reinstatement and the restoration of the environment. Liability should 
be for the actual costs and expenses incurred, in order to bypass the 
requirement of proving the extent of ‘damages’. Claims for natural resource 
damages fare especially badly in civil liability regimes due to the difficulties in 
proving the exact quantum of damages. Statutory recognition that clean-up 
costs and a reduction in the value of property that include stigma damages 
and reduced aesthetic value of the property, reflect ‘natural resource damage’ 
could provide a solution and will be in accordance with the international 
environmental polluter-pays principle, as well as the principle of restitutio in 
integrum. 
 
As our environmental allocation law is developing into environmental 
protection law, it demands an increase in intensive administrative governance, 
and comprehensive control laws for specific activities and industries such as 
the control of air pollution.3 The approach is in accordance with the 
preventative principle. Stricter statutory safety regulations could also assist 
judges in the determination of wrongfulness and fault in environmental liability 
cases. Although the South African legislature is currently addressing these 
issues, care must be taken against the effects of over-deterrence as it is 
costly and has the potential of stifling economic growth. 
 
                                            
3 See, for example, the recent South African National Environmental Management: Air Quality 
Act 39 of 2004. 
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Governmental regulation should enjoy priority and prevent the lack of legal 
certainty where new risks arise from the rapid development in technology 
which has the potential to cause pollution and environmental damage are 
concerned. 
 
In order to ensure remediation of the environment and to lighten the burden of 
individuals who are prejudiced by environmental damage, the statutory 
introduction of a comprehensive environmental remediation fund or smaller 
funds within specific industries can be recommended. The CERCLA fund in 
the USA, as discussed in chapter 7 and addressed below, could serve as an 
example. These funds, to be governed by the State, should remedy 
environmental damage, or ensure the polluter’s compliance with his statutory 
obligations to do so. As the State should not be expected to cover remediation 
costs, it should have a statutory right of recourse to recoup the costs and 
expenses from the responsible polluter, or to expropriate his land as provided 
for in NEMA and ECTA.4 It would also be possible to finance the funds from 
the proceeds of mandatory first-party insurance to the benefit of a third party. 
 
Due to the wide definition of the ‘environment’ in NEMA, anyone who bases 
his case on any statutory environmental provision has locus standi in 
accordance with section 32(1) of the Act to present his case. 
 
The increase of comprehensive statutory protection measures cannot, 
however, address all the problems relating to claims for environmental 
damages and the insurability of the related risks.  
 
 
8.4 CIVIL LIABILITY 
 
Although the law of delict offers elastic and adaptable principles that can be 
applied to novel situations and new risks, it is not always the most effective 
compensation mechanism. Various delictual requirements such as 
                                            
4 NEMA s 28(6); ECTA s 31A. 
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wrongfulness, causation and the extent of damages prove to be challenging in 
the context of environmental damage claims.  
 
In order to overcome these restrictions, the statutory regulation of specific 
aspects of delictual liability for environmental damage should be introduced. 
The civil law should also be developed in accordance with international 
environmental principles. The polluter-pays principle requires the 
development of the general principles of civil liability law to ensure that the 
polluter is held liable for the damage he causes. The precautionary principle 
and the principle of preventative action should inform the criterion of 
wrongfulness for omissions, as does the constitutional right to the 
environment as discussed above. The principle of strict liability provides 
justification for the introduction of a strict liability regime for environmental 
damage. In the last instance, the principle of restitutio in integrum can provide 
guidance where the extent of actionable damages is in issue. 
 
Liability can only ensue where conduct or the failure to act is wrongful. 
Section 24 of the Constitution, as referred to above, creates a general legal 
duty to act to protect and not to damage the environment. Failure to do so will 
be deemed to be wrongful. Actionable omissions in the specific context of 
liability for environmental damage include an omissio per commissionem, 
failure to control a dangerous object or substance, and the failure to act in 
accordance with an environmental statute. 
 
In case of nuisance, which has been called the ‘classic environmental tort’, 
the doctrine of the abuse of rights in South African law provides guidelines for 
the determination of wrongfulness. Grounds of justification for wrongful 
conduct include the impossibility of a polluter to prevent the pollution, statutory 
authority to act, a state of necessity and self-defence. 
  
As there is an international tendency to move towards strict liability for 
environmental damage, an important step would be to introduce a strict 
liability regime that is similar to the regime for product liability claims that will 
be introduced in South Africa in terms of the proposed consumer protection 
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legislation. Two theories serve as justification for the introduction of strict 
liability. The first justification is in accordance with the ‘risk or danger theory’ 
that is based on a person’s participation in a dangerous or risky activity. The 
mere fact that a person’s activities have increased pollution potential justifies 
liability in the absence of fault. The second justification is based on the 
interest or profit theory, namely that a person who causes harm or loss while 
he acts in his own interest or for a profit, should carry the burden of all the 
advantages as well as disadvantages of his economic activities. It is 
submitted that where a person directly exploits the environment for the 
primary purpose of operating a profitable commercial venture, but irrespective 
of whether he succeeds in enjoying an eventual profitable gain, he should 
accept the ensuing responsibility that the environment could be harmed. 
 
All persons, therefore, who are in control of, responsible for, or who benefit 
from dangerous or hazardous substances or the premises where these 
substances are present, incur liability unless they can prove specific 
defences. Defences include force majeure, contributory negligence, statutory 
authority and inherent vice. It is recommended that a statutory limit be placed 
on the amount for which the polluter can incur strict liability.  
 
Our courts have already found in principle that the extension of the common- 
law principles as applied in terms of the doctrine of the abuse of rights in 
cases of nuisance, regarding claims based on the actio de pauperie, and 
statutory strict liability as introduced by the Genetically Modified Organisms 
Act5 and the Consumer Protection Bill6, for example, are of great value in view 
of developments within modern society. 
 
The factual test for causation is tempered by the open-ended criterion of legal 
causation, which in this case, is also informed by the constitutional right to the 
environment.  
 
                                            
5 Act 15 of 1997. 
6 Consumer Protection Bill 3 [B 19B – 2008]. 
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The apportionment of damages where there is contributory fault will depend 
on the application of the Apportionment of Damages Act7 and the court’s 
discretion based on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where there is 
multiple or cumulative causation, the court should as a general rule, attempt 
to determine the actual pollution-share liability when assessing damages. 
 
As it is often difficult if not impossible to do, or where the identity of the actual 
polluter is unknown, the introduction of a statutory joint and several liability 
regime for all persons who could potentially be responsible for a polluting act 
or contribute to the pollution, a solution in conformity with the proposed 
product liability regime in the Consumer Protection Bill, is a viable option. 
Persons held jointly and severally liable have a right of recovery against each 
other for the amount in which their contribution exceeded their share in the 
pollution, provided they can prove their respective shares. Another possibility 
would be to apply a market-share allocation, or finally a proportional allocation 
as a last resort. Defences against this type of allocation include force majeure, 
contributory negligence, inherent vice and statutory authority.  
 
The assessment and quantification of damage caused by pollution also prove 
to be problematic. Actionable damages should include various forms of 
‘property damage’, namely a decrease in the property value, clean-up and 
remediation costs, compensation for loss of use and enjoyment of the 
property that includes a claim for damage to the aesthetics of the property, 
and stigma damages. 
 
Because the Constitution creates a legal duty to act to prevent damage to the 
environment, which is required to claim for pure economic loss, it is possible 
to claim for these losses. Because the extent of damage caused by pollution 
often manifests only in future, it should be possible to claim for prospective 
losses, provided that the nature and extent of loss is determined at the time of 
claim. As the assessment of prospective damage will have to depend on a 
speculative process and because very little jurisprudence exists in this regard, 
                                            
7 Act 34 of 1956. 
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the courts will have to follow a pragmatic approach and base the award on a 
reasonable estimate. 
 
Express statutory regulation of the types of damage that are actionable where 
environmental damage is concerned could provide plaintiffs with some relief. 
The proposed Consumer Protection Bill that allows for claims for ‘economic 
loss’ serves as an example. 
 
Prescription starts from the time when the loss or damage manifests itself and 
the identity of the polluter is known. As three years is a relatively short period 
to gather information for a claim relating to environmental damage, a solution 
could be to extend the prescription period for specific claims for longer 
statutory periods. This is already the case in terms of prescription of liability 
claims within the nuclear industry. 
 
Although most claims for environmental damage will be based on delictual 
liability, a claim could also be based on breach of contract or on negotiorum 
gestio. Insurance cover is provided for contractual liability only where the 
insurer and the insured reach an express agreement to that effect. 
 
Although a delictual claim is seen as an effective form of law enforcement, it 
can be criticised for being a time-consuming and expensive process. What is 
clear, however, is that liability law should be maintained and optimized to 
accommodate new risks, as it is currently the most suitable vehicle for a civil 
damages claim. Alternative compensation mechanisms should not replace or 
substitute delictual liability, but should be developed and extended in 
synchronisation with other enforcement measures to present an efficient 
compensation regime. The legislature and the judiciary will hopefully develop 
these aspects to their fullest potential as they are confronted by new 
challenges in this regard. 
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8.5 INSURANCE MECHANISMS 
 
Insurance cover for pollution damage can be provided as first-party insurance, 
in terms of a general policy such as a property or ‘all risk’ policy, or under a 
specific environmental insurance policy. The disadvantage is that the insured 
pays for indemnification, which is not in accordance with the polluter-pays 
principle. 
 
Cover can be provided for the insured’s liabilities towards third parties who 
are prejudiced by pollution damage where there is third-party insurance cover. 
A ‘legal liability’ that triggers insurance cover includes a statutory liability, civil 
liability, liability based on breach of contract and in terms of negotiorum 
gestio. 
 
A third possibility is for cover in terms of first-party insurance to the benefit of 
a third party. This type of cover can be provided by the inclusion of extension 
clauses in first-party insurance policies, or by a specific first-party policy to the 
benefit of a third party. The EDI insurance in the Netherlands, and the EIL 
insurance in the USA serve as examples. Where this type of cover is provided 
it is important for the policy document to reflect the exact nature of the 
relationship between the insurer, the insured and the third party. Because of 
the current uncertainties regarding the construction of the stipulatio alteri, the 
time when the third party obtains his rights and the extent of the enforceability 
of these rights against the insurer and the insured, as well as the nature of the 
interests of the insured, must be stipulated clearly in the insurance contract. 
 
It is proposed that operators within specific designated industries must obtain 
industry-specific minimum mandatory insurance cover, provided that the 
insurance market has the capacity and is willing to provide this type of cover. 
It appears as if the advantages of mandatory insurance exceed the 
disadvantages of its implementation. In order to ensure that payment reaches 
the prejudiced party, the insurance should ideally be structured as first-party 
insurance to the benefit of a third party, where the third-party is either an 
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environmental clean-up fund or any other person who is prejudiced by the 
environmental damage.  
 
Another possibility would be to extend the right of a prejudiced party to claim 
directly from the insurer of the polluter, as is the position in the Netherlands 
and Belgium. The right of a third party to claim directly from the liability insurer 
of an insolvent insured in accordance with the Insolvency Act8 could serve as 
an example for such a statutory extension in South Africa. 
 
Due to the difficulties in obtaining sufficient information for a claim and in view 
of the fact that these periods are generally limited contractually, it might be 
prudent to investigate the possibility of extending the minimum prescription 
period for insurance claims that relate to environmental damage claims. This 
issue is addressed below. 
 
 
8.6 UNIVERSAL ISSUES CONCERNING ENVIRONMENTAL 
 INSURANCE POLICIES 
 
Various theories exist that address the problematic issue concerning the 
moment when insurance coverage is triggered. Where a policy is based on an 
‘act committed’ or ‘occurrence based’ trigger, the insurance policy in force at 
the time of the polluting occurrence provides cover. This causes long-tail 
liability for the insurer who can incur liability even after his insurance policy 
with the insured has lapsed. The modern tendency is to move away from this 
type of trigger. A policy can be based on a ‘loss-occurrence’ or ‘manifestation’ 
trigger. Cover is triggered irrespective of when the polluting occurrence 
occurred. This can also cause a long-tail liability for the insurer. 
 
The third type of trigger is the ‘claims-made’ trigger, which is currently seen to 
be the most acceptable trigger for coverage. The policy in force at the time of 
the insurance claim is the policy that must provide cover. In order to avoid 
                                            
8 Act 24 of 1936. 
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infinite retroactive liability, most countries have standardised the trigger for 
environmental policies to a ‘claims-made’ trigger that is linked to fixed 
retroactive dates. 
 
Where a policy is issued on a ‘claims-made and reported’ basis, the required 
notice of the claim by the insured can be interpreted in two ways. The 
construction is that the duty to notify prior to the institution of the claim is a 
suspensive duty that suspends the insurer’s duties until proper notice is given. 
The second is that it is a contractual duty and that the insurer’s obligations are 
not triggered unless the insured gives proper notice. The notice period is 
usually prescribed and must reflect a specific realistic time limit. It is submitted 
that policy wording that states that notice must be given ‘as soon as possible’, 
‘within a reasonable time’ or ‘immediately’ should be prohibited. This issue of 
statutory regulation of policy wording is addressed below. 
 
Many a claim has failed because an ambiguity or uncertainty regarding the 
wording of insurance policy documents. Because it is impossible to prevent 
the inclusion of exclusion and limitation clauses in insurance policies, stricter 
regulation within the insurance industry of prescribed policy wording and 
especially the prohibition of using misleading terminology such as ‘all risk’ and 
‘comprehensive’ insurance, is required. This will avoid costly disputes on 
issues of interpretation, and will also provide increased consumer protection 
and legal certainty within an industry that is already heavily regulated. Where 
there is an increase in detailed specific statutory definitions as recommended 
above, the standardisation of the wording of insurance policies will only be 
viable if the prescribed wording runs parallel to the wording prescribed by 
statute. Terms such as ‘sudden and accidental’, ‘gradual’, ‘incident’ and 
‘occurrence’, should be described by statute, where possible. Pro forma policy 
wording issued by the insurance industry could also provide guidance to 
prevent disputes that relate to matters concerning interpretation.  
 
Exclusion and limitation clauses may not be contrary to public policy, which is 
informed by the constitutional right to the environment. A court may hold that 
clauses that infringe upon this right to such an extent that they do not serve 
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the public interest are invalid. Any time bar clause that denies a plaintiff his 
right of access to the courts in accordance with section 34 of the Constitution 
can be contrary to be public policy and invalid. Care must be taken where 
contractual exclusions and limitations are concerned, to maintain a balance 
between the interests of the insurer and his insurance business, and the 
interests of the insured. 
  
The scope, assessment and quantification of ‘damages’ and ‘compensation’ in 
an environmental context proves challenging. Because it can never be an 
exact science, the award will be based on the court’s reasonable guess or 
estimate based on the facts and circumstances of each specific situation. The 
most reliable measure for ‘property loss’ would be the depreciation in the 
market value of the property. Clean-up and restoration costs serve as the best 
measure for the assessment of natural resource damage. Although statutory 
intervention will allow for claims for pure economic loss, stigma damages, lost 
profits, prospective and sentimental losses, the exact quantification remains 
difficult and will depend on the court’s discretion in each instance. 
 
The goal should remain the effective indemnification of the loss caused by the 
pollution, but not at the cost of a profitable and viable insurance market. 
 
 
8.7 THE POSITION IN OTHER COUNTRIES 
 
The difficulty of holding polluters liable in terms of civil liability regimes is an 
international phenomenon. The EU Environmental Liability Directive that 
came into force in 2007 introduces a strict liability regime for natural resource 
damage caused by pollution. The regime applies only to persons involved in 
certain designated activities. It does not address liability for private property 
damage, personal injury or claims for pure economic loss or prospective loss. 
It also has no retroactive effect and provides no strict liability for past sins. 
 
Most countries have over the past two decades introduced or increased the 
statutory liability for damage caused to the environment. Many statutes are of 
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a preventative nature and provide for criminal sanctions and enforcement 
measures. Very few provide for statutory civil damage claims. There has been 
a sharp increase in legislation that requires potential polluters to clean up, or 
that enable the government or other authorities to do so and to recoup the 
costs and expenses from the polluter. This is the position in the USA as 
implemented in terms of CERCLA by the introduction of the Superfund. 
 
The civil liability systems in the UK, the Netherlands and in Belgium are 
similar to the South African system. Most struggle with the issues regarding 
wrongfulness, fault, causation and actionable damages referred to above. 
Although most forms of liability are fault-based, it is clear that there is an 
increase in the introduction of objective strict liability regimes. Nuisance 
appears to be the most common environmental tort. In situations of multiple or 
cumulative causation, liability is mostly allocated in accordance with a joint 
and several liability regime. In some countries the preferred allocation is in 
accordance with a pollution-share liability, market-share liability and even a 
simple proportionate allocation. 
 
The Netherlands and Belgium allow the prejudiced party to claim directly from 
the polluter’s liability insurer. Mandatory insurance is required to provide cover 
for environmental risks in specified industries in most countries. In some 
cases this requires first-party insurance to the benefit of a third party. The EDI 
in the Netherlands is a comprehensive policy that provides for integrated first-
party and third-party insurance cover. The EIL in the USA provides cover for 
third-party bodily injury and property damage, clean-up costs and defence 
costs. These types of cover may offer a potential solution to the problems 
experienced in our country where there is a lack of insurance cover to provide 
compensation for damage caused by polluting incidents. The ERI in the USA 
is a special peril insurance that was developed in response to CERCLA for 
the remediation of the environment. 
 
Most countries regulate their insurance industries by statute, and in some 
cases even policy provisions are prescribed by statute. Issues relating to the 
wording, scope and effect of pollution exclusion clauses appear to be 
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universal, and were dealt with above. The ‘act committed’ and ‘loss 
occurrence’ triggers are systematically being replaced with the more 
advantageous ‘claims-made’ trigger. 
 
   
8.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
As a developing society we are exploiting nature which leads to enormous 
utilization and waste of non-renewable energy sources, in the artificialisation 
of nature, and lastly in the deposit of toxic and mostly non-degradable 
pollutants in nature. The focus of current statutory development is on 
protection, on creating deterrents and on environmental restitution measures, 
rather than on the structure of civil compensation mechanisms. Strict statutory 
liability and mandatory clean-up and restoration, and the creative and pro-
active use of civil liability and compliance mechanisms are required. Care 
must however be taken not to over-regulate, as it is expensive to manage and 
difficult and expensive to reinforce.  
 
As environmental damage claims are so difficult to insure, specific 
environmental insurance policies are being developed to provide the 
necessary cover. These policies are, however, usually of a specialised nature, 
not readily available and expensive. As most potential polluters are unaware 
of the risks that their activities pose to the environment, and of the extent and 
magnitude of their potential liability and the lack of insurance cover that they 
enjoy under traditional policies, the issues addressed in this study will 
continue to affect many polluter and persons prejudiced by environmental 
damage in future. 
 
Damage to our environment is being done at a great scale and somewhere in 
future someone will have to pay. The question remains in each case whether 
it will be the polluter, the prejudiced party or their respective insurers, or the 
community at large and future generations who will eventually carry the costs. 
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Waste Management Bill 1832 of 2007 
 
 
2.3  Government Gazettes 
 
Government Gazette No 29487 (12 January 2007) Waste Management Bill as 
enacted in GN 1832/2007 
 
Government Gazette No 26942 (29 October 2004) Regulations to the Mineral 
and Petroleum Resources Development Act enacted in RGN 527/26275/3 (23 
April 2004) 
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Government Gazette No 24839 (9 May 2003) Schedule on Plastic Carrier 
Bags and Plastic Flat Bags as enacted in GN R625 
 
Government Gazette No 15987 (30 September 1994) The Policy in terms of 
ECA on Hazardous Waste Management as enacted in GN 1064 
 
Government Gazette No 15428 (21 January 1994) General Policy in 
accordance with ECTA as enacted in GN 51 
 
Government Gazette No 13717 (10 January 1992) Regulations issued in 
terms of section 25 of ECA regarding Noise Control as enacted in GN R154  
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The (Australian) Commonwealth Environment Protection (Impact of 
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Afvalstoffendecreet van 22 juli 2004 
 
Belgian Burgerlijk Wetboek 
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Policy by Interuniversity Commission published by the Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities http://www.europa.eu.int) 
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Wet van 12 april 1965 op vervoer van gasachtige stoffen 
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2.4.3 EU Directives and Resolutions 
 
Environmental Liability Directive 2004/35 CE [2004] O.J. L143/56 
 
European Community Council Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts 1993 
 
European Council Regulations for EU members 44/2001 OJL 12 
 
European Council Resolution on the Declaration on the Environment1990  
Bulletin of the European Communities par 1.36. 
 
White Paper on Environmental Liability COM(2000) 66 Final, Brussels 9 
February 2000 
 
 
2.4.4 Finland 
 
Finnish Environmental Damage and Compensation Act 1994 
 
 
2.4.5 Germany 
 
German Civil Code  
 
German Environmental Liability Act 1990 
 
 
2.4.6 New Zealand 
 
Contractual Remedies Act 1979 of New Zealand 
 
 
2.4.7 Norway 
 
Norwegian Pollution Control Act  1981 
 
 
2.4.8 The Netherlands 
 
Besluit financiele zekerheid milieubeheer van 8 Februari 2003 
 
Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden van 24 augustus 1815 
 
Mededingingswet van 1 januari 1998 
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Stortbesluit bodembescherming van 1993 
 
Wet bodembescherming van 1986 
 
Wet inzake de luchtverontreiniging van 1976 
 
Wet milieubeheer van 1992 
 
Wet milieugevaarlijke stoffen van 1997 
 
 
2.4.9 United Kingdom 
 
Arbitration Act 1996 
 
Civil Evidence Act 1968 
 
Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 
 
Clean Air Act 1968 
 
Employer’s Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 
 
Environmental Protection Act 1990 
 
Environment Act 1995 
 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
 
Human Rights Act 1998 
 
Merchant Shipping Act 1995 
 
Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971 
 
Occupiers Liability Act (for visitors) 1957 
 
Occupiers Liability Act 1984 (for non-visitors) 
 
Rivers Pollution Prevention Act 1876. 
 
Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930 
 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 
 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 
 
Water Act 1981 
 
Water Act 1989 
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Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 
 
 
2.4.10 United States of America 
 
Clean Air Act 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq 
 
Clean Water Act 33 U.S.C §§ 1251 et seq 
 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 
1980 42 U.S.C §§ 9601 et seq 
 
Federal Environmental Regulations  
 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
 
Fisherman’s Contingency Fund 43 U.S.C §§1841 et seq 
 
Governor’s Memorandum on Approval of Chs 765, 766, NY Laws (June 25 
1971) 
 
McCarran-Ferguson Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011 et seq 
 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1970 42 U.S.C §§ 4321 et seq  
 
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 33 U.S.C §§ 2701 et seq 
 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1976 43 U.S.C §§ 1311 et seq 
 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 42 U.S.C §§ 6901 et seq 
 
Restatement (Second) of the Law of Conflict of Laws of 1971 
 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts of 1981 
 
Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws of 1943 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts of 1976 
 
Rivers and Harbours Act of 1899 
 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorisation Act of 1986  
 
Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq 
 
Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977 
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ANNEXURE A 
 
Multilateral International Environmental Agreements which South Africa 
has agreed, ratified or acceded to1 
 
 
1. Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora2 
2. Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA3 
3. Antarctic Treaty4 
4. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
 Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal5 
5. Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild 
 Animals (CMS)6 
6. Convention for the Conservation of Arctic Seals7 
7. Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions 
 at Sea8 
8. Convention on Biological Diversity9 
9. Convention on Nuclear Safety (NS)10 
                                               
1 See chap 3 for a comprehensive discussion on statutory liabilities, including liability in 
accordance with international legal principles;  http://www.environment.gov.za/enviro-
info/env/intro.htm (last accessed on 3 March 2008). 
2 Signed in 1964;http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreed_Measures_for_the_Conservation_of_ 
Antarctic_Fauna_and_Flora (last accessed on 2 February 2009). 
3 Signed as a party with reservation on 13 September 2002; http://www.iaea.org/  
Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2007/infcirc703.pdf (last accessed on 2 February 2009). 
4 Signed on 1 December 1959 and ratified on 21 June 1960; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Antarctic_Treaty_System. 
5 Approved on 27 March 1994 and acceded on 5 April 1994. Even though a draft policy for 
Hazardous Waste Management has been published in GN 1064 Government Gazette No 
15987 dated 30 September 1994, and Proposed Regulations drafted (undated), no final 
regulations have been made in line with the model regulations proposed by the Basel 
Convention; see also Kotzé L “Die vervoer van gevaarlike en giftige afval per skip: Suid-Afrika 
en eise vir suiwer ekonomiese verlies” 2002 Word and action 18; http://www.basel.int/text 
/con-e-rev.pdf (last accessed on 2 February 2009). 
6 Acceded in December 1991; http://www.cms.int/pdf/convtxt/cms_convtxt_english.pdf (last 
accessed on 2 February 2009). 
7 Signed 9 June 1972 and ratified 15 August 1972; http://untreaty.un.org/English/UNEP/ 
antarticseals_english.pdf (last accessed on 2 February 2009). 
8 Signed 30 December 1976 and acceded 15 July 1977; http://www.imo.org/Conventions/ 
contents.asp?doc_id=649&topic_id=257 (last accessed on 2 February 2009). 
9 Signed in June 1993 and ratified on 2 November 1995; http://www.cbd.int/ (last accessed on 
2 February 2009). 
10 Ratified on 24 December 1996; http://www-ns.iaea.org/conventions/nuclear-safety.htm (last 
accessed on 2 February 2009). 
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10. Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage 
 (SUPP)11 
11. Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
 (CCAMLR)12 
12. Convention on the Physical Protection for Nuclear Material (CPPNM)13  
13. Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution14 
14. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
 (MARPOL)15 
15. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (IWC)16 
16. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 
 (CLC Convention)17 
17. International Convention on Load Lines18 
18. International Convention on Salvage 198919 
19. Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the 
 Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (RADW)20 
20. Kyoto Protocol to the New York Convention of 1992 on Climate 
 Change21 
21. Montreal Protocol for the Protection of the Ozone Layer22 
                                               
11 Currently a convention under negotiation; http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/ 
Infcircs/1998/infcirc567.shtml (last accessed on 2 February 2009). 
12 Ratified in 1982 and acceded in September 1980; http://sedac.ciesin.org/entri/texts/ 
antarctic.marine.resources.1980.html (last accessed on 2 February 2009). 
13 Party with reservation signed on 18 May 1981; http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/cppnm.pdf 
(last accessed on 2 February 2009). 
14 Signed 13 November 1979; http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/cppnm.pdf (last accessed on 
2 February 2009). 
15 Of 1973 as amended in 1978; http://www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?doc_id=678& 
topic_id=258 (last accessed on 2 February 2009). 
16 Ratified in 1946; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Convention_for_the_Regulation 
_of_Whaling (last accessed on 2 February 2009). 
17 Adopted in 1969 amended in 2003; http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/ 
1968/23.html (last accessed on 3 February 2009). 
18 Signed 14 December 1966 and acceded 21 July 1968; 
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=259&doc_id=687 (last accessed on 
3 February 2009). 
19 Agreed to in terms of the Wreck and Salvage Act 94 of 1996; http://www.imo.org/ 
Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=259&doc_id=687 (last accessed on 3 February 2009). 
20 Acceded to on 15 November 2006, and entered into force on 13 February 2007; 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/jointconv.html (last accessed on 3 
February 2009). 
21 DEC 2002/358 [2002] O.J. L130/1; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyoto_Protocol (last 
accessed on 3 February 2009). 
22 Ratified and acceded to on 15 January 1990; http://www.moe.gov.lb/Corporate/The 
+ministry/International+Agreements/ (last accessed on 3 February 2009). 
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22. Paris Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land 
 Based Sources.23 
23. Persistent Organic Pollutants Convention (POP’s)24 
24. Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, 
 especially Waterfowl Habitat25 
25. The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons 
 and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean 
 Floor and the Subsoil thereof26 
26. United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries 
 Experiencing Droughts and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa27 
27. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 
 1982 (UNCLOS)28 
28. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
 (UNFCCC)29 
29. Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage30 
30. World Heritage Convention concerning the Protection of the World 
 Cultural and Natural Heritage.31 
                                               
23 Dec 75/437[1975] O.J. L194/5; http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/related-
international-agreements/toxic-chemicals-and-the-environment/marine-pollution-from-land-
based-sources/ (last accessed on 3 February 2009). 
24 Currently a convention under negotiation; http://www.chem.unep.ch/pops/ (last accessed 
on 3 February 2009). 
25 Signed and ratified on 12 March 1975; http://ekh.unep.org/?q=node/678 (last accessed on 
3 February 2009). 
26 Ratified 14 November 1973; http://www.un-documents.net/seabed.htm (last accessed on 3 
February 2009). 
27 Signed on 9 January 1995 and ratified on 30 September 1997; http://www.unccd.int/ 
convention/text/convention.php?annexNo=0 (last accessed on 3 February 2009). 
28 Signed in 1994 and ratified on 20 August 1997; http://www.unccd.int/convention 
/text/convention.php?annexNo=0 (last accessed on 3 February 2009). 
29 Signed on 27 August 1997, and ratified on 29 August 1997; http://unfccc.int/2860.php (last 
accessed on 3 February 2009). 
30 Currently a convention under negotiation; http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf67.html (last 
accessed on 3 February 2009). 
31 Ratified on 10 July 1997; http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php- (last accessed on 3 February 
2009). 
